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The conclusions of both Parts One and T%io complement and reinforce each 
other. After outlining the ideals of On, I set out in Part One to find and 
scrutinize the philosophical foundations upon which some leading operations 
researchers have claimed that these ideals could be implemented. In 
chapters 2,3, and 4I argue that adopting (re pectively) the positivist, 
conventionalist and/or idealist philosophies as the theoretical foundations 
upon which to build an adequate theory of inquiry for the purposes of 
OR would force it to abandon its ideals. These philosophies are interpreted 
as attempts on the part of academic operational researchers to stave-off 
the open-ended ambiguity and anarchy of inquiry vhich an unqualified 
interpretation of OR's ideals could engender. These attempts to Give 
substance to the ideals of OR all exert a strong bias against raising 
questions about the nature of the subject-matter with which OR deals, 
and it in largely on these grounds that they are rejected in chapter 
5 because of the implications which this has for the ideals of OR. 
One conclusion of Part One is that OR needs protection from such 
philosophies, and that a realist-type alternative at least provides this. 
I conclude by raising the doubt whether philosophy can provide much more to 
O. R. The other major conclusion is that OR needs to understand its subject- 
matter before it can reasonably hope to implement its ideals. 
Given the general bias which we find in Part One against seriously 
considering the subject-matter of OR, we enter Part Two with some trepid- 
ation. Notwithstanding the philosophical bias against it, it is clear 
that OR must have a conception of the nature of its subject-matter. Hor; ever, 
OR's ideals can just as easily be lost by inadequate attention to this 
task. In Part Two the biases discovered in Part One come home to roost. 
The first attempt to provide the ideals of OR with a-sfbstance on'the 
basis of which its ideals can be implemented in an objective fray turns out 
to be just that, i. e., metaphysical 'substance' in the guise of a theory 
of management. 1-le see in chapter 6 that to the extent to which this 
theory moves beyond merely asserting that management mould 'take care' of 
OR's need for an objective basis, it presupposes a social theory which 
would show how social systems by their nature (if properly constructed) 
embody this objectivity. This move is foreshadowed in chapter 3 where we 
see Kuhn (who is taken as an exemplar of conventionalist philosophy) finally 
resorting to this device to prop up his conventionalism, against the 
growing weight of subjectivity under which it threatened to sag into the 
jaws of positivism. The social theory on which such claims rest is given 
detailed consideration in. chapter 7. 
In chapter 7I give serious consideration to the possibility that 
OR's social theory, if it has one at all, will be developed in reaction 
to what it sees as the "problem of order", because this problem can be 
seen as but another way of stating its ideals in a specifically social 
way. Stating OR', ideals in this way orients them directly to at least one 
aspect of the question of the nature of OR's subject-matter. ale see that 
by employing, Durkheim's account of and solution to the social problem of 
order as a basis for comparison with OR (first as a homomorphism. and later as 
an isomorphism) that we are able to gain quite a firm grip on OD's social 
theory (and, hence, its grasp of its subject-matter). We see that this theory, 
although providing a justification for CR's theory of management (especially 
in its modern form), it is itself inadequate. The basis of the inadequacy, 
most fundamentally, is that the theory in question presupposes the very thing, 
that should be in question, namely, the nature of the social collective. I 
conclude with a specific illustration of the impact of this theory on the ideal 
of OR by analysing the inadequate treatment of power and conflict which it'--, 
allows. .t 
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I take it az an axiom throughout this, thezic that the general 
ideal which operational research (hereafter referred to as OR) (1) 
should pursue is the implementation of reason in human affairs. In 
chapter one this ideal trill be shown to underlie various writings 
on the basic nature of OR. This general ideal will appear there in 
the form of a net of more specific ideals which I take to be OR's 
distinctive interpretation of it. The task of OR when it is defined in 
this way is to find ways of implementing these derivative ideals. 
Defining CP. in this way iss, of course, not at all typical. The 
literature on the techniques of OR is enormous in comparison with the 
literature on how it might go about inplementing its broader aims (2). 
This fact might be taken as an indication that the aspect of OR on which 
I wish to concentrate in as yet too immature to warrant sustained analysis. 
This discouraging conclusion cannot, however, be drawn from small numbers 
alone. Those involved in attempting to state the basic nature of OR 
have by their considerable efforts constituted a formidable literature, 
and others are begining to follow their lead. Also, for the pur; ozes of 
this thesis, whatever limitations might be imposed by the small numbers 
of miters involved is more than compensated for'by the quality and 
influence of their work. I 
The writers who will receive most attention in this thesis are 
Ackoff, Churchman, Beer, and some members of the Institute for Operational 
Research (I. O. n. ). The problem posed by their work is whether, their 
various writin-s enable us to say with any confidence that OR can make 
1 Throughout I refer to the subject of interest in this thesis as 011- 
Others may wich to attempt to demarcate OR from Management Science or 
Systems Science, etc. These distinctions are not relevant for this work. 
(2) The small numbers involved means that my repeated reference to OR in the 
abstract is to be taken as an idealistion which need not necessarily refer to 
an explicitly expressed majority opinion. 
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pro, 3reew to%-lardc fulfillin; its ideals. The conclusion reached at 
several points till be that as it is set at present its ideals are 
unattainable. This is so because the theoretical tools which they 
employ in the attempt to implement OP, Is ideals in fact prevent their 
attainment. 
The major task of this thesis is the discovery and critical 
assessment of these theoretical tools. This thesis is persistently 
critical. The hope is that by such criticism OR may develop through 
the pushing back of theoretical barriers rather than through the filling 
out of inappropriately fixed boundaries. The need for criticism and 
discussion is crucial at these early stages of 0:; 1s development. The 
function of the criticism engaged in here is to help OR change course 
from the direction in which it is now heading. At times the criticism 
may appear savage, but no greater compliment could be paid to those 
whom I criticize than to take their work as deadly serious and worthy 
of sustained analysis. 
The theoretical foundations which I shall discuss are those which 
are commensurate with OR's general ideal. In a broad sense the general 
ideal has two parts to it. One part relates to the role of reason. The 
major source which has been drawn upon to understand this has been 
philosophy. Part One of this thesis, therefore, looks at the theoretical 
foundations of OR which stem from its associations with certain 
philosophical traditions. I' interpret the concern shown (sometimes 
implicitly) with philosophy as an attempt to understand the role of 
reason by the development of a theory of inquiry for OR. The other 
part of the General ideal relates to husan affairs. The major source 
s 
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which has been drain upon by OR to understand human affairs is 
social theory. cart Two of this thesis, therefore, looks at the 
theoretical foundations of O which --ten from its associations tuith 
certain traditions within the field of social theory. I interpret the 
concern shown (again, Sometimes implicitly) with social theory as an 
attempt by OR to understand the object (or subject-matter (1)) of inquiry. 
In both parts I shall show that the traditions with which On has 
become 
most closely associated exert biases which rush it in unfruitful directions. 
It is lack of both space and time which prevents me from doinC more than 
outlining the kinds of theoretical foundations which would bias OR in 
more fruitful directions. This is the major task for the future which 
emerges from this work. I shall not discuss those foundations--particularly 
mathematics and statistics--which do not seem directly to promote or to 
hinder the attainment of the General ideal. £ubsequont developments may 
eventually show more clearly than it is currently understood how stich 
foundations have an equivalently direct impact as the foundations which 
are of concern here. 
Interest in the philosophical and social foundations of OR is a 
way of discussing the relationship between OR and 'science'. Science 
can be treated as an idealisation of objective- inquiry or it can be 
treated as a current body (or bodies) of knowledge and problems. In 
most definitions and discussions of the basic nature of OR the first 
treatment dorminates. In Part One it will be shown that-the correct way'- 
for OR to relate to science is in both senses of the term. In Part Two 
I tackle the question of the relationship of OR tö"one specific science, 
namely, social science. 
1 Because I shall argue that an adequate theory of inquiry cannot be,; ý,:. 
developed in isolation from an understarcI`ßng of what it is that is being 
inquired into, the term subject-matter dominates the discussion. Grasping 
the nature of subject-ratter is fusing the two aspects of the General 
ideal. Sometimes I use the term object of inquiry to emphasise the need for 
this. 
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GR' has emerged from the early days of scientists using their 
intelligence to solve problems to become a subject of academic 
interest and practice. This work is addressed to these academics. 
It is not primarily addreszed to the practitioner although it obviously 
has implications for him. If the ideal of Ofl has any meaninG it is 
as a lone-run theoretical aspiration for the practice of OR. However, 
there is no time or space to develop these implications here. The 
long-run hope of all interested academics must be that they'can help 
in the development of an adequate theory of the practice of OR. I 
share this hope. 
I 
PART0 11 E 
OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND PHILOSOPHY 
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CHAPTER 0NE 
THEIDEALSOFOPERATIONALRESEARCH 
Introduction: 
Our task is an evaluation of the 'theory of OR'. To do this we need 
some criteria against which to compare the extant theory that is uncovered 
with the kinds of theory that, in the light of the ideals, would seem 
most appropriate. It will often not be possible in this thesis to do 
more that indicate in general terms the kinds of theoretical development 
which seem called for. Much of the thesis is taken up with"a critical 
exposition of the status of the theory of OR. However, even to do this 
we require as a minimum a set of criteria which can act as ideals. The 
task of this first chapter is an exposition of OR's ideals. 
The ideals of OR which are presented here will function in two 
main ways. Firstly, they will suggest problems which require some kind 
of theoretical solution. Secondly, after an exposition of the theoretical 
solution typically adopted by ORS they will act as reference point against 
which this solution can be judged and, to a limited extent, will provide 
guides to the directions in which theoretical exploration could usefully 
be taken to remedy any deficiencies which are found by this comparison. 
Put more generally, the rest of the thesis following this chapter will be 
an attempt to follow the efforts of OR to 'implement' or 'operationalize' 
its ideals. 
Without exception, all attempts toinpleinent the role of reason in 
human affairs have pursued the general ideal of 'improvement'. At the 
highest level it is the distinctive interpitation of this ideal which 
has marked off one attempt from another. Thus, Churchman's (1974) 
definition of systems design (in which he included OR) as: 
"... implementing improvement in socal systems 
by means of the best available method of 
x inquiry" (p. 452) 
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- does not, of itself, distinguish OR from any previous attempt to implement 
reason in human affairs, stretching from Plato to the present day. All 
are for improvement and all have chosen their 'best available method of 
inquiry' - usually called 'science' (as it is by Churchman elsewhere, 
cf. 1971). Thus, for example, to fully understand the Platonic approach 
to social reform in all its distinctiveness`we have, as Popper (1945) 
has shown, to understand what exactly Plato understood by the term im- 
provement. Only when we understand that for Plato improvement is to be 
interpreted as the ideal of a perfectly stationary state we can claim to 
truly understand his approach. Similarly, any claim to understand OR 
must be based on an understanding of its ideal of improvement. There is 
little point in asking whether a particular approach 'works' without 
first clearly grasping the notion of improvement against which it claims 
it ought to be judged. Having done this the analysis can proceed further 
by the erection of more general and'comprehensive notions of improvement 
against which both the practice and the ideal of the approach in question 
can be judged. Failure to make these steps clear in his analysis, I 
believe, weakens an otherwise similar analysis by Boguslaw 
(1965) of a 
number of approaches to designing "utopias". If anything distinguishes 
OR from previous attempts to institute the role of reason in human affairs 
it is the great deal of attention which has been devoted to an explicit 
elaboration of the most general and'comprehensive notion of improvement 
which is conceivable. This is something which Boguslaw ignores. It is 
so general and comprehensive that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
seriously disagree with it. No attempt to do so will be made in this 
thesis. In an analysis of OR the two steps of understanding the 'internal' 
ideal of improvement and comparing this with a generally acceptable ideal 
of improvement are collapsed into each other. The _''OR approach', in 
distinction to most other attempts to institute reason in human affairs, 
is almost exclusively preoccupied with an explicit understanding of what 
is meant by improvement. In most other approaches the notion is left 
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implicit. 
Totality and Complexity: 
Two central and closely related ideals of OR are that planned 
interventions into the world ('designs') can only be guaranteed to 'improve' 
the situation if due attention is paid to the 'total' or 'whole' situation 
and, what amounts to an expression of the same idea, all the interactions 
between the 'parts' in the situation are dealt with in their full com- 
plexity. OR is against 'incrementalism' (cf. Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963) 
and 'satisficing' (cf. Simon, 1957)" It is against notions of improvement 
which rest on the complementary ideas of fragmentation and simplicity. I 
shall turn in later chapters to the questions of whether,, in fact, OR, 
attempts to deal with totalities which are truly perceived to be complex 
and whether it'deals with totalities at all. These questions, in fact, 
relate to another ideal which is also strongly related to the ideal of 
totality, namely, the idea that improvement is only truly secured if in 
formulating the intervention no 'arbitrary' limitations are placed on 
inquiry. By 'arbitrary' is meant limitations which prevent a grasp of the 
totality. The above questions can, therefore, be reformulated to ask 
whether, in fact, OR accepts arbitrary limitations on its inquiries by 
reason of its theoretical commitments. 
That OR is preoccupied with improvement defined in terms of dealing 
with the whale 'system' is a point frequently and forcefully made by 
Churchman. Thus he reminds his fellow academic operations researchers, 
... the joy of OR is that it is in the centre 
of the deepest mysteries of the human race, 
because, academically speaking, it has taken 
on the whole system" (19? Ob, P" B- 53). 
Also, reiterating the same point, Mitchell has recently (1973) complained 
13 
that OR has yet to make a significant contribution to a world-scale 
problem. The connection between dealing with a totality and dealing with 
complexity is brought out by the basic texts of OR. 
According to Churchman, Ackoff, and Arnoff (1957) OR arose precisely 
as a response to the increased complexity of the management function 
which came about because of increased size and the increasing use of 
technology (both human and mechanical). As they put it, "during this 
period of differentiation and segmentation of the management function a new 
class of managerial problems began to appear and assert themselves, problems 
which can be called executive-type problems" (p. 4). The problem for the 
executive, Ackoff and Rivett suggest, is to ".. * integrat(e) the policies 
and operations of the diverse departments reporting to him, in order to 
obtain an overall operation that comes as close as possible to realizing 
the organisation's overall objectives". "This integrating function is 
quite complex", they note, "because of the conflict of interests that always 
develop between the units co-ordinated by an executive" (1963, p" 3). The 
job of the executive, then, is to "consider the effects of a policy on each 
department, but his evaluation should depend on the overall effect" (idem, 
p. 4); he has, that is, to "put ..... together the activities of parts of 
an organisation in such a way that the overall operation comes as close as 
possible to attaining the organisation's objectives" (ibid). The central 
idea is "... that the activity of any part of an organisation has some 
effect on the activity of every other part ... 
(and, therefore) .... it 
is necessary to identify all the significant interactions and to evaluate 
their combined impact on the performance df an organisation as a whole, 
not merely on the part originally involved" (p. 10). As Churchman et al 
put it: "it is an objective of OR ... to provide managers of the organisation 
with a scientific basis for solving problems involving the interaction of 
components of the organisation as a whole" (p. 6). In a later chapter I 
shall consider what light can be thrown on the theory of OR by comparing 
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this view with the sociological 'problem of order'. 
OR is not content even if the problems which are presented to it 
are relatively simple; not likely! It adopts the "... system's orientation" 
and "... it deliberately expands and complicates the statements of problems 
until all the significantly interacting components are contained within 
it" (Ackoff and Rivett, op cit, p. 10, my emphasis). Recently Ackoff 
(1974) has restated this central idea of OR as the "... realiz(ation) that 
no problem ever exists in complete isolation. Every problem interacts 
with other problems and is therefore part of a set of interrelated problems, 
a system of problems"; such a system he calls a "mess" (p. 21). 'Problems', 
therefore, have to be 'deliberately expanded'; they have to be considered 
as a 'whole' because it is only as a whole that the problems of concern to 
OR exist. There may be other types of problems 
(although I think. that some 
operations researchers would doubt this) but they are not of concern to 
OR. OR is concerned with complex problems and some, as Ackoff 
(1960) notes, 
"... feel that complexity is essential to OR" (p. 10). Ackoff apparently 
agrees with this, characterisation for he goes on to note that 
"! the com- 
plexity of the systems studies by OR lies not only in the large number of 
parts which they usually have but also in the types of interactions, between 
the parts" (ibid). In view of his reference to OR's preoccupation with 
"... systems ... involv(ing) feedback control" 
Ackoff presumably_would 
argue that OR deals with situations where the interdependencies are 
(reciprocal' (Thompson, 1967), i. e., ' situations where all parts intereact 
with each other, and where, of necessity, all parts must be brought into 
harmony simultaneously. Thompson sees this type of situation being the 
most difficult, with less difficult situations being characterised by 
'sequential' and 'pooled' interdependencies. 
However, not only are the problems with which OR wants to deal 
complex, they are also difficult in another ray. They are 'ill-structured'. 
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Mitroff and Sagasti (1973) define the difference between 'well-structured' 
and 'ill-structured' problems in It... terms of the class of decision 
problems" to which they belong. They define "a decision theory problem" 
as a situation in which one has to ... choose from among a set of acts 
A: L ... Am that A. which optimizes 
(in some sense) the decision-maker's 
(Z's) return Ui,, where Uý3 is the utility or value to Z of the outcome 
Oi3 corresponding to the doublet (Ai, S3) where (Sn) is the set of the 
'states of nature"' (p. 120). They go on to say'that ! 'an ill-structured 
or 'wicked' decision problem is one for-which one or more of the (Ai), 
(Uni), (0i ) and (Si ) terms or sets is unknown or not known with any degree 
of 'confidence"' (p. 121). 
Mitroff and Sagasti comment that "il. l-structured problems ... are 
problems such that the biggest problem connected with them is to 'define 
the nature of the problem "'. (Exactly the same point is made by Mason, 
1969, p. B- 1Ok)" They go on to say that "ill-structured problems have 
an elusive quality that seems to defy precise methods'of formulation" and 
that "many social problems seem to be of this kind or quality" (ibid). 
It may be true that many 'social' problems are of this type, but it is 
certain that all of the really significant problems which OR tackles are 
ill-structured. It is true, as Mason (op cit) puts it, that "to date the 
main thrust of the research effort in management science has been directed 
towards the task of finding 'optimal solutions' to planning type problems 
once they have been formulated and defined" (ibid), but this is clearly 
mere neglect on the part of operations researchers; it is not a result 
which has come about as a consequence of the typical perception of the 
'nature$ of the subject. 
Thus, Churchman et al argue that "research should begin with the 
formulation of a problem" (p. 105, my emphasis). And what does 'formulati'ng 
the problem' entail? Well .. o precisely the activities which would turn 
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an ill-structured problem into a structured one. Churchman, Ackoff, and 
Arnoff define a 'problem'in precisely the same terms as Mitroff and 
Sagasti define a 'decision theory problem', namely, as a situation in- 
volving a 'decision-makers ('Z'), his'objectives' (! Uij0, "the system, 
or environment" in which the. decision maker exists M1, S3' = 03), and 
the "alternative courses of action" ('Al ... Am'). If it is the absence 
of one or more of these which defines an Ill-structured problem then it 
is the job of the operations researcher to transform an ill-structured 
problem into a well-structured one because it is his job to "identify 
the decision-maker" (p. 108), "complete(ly) formulate objectives" (ibid), 
"understand the organisation and the resultant system" (p. 110), "get as 
complete a list of alternatives as possible" (p. 111), and develop new 
courses of action as required (p. 113)" 
None of these things may be done completely adequately, in practice 
the bulk of operations researchers (if they can be called thatl) may 
neglect these issues ... never mind, this is what OR is about. As a 
statement of fact about the practice of OR it may be true that operations 
researchers typically deal with well-structured problems (referred to by 
March and Simon (1958) as "programmed" and Boguslaw as "established")9 
where no search activity is required. However, as a statement about the 
ideals of OR nothing could be further from the truth. 
Confirmation of this is not hard to find. Consider the views of 
another leading figure in'the OR world - Stafford Beer (1966). Beer sums 
up an "... attitude towards a potential OR job which one increasingly 
hears taken up by senior OR men, as well as by the managers they serve" 
(p. 496). This attitude is that "there is a well-defined problem; the 
facts appertaining to this problem are readily available, well-documented, 
accurate; there is an established measure by which. to quantify the facts; 
there are well-known techniques which have proved reliable for solving 
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similar problems; there seems to be no difficulty in making another 
application here; it follow that the outcome of the study will be of this 
certain form; there is a simple way of implementing the conclusions in 
practice. When all of this can be affirmed it is sensible to embark on 
some work; if any of these propositions is falsified then really we ought 
not to tackle the job" (ibid). Not surprisingly in view of-what has been 
said about the ideals (if not the. successes) of OR, to Beer "this outlook 
is anathema" (p. 497). "It is", he goes on, It a straightforward denial 
of the historical origins of the subject .:. and has nothing at all to 
say about the future potentiality of science in management" (ibid). 
"There remain(s)", he says, "hosts of problems which are ill'defined, 
the precise questions which ought to be answered being unknown either to 
the manager or to the scientists. They are characterised by an absence 
of facts, by inadequate recording of data, by unsatisfactory mensuration 
concepts, and perhaps by the absence of any relevant metric whatsoever. 
No-one has the faintest idea what would count as a solution". As it"iss 
"... these problems which keep managers awake at night ... some group of 
scientists ought to attack ... 
(them) 
... in collaboration with the' 
management concerned" and if, he goes on, "in the consensus of OR opinion, 
to do this is not to do operational research, -then we shall simply have- 
to find a new term to describe the activity" (ibid). 
Churchman goes so*far as to make the tackling of 'wicked problems" 
a moral precept. "The term "wicked problem! "19 he says, "refer(s) to'that 
class of social system problems which are ill-formulated, where the in- 
formation is confusing, where there are many clients and decision makers 
with conflicting values and where the ramifications in the whole system' 
are throughly confusing" (1967, p. B'- 141). ! 'The moral principle" which 
he enunciates "is this: whoever attempts to tame part of a wicked problem, 
but not the whole, -is morally wrong" (p. ' B- 14+2). Churchman puts forward 
this moral injunction 'as an ideal (in fact, Churchman has done more than:. 
/$ 
almost anyone else in keeping the ideals of OR alive in what is in some 
respects a hostile environment - we shall see more of his endeavours 
later), for he realises that "such a moral principle would appear to be 
ridiculous to many a mangement scientist, who has been brought up to 
believe that he should only tackle 'feasible' problems"; this lack of 
concern, however, is merely a reflection of the fact that "... the profession 
has not yet taken itself seriously". However, "that the profession has 
a moral problem, nonetheless", he concludes, "there can be no doubt" (ibid). 
A similar moral injunction is made by other leading operations researchers. 
Beer, for example, carries on his argumenh.. (presented above) to attack 
"... the prudential policy that OR does only what it knows how to do" 
because, he goes on to say, if this philosophy is adopted "... the 
profession becomes stuck with the relatively small things it has already 
mastered ... (and) ... managers become used to these little activities 
and begins to draw boundaries to the scope of an OR group". This means, 
he believes, that "the most creative and adventurous scientists depart, 
and the group that is left 'become incapable of great things"'. It is 
clear that this capability is seen as being central to OR's distinctiveness 
because he goes on to say that without it there is a ".. * de-naturing 
of what was originally operational research ... ". What is required in his 
view is "adventure, hard work and the motive to get things done". Ackoff 
had expressed a similar theme in an earlier work (19Eo): arguing that 
although "OR, has established its usefulness in dealing with problems 
of limited scope ... it is important that operations researchers continually 
try to deal with problems of broader scope (e. g., long-range planning), 
that they try to deal with obstinate aspects of organisational operations 
(e. g., marketing and research in industry), and that they try to enlarge 
the category of types of systems that are studied so as to include even 
problems of national planning" (p. 30). A similar vision of the "Need for 
Operational Research" was advanced by Zuckerman (1958). He argued that OR 
was crucially concerned with the design and evaluation of strategic policy 
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in military affairs (for example, the ramifications of the use of atomic 
weapons) and his case for OR is summed up in the view that "the less one 
knows about a situation, the more, not the less, scientific attention it 
demands" (p. 16). 
Churchman (19680 has identified the whole system/complexity_ideals 
as lying at the very heart. of the ideal of improvement. One part of the 
"... very serious problem,... '(of).. * defining the concept of improvement 
... is ... how can we desigri improvement, in large systems without under- 
standing the whole system, and if the answer is that we cannot, how is 
it possible to understand th'B whole system? " (p. 2). His conclusion is 
that we cannot: It... we seem forced to conclude that anyone who actually 
believes in the possibility of improving systems is faced with the problem 
of understanding the properties of the whole system, and that he cannot 
concentrate his attention merely on one sector" (p. 4). The mirror image 
of the ideal of the whole system is the ideal of complexity. The ideal 
is, Churchman suggests, "the maximum-loop"principle ... 
(which) ... is 
based on a monistic philosophy: there is one world of interconnected 
entities, not many" (p. 114). The claim is that to truly understand 
anything it must be understood in terms of all of its relationships. The 
principle of the maximum loop says that starting at any one point, inquiry, 
if it is to lead to improvement, must push out on all fronts until it 
finds the largest possible system within which the part makes #sense'. 
Complexity is the corrollary of wholeness. We do not have a totality. 
until the expansion of relationships does not make any 'significant' 
difference. It is, of course, the perception of the complexity of re- 
lationships which make up a totality which has often led to the. call for 
OR teams to be interdisciplinary. 
Free Inquiry: OR as 'Revolutionary' Science: 
x 
That OR aspires to grasp complex wholes - to deal with the "whole /10 
r- 
system" - because through this step it has defined improvement, has become 
an essential part of OR's vernacular. It has become the enduring motif 
of the 'OR approach'. It is, however, an essentially vague and open- 
ended ideal. It poses many more questions than it answers, and I think 
that there must be some doubt whether, without substantial 'filling out', - 
it answers any significant questions about the theory of the practice of OR. 
One approach towards giving some concrete substance to the ideals of 
totality and complexity is that of General Systems Theory. This approach 
has found some favour amongst those who were simultaneously oriented 
towards 'hard science' and the problems posed by the ideals. General 
Systems Theory, with its aspiration to discover the laws which were general 
to all systems, seemed to offer a scientific way of filling out the ideals 
of OR stemming as it did from the physical sciences. Sustained interest 
in General Systems Theory in OR circles seems, however, to be lacking- 
and I shall consider it only indirectly to the extent to which. -a residue 
of its ideas have sedimented into the'systems approach'. A major reason 
for this lack of sustained interest must be that the General Systems 
Theory is often little more than a restatement of OR's ideals;, its 
injunctions are the same: deal with totalities (which implies that they 
have 'boundaries') as complex unities (which implies relationships between 
the parts which may even be 'law-like'). Although some explicit use has 
been made of the 'laws' of complex systems (particularly by those with a 
cybernetic inclination, for example, Beer), for the most part the reaction 
of operational researchers seems to have been merely that there is a 
happy: coincidence of 'frameworks'. This being so, General Systems Theory 
could not offer, nor did it produce, answers to questions which the 
totality/complexity ideals posed about the practice of OR. In particular, 
it did not produce answers to the question of how one should conduct 
inquiry into wholes (systems). Granted that systems have boundaries and 
exchange processes, but by what means does on discover these? 
(i) 
(1) Some attempts have recenýly been made to answer. this in terms of systems 
theory. See: Buckley 197 + /11 
The failure of General Systems Theory to provide answers to this practical 
question has meant that those operations researchers concerned with the 
general development of the subject have been thrown back on their own 
resources. They have provided a set of answers to the theory of the 
practice of OR, and it is these which are of major interest in the ensuing 
chapters. 
Although I have said that the ideal of grasping a complex totality 
is vague and open-ended, it has. had a profound effect on the general 
approach which operations researchers have taken towards the problem of 
improvement-oriented inquiry. An implication which has been drawn from 
it (but which need not-.. necessarily have been, as we shall see) is that if 
improvement is to be understood in terms of complex totalities then any 
limitation on the scope or depth of inquiry is to be avoided. If improve- 
ment is to be understood in terms of the 'whole system' then for inquiry 
to be valid it too has to encompass the whole system. Taken to extremes, 
the ideal of the whole system implies that there can validly be no 
limitations whatsoever on inquiry. Although few operations researchers 
embrace the implication in"this extreme form (although a few sometimes 
come close to it) it has had a profound effect on their attitudes towards 
such things as the role of techniques in OR; the role of (lower) management 
in the practice of OR, and, more generally, on the nature of OR as a 
science. A particular instance of this last attitude is the view typically 
taken towards the role of the established sciences in the practice of OR. 
Before I turn to look in detail at these attitudes, let me first say a 
few words about the general directions in which the argument will flow 
from here. 
The history of the development of the theory of OR has been the 
history of attempts to avoid the complete emptiness of the extreme im- 
plications that, in the ideal, there are no limits on the scope of OR's 
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inquiries, while at the same time attempting to ensure that the limits 
which are imposed do not frustrate the complex totality ideal. Various 
attempts have been made by leading OR theorists to impose 'acceptable' 
limitations on inquiry, with varying degrees of consciousness that this 
was, in fact, what they were doing, and at varying degrees of explicitness. 
The fact which is most curious about these attempts is that although the 
problem of valid inquiry for improvement stems from the problem of complex 
totalities, no serious effort has been made in OR circles to understand 
the nature of the totalities with which they deal. There has been phil- 
osophical speculation and a priori theorizing at various levels of 
sophistication (which has much in common with the rather 'other-worldly' 
theorizing of the more ardent General Systems Theorists, and both of 
which deserve Mills' (1959) not too friendly appellation 'Grand Theory'), 
but virtually no attempt has been made to ground OR in the nature of 
those particular systems - social systems - with which they are, by 
virtually common consent, concerned. Many of the more recent writings 
on OR (e. g., Ackoff, 1970; Ackoff and Emery, 1972; Churchman, 1974; 
Friend and Jessop, 1969; Friend, Pourer and Yewlett, 1974; Eden, 1976; 
Rivett, 1974; Mitchell, 1976; Stringer, 1967 & 1972) have in one way or 
another acknowledged 
(1)that 
social systems are the totalities with which 
OR is preoccupied, and yet even those who make this acknowledgement fail 
to grasp the implication which this has for the ideals and, potentially, 
the practice of OR. ' This failure can be traced partly to philosophical 
commitments (which I deal with first) and partly to 'pre-packageds" 
commitments about the nature of the social world which have largely been 
discarded by modern social scientists (I deal with this at the end of the 
(ý) I shall, of course, produce evidence for this assertion. 
/13 
k6l 
thesis). Throughout the question which I shall be attempting to answer 
is whether the theory of OR which has been erected (or, more accurately, 
borrowed) to fill out the complexity/totality ideal is coherent, that 
is, does it allow for and encourage an understanding of the 'whole system' 
or does it prevent it and discourage it? 
The Freedoms of OR: 
Let us consider some reactions of some leading operations researchers 
to attempts (some of which are their own) to tie them down to a conception 
of the whole system. Operations researchers display great tenacity in 
avoiding commitment about what it is that they are talking about. Even- 
tually, however, they must provide us with some guarantees that they are 
talking about the whole system; then we can judge. --them on 
their own terms. 
Let us start by a consideration of the views presented in an early 
paper by Ackoff (1960) entitled the "Meaning, Scope, and Methods of 
Operational Research". In it his "purpose ... 
(was) 
... to accumulate, 
consolidate, and synthesize what has been said and written about the 
strategy of OR" (p. 4), and he notes that "at the heart of any discussion 
of the strategy of a scientific discipline is the following question: 
What is the nature of the discipline? " (ibid). In answering this question 
Ackoff notes his general agreement with Kendall (1958) (with which he 
thinks "... most operations researchers are in substantial agreement ... " 
(p. 6) who describes OR 11... as an attitude of mind towards the relation 
between man and society" (ibid) and Beer (1959) who expands on this view 
to conclude that "operational research is not a science, for it is not 
about anything; it is science" (ibid). Whilst agreeing with this charac- 
terisation (we turn to consider Beer's views in more detail in a moment) 
Ackoff feels the need to distinguish what, if anything, is unique about OR 
/14 
that is, what is the "... special class of phenomena" that operational 
research scientists study. His conclusion is that It... in OR we study 
... sets of interrelated acts ... 
(which he calls) .. & operations" (p. 8). 
An operation, he tells us, is "... set of acts required for the accom- 
plishment of some desired outcome'? (ibid). 
I think it will be admitted that this is not very specific: what 
are "required" and what are the "desired outcomes"? Ackoff refines the 
idea of operations by noting that "in general, OR has not been concerned 
with the operations of individuals but rather with those of a certain 
type of system" (p. 10), namely, an "organization". Apparently, then, it 
is "... the types of problems involving organizational operations which 
constitute the domain of OR" (p. 12). This, however, does not place 
very severe restrictions on the scope of OR. All we learn is that 
organisations are "essentially" groups of people with specialised res- 
ponsibilities who communicate with each other and are controlled (pp. 11-12). 
Far from defining a "unique class of phenomena" (a criteria which, in fact, 
he comes to drastically weaken: see below) we find that all we have 
learned from this effort is that organizational operations can. be changed 
by changing 'organizational content', 'organizational structure', 'comm- 
unication' and 'control' (pp. 13-14), and that many other groups of 
scientists are concerned with these. Given the generality with which 
Ackoff talks about organizations it comes as no surprise to find him 
concluding that selecting an appropriate approach to 11... improv(ing) an 
organization's performance ... can only be effectively solved by an 
integrated examination of the organization".. (p. 17) 
(1) 
Thus, although 
(1) I shall return in the last chapter to a detailed criticism of Ackoff's 
subsequent developments of the substance of organizations. 
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Ackoff "... trie(s) to show that the aspect of organizations that OR has 
staked out for study is-restricted to their. operations and the decisions 
which control them" (p. 17), he actually ends up by saying that properly 
the organization should be studied from more or less all angles. This 
seems to me to be merely a way of saying that OR is the application of 
tsciencel in organizations. He seems to be saying that all aspects of 
an organization are (at least) potential co-producers of operations, and 
that, therefore, all of them fall within the scope of OR's inquiry. The 
definition of OR as a science in terms of it discovering co-productive 
relationships in no way limits the scope of OR. In fact, the emphasis 
which Ackoff places on this concept (particularly in his more recent work 
with Emery, 1972) indicates a clear open-endedness in the scope of OR 
because, as Keat and Urry (1975) say in a discussion of the originator 
of it, J. S. Mill, ".. o almost anything can turn up in a list of causal 
conditions" (p. 32h In the final chapter I shall turn to ask how Ackoff 
in practice controls the proliferation of potential producers of operations. 
He does it, we shall see, by the implicit theoretical commitments which 
he (and others) makes about the nature of the social world. For the present 
we can note his disquiet about the "... absence of psychological and 
social variables ... in OR models ... " 
(p. 26). 
(1) 
In his view "a total 
system study would include consideration of all relevant objectives and 
all of the classes of action which make up the operation. That is, each 
choice would be considered as a controllable variable relative to all the 
organizational objectives" (p. 29). All forms of "problem reduction! ', 
(a term he thinks is more suitable than 'sub-optimisation') are to be 
avoided., 
(1) Which, as Hales (1974) notes, is seen in OR as a "... blatant case of 
sub-optimisation" (p. 13) and encouraged the adoption of the socio- 
technical systems frame of reference. 
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"Where ... 
(problem) 
... reductions are imposed on the researcher 
by external forces no problem arises other than the one of determining 
whether the problem should be tackled under the imposed constraints", 
Ackoff says (p. 30). However, for him real "concern lies with reductions 
made by the researcher of his own free will, with his inclination to 'cut 
the problem down to size"' (ibid, my emphasis). It is, then, the re- 
searcher's own choice; nothing in OR limits him to this or that type of 
variable, or this or that type of relationship. In ackoff's opinion, 
it... the heart of the problem that has come to be known as "sub-optimization! "I 
is the researcher's inclination to "... reduce the number of objectives, 
courses of action, or uncontrollable variables or modifying them in some 
way so that the resulting problem can be handled by familiar methods and 
techniques" (ibid). - The danger which Ackoff sees is not' that OR in 
engaging in problem reduction will solve problems a little less well than 
it otherwise might; it is a matter, no less, of"survival of OR. Thus, 
Ackoff does on to say that "if OR is to survive it must maintain a'strong 
problem orientation, not a technique orientation. It must-111 he says, 
"expand its methods and techniques to fit the problems and not contract 
the problems to fit available methods and techniques" (ibid). Problem 
reduction clearly strikes at the heart of OR's raison d'etre. Other 
operations researchers have expressed as similar mistrust of relianne 
on the techniques of OR on similar grounds, and I turn to them in a moment. 
Although Ackoff says in this paper and elsewhere that what distinguishes 
science from common-sense "... lie(s) either in its subject matter or in 
method, or both" (1962, p. 2), his efforts on the question of subject- 
matter lead him to equivocation: "whether or not OR has a unique area of 
study, the question remains as to whether or not it has a unique methodology" 
(1960, p. 18). From his analysis there is clearly some doubt regarding 
the first., even though 4is intention had been to counteract the implication 
of Beer's remark (quoted above) that OR 't... does not have and cannot 
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develop a unique body of knowledge about the phenomenon which it studies" 
(ibid). This highlights the question of what distinguishes OR from any 
other possible discipline interested in the whole system. Does the 
same open-endedness apply to OR's methodology as well? 
Again, Ackoff attempts to head off what he sees as the prevailing 
view in OR. He quotes Jessop's view that "... what constitutes oper- 
ational research is not knowledge but know-how" (ibid). This clearly 
runs against the view that OR has a unique subject-matter but Ackoff 
draws consolation from the fact that the abstract model-building which 
Jessop advocates is. in some sense scientific because "... an important 
characteristic of the scientific approach to problem solving is the act 
of abstraction which is involved" (p. 19). "Abstraction" as an attribute 
of OR's distinctiveness as "... unique scientific activity... 
(with a) 
... methodology which equips... 
(its practitioners)... to study their 
subject matter more effectively than anyone else can" 
(p. 4) does not 
seem very distinct. Clearly, with an unrestricted subject-matter OR 
needs an unrestricted methodology. This is what Ackoff suggests. He 
defines methodology in exactly the same terms that he defines subject- 
matter. The subject-matter of OR is 'problems' and 
"Methodology can be considered to be a special 
type of problem solving, one in which the prob- 
lems to be solved are research problems... 
(A)ny problem situation, and hence research- 
problem situations, can be represented by the 
following equation-, 
V= f(Xi, Yj), 
where V= the measure of performance or acc- 
omplishment that we seek to maximize or 
minimize. 
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where Xi the aspects of the situation we 
can control ... 
where Yi = the aspects of the situation (en- 
vironment of the problem) over which we 
have not control" (1962, p. 28) 
Defining methodology in this way deliberately makes it as general as OR's 
subject-matter. This description does not help the outsider very much 
in his attempt to pin down what OR believes itself to be because the 
methodology is as non-specific as the subject-matter. Ackoff eventually 
resorts to the speculation that there is ".. e a trend toward models of 
greater generality... (and)... as these are developed consequences 
deduced from them may form a generalized body of knowledge about oper- 
ations" (p. 20). One can only conclude that if, as he puts it, OR 
eventually found a "unifying body of knowledge" with its methddology it 
would, as he has described its outlines, be knowledge of everything: 
formulating a problem, he says, "... requires a complete identification of 
the components of the decision maker's problem... " (1962, p. 67, my 
emphasis). 
Beer (1966) in his attack on "stereotyped" views of science, comes 
to an identical conclusion. The two particular stereotypes which Beer 
attacks that science solves 'given' problems and that the solutions which 
it does provide are found within the context of that given problem. In 
short, these stereotypes see science solving the problems it is given. 
To take the first stereotype, Beer argues that "the point to be made is 
this: operational research must encompass the whole of the problem 
situation, and management may not succeed in defining what this is" 
(p. 50). Beer will brook no interference to this freedom to define what 
the problem is. "Only the operational research team", he says, "can 
'IC 
be held responsible for defining the scope of the problem" (ibid). 
(1) 
(1) Beer continues rather ruefully that "this is perhaps a revolutionary 
point of view; certainly it is one which management often resents as an 
abrogation of its prerogatives". "But", he concludes, "it is a rational 
attitude and one which management ought to embrace" (ibid). It is worth 
noting here a future major issue to which these remarks can be taken as 
a pointer. 
The issue which will be of concern later is the ambivalence of OR 
towards management. It has been expressed by others, as well as by Beer. 
The Education and Research Committee of the Operational Research Society 
(1973) in its gloomy comments on 'The State of Research in OR' has drawn 
attention to this issue which it clearly sees as a central problem. It 
raises the "general question: what kind of subject do we think we are? 
Are we", it goes on, "to do the bidding of our paymasters, solving managers' 
problems by whatever ad hoc means seem best suited to the immediate cir- 
cumstances, or are we indeed a science devoted to the greater understand- 
ing of the behaviour of complex socio-economic systems? " They go on to 
quote Tomlinson (1971) who points to what he sees as "... the OR dilemma, 
to be involved with management - indeed, to be an extension of management - 
in the actual solution of its problems, and at the same time to be able to 
withdraw from the fray and dispassionately study what is being done so that 
major improvements can be effected in the future". This issue also 
concerns Popper, whose philosophy of science we shall look to for insights 
into the theory of OR. Popper, too, is concerned with the relationship 
between the free scientist and the achievement of objective science. 
At one point he looks for this anchorage in tradition and appeals to the 
scientist to "study the problem situation of the day" to continue a "line 
of inquiry which has the whole background of the earlier development of 
science behind it; you fall in with the tradition of science... " (1963, 
p. 129). There is, he says (and Beer agrees), no way to avoid the impress 
of tradition (cf. Magee, 1973, p" 70) and yet he elsewhere says (e. g., 1970) 
that being constrained by frameworks is poor science. Popper and the 
operations researchers never satisfactorily resolve this contradiction. 
Popper achieves a resolution, as Habermas (1974) shows, by neglecting 
to critically analyse his pivotal notion of 'criticism'; it is this which 
makes (as we shall see more fully in a moment) a proposal 'objective' 
and yet what eventually makes the criticism itself objective is unanalysed. 
The same complaint can also be levelled at OR, although the resolution 
arises there in a different form. However, Habermas neglects, after 
having raised a very pertinent question, to analyse on what grounds Popper 
thinks the resolution holds - if there is one this Popper cannot be accused 
of it is oversight. Analysis of both Popper and OR leads to the sugg- 
estion that in both cases the resolution is taken to hold because both 
rely on a largely undisclosed model of the social world which ensures'that 
the processes of criticism are themselves objective. Very crudely, both 
envisage science as a social system with mechanisms which, if certain 
preconditions hold (Popper's 'open society'), continually evolve and 
adapt as entities to produce more and more perfect solutions. Under this 
view, then, it is perfectly acceptable to take 'tradition' as the start- 
ing point for inquiry - one would be crazy not to. The question arises, 
however, as to whether in fact this is the nature of science or of social 
systems in general. In any case, the point I wish to indicate here -I 
leave substantiation until a more appropriate time - is that it is on this 
sociological question that important issues for the successful implementation 
of OR's ideals hinge. 
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The reason for this is that "... the totality of what exists is an in- 
tegrated system, and anything split off from the totality and considered 
separately is incomplete" (p. 53). This is the reason, he says, why to 
"... determine the boundaries of the problem ... is the most difficult 
problem in operational research"... because the "... scientist needs to 
enlarge the scope of his study in every dimension until the factors he 
is bringing in seem to make no difference to the answers he is getting" 
(ibid). The scope of OR's inquiries are as big as the problem: expansion 
of the scope of OR's inquiries "... is a process dictated to the'scientist 
by the interrelated nature of the world" (p. 54, my emphasis). As 
Wittgenstein (1961) says in his investigation of the meanings of such 
language: "The world is all that is the case" (p. 5); which leads to the 
implication that "the sum-total of reality is the world" (p. 8). OR does 
not seem overly constrained by its investigation of the world (although 
we shall see that it is constrained by 'nature'). Beer sums up his argument 
thus: "The management problem has no stereotype. It is unique. It is 
malignant. It may involve all sorts of factors that no-one imagines to be 
relevant. The job of the OR man is to handle it. Do not tell him what 
the problem is, nor where his task may take him. Tell him what the 
trouble is, and send him to find the problem" (p. 54). 
So much for given problems. Given solutions trespass on very much 
the same ground. For Beer the OR man is no-more 'technologist', he is a 
free scientist. Beer argues that "it has to be accepted .., that the-OR 
scientist works with true scientific comprehensiveness; he is not a 
pedlar of techniques". The OR man as scientist carries "the mark of the 
true scientist... (namely)... breadth of outlook" (p. 10). Techniques 
are relegated to second place, then, because they pre-empt inquiry. 
Thus, Beer says that what really happens when a decision technique is 
merely 'applied' is that "the mathematical model is a rigorous account 
of a very loosely formulated and altogether untested theory about the 
/21 
natural mechanism involved" (p. 224). "It is a limitation of the decision- 
theoretic approach", he says, "that it impetuously declares what the 
structure of a decision ought to be. without first, investigating what it 
is" (ibid). Therefore, "one dare not slap a decision theoretic technique 
onto a problem like a poultice. The relevance of the mathematical model 
has to be examined with the greatest of care, and this in itself is a full- 
scale scientific investigation, involving the collection of facts, the 
formulation of hypotheses and the undertaking of experiments" (pp. 226-7). 
Beer sums up his argument by saying that the ! '... mathematical model does 
not exist sui generis" (ibid). This freedom is demanded because "oper-. 
ational research is an empirical science: it is concerned with-actual 
situations and not with idealisations of them - and what is important to 
the manager mayýnot have been present in the minds of those who developed 
the techniques" (p" 219). OR is normally to be thought. of as a free and 
revolutionary science. It is only 't... within a given and accepted frame- 
work ... 
(that)... it may well be true that the problems of management 
can be matched to ... 
(techniques) 
... for quick handling by someone 
trained in the appropriate mathematical technique... -(whereas)... 
the whole 
purpose of Operational Research is to join in with the manager in question- 
ing that very framework" (p. 404; of. also Churchman, Ackoff and Arnoff 
op. cit. p. 12; and more recent expressions of this view by Wagner (1971) 
and Rivett (1974))- 1 
A further illustration of OR's attitude towards limitations on its 
freedoms, is provided by Beer's views on the proper place of lower management. 
I-shall return to these views-in---a later chapter to draw different (but 
congruent) implications from them. Solutions are stereotyped when they 
lie, as Beer puts it, "... in the common phase space - that is, in the 
area of overlap between the phase spaces of the individuals who comprise 
the management team... " (p. 59). To explain: a 'phase space', as Beer 
describes it (pp. 57-8) is a "framework" within which, "... if it is 
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properly selected, may be discovered the. solution to the problem". When 
applied to an organisation Beer says that we need the concept of "thought 
block" - that is, the idea of the members of an organisation being 
"conditioned" so that the "... brain learns to find patterns in the world 
outside". "This process of conditioning", Beer says, "is vital for sur- 
vival, for in its absence the world would appear entirely incoherent and 
unpredictable". With this framework or conditioned thought block the 
unruly and limitless universe is brought within manageable proportions: 
it provides stereotyped responses which reduce uncertainty and give 
direction, 
(1) 
and this is what Beer objects to. He concedes that people 
have different phase spaces (a notion very similar to 'role style'), but 
they are phase spaces nonetheless, and therefore even adopting a solution 
which lies within area of phase space overlap provides It... no guarantee 
that this gives the most appropriate answer" (p. 59). And why exactly? 
Because ! 'the company itself has no brain. It has a phase space within 
which it always operates, but this can only be interpreted by human beings 
who inevitably get the company's phase space confused with their own" (ibid). 
This creates a difficulty for "the answer to a particular problem might... 
lie on the fringes of this space, in an area not belonging to the phase 
space of any one manager in the organization. The best answer to the problem 
would therefore be missed, because it would be strictly' inaccessible to the 
management's (ibid). The same reason is advanced by Beer for the freedom 
(1) It is hard to resist, even at this early stage, alerting the reader to 
the strong similarity between Beer's characterisation of the functioning 
of organizations (more of which is to come) and that proposed by the 
Carnegie school of organisation theory, particularly Simon and his collab- 
orators. Later on I shall go further than merely asserting a similarity 
between the conceptualisations of operations researchers and organisation 
theorists; I shall attempt to establish the case that operations researchers 
rely on such schemes. It is also worth noting here -I take it up in more 
detail in a moment - that Beer's 'phase space' is very close to Kuhn's notion 
of a paradigm, which is a device to enable problem solving to proceed. 
Paxallels between OR's theory of inquiry and Kuhn's philosophy of science will 
be drawn and criticized. 
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claimed by OR to be the sole definer of the problem, and is implied by 
Churchman, Ackoff and Arnoff's comment that "... the. initial statement 
of a problem provided by management to an OR team is more apt to be a 
revelation of symptoms than a diagnosis" (p. 68). As Beer goes on to 
say, the reason is "... that many of the problems that most need to be 
solved... are those very problems in which the solution has not only 
eluded management but has not even been envisaged... precisely because of 
the way in which a company is organised". That is, 11... into clear-cut 
areas of responsibility; and the manager, whose authority derives from his 
position in one of those areas, is conditioned by the whole of his ex- 
perience to seek solutions in which he can feel confident from personal 
knowledge, and over which he can exert personal authority" (pp. 50-51). 
Management (or at least operating management - as we shall see, Beer 
distinguishes 'higher' and 'general' management from other management) 
cannot be allowed to interfere with the investigations of OR - any inter- 
cession by management between 'nature' and the OR scientist corrupts the 
scientific process because management takes decisions "... based on 
mechanisms which, though rational, are not logical., -They derive from 
biological necessity, not from intellectual processes, and result in 
decisions which have more to do with learning to survive than with... 
objective analysis... " (p. 1). The scientist, according to Beer, is 
essentially distinguished from the layman by the fact that the scientist 
can exercise "... his free will in rigorous choice" (p. 31). The rigour 
in the scientist+s expression of his freewill ("self-consciousness", 
"intellectual") is imported by his methodology ("If we want to use words 
carefully", Beer says, "the method of science is method" (p. 29)). 
Rigour is provided by the "formal languages" (Beer's chapter 8) which are 
the highly generalized languages of "quantity", "probability", and - 
"quality". These languages in themselves do not impose limitations on 
the scope of OR, however, because methodology is subservient to the freewill 
of the scientist. The scientist expresses his freewill in the self- - 
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conscious building of models and "hence models take pride of place over 
the formal languages used to make them rigorous" (p. 143). The scientist's 
freewill in choosing the problem definition could not, in any case, be 
much restricted by these formal languages; they are "abstract" and refer 
to nothing in particular and everything in general. 
Conclusion: 
These examples illustrate the reluctance which operations researchers 
show in accepting limitations on the scope of their inquiries. They 
accept no interference from lower management, from techniques, from 
methods, and from notions of subject-matter. This shows that operations 
researchers are equally reluctant to say precisely what it is they are 
talking about. The refusal to accept limitations imposed by a concept of 
OR's subject-matter is the key dimension along which freedom is claimed. 
The other restrictions flow more or less naturally and acceptably from the 
complex-totality ideal; the refusal to be pinned down to at least the 
attempt (we shall see that the attitude stretches to this extent) to grasp 
the nature of the subject-matter does not. We shall see in a later chapter 
that, in fact, there are very strong grounds for arguing that without a 
grasp of the nature of the subjectt-matter being dealt with there is no 
hope whatsoever of achieving the ideal of securing improvement in the 
context of complex-totalities. We shall see in the last chapter that in- 
sisting on this freedom finally takes its toll. It is impossible in 
practice to operate without at least an implicit grasp of the nature of the 
subject-matter being dealt with. -- This is an implication of Kuhn's work 
(and, to some extent, of Churchman's as well) but it is an implication 
which is not recognised, and consequently is not developed, for reasons I 
go into later. The problem is that because of ORts refusal to be con- 
strained by subject-matter as a general principle, it has neglected the 
task of inquiring into the nature of its subject-matter. The result of 
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this neglect has been that OR implicitly embraces a notion of its subject- 
matter which in fact prevents it from grasping the complexity and totality 
of the systems with which it deals, namely, social systems. We shall see 
that what is involved here is not merely the addition of "behavioural 
variables". Rather, I shall argue that even as it is seen by operations 
researchers themselves, what is required for there to be a theory of OR 
is that it should have an adequate theory of social systems. However, 
we must first inquire into the philosophical leanings of OR (its theory 
of inquiry) to discover (a) how it tames the potential anarchy of inquiry 
which is implied by its envisaged scope (OR's attitude is very similar to 
the anarchistic theory of knowledge advanced by Feyerabend (cf. 1970) 
which argues, contrary'to OR's ideals, that there'are no rational standards 
for science); (b) how. these attempts to limit the scope of OR's inquiries 
have injected a bias against the desirability (or even possibility) of 
giving serious consideration to the subject-matter of OR, and, (c) how 
lack of consideration of the subject-matter of OR influences the possibility 
of it achieving its ideals. These questions are the conern of the remainder 
of Part One. 
9 
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Introduction: 
There are two sources which operations researchers turn to when 
they are searching for ways of controlling the potential anarchy of 
inquiry which is'encouraged by the complex-totality ideal. These sources 
are philosophical positivism (which later turns into sociological 
positivism) and a philosophy which should (cf. Kolakowski, 1968, whose 
classic account of positivism I follow) be seen as an extension of this, 
namely,: conventionalism (which appears in sociology as idealism). We 
shall see that both of these philosophies are paradoxical in that they 
attempt to simultaneously restrict inquiry (to make it scientific) and, 
at the same time, give it'complete freedom. That philosophers should have 
pursued these seemingly incompatible goals is not surprising if we consider 
the historical circumstances in which these philosophies were for the 
most part worked out. For most of the history of these philosophies 
science was waging an ideological war against arbitrary impositions, 
mostly from ecclesiastical quarters. Science had to both assert its 
freedom and justify its claim to be the provide of 'controlled' knowledge. 
The working through of thes: historical concerns to a model of scientific 
inquiry has, however, left the paradox intact. The central weakness 
which this paradox has produced from our point of view is that, because 
of the preoccupation with freedom, philosophers have been willing to do 
no more than- offer criteria by which we are entitled to say 'this is 
knowledge's From their undoubtedly strong 'bargaining' position this 
was all that the philosophers on behalf of scientists were prepared to 
concede. Great reluctance has been shown by philosophers and scientists 
in disclosing or analysing how knowledge is acquired in the first place. 
This weakness seems to me to be fatal for OR which, if it needs any sound 
theory, needs a theory of inquiry itself. Churchman has, of course, made 
this the theme of much of his work (particularly, 1971). I shall give 
his work a detailed consideration in later chapters. 
/27 
'ý` 
Let us see, then, what connections can be made between OR and 
positivism. No one person, nor even OR as a whole, has a consistent 
and completely worked out positivistic scheme of inquiry. Enough strands 
are evident, however, for the influence of positivistic thinking to be 
justifiably considered a significant thread in the theory of OR. It is 
(to carry on the metaphor) interwoven with the conventionalist thread in 
various ways to produce OR's philosophical garb. 
The Nature of Positivism: 
There are many varieties of positivism, and I cannot possibly deal 
with all of them here. Most often positivism appears as a dominant 
orientation which admits many interpretations 
(in this respect it is 
similar to a paradigm: see chapter 3). ' Positivism'does, however, offer 
the prospect of control. Kolakowski observes that 
"Defined in the most general terms pos- 
itivism is a collection of prohibitions 
concerning human knowledge, intended to 
confine the name 'knowledge' or 'science' 
to the results of thoEeoperations that 
are observable in the evolution of the 
modern sciences of nature" (p. 18). 
Positivism, as a general philosophy, lays down four 'rules' of control 
(Kolakowski, pp. 11-19). 
The first is the "Rule "of-Phenomenalism'". This is the basic rule 
of positivism. According to positivism "we are entitled to record only 
that which is actually manifested in experience; opinions concerning occult 
entities of which experienced things are supposedly the manifestions are 
untrustworthy" (p. 11). This rule is designed to prevent questions about 
what, if anything 'lies behind' our observations, i. e., what generates them. 
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These questions are ruled out as tmeaningless?. The limits of knowledge, 
its 'raw material', are phenomena. Any attempt to extend the limits of 
knowledge beyond that which can be experienced is forbidden. This gives 
rise to the second "Rule of Nominalismrr% 
"The Rule of Nominalism states that we may not assume that any 
insight formulated in general terms can have any real referents other 
than individual concrete objects" (p. 13).,. Theories, for the nominalist, 
are merely convenient and useful ways of ordering experience. They do 
not extend the limits of our knowledge; in themselves theories do not 
constitute knowledge. They 'represents our true knowledge which is limited 
to our experience. Theories, in short, have no "ontological status" (cf. 
Keat and Urry, 1975, Chapter 1) in that they do not describe any reality 
beyond the experiences which they represent. "According to nominalism, 
in other words, every abstract science is a method of abridging the 
recording of experiences and gives us no extra, independent knowledge in 
the sense that, via its abstractions, it opens access to empirically in- 
accessible domains of reality" (pp. 15-16). 
An extension of nominalism is the "rule that refuses to call value 
judgements and normative statements knowledge" (p. 16). Values do not 
exist of themselves except as subjective experience. Unless we can reduce 
them to phenomena they do not constitute knowledge. 
(1) 
The final rule, which follows phenomenalism in particular, is 
11... a belief in the essential unity of the scientific method" (p. 17). 
(1) Ackoff and Emery (1972) have attempted to construct a methodology for 
behavioural research following this rule. I consider it in detail in the 
final chapter. 
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This rule also follows from positivism's general orientation towards 
only providing criteria for valid knowledge. If knowledge is restricted 
to phenomena, then it follows that all the sciences (that iss only those 
areas of inquiry which deal with phenomena) are subject to the same 
criteria. To admit that different sciences deal with fundamentally 
different realities (even while admitting that they deal with different 
phenomena) would be to deny the place of phenomena as the seat of knowledge. 
Because the origins of knowledge are irrelevant to the status of knowledge 
we cannot distinguish between the sciences by reference to their subject- 
matters. 
Operational Research and Positivism: 
The unity of science is an ideal which has inspired much thinking 
about OR's theory of inquiry. The latent (but unfulfilled) hope has been 
that such a theory could be provided by an application of a 'logic of 
science'. That is, in the spirit of positivism, an analysis of science 
which is conducted at a 'meta' level, independently of the "... actual 
and varying specific contents of different scientific theories" (Keat 
and Urry, op. cit., p. 25). In keeping with this general positivistic 
orientation Ackoff (1962) is "... not... concerned... with the body of 
information and knowledge which... (science)... has generated; that is, 
not with the specific theories, - laws, and facts that have been developed 
in the various physical, life, and behavioural sciences". "Insteadll, he 
says, he is "... concerned with the procedures by which science generates 
this body of knowledge, the process of inquiry" (p. 5). This reference' 
comes from a book'dedicated to scientific method, so perhaps the bias is 
not surprising. However, the whole work rests on the assumption that for 
the purposes of OR (or, tmore generally, 
"applied science") what is really 
significant is what is general to science, rather than what can be learned 
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from its accumulated knowledge. Ackoff has also made little attempt to 
redress the bias (an exception is his 1974 work which I discuss in the 
final chapter). This bias is common throughout OR circles, with many 
discussions on the nature of OR being restricted to "The Scientific 
Method" (Goodeve, 1957); "The Nature of Science and Methodology" (Ackoff, 
op. cit., Chapter 1); "Science and Operations Research'' (Minas, 1961), and 
so on. 
A phenomenalist and nominalist basis for this bias is clearly 
evident in the work of bothAckoff and Beer. -Although we have seen Ackoff 
argue (rather half-heartedly we concluded) that scientific status depended 
in part on possessing a distinctive subject-matter, this view is all but 
abandoned when he comes to discuss the interdisciplinary nature of OR. 
Displaying his nominalist base he argues that "the division of science 
into disciplines was accomplished by man, not by-nature". (1960, p. 24). 
The phenomenalist in him comes out when he immediately goes on to argue 
that "the disciplines cannot be individuated by a unique set of objects 
or events which constitute their subject matter, but they are distinguished 
by the aspect of phenomena to which they direct their attention " (ibid). 
For Ackoff all that is distinctive about a discipline is that it "... 
concern(s) itself with... (specific)... aspects of... phenomena" (ibid). 
If this is all that is significant about the different scientific disc- 
iplines, then OR as an 'interdiscipline° is a short and logically com- 
pelling step. The complex-totality ideal can be met by the employment of 
an interdisciplinary team because "in the operation of a system... the 
aspect... (of phenomena)... of the system which can be manipulated no as to 
improve its performance are likely to come from many different disciplines" 
(p. 25). The positivistic inspiration for the interdisciplinary team idea 
is that the team would cohere around the logic of science. In the ideal 
all subjects would be represented, and their contributions, by this line 
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of reasoning, would be processed by a logic higher than that of the 
subjects themselves. Thus, Beer argues 
"... the OR man seeks other kinds of natural 
law than those normally investigated academ- 
ically, namely those which are themselves 
interdisciplinary. For these are laws that 
apply to systems in general, and to control 
in general - these are the laws that manage- 
ment would like to discover" (p. 119). 
In Part Two I shall amongst other things assess Beer's attempts to provide 
an account of such laws as it is formulated in terms of a theory of manage- 
ment and a cybernetic model of organizations. 
Phenomenalism is for OR a way of claiming from, as Beer puts it, 
the stereotypes of science working on given problems with predetermined 
solutions. In Beer's view "the intellectual revolution of twentieth - 
century science... (which)... has been accepted by the scientist... (is 
that)... it is proper to his work to uncover the essential characteristics 
of things" (p. 1+, my emphasis). That is, we have come to the "... real- 
ization that science is basically concerned with investigating how and 
why things are es they are". This means that "science, in fact, is org- 
anised knowledge about the world, not organised knowledge about itself" 
(ibid). It is merely a historical accidait that the investigation of the 
world is grouped around 'subjects' and Beer sees this as an unfortunate 
ýý... hardening of the faculties" which means that investigation is 'slanted' 
(p. 5). This conception of science as investigation into a subject 
matter is merely a "... confusion in the public mind between science and 
technology". Only for the technologist is it relevant to ask "'Uhat is 
your subject"' because the real scientist has to reply 'U'I investigate the 
world"' (ibid). "... (s)cience is not a thing done by physicists, nor a 
thing done by chemists" but is "the establishment of knowledge about the 
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world" (p. 10). In Beer's view, then, "... nature is the subject-matter 
of science" (P. 55). 
This phenomenalism is blended with a radical nominalism around the 
interdisciplinary team concept. Although in the previous chapter we have 
seen him argue that what distinguishes the scientist from laymen is his 
exercise of freewill, he is concerned that the scientist's training in 
practice "... gives him a bias" so that "the scientist, like those he 
seeks to advise, tends to be a prisoner within the accepted boundaries 
of the existing solution" (p. 48). We shall see shortly that this worry 
comes to dominate his thinking about science and the nominalism expressed 
here turns into conventionalism. To counteract this tendency he suggests 
that "... when a new area of study is being opened up, it is as well to 
use an interdisciplinary team" (ibid) because then the scientists "... do 
not play individually stereotyped roles" (p. 49). Apparently it is 
Beer's view that merely being in a team will mean that the scientists 
it... are neither stereotyped nor committed in advance to a point of view" 
(p. 50). The idea of an interdisciplinary team, therefore, is that by their 
interaction the many separate biases will be neutralised. OR searches 
for "completely novel solutions" (more on this in a-moment) so that "... it 
cannot be predicted in advance which branch of science will 
be most useful in suggesting the breakthrough" (ibid). Conceptions of 
subject matter (theories) ought to be treated completely nominally. They 
are often not, so the next best thing is to, in some overall sense, 
neutralize biases to make them nominal in effect if not in origin. Another 
implication of the neutralizing-hypothesis is that, in Beer's view at 
least, science is neutral as regards its subject-matter. This implication 
is borne out by his subsequent discussion about models (I have more to 
say about this in Chapter 5). 
I 
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The strictures of both Beer and Ackoff that science is concerned 
with phenomena is the basis of their complaint against individual scientific 
disciplines: Phenomenalism "... require(s) that we distinguish between 
the true content of the data of experience (appearances, phenomena) and 
such illegitimate extrapolations from it as present the qualities we 
observe as qualities inherent in the nature of things... " (Kolakowski, 
op. cit., p. 20). For both Beer and Ackoff the scientific disciplines 
represent precisely these illegitimate extrapolations.. Beer tales this 
point to the extremes of both nominalism and phenomenalism. Of the OR 
scientist (and one presumes he has a team in mind here rather than an 
individual) he-argues that 
"he has no interest in arguing about the 
fright'-use of... (for example)... a 
psychological term, but only in the re- 
sults. So the OR man is a special kind.. 
of scientist, for he does not have to 
bother with determining the laws govern- 
ing basic natural phenomena such as learn- 
ing. This is a preoccupation for the ac- 
ademic animal psychologist who has a spec- 
ial responsibility to define the terms to 
be used in his science, and to denote the 
mechanisms for which terms will stand. The 
OR man has, however, other concerns which 
do not preoccupy the academic scientist who 
normally regards himself as a specialist in 
a fairly narrow field. He must operate 
across the various scientific disciplines, -. 
being sufficiently knowledgeable and men- 
tally agile to identify the model he needs... " 
(p. 119). 
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OR is not interested in the subject-matters of science; for OR they are 
purely nominal representations of phenomena. Combined with his earlier 
views a similar conclusion is implied by Ackoff's (197k) statement that 
"although concrete systems and their environments are objective things, 
they are also subjective insofar as the particular configuration of 
elements that form both is dictated by the interests of the'researcher" 
(p. 84). I shall return in a later chapter to the concept of totality 
which is implied by these views. For the present we can begin to see 
what Beer means when he talks of "... uncovering the mechanism which 
underlies... " (p. 70) facts. 
Insight is gained into OR's theory of inquiry by its links with 
the distinctly American philosophy of pragmatism. Elements of this 
philosophy underlie the views which we have so far considered, and they 
underlie others which we shall consider shortly. Pragmatism is linked 
to positivism in being, in some versions, an interpretation of positivism 
into a 'way of life' (Kolakowski, op. cit., Chapter 7). This extension 
of positivism is a-natural one for OR to make being concerned, -as 
it is, 
with the practical. Beer specifically links his conception of the nature 
of science to the well-known pragmatist Charles Peirce whose early work 
had marked positivist tendency. However, the extremity of Beer's views 
links him more closely with the interpretation of pragmatism given by 
William James. Beer shares with James (and most other operations research- 
ers) the belief that there is an "... opposition between impartial 
explanatory knowledge and useful knowledge... " (Kolakowski, op. cit., p. 188). 
(Much of my later criticism of OR is in fact directed at just this dis- 
tinction). James is very similar to Peirce in arguing that the meaning of 
our theories is their practical applications, and does not refer to 
unobservable underlying reality. However, he went further to assert that 
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... we are right not only to behave as though the world looks this way 
or that, but also to entertain the idea that it is truly this way or 
that" (Kolakowski, op. cit., p. 189). For James the consequences of a 
theory exhausts its meaning and its truth; for Peirce (and for Beer 
sometimes) truth was still restricted to a "... correspondence between 
judgements and actual states of affairs" (p. 187). For both James and 
Beer 
"It makes no. sense to ask, $How are things 
really constituted? ' but only, 'What do I 
get if I believe this or that? '... Science 
is not a collection of truths in any curr- 
ent, traditional, metaphysical, or trans- 
cendental sense, but a collection of prac- 
tical directives that make sense when they 
can be carried out, and that are true when 
they further life, multiply energy, provide 
gratification". (p. 191). 
We have seen Beer express a similar view as regards OR as an interdiscip- 
linary science. The link with Jamesian pragmatism is forged with views 
such as the following: 
"It is worth remembering above all that 
facts are no use without a specification 
of why they are needed... Secondly, and 
this is a far more sophisticated point, 
the purpose behind data collection alters 
the facts that are-collected" (p. 71). 
"The simple-minded notion of 'objective 
measurements collapses under close exam- 
ination. It turns out that measurements 
/36 
are themselves based on theory, since there 
must be a purpose in mind when the measuring 
instruments are devised" (p. 96). 
"Science is certainly based upon fact and 
experiment; but the organization of its 
findings into coherent and useful general- 
izations is a subjective process... It 
therefore comes about that the so-called laws 
of nature are contingent, and not absolute; 
they are contingent on the languages we use 
to express them, both as to the structure 
of those languages and their frame of refer-, 
ence" (p. 121o. Idote that this statement is 
verging on a conventionalist view; I turn to 
this later). 
Both Churchman (especially 1961a) and Ackoff (1962) show marked pragmatic 
tendencies. This can be seen in their treatment of defining, an activity 
which occupies a central place in their thinking. Both are preoccupied 
with operationalizing definitions, and both follow Peirce (and other 
positivists, particularly Bridgman and Stevens) who argues, as Kolakowski 
puts it, that "every work denoting a thing or a quality must be subjected 
to the pragmatic test before it can be legitimately employed. To know 
what it means we must state the, practical steps by which we can verify 
whether a given object corresponds to the word in question" (p. 186). 
However, they too veer towards. Jamesian pragmatism when they insist on 
the crucial role of purpose. Thus, Ackoff says that 
"To determine whether or not two oper- 
ations are the same requires that we crake 
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explicit the sense in which we want sameness 
to be taken. This requires an explicit state- 
ment of the purpose for establishing diff- 
erence or similarity between two or more op- 
erations" (1962, p. 143). 
Without giving his work the detailed consideration it warrants, we can 
note that Churchman also adopts the pragmatic stance when he defines 
"measurement.. e functionally... (as)... the organization of experiences 
in such a way that they codetermine purposive decisions in a wide variety 
of contexts... " (1961a, p. 101). This definition follows on from his 
earlier discussion of the"theoretical content of facts" (1961a, Chapter=. 4) 
in which he poses the question: It... if the ultimate authority of obser- 
vation or fact is removed, what has become of the objectivity of science? " 
(p. 87). He goes on: 
"Of course, to say that observation and meas- 
urement are theoretical constructs is not to 
say that they are fantasies of the mind or 
rational constructions without any ties to 
reality. But one must now think of reality 
and objectivity in different terms. Once 
the notion of "ultimate" authority is given 
up, one can no longer assert that the real 
_ 
is what is directly observed. Wherein lies 
the objectivity of science? 
The answer that most naturally comes 
to mind is that the objectivity of science , 
lies - not in what it takes to be the ul- 
timate authority - but in what it seeks to 
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accomplish" (p. 89). 
The association of OR with nominalism in general and pragmatism 
in particular can be seen as an attempt to claim the freedom of inquiry 
which we encountered in Chapter 1. As F: olakowski says of it: 
"... pragmatist philosophy amounts to a 
kind of epistemological Jesuitism, a basic 
readiness to accept anything and every- 
thing, and boundless flexibility in applying 
evaluative rules in knowledge. Any other 
view is exposed to the objection of being 
rigidly dogmatic, of sacrificing the real 
values of life to'abstract metaphysical 
fictions. This is indeed the case once it is 
granted that reality has no inherent qual- 
ities that can be interpreted as such, but 
is merely a collection of opportunities for 
individual success, and that this exhausts 
its possible meaning" (op. cit., p. 194). 
In the pragmatist view the truth of anything depends on usefulness. This 
has the consequence that the "... scope of the truths we are entitled 
to accept is altogether unlimited, so long as they are useful to us in 
any respect whatsoever" (p. 193). With a pragmatic philosophical base, 
therefore, OR still has its unlimited freedom. Also, of course, it is 
still open to the charge that OR's theory of inquiry is that 'anything 
goes'. In response to this state of affairs two different strategies have 
been proposed. These two strategies, although both responding to the 
potential anarchy of pragmatism, have perceived this danger in slightly 
different ways. In one strategy the fear is that the scientist, because 
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of his innate subjectivity, will persist (unless appropriate steps are 
taken) in having a narrow and biased view of reality (the whole system). 
The whole system is seen in strongly phenomenalist terms as all aspects 
of all phenomena. We have seen Ackoff express this view. As the danger 
is seen to come from the tendency of the scientist to reify his subject- 
matter, the strategy adopted here is to devise ways whereby the scientist 
(and/or science as a whole) is forced to de-reify subject-matter. The 
interdisciplinary team idea is a crude example of this. Popper and his 
followers (particularly Lakatos) have devised more sophisticated schemes. 
The objective of this strategy, in short, is that the scientist (or science) 
be forced to orientate himself to reality. In the second strategy the 
fear is not that the scientist (or science) will not be oriented to reality; 
it is accepted that scientists will inevitably and always reify their 
subject-matters. Direct access to reality is not seen as a possibility 
and so the second strategy does not attempt to achieve this. The fear 
which motivates the second strategy is that the inevitably reified schemes 
employed by scientists (sometimes called weltanschauungen, paradigms, 
or even just frameworks) will not, in some sense, 'match uplýto the whole 
system. -There is some doubt in this strategy as to the terms in which the 
whole system is perceived. I shall argue in the next chapter that the 
effect, if not the intention, of this'strategy is the same as would have 
been achieved if it had straight-forwardly been perceived in phenomenalist 
terms. This notwithstanding for the moment, the second strategy may be 
summed up as the attempt to design some kind of system so that the reified 
schemes (or scheme, for science as a whole) at least progresses towards 
an eventual encompassing of the whole system. (Churchman, particularly 1971, 
has considered several such attempts). The interdisciplinary team idea 
can be interpreted in this way as well but, conceptually at least, they 
are distinct strategies. The first strategy is positivism proper, and I 
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shall use the strategy put forward by Popper as an examplar of this. 
The second strategy is the conventionalist alternative which arises as 
a reaction to the positivist strategy but which, we shall see in Chapter 
3, is subject to the same weaknesses. As an examplar for this strategy 
I choose Kuhn's work. For the remainder of this chapter I consider the 
positivist strategy and the conventionalist criticisms which have been 
made of it. I shall then turn to a more detailed consideration of the 
conventionalist alternative. 
Strategies of Inquiry: 
It follows from the pragmatist view of truth - what is true is 
what is useful- that straightforward phenomenalism has to be abandoned. 
We cannot say straightforwardly that our perceptions are true because 
we do not straightforwardly know that they will be useful. Because the 
whole system is seen as being immensely complex it is beyond the wit of 
any individual (or in Popper's version, for the whole of science for all 
of time) to grasp it. 
(1) 
Perceptions of phenomena, therefore, are bound 
to be partial, and we cannot rely on them in any straightforward sense to 
be a part of the whole. Phenomena may mislead us in their partiality. 
It is this view which is responsible for OR's demand for freedom from 
external impositions - subject-matter, management, and even given facts - 
on its process of inquiry. This view is also responsible for Popper's view 
that 'ý... there are all kinds of sources of our knowledge; but none has 
(1) As Popper (1963) puts it, we live in a world Ehere "... our know- 
led6e can only be finite, chile our ignorance raust necessarily be 
infinite" (p. 29). 
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authority" (1963, p. 24). To take what perhaps seems the clearest and 
most authoritative source of knowledge, namely, observation, Popper 
concludes that "... the programme of tracing back all knowledge to its 
ultimate source in observation is logically impossible to carry through: 
it leads to an infinite regress" (p. 23). This is so because "every witness 
must always make ample use, in his report, of his knowledge of persons, 
places, things, linguistic usages, social conventions, and so on" (p. 22). 
In other words, ".. all observation involves interpretation in the light 
of our theoretical knowledge... " (p. 23), and it is logically impossible 
to unravel all these 'theories' and reduce them to observational reports. 
Habermas (1974), to whom we turn in a moment for some insightful criticisms 
of Popperian epistemology, sums up Popper's central thesis in the following 
way: "... the sources of knowledge - pure thought, established tradition 
and sense experience - all lack authority. None of them.. (or any others) 
... can lay claim 
to immediate evidence and primary validity and conse- 
quently to the power of legitimation. The sources of knowledge are always 
contaminated; the way to their origins is barred to us" (p. 199). 
There iss of course, a fundamental problem which this recognition 
entails. It is that scientists may rest content with their partial views; 
then even the possibility of a whole system view would be lost. Popper 
airs this view in a discussion of Kuhn's notion of "normal science", 
which I shall discuss in more detail in the following chapter but which 
can be taken here, simply, to mean the acceptance by scientists of a 
partial view as a basis for their work. . 
Popper describes this acceptance as 
"... the activity of the non-revolutionary, 
or more precisely, the not-too-critical 
professional: of the science student who 
accepts the ruling dogma of the day; who 
does not wish to challenge it; and who 
bý 
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accepts a nei, 4 revolutionary theory only if 
almost everybody else is ready to accept it 
- if it becomes fashionable by a kind of 
bandwagon effect. To resist a new fashion 
needs perhaps as much courage as was needed 
to bring it about" (1970, P. 52). 
The consequence of this attitude Popper sees as nothing less than "... a 
danger to science and, indeed, to our civilization" (p. 53). Commenting 
on his recognition "... that facts, which are popularly supposed to be 
neutral, turn out to be purposive, because of the way they are assimilated 
into a situation", Beer goes on to make an identical point: 
"This state of affairs is dangerous to 
science, if it. is not clearly recognized, 
for it can block new discoveries. Progress 
in science might well be defined as the 
overthrow of a model, and its appurtenances, 
that has exhausted its usefulness. The 
great scientist is one who sees the need 
and the moment to destroy a model - and 
who can also create its successor" 
(op. cito p. 122). 
As the last part of this quotation from Beer shows, he sees as a necessary 
condition (though not a sufficient one as we shall see in a moment) for 
progress in science that prevailing. 1though blocks' be overthrown: 
although "... science collects more and more observations about the world, 
and undertakes more and more experimentation, discovery often awaits 
a conceptual breakthrough, a bursting of the thought blocks of the 
scientist himself" (p. 121). So, too, with Popper. It is a necessary 
condition for progress in science that scientists "... discuss fundamentals 
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- that is, the very framework of our assumptions" (op. cit., p. 56). 
In his view "... if we try, we can break out of our framework at any 
time" (ibid). 
The metaphor which has readily come to mind to both highlight the 
necessity for overthrowing prevailing frameworks and to indicate the 
nature of the process (I come to this in a moment) is that of adaption. 
This is in line with the "... whole evolutionist current of positivism, 
the reduction of knowledge to a biological instrument of adaption... " 
(Kolakowski, op. cit., p. 246). This follows from the positivist denial 
of the possibility of "... faith in experience or reason if they are 
conceived of as capable of revealing something to us of 'the worldIs 
qualities"" (p. 247). Knowledge as biological behaviour is the only 
possible answer left to the question of the nature of knowledge if all 
questions of its origin are ruled out of court as metaphysical. 
Popper (1973) distinguishes three levels of adaption: "genetic 
adaption; adaptive behavioural learning; and scientific discovery... " 
The latter, he says , 11... 
is a special case of adaptive behavioural 
learning" (p. 73) which "... may be regarded as a means used by the 
human species to adapt itself to the environment" (ibid). Beer (1966, 
Chapter 2) distinguishes two forms of adaption by combining Popper's 
first two types (although following Peirce, he distinguishes sub-classes 
of the first type). Beer1s problem (as is Popper's here and elsewhere) 
is to distinguish 'scientific reasoning' from other 'modes of thinking'. 
The brain, Beer says, is merely a rather good adaptive device. Brains 
are "... constructed as machines for reinforcing successful combinations 
of neural events, and reducing the probabilities that alternative 
combinations will be tried" (p. 18). Normal thinking is merely an adap-. 
tation (Beer often refers to it as 'conditioned') to external events and 
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contingencies. However, this puts man in a precarious position because 
It... the device which works so well in adapting the animal to its envir- 
onment is no blessing when an intellectual breakthrough is required" 
(p. 20). Then "... the brain is not always equal to the task" (p. 21). 
Everything is fine "... so long as the social, economic and industrial 
environments change slowly... " but the problem is that they don't. 
This means that "unless those responsible for policy-making abandon , 
this method, and turn to other ways of exploiting their cerebral equipment, 
our society will not adapt sufficiently quickly, and we shall become 
economically extinct" (ibid). The message is clear: what is required is 
some form of super-adaptive process - enter OR as science to the rescue. 
Hence the raison d'etre of OR: managers (unless they are trained 
as OR scientists - Ackoff and Rivett, 
(p. 96) - or unless they are 'top' 
management) cannot do OR if they have the time from normal duties (See: 
Beer, op. cit., p. 51) because their normal duties of adaption make them 
completely unsuited to undertake the super-adaptation of the scientist. 
However, in a 'complex' world mere 'managing' is clearly not enough, 
and it is in recognition of this fundamental that Beer 
(and many others) 
seeks to find for OR "... its meaning in its origin and early days" - 
(p. 33). He refers, of course, to 'war-time OR', a period of activity 
to which many operations researchers turn to discover the 'essence' of 
OR, and Beer explains why it serves so well as an examplar for present 
day OR. It does so because it illustrates, par excellence, revolutionary 
science in action in response to the failure of traditional ways. Beer 
explains: the situation was clearly one of crisis; things were going 
drastically wrong, and all: this in a situation where as he puts it, 
if... a large number of sacred cows had laid down and died" (p. 34). 
In a war situation, he says, which is entirely analogous to that in an 
I industrial undertaking, "... it turns out that nothing happens exactly 
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as was expected" (p. 38). In this perfectly typical situation, he goes 
on, "the scientific description of the whole situation has to be rewritten, 
which is a job for operational research". ( p. 41). This war-time situation 
suggests to him-"... a remarkably characteristic feature of an operational 
research solution. It often", he says, "lies outside the framework of 
possibilities ever contemplated by the managerial solution. This means 
that the mixture of experience, knowledge and straight thinking by which 
the management's policy has been reached, has managed to delineate a range 
within which the answer is expected tolie, and the answer chosen is roughly 
in the middle of this range. The inexplicable failure of the management's 
policy, which is normally the signal for introducing operational research, 
often means that the best answer has unfortunately been excluded from the 
collection of plausible policies that management is prepared to belive 
offer solutions that really count". (pp. 44-45). It is on the basis of 
this view of the adaptive function of OR that Beer (as we have seen) 
attacks the stereotypes of science. It follows from 'complex world- 
simple mans view and it provides the "... reason why it takes an objective,, 
scientific, interdisciplinary investigation to arrive at a solution outside 
the phase space -a study undertaken by men who are by definition not 
prone to this particular thought block" (p. 61). 
Many other leading operations researchers define knowledge, from an 
OR point of view, in terms of its adaptive function. Thus, Churchman, 
Ackoff and Arnoff (opo cit. ) remark that "... one of the functions of OR 
with its mixed discipline teams is to increase an organization's memory - 
by bringin in a collection of knowledge different from that of the org- 
anization's routine - and to aid its consciousness (the executives) in 
developing and evaluation alternatives for action" ( p. 85). An important 
role for OR is the enhancement of the "self-repair" capability of the 
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organization tiihich, although it is a 'high level. ' 'reflective goal- 
changing unit' which concciously adapts itself - in that it can engage 
in "conscious learning... (and)... can be selective and take, from a 
wide range of external information sources, that information relevant 
to the organization's survival or other major goalht' (p. 83) - that 
adaptation may be 'faulty'. Thus they say that "the consciousness could 
be expected to show all the faults, in its operation, that we might find 
in humans or executive groups which run organizations: delusions, faulty 
direction, misinterpretation of messages, lack of awareness of new 
opportunities, poorly defined operating goals and the rest" 
(pp. 84-5)- 
With this conception of the capabilities of the organization without the 
input of OR it is not surprising that they earlier advocated the 'team 
approach' partly on the grounds that "those in control of a system may 
be unaware of one or more of... (the)... aspect... (of a problem)... and 
hence have an incomplete picture of their system" (p. 10). 
Very few operations researchers write in such a direct way as Beer 
and Churchman, Ackoff and Arroff, and yet many more advocate revolutionary 
science as the raison d'etre of OR and implicitly rely on the knowledge 
of adaptation. Relatively recently there have been published articles by 
two leading operations researchers (Wagner, 1971, and Rivett, 1974) which, 
in their strong criticism of the conception of OR as techniques and their 
refinement, reflect this fundamental belief. It is expressed in the view 
that OR is a revolutionary science dedicated to the formulation and solution 
of problems beyond the reach of normal management. Rivett in his article 
'Perspective for Operational Research' commences with the claim that "... 
growth of... organizations... is one of the fundamentals of all organiz- 
ations" (p. 225) and later adds "... the basic need for survival which, 
together with growth, underpins all organizational objectives" (p. 227). 
t 
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He believes that OR has concentrated on the development and use of 
techniques and that this has prevented it from effectively helping to 
achieve these goals. More generally, he believes that it has hindered 
OR in the achievement of its historic promise. The promise is that 
11... when we look at a particular area of an organization's activity and 
try to create a model which represents that activity we are doing so 
not in order to descrive that activity in some logical connected way as is 
usual in science at large but rather in orde`to enable a better achievement 
of the organisation's objectives to be made" (pp. 226-7). To discover 
the objectives of an organization we must not, he says, be misled by 
individual pronouncements (ibid). 
Wagner diagnoses a 'coming battle for survival' in OR, and the 
response which he considers appropriate is a strong shift towards a 
'professional' rather than a 'technical' outlook., The background just- 
ification for this shift is the remark made back in 1953 by Levinson that 
It... the successful operations-research department can render an invaluable 
service by keeping top management informed of significant trends, either 
inside the business or in the business's relation to its environment, 
which may have an impact on executive decisions" (Wagner, 1971, p. 1261). 
The implication flowing from all these views is that OR starts 
where normal processes of adaption fail. The truths which operational 
researchers seek are pragmatic, and there is nothing quite so pragmatic 
as survival. - As a sympathetic reviewer of Popper's philosophy notes, 
"... Popper's theory of knowlecfe is coterminous with a theory of 
evolution. Problem-solving is that primal activity: and the primal problem 
is survival" (Magee, 1973, p" 57). 
The pragmatic view of truth immediately directs formulations of 
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theories of inquiry towards process models. Clearly, if truth is what 
is useful for adaptation we can never have truth itself because the 
environment (including our purposes) may change and negate what was 
once 'the' truth. Thus, "Popper's notion of 'the truth' is very like 
this: our concern in the pursuit of knowledge is to Get closer and 
closer to the truth, and we may even know that we have made an advance, 
but we can never know if we have reached our goal" (Magee, op. cit., p. 28). 
A guarantee that progress is in fact being made is required by this view 
of truth, and such guarantees are sought by all. From the OR side it 
has been Churchman above all others who has persistently argued this point. 
The nature of the guarantees demarcates for us the positivist from the 
conventionalist'strategies. Within the positivist frame of reference 
there are two major alternatives for the role of guarantor. Firstly, 
one may choose the phenomenal world as the guarantor. In his direct 
intercourse with the facts the scientist is prevented from persistently 
pursuing non-adaptive ideas. Alternatively, one may focus on the adaptive 
process itself and concentrate on the usefulness of the knowledge as a 
basis for its acceptance irrespective of the empirical compulsion to do 
so. Because of the nature of the process itself science is compelled to 
accept useful ideas and reject those which are not useful. 
Facts as' Guarantor: 
The metaphor of adaption carries riith it the implication that there 
exists 'selective pressures, an 'environment' which vetos non-adaptive 
mutations, and rewards useful ones. Popper's best known contribution 
to the philosophy of science is his statement of view that for science 
the environment can only be a sure guarantor in its vetoing function; we 
get very little guidance on our successes. This view follows partly from 
his belief in man as a free agent who exploits nature. Its main impetus 
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however, comes from his conception of the enormity of the whole system and 
the intellectual impossibility of doing more than correcting mistakes 
(see, particularly, 1957)" His ardent for falsification and against 
induction (or verification) follows from this, and so his "... propos(al) 
to replace... the question of the sources of our knowledge by the entirely 
different question: 'Ho1"w can we hope to detect and eliminate error? " 
(1963, p. 25). 
Popper's limitation of the 'language' of adaption to one or two 
word utterances - 'no' or 'not disproved' - does not affect the positiv- 
istic nature of his scheme, even though he argues that he is not a 
positivist (by which he appears to mean inductivist). The fundamental 
claim made by Popper is that progress in science is guaranteed by the 
ability of the scientist to directly compare the predictions of theories 
with-the 'facts'. Thus, he says, "the proper epistemological question 
is not one about sources; rather, we ask whether the assertion made is true 
- that is to say, whether it agrees with the facts... And we try to find 
this out, as well as we can, by examining or testing the assertion itself; 
either in a direct way, or by examining or testing its consequences" 
(op. cit., p. 27). A fundamental implication of this view is the further 
one that facts and theories are independent in the sense that theories 
can vary independently of the facts. This further view is indicated by 
Popper's insistence that the philosophy of science is solely concerned 
with the 'logic of science' implying that science as a whole talks with 
a metalanguage (cf. Beer, p. 208) within which disputes between theories 
can be resolved. The metalaxgudge which Popper has in mind is what has 
been dubbed the 'neutral observational language'. Kuhn has observed of 
Popper's scheme that his falsification rule "... require(s) that both the 
epistemological investigator and the research scientist be able to relate 
sentences derived from a theory not to other sentences but to actual 
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observations and experiments" (p. 15). Later on, in replying to his 
critics, he clarifies his view of the Popperian scheme. "The point-by- 
point comparison of two successive theories demands", he says, "a 
language into which at least the empirical consequences of both can be 
translated without loss or change". This means, he goes on, that "... 
theories can be compared by recourse to a basic vocabulary consisting 
entirely of words which are attached to nature in ways that are un- 
problematic and, to the extent necessary, independent of theory" (p. 266, 
my, emphasis). 
Habermas has made an identical point. iiabermas wages war on 
Positivism, and whilst noting that Popper has done much to rid us of the 
idea of 'immediate knowledgel, he argues that"... for all his criticism, 
he shares in the last analysis a deep-seated positivistic prejudice., He 
assumes the epistomological independence of facts from the theories which 
should descriptively grasp these facts and the relations between them. 
Accordingly, tests examine theories against 'independent' facts". (1974, 
p. 200). As Kuhn (ibid) implies, the independence or neutrality of the 
required language for theory comparison is ideally based on a language 
"... consist(ing) of pure sense-datum terms plus syntactic connectives". 
Beer, too, resorts to a neutral observational language to salvage 
his conception of science from the ineptitude of the subjective scientist. 
It is Beer's view that the subjectivity of the scientist notwithstanding, 
for some reason a scientific ".. * model is simply a reflection of whatever 
is the case which is explicitly made available for experimentation" 
(p. 101). The reason is that "... science itself is in the long run 
protected against the dangers of its own intellectual apparatus. In the- 
firbt place';, he says, "it is founded on observation and experiment. 
Eventually the model that is no longer useful (we say 'that is seen to be 
false'), and the model that can no longer encompass the scope of the 
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scientist's insight (we say *that is seen to be trivial') are over- 
whelmed. For if objectivity and neutrality in science are nowadays 
regarded with more suspicion than our fathers showed in them, something 
of the objective and neutral breaks through into our work from outside 
ourselves" (pp. 122-3). In short, science has "... an objective language 
of fact and... models of reality... " (p. 123), and this is why Beer can 
so confidently assert that "... the laws that govern systems and indeed 
the laws that govern nature itself - and therefore scientific enquiry" 
(p. 120) even though "... the so-called laws of nature are contingent... 
on the languages we use to express them... " (p. 121). Churchman (1970b) 
has concluded that the view that the facts act as a guarantor is widespread 
in OR texts. He recounts his experience: "In almost every text I have 
examined, the discussion of data collection seems very strongly to imply 
that the data items are to be obtained by observation, i. e., that... (the 
data gathering step in 'doing OR')... is based on the classical empiricist 
notion'that the true events of external nature are to be learned through 
our senses" (p. B- 41). 
Before moving on to a brief consideration of conventionalist 
criticisms of this strategy and the alternative which it proposes (which 
are considered in more detail later) it is worth mentioning another 
feature of Popper's scheme which will be considered in an OR guise in 
Part Two, namely, the role of tradition. Although he sees science as 
ý'... consist(ing) of bold conjectures controlled by criticism and that 
it may, therefore, be described as revolutionary" (1970, p. 55), he 
has also "... always stressed the need for some dogmatism" (ibid). 
Because of the enormity of the whole system and the infinitude of possible 
speculations there has, for efficiency's sake, to be a degree of restraint 
imposed on scientist other than that provided by the facts. For Popper 
this restraint is provided by having scientists oriented to tradition as 
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the repository of the results (Imowledge and problems) of past adaptions. 
For the organism of science to adapt efficiently it must have the direction 
provided by its 'basic nature'. This basic nature is, as far as Popper 
is concerned, the accumulated heritage from the past. As Popper sees it, 
science works most efficiently when it presupposes the basic correctness 
of previous non-refuted theories. Subsequent science modifies but does 
not subvert. As Popper puts it, ... a scientific revolution, however 
radical, cannot really break with tradition, since it must presume the 
success of its predecessors" (1973, p" 93)" "This is why", he says, 
"scientific revolutions are rational" (ibid). They are rational because 
they refine the rationality embodied in tradition. For Popper, then, 
tradition plays an important role in rationally curbing the otherwise 
boundless freedom which he, like many operations researchers, claims 
for science. In Part Two we shall examine very closely a similar device 
employed by some operations researchers (for similar ends) as it arises 
in two forms. First, I will consider some attempts to give OR a rational 
basis which rest their case on a 'theory of management'. Second, I shall 
consider the rather more implicit attempts to achieve the same result 
which rely on a theory of the social world. 
Conventionalist Criticisms: 
Rivett (op. cit. ) remarks on "... one of the difficulties which 
we face in carrying out Operational Research". It is a difficulty which, 
he says, It... probably exists in all sciences, but in none... does it 
exist in such a severe or constraining form as in our own". The difficulty 
is that "there is, of course, no such thing as an Operational Research 
problem. There are not even such things as problems, in a concrete form 
... The problems only exist 
in our own minds. Hence there is a purely 
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subjective basis to our subject... " (p. 226). Conventionalists take such 
views very seriously and make them the cornerstone of their preferred 
strategy of inquiry. Conventionalists take for granted the nominalism 
of theories and their reification and ask, given these inevitable features 
of science, how things can be arranged such that the selection of theories 
is justifiable. As Kolakowski puts it: 
"The fundamental idea of conventionalism may 
be stated as follows: certain scientific 
propositions, erroneously taken for descrip- 
tions of the world based on the recording 
and generalization of experiments, are in 
fact artificial creations, and we regard 
them as true not because we are compelled to 
for empirical reasons, but because they are 
convenient, useful, or even because they 
have aesthetic'appeal. Conventionalists 
agree with empiricists on the origin of know- 
ledge, but reject empiricism as a norm that 
allows us to justify all accepted judgements 
by appealing to experience, conceived of as 
a sufficient criterion of their truth" 
(op. cit., p. 158). 
For the tnaiveI positivist theorj choice is determined by the' 
facts alone. For the conventionalist the facts are claimed to be only 
a necessary condition for theory choice; other criteria are, they assert, 
more important, and it thus falls to the conventionalist to demonstrate 
the rationality of these criteria and their application. The convention- 
alist critique starts with an analysis of the positivist conception of 
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'facts'. Conventionalists attempt to destroy the concept of fact as a 
basis for theory choice and in so doinG remove the opacit, r which they 
see surrounding the concept as it appears in positivist's hands. I 
shall be concerned in the later chapters of this first part with the 
question of whether this attempt is successful, and also with the 
further question of the consequences of (as it turns out) its failure 
on the ideals of OR. 
As we have seen, positivists assert the independence of facts from 
theories. That is to say, they claim that facts and theories constitute 
qualitatively distinct domains. It is possible, they claim, to move 
between these two domains by mans of the metalanguage of a neutral 
observational language, but the fundamental distinction between them 
is unaltered by this possibility. Conventionalists argue, on the contrary, 
that for the purposes of theory choice facts and theories constitute 
the same domain; they are qualitatively identical. Thus they claim that 
a neutral observational language is an impossibility. As Kolakowaki puts 
it: 
"The conventionalists deny that there is any 
such thing as 'pure experience', i. e., facts 
that do not involve theoretical presupposit- 
ions, but are recorded directly 'from nature', 
so to speak" (p. 16o). 
Acceptance of the interrelationship of fact and theory (sometimes 
posited on psychological grounds, sometimes on tie basis of the properties 
of language, and sometimes on logical grounds) implies the impossibility 
of either proving or disproving theories by means of the 'facts! because 
they, in various ways, presuppose theories. Thus, Churchman's criticism 
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of OR texts which imply that data are what are apprehended directly 
by the senses is based on their neglect of the "... ctronC philosophical 
tradition which says that all data are a combination of theory and 
sensation" (1970b, p. B- 42). Conventionalism is also the basis on 
which Churchman criticizes views, such as are expresses by Beer, that 
"laws" "... 'are conceptual devices by which we organize our empirical 
knowledge and predict the futures" (Beer, op. cit., p. 171, my emphasis). 
Churchman criticizes the positivism betrayed in such views because they 
rest on the assumption that facts are independently given to be organized 
(cf. Churchman, 1971, p. 60). As far as Churchman is concerned the 
"... "facts"... are based on assumptions about how the whole system should 
work or inevitable does work" (1970b, p. B- 1+? _). 
Thus, "the inconsistency 
of an hypothesis with an observation does not necessarily mean that the 
hypothesis is to be rejected: the measurements themselves may sensibly 
be rejected... " (Churchman, 1961a, p. 78). This is so because It... all 
description methodologically entails prediction... (and)... in general 
all measurement takes place within the context of a theory" (op. cit., 
p. 85: see also Ackoff, 1962, pp. 22-24 who follows Churchman). 
For OR the conventionalist criticism is a powerful one with 
profound implications. The criticism amounts, in Kolakowsli's view, to 
the argument that'!!... the data of experience always leave scope for more 
than one explanatory hypothesis, and which one is to be chosen cannot 
be determined by experience" (op. cit., p. 159). Or, as Keat and Urry 
(op. cit. ) put it, "there is the view that the truth or falisty of 
theories is 'under-determined' by empirical data" (p. 61). Positivism 
claimed to provide a way to grasp the whole system by reducing it, through 
its phenomenalist orientation, to, as Kolakowski puts it, a "hypothetical 
unity" (p. 41) which wgs to be found expressed in the direct experience 
of phenomena. Conventionalism's rebuttal of the purity of experience 
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is also, then, a rebuttal of the claim that we can grasp the whole 
system, so to speak, in 'parts'. In fact, conventionalists argue, we 
never understand things as isolated parts. Our very designation of 
the facts presupposes a larger view within which such facts are produced, 
as we have seen Churchman (1970b) argue, and it is a point which crops 
up regularly in his work (see for example: 1968a; 1971). If facts 
presuppose a view of the whole system then the positivist position, far 
from providing an adequate theory of inquiry for OR with which it can 
live up to its ideal of grasping the whole system, has merely pushed 
the most important question into the background. The question that 
arises from the conventionalist critique is: how can we 
justify the assumptions which we inevitably make about the whole system? 
For the conventionalist, the refusal of positivists to face this question 
makes their strategy of inquiry opaque. Habermas (1974) who although 
in many important ways is not a conventionalist, sums up the convention- 
alist concern very clearly. Commenting on Popperts scheme he concludes 
that in it It... whole problem-areas would have to be excluded from dis- 
cussion and relinquished to irrational attitudes, although, in... 
(his) 
... opinion they are perfectly open 
to critical elucidation" (p. 196). 
In his view in the Popperian scheme "... the meaning of the empirical 
validity of factual statements... is determined in advance by the 
definition of the conditions of refutation" (p. 201) and, therefore, 
` 
ýý... positivism... (is)... a fetish which merely grants to the mediated 
the illusion of immediacy" (ibid). 
At one point in his work Churchman phrases the concern in the form 
of the question: "What assures us that in our attempts to improve social 
systems we have considered all that it is possible to consider? " (1968, 
p. 171). The failure by the positivist to answer this question because 
of the urdertermined nature of facts rules positivism out as a serious 
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contender for the development of OR's theory of 
inquiry because, fund- 
amentally, operating within the positivist frame of reference 
inquiry 
is out of control. The facts, in this frame of reference, represent a 
denial of OR's ideal of free inquiry. They represent an arbitrary 
limitation on inquiry because they have to be taken as 'given', that is 
to say, they have to be taken as preconstituted entities the inquiry into 
which is forbidden. 
A popular conventionalist reaction to this imposition from positivism 
is to argue for an idealization of the fact. That is, instead of allow- 
ing the assumptions behind the facts to lie dormant and implicitly 
constitute-the facts, an attempt is made to bring the assumptions to 
consciousness (cf. Ackoff, 1962, Chapter 5) and in so doing explicitly 
determine the facts. Facts are thus determined by ideas and hence are 
idealisations. As Churchman says of the idealist who dominated his work: 
"For him the question "What is real? " 
means "What is realizable? " Since the 
realizable is an idea, he believes that 
ideas are primary; what we observe is a 
result of what we think about. Hence he 
interprets the first challenge to be a 
challenge of thought: How can we be sure 
that we have thought about everything 
that is relevant? " (1968a, p. 172). S 
As facts are determined by idealized conceptions, the only way to determine 
the whole system is to conceive it through an idealization of the whole 
system. Churchman recognizes that this is an impossible demand which 
is as open-ended as the pragmatic philosophy we encountered earlier. 
In fact, pragmatism is, often conjoined with idealism to produce, for 
example, the notion of idealized operational definitions. Under this 
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notion we should define a variable (for example) such that the operations 
whereby it is to be measured are specified in the definition in ideal 
terms. That is, the conditions of measurement are specified interms of 
the "best conceivable". Actual measurements are then compared to these 
"standard conditions" and attempts are made to adjust the actual data 
to the data which would have been produced were the conditons actually 
ideal. This notion is advanced by both Churchman and : ckoff. " IIouever, 
using "... the ideal conditions and procedures... (to)... act as a 
standard by means of which we can compare observations made under diff- 
erent conditions using different operations... " (ackoff, 1962, p. 162) 
entails that we measure the standards. themselves. So we need another set 
of idealized definitions to enable us to measure the standards. "Similarly, 
we need to measure the standards at this higher level... and so on. We 
shall encounter this problem in a particularly vicious form in the 
final chapter when considering the work of Ackoff and Emery (1972). 
The point to be made here, however, is that there is a clear need to 
provide some justification for the idealizations in a way that removes 
this open-endedness. The conventionalist has to convince us that his 
conventions (idealizations) are objective. 
The way forward for the conventionalist, having destroyed the 
positivist notion of fact, is to argue that- it is the process whereby 
the conventions are chosen which determines the objectivity of science. 
If it is theories which determine the facts and conventions which 
determine the selection of theories, then it is vitally important to 
have the theories selected by the 'best' conventions. Thus, Churchman 
argues that the real meaning of the claim that facts have a theoretical 
content is that 11... all propositions of science are - methodologically 
interpreted - theories" (1961a, p. 81). By this Churchman does not mean 
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"... that 'facts' are 'theories' in any semantical or syntactical sense" 
(ibid). What he is interested in from the claim is the "... consider(ation) 
... 
(of)... propositions in terms of the decision-processes by which 
they are accepted or rejected" (op. cit., p. 80). It is this process 
which determines their "methodölogical meaning" which is of crucial 
importance because for Churchman it "... seems impossible to discuss 
the scientific verification of recommendations without at the same time 
discussing the problem of how science itself should make decisions" (p. 78). 
Churchman's favourite solution to the obviously threatening open- 
endedness of this proposal is to attempt to design a system of inquiry 
which has objectivity 'built in', that is, guaranteed by its very 
structure. After demonstrating that "... the validation of simple 
sensations can only be designed within the context of a community of 
inquiring systems; in other words, "X is yellow" can be validated by 
an inquiring system only if there are other inquiring systems" (1971, 
p. 103), he concludes that the major problem is that the inquirer turns 
out to be "conventional". * That is, it is "... capable of receiving any 
"information" and handling it in exactly the same way as it does imputs 
from any other source" (op. cit., p. 123). It has, in short, a "reality" 
problem the only solution to which "... lies in the design of a community 
of inquirers" (ibid). I shall consider Churchman's attempt to provide 
an adequate community design to make conventionalism objective, by its 
interpretation within Hegelian philosophy, in Chapter 4.. 
Before that, however, 'in Chapter 3,1 shall Give extended consid- 
eration to the work of Thomas Kuhn (particularly, 1962) PI-obably the 
most widely known contemporary conventionalist. His work provides a 
blueprint for a possible conventionalist strategy for the development 
of a theory of inquiry for OR. Kuhn, as a committed conventionalist, 
is dedicated to the task of putting some muscle behind the basic conven- 
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tionalist view that the facts do not provide an adequate basis for theory 
choice. He wants to show that scientific activity can be seen to be 
objective without recourse to the positivist's opaque conception of 
facts. As he says, although many philosophers of science wish to "... 
compare theories as representations of nature, as statements about 'what 
is really out there"', Kuhn believes that such approximations to the truth 
are not to be found. "On the other hand", he goes on, "I no longer feel 
that anything is lost, least of all the ability to explain scientific 
progress, by taking this position" (1970, p. 265). Kuhn attempts to 
explain the progress of science - its rationality - virtually solely in 
terms of its social structure (cf. 1970, p. 21), that is, in terms of 
the values, norms, ideology and social organization of science. 
As conventionalism is an obvious contender for the attention of 
operations researchers (and more interest is currently being shown in 
it, as we shall see later) it is worth closer consideration. The major 
question I shall be seeking to answer is whether it is as practically 
comprehensible as its advocates claim. That is, does it too, even in 
the hands of its most sophisticated exponents, ask us to unquestioningly 
accept the given facticity of the object of inquiry to provide the final 
quarantor of objectivity? Does conventionalism let positivism slip in 
through the backdoor? Itýis to these difficult questions that I turn 
in the remaining chapters of this part. 
Conclusion: The Realist Option: 
In this chapter I have considered two major strategies of inquiry 
- positivism and conventionalism - which have some support in the OR 
literature. So far I have subjected the positivist alternative to 
the criticism made of it by conventionalists, but we have still to see 
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whether similar criticisms from a non-conventionalist viewpoint can be 
made of conventionalism itself. To show how this might be the case it 
will be useful at this stage to briefly outline the criticisms of 
positivism which are very similar to those made from the conventionalist 
viewpoint but which stem from what could loosely be called the realist 
viewpoint. Realism is as yet a relatively undeveloped philosophical 
viewpoint which has arisen as a reaction against both positivism and 
conventionalism. Later on I shall pick up some of the essential threads 
which I outline here under the title of realism in terms of other 
philosophical positions with which realism is closely associated - patt- 
icularly the structuralist viewpoint. Here I shall draw generously on 
the account of realism given by Keat and Urry (op. cit., particularly 
Part One), which is itself a synthesis of much of the available literature. 
Realists are preoccupied with the problem of adequate causal ex- 
planation, and it is on the grounds that both the positivist and conven- 
tionalists cannot provide adequate causal explanations that they are 
attacked by realists. Because'of their phenomenalist and nominalist 
commitments, positivists do not accept that theories add any truth value 
to the phenomena which they summarize and organize. Thus, they attempt to 
devleop 'correspondence rules' and neutral observational languages to 
translate theoretical terms into their phenomenal equivalents. Positivists, 
therefore, cannot (and do not)-use theoretical terms as a constituent 
part of causal explanations. Theoretical terms enter into causal ex- 
planations for the positivist only as general laws which summarize, in 
"a universal form, regular connections (so far as not yet disproved from 
a Popperian viewpoint) between discrete phenomenal 'events'. For the 
positivist a causal explanation has been established when a regular 
connection between events has been verified or not refuted. We shall see 
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evidence of this view of explanation being entertained in OR circles 
(by Ackoff and Dnery, 1972 at least) in the final chapter. 
The realist finds the positivist account of causal explanations 
inadequate because of the positivist's insistence that all that is 
real (for science) is phenomena. If this is so, the realist argues, 
then as we often find regular relations between events which are accepted 
not to be causal (for example, the regular relationship between barometer 
readings and changes in weather conditons: see Keat and Urry, p. 12), 
there is a gap in the positivist's account. The positivist does not tell 
us, though he ought to, how we are to distinguish regular relationships 
which are indicative, - of truly causal relationships and thosewhich are 
not. Because the positivist is prevented from looking beyond the phen- 
omena he cannot distinguish causal from non-causal laws. All regular 
connections between events have (strictly) to be treated by him as 
causal. The realist argues that we should distinguish between explan- 
ations: ý that are causal and those that are not on the basis not merely 
that a regular connection has been found between events, but additionally 
and crucially, on the basis that we can provide a description (and to 
the extent possible, a demonstration) of underlying mechanisms and 
processes which are responsible for the regularity. Keat and Urry put 
it this way: 
"For the realist, adequate causal explanat- 
ions require the discovery both of regular 
relations between phenomena, and some kind 
of mechanism that links them. So, in ex- 
plaining any particular phenomenon, we must 
not only make reference to those events 
which initiate the process of change: we 
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must also give a description of that pro- 
cess itself. To do this, we need knowledge 
of the underlying mechanisms and structures 
that are present, and of the manner in which 
they generate or produce the phenomenon we 
are trying to explain" (p. 30). 
For the positivist there are no underlying realities. Insofar 
as he countenances the use of theories and models they are treated as 
heuristic devices to summarize or suggest regular relations. For the 
realist theories and models are attempts to "... describe structures 
and mechanisms which. are often unavailable to observation... " (Keat 
and Urry, op. cit., p. 34). Thus, like the conventionalist, the realist 
argues that. theoretical terms are in some sense real.. However, the 
reality of theoretical terms for the realist lies in their attempted 
description of real processes; the reality of theoretical terms for the 
conventionalist lies in their belief that theoretical terms are themselves 
the basic reality for science. For the conventionalist definitions 
determine reality. For example, the conventionalist view of "... the 
proposition, 'Phosphorus melts at the temperature 44 degrees centigrade' 
-a famous example - is... 
(taken)... not... (as).. * the account of any 
observation, but a definition or partial definition of phosphorus". 
(kolakowski, opo cit., p. 163). A similar view of definitions is evident 
in the work of Ackoff and Churchman, and we shall see it in operation 
particularly in the final chapter as regards Ackoff in particular. 
Kolakowski comments on the conventionalist view that the proposition does 
not "... stand here for Ia body that melts at 44 degrees centigrade', 
but a body with certain known physical and chemical properties" (p. 167). 
He goes on: The proposition in question establishes the coincidence of 
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these properties with the melting point, which cannot be decreed by 
any definition. Therefore this proposition is not a definition, for 
we assert it only when we know that the object it refers to is really 
present" (ibid). In this comment of Kolakol-iski's we can detect the 
seeds of a realist-type criticism of conventionalism. I shall attempt 
to germinate it in the following three chapters. 
However, even at this point we can see that the realist, unlike 
both the positivists and the conventionalists, argues that theories 
deliberately posit the existence of entities which although possibly 
non-observable are real nonetheless. The fundamental weakness of pos- 
itivism for the realist is that it forbids this (an illustration of 
the consequences of this will be given in'the final chapter), and so 
cannot possibly claim to provide a way of grasping the whole system. 
Positivists, in their claim to have provided causal explanations, must 
do so, from a realist point of view, by presupposing the properties of 
the very underlying reality which the realist would like to discover. 
The conventionalist, because of his refusal to consider the reality 
underlying adequate theories, must do likewise. We shall see that he 
typically does so in a way which makes him indistinguishable from the 
positivist. In their concern to banish the metaphysical from science, 
both positivism and conventionalism have succeeded, we shall see, in 
banishing the real world by banishing any consideration of the real 
nature of the subject-matter of inquiry. Positivists do this by limiting 
facts to phenomena, conventionalists by claiming all reality there is 
for theories. The conclusion to this first part will therefore be that 
the association of OR with these philosophies is destructive of its ideals. 
In support of this conclusion I shall argue that the adoption of a realist- 
type alternative would help OR achieve its ideals. 
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Introduction: 
Chapter Two has laid to rest any hope that OR could turn to 
positivism as a source for the construction of a theory of inquiry 
which would be consistent with its ideals. It is, indeed, surprising 
that positivism should be entertained in OR circles at all. However, 
the realist-type viewpoint arises mainly as a reaction against the 
destructive implications of the most sophisticated positivist of them 
all - David Hume - who took positivism to the only conclusion that was 
logically consistent with its premises, namely, that rational knowledge 
was an impossibility. Starting from an extreme phenomenalism and 
nominalism, Hume argued that the 'necessity' involved in any causal 
explanation was purely a psychological phenomenon. We feel that events 
are necessarily connected but this feeling is based only on the habits 
produced by past experience. The more frequently events occur in regular 
relationship the stronger is our psychological feeling of the necessity 
of the relationship, but the logidal grounds for doing so do not increase. 
As Kolakowski puts it: 
"Consequently what can really be asserted 
beyond all doubt is limited to individual 
accounts of immediate observations; assump- 
tions concerning the nature of the world 
'given' in those observations, whether touch- 
its reality or the nature of the observing 
4 
subject, are excluded. It is easy to see 
that, in this conception of knowledge, that 
which we truly know is utterly barren'. and 
unproductive, whereas that which helps us to 
live, create a science, and enrich our store 
of information generally is no longer 
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knowledge in the proper sense of the terra. 
In the last analysis, according to Hume, 
there is no such thing as rational know- 
ledre about the world" (op. cit., pp. 51-2). 
It is this underlying logic which accounts for the prevalent attitude 
in OR circles that the knowledge of the various sciences is not really 
knowledge in the full sense but, rather, is "... a collection of guide- 
lines, useful and indispensible in practice, but devoid of truth value" 
(ibid). Je have seen this view expressed particularly strongly by both 
Beer and Ackoff, and it is reflected in the training of operations 
researchers. 
The sarge tendency to undermine the ideals of OR is to be found 
in the work of Popper, probably the most sophisticated contemporary 
positivist. Popper (particularly, 1957) 9Penly declares war on those 
who would attempt to gain knowledge of totalities. He confines valid 
knowledge to the small scale "piecemeal" fragments of experience which 
can be falsified. In view of this it is perhaps surprising that he has 
received even those attentions that he has 
(e. g. Boothroyd, 1971+; Bevan, 
1976; Eilon, 1975) from operations researchers. Nevertheless, in this 
chapter I shall use the Popperian scheme as a representative of the 
positivist option for OR. It has at least face-value relevance partic- 
ularly on the grounds that Popper insists that science should continually 
be revolutionary in its outlook and practice. This feature, at least, 
coincides with the ideals of OR. that we found in Chapter One. 
As I suggested in Chapter Two, a major alternative, and apparently, 
competing, option for OR is the adoption of some form of the convention- 
alist viewpoint, ande have found some support for this viewpoint in 
OR circles. As I have already suggested, a convenient choice for an 
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examplar of this option is the work of Kuhn. The conventionalist option 
does not, at least at first sight, have the fatal defect of obviously 
undermining the ideals of OR, and we will find support for Kuhn's 
version of it in the writings of some operations researchers. The 
major task of this chapter is to discover whether the conventionalist 
option in Kuhn's hands can provide an adequate basis for the development 
of a theory of inquiry for OR. In the following chapter I shall ask 
the same question of the conventionalist option as it is treated by 
Churchman. 
Kuhn's option for Oß: 
I 
Of all the reasons why Kuhrats work might be adopted to provide 
an exemplar scheme of the practice of science on which OR's strategy 
of inquiry could be built, the following are perhaps-the most compelling: 
1. Kuhn appears to offer a radical alternative to the Popperian scheme, 
which, in the light of the latter's failure provides at least the basis 
for interest in his scheme. 
2. This interest is rewarded for, as we shall see, Kuhn appears at one 
and the same time to remedy what is deficient in Popper without losing 
Popper's most valuable feature, namely, his revolutionary outlook. 
3. Kuhn achieves this favourable resolution by offering (implicitly, 
for OR) an intellectual division of labour which both has a good deal 
of support in the OR literature and avoids the worrying aspect of 
Popper's scheme which argued for the necessity of continually over- 
throwing total theoretical schemes in order that progress can be said 
to have been made. 
In the barest outline, these reasons make Kuhn a most attractive 
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option for OR. In our exposition of these bases of attraction, let. 40 
us start with a seeminuly very practical point: Popper's scheme is 
downright impractical whereas in Kuhn's work there is a ctronZ.; breath of 
realism injected into thinking about the practice of science and its 
progress. :t last scientist feel that they can recognise themselves in 
Kuhn's account, whereas many previous attempts to theorize about the 
nature of science have left them cold. 
A major source of the realism which one suspects scientists find 
in Kuhn's account is to be found in the very structure which he lays 
down for scientific activity. Unlike Popper, who stresses the necessity 
(and claims the actuality) of continual and fundamental'revolution in 
science Kuhn distinguishes between two major types of activity in the 
progress of science only one of which matched Popper's all-embracing 
notion of revolutionary science. According to Popper science "... pro- 
gresses by bold ideas (such as the theory that the earth is not flat, 
or that 'metrical space' is not flat), and by the overthrow of the old 
ones" (1945, Vol. 2, p. 12). The structure which Kuhn, on the other 
hand, employs to describe the progress of science (we shall see later 
that Kuhn takes for gratrted that science progresses, so we can use 
'activity' and 'progress' synonymously) has this revolutionary (or 
'extraordinary') research as a major component, but Kuhn firmly distin- 
guishes this from what he claims is the dominant 'normal' activity of 
science. The structure of scientific progress which Kuhn lays down'is 
one with fairly long periods of 'normal' research interspersed with 
'relatively infrequent periods öf revolutionary research (note that all 
that is necessary for Kuhn's view is that these different types of 
research alternate; it is merely his empirical judgement that 'normal' 
research dominates as .a proportion of 
time). 
/68 
Thus, whereas Popper argues that for true scientificity "... a 
mistake infects an entire system and can only be corrected by replacing 
the system as a whole" (Kuhn, 1970, P. 12) Kuhn argues that typically 
it is not whole theories which are tested but the ingenuity of the 
scientist in solving tricky and interesting 'puzzles' which are posed 
within a pre-existing theory. That is, it is, according to Kuhn, the 
scientist and not the theory which is falsified (! ) by a 'mistake+. It 
is the scientist's attempt to solve the puzzles posed by the currently 
accepted theory - or, as Kuhn prefers, for reasons we go into later, 
to call the 'paradigm' - which Kuhn argues preoccupies most scientists 
for most of the time, a conclusion which he believes is entailed in 
Popper's description of science as well as his own. For Kuhn it is a logical 
truism that revolutions in science require normal (non-revolutionary) 
science as their counter-part: it is not possible to make Imistakest or 
to 'test' theories by attempting to 'falsify' them outside the context 
of a pre-diven framework (see: 1970, pp. 1-23), and once this much is 
accepted, normal science follows as a corrollary. 
Apart from the fact that Popper's criterion of falbifiability 
would reduce science to impotence, 
(1) 
Kuhn's major point of contention against 
the Popperian view of 'progresst is that without normal science (that is, 
(1) Because it "... requires'that we first produce the class of all 
logical consequences from the theory and then choose from among these, 
with the aid of background knowledge, the classes of all true and of 
false consequences. None of these tasks can", he adds, "be accomplished 
unless the theory is fully articulated logically and unless the terms 
through which it attaches to nature are sufficiently defined to determine 
their applicability in each possible case" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 16). Needless 
to say, "... no scientific theory satisfies these rigorous demands... " 
(ibid). 
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research which is not progressive in Popper's terms) no progress, 
revolutionary or otherwise is possible. We come to this shortly. 
Here it is of interest to note that Kuhn's conclusions regarding 
one of the unrealistic implications of Popper's criterion of scient- 
ificity has been noted by at least one operations researcher. 
Eilon (1975) in his editorial descussion on the question of 
"How Scientific is OR? " draws upon the Popperian option as an exemplar 
of the scientific approach, and on the basis of the parallel which he 
draws between the major features of Popperian science and what he 
takes to be the practice of OR, he concludes that when set within the 
Popperian "... context... OR may be regarded as a scientific activity" 
(p. 7). However, after having completed this 'matching' exercise some 
doubt about the practical implications of Popper's scheme sets in. 
Eilon goes on to observe that there "... is... (an)... aspect in which 
"experimentation" in OR fails to attain the rigour-demanded by the 
hypothetico-deductive method... (of Popper)" (p. 8) because he "... 
recall(s) that the purpose of scientific experimentation... (in the 
Popperian view)... is to subject a given hypothesis to the most crucial 
and demanding test that can be devised, since the object of the exercise 
is to refute the theory". "In a managerial context", Eilon concludes, 
echoing Kuhn's comments on the omanagementt of science, this "is not 
tenable, since when socio-economic systems are placed in extreme critical 
conditions they may fail altogether; and while such experiments maybe 
entirely satisfactory in refuting given hypotheses, they could be cata- 
strophic. from a managerial vie4ipoint" (ibid). Again recognising the 
lack of realism in Popper's account from a Kuhnian point of view, Eilon 
goes onto observe that "in the majority of cases... implementation does 
not constitute a crucial ted of accepted beliefs, but a relatively minor 
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experimentation exercise" (ibid; cf. Popper, 191+5, Vol. 2, p. 12). In 
other affords, the practising operations researcher in his day to day work 
in modifying and improving organizations, typically takes 'accepted 
beliefs' for granted and contents himself with puzzling out improvements 
within this framework. What Eilon has in mind, I believe, is something 
closely akin to Kuhn's normal science. 
However, there is a potential contradiction here. As Eilon notes, 
"the hallmark of the hypothetico-deductive approach is that of conjectures 
and refutations... (p. 5) and further that "the elements... (found in the 
Popperian model)... of formulating a hypothesis, of prediction and of 
experimentation are clearly discernible in the OR process; the feedback 
mechanism that requires the definition of the problem, the assumptions, 
the model structure and the conclusions to be continuously reviewed and 
adapted in the light of new information and new experience is analogous 
to the continuous evaluation that takes place in scientific... (i. e. 
Popperian)... inquiry" (p. 7, my emphasis). In the Kuhnian scheme there 
is no such continuous evaluation; 'normally' scientists work within 
'accepted beliefs'. How then can we have our cake and eat it as Eilon 
appears to attempt? How, that is, can we have both revolutionary 
('bold conjectures') and non-revolutionary science? Eilon detects but 
does not make the contradiötion between these two modes of activity 
explicit, which accounts, I believe for his attempted compromise through 
the advocacy of 'satisficing' (see: 1972). Kuhn handles this contradic- 
tion very easily through his advocacy of role specialisation: some are 
concerned with revolutionary activity; most are concerned with puzzle- 
solving. However, before concretely making the connection between Kuhn 
and OR on this basis it is worth showing how it is that Popper fails to 
see the impracticality of his proposals and why, therefore, Eilon is 
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not unduly disturbed by the contradiction which his comments point 
towards. 
Eilon could 'match' OR and Popperian science because at the level 
of ideals, and a from the correspondences over such things as 
rigorous specification of predictions and testing through the comparison 
of predictions with 'experience', both OR and Popper share the commit- 
ment to radical rethinking as an essential attribute of scientificity. 
However, as we have seen, OR is also committed to the idea of radically 
rethinking the whole whereas Popper is well-known for his opposition to 
holism. Therefore, both Popper's and Eilon's advocacy of falisification 
only become comprehensible (but not, of course, thereby justified) when 
we realise that it is meant to apply to 'piecemeal social engineering'. 
Thus, although 'whole' theories are in Popper's scheme continually 
exposed to the risk of revolutionary overthrow, the theories themselves 
are thought to be rather small-scale. By way of added explanation it 
should be noted that Popper acknowledges his debt to micro-econimics 
(via, particularly Ludwig von Hayek) for major features of his scheme. 
Popper's model can be seen, then, as an elaboration of 'intellectual 
perfect competition'. In the micro-economic model, of course, with the 
'market' being composed of units so small that they are 'insignificant' 
with respect to the total market so that the failure of one unit (its 
economic *falsification', so to speak) has no catastrophic consequences. 
In the classical economic model the individual units are related only 
through the information provided by the impersonal price system: in 
other words their level of connectivity is low. When the level of 
eonnectivity increases (as it has, of course, in our 20th Century economy) 
the failure of one unit does have catastrophic, that is, widespread, 
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consequences, as recent history has amply demonstrated. Looked at in 
this way the lack of realism of Popper's scheme is its location in 
19th Century thinking. Eilon achieves the same degree of low connec- 
tivity through a slightly different route: he recognises complexity 
but denies its importance through his belief that performing at a 
'satisfactory' level is the most that can reasonably be expected. As 
Cyert and March (1963) have shown, the satisficing criterion uncouples 
connections in a totality and with this low level of connectivity one 
can understand very well how someone could simultaneously advocate 
falsification and piecemeal change. 
Kuhn's scheme should be attractive to OR as an exemplar because 
it effects a synthesis between the desirability of revolutionary science 
and the necessity of normal science through a division of responsibility. 
This view is remarkable for its correspondence both with a popular view 
in OR (and we shall see later in modern organization theory). Kuhn's 
viewpoint is realistic because it avoids extremes: firstly, if we look 
at it as a managerial philosophy, it recognises that revolution is not 
all there is to scientific progress. As Kuhn himself remarks, "by their 
nature revolutions cannot be the whole of science: something must necess- 
arily go on in-between... (and)... since the science which I call normal 
is precisely research within a framework, it can only be the opposite 
side of a coin the face of which is revolutions" (1970, P" 21+2). Secondly, 
by this recognition, the Kuhnian scheme creates a clear role for spec- 
ialists in revolution, that is, specialists in the creation of frame- 
works. Thus, in Kuhn's scheme we have roles for both OR and top manage- 
ment, and middle management, and to make the connection between the 
views of Kuhn and those expressed in OR circles I need do no more than 
recall the views of Boer set out in Chapter 2: OR, responding to a crisis 
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situation (which pie shall see is an integral part of Kuhn's structure 
of scientific progress), comes in and recasts the framework within 
which it is management's task to manage. To reinforce the connection it 
is perhaps worth stressing that in common with OR, as seen by Beer and 
others, Kuhn is centrally preoccupied with the revolutionary side of 
science. As he says in response to critics who accuse him of 'down- 
valuing' scientific revolutions: "Discovering the puzzling nature of 
revolutions was what first drew me to history and the philosophy of 
science in the first place" (op. cit., 241-2). Also, in case there is 
any doubt about it, it is also worth pointing out that Kühn (in common 
with both Popper and OR) sees his work as having definite normative 
implications: this can be seen from his commitment to a better under- 
standing of the notion of rationality (cf. 1970, p. 264) which he equates 
with science and his view that the normative and descriptive are inex- 
tricably linked. Thus his belief that his "... theory has consequences 
for the way in which scientists should behave if their enterprise is 
to succeed" (1962, p. 207). 
OR and Normal Science: 
Let us look first at the role envisaged for the normal scientist 
- the equivalent role in OR thinking being played by the 'average' 
manager. We have seen in Chapter 2 that Beer distinguished the different 
mode of thinking- employed by the OR scientist and the average manager. 
The manager was prone to all types of 'thought blocks', the major one 
coming from the limited perspective generated by his formal organizational 
role. The formal organizational role was, in turn, a derivative from 
the 'organizational phase-space': it constituted, in Beer's rendering, 
the particular manager's 'phase-space'. This distinction between org- 
anizational and particular phase-space provides the basis for Beer to 
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distinguish two different types of roles: one set of persons is concerned 
with the organizational phase-space (the OR scientists and top management) 
and another set is concerned with particular phase-spaces ('average' 
managers). 
(1) 
As Beer himself puts it: "It is not a question of the scien- 
tist being cleverer than the manager, nor of the manager being obstinate 
and old-fashioned. The two men have quite different roles to play in 
quite different jobs" (1966, p. 84). It is on the basis of this strict 
demarcation of outlooks and responsibilities that Beer argues that OR is some- 
thing that a manager could not do even if he had the time: these two 
roles are seen as being intrinsically different. And wherein does this in- 
trinsic difference lie? 
The key to the distinction between these two roles lies in the 
different types of commitment which they necessitate, a difference which, 
as spelled out by Beer, is mirrored by Kuhn'c distinction between normal 
and revolutionary scientists. Beer, continuing the quotation above, goes 
on to say that "It is not the manager's job to change his own conceptual 
framework, but to get on with the responsibilities which he exercises 
within it". A phase-space is a conceptual aid to problem solving (p. 58) 
and thus the good manager is someone who'accepts his role and'solves problems 
vithin it. Also, clearly, the reverse of Beer's strictures to managers 
applies: it is not the job of scientists to solve these small-scale and 
detailed problems. The scientist provides the possibility and the manager 
realises the actuality. This is Kuhnian science. As Kuhn says of paradigms: 
being "... very limited in both scope and precision... at the time of its 
first appearance... " a paradigm in this crude state is "... an object for 
(1) I shall deal with the implications of Beer's views for a'theory of 
management' in Part Two. 
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further articulation and specification under new or more stringent 
conditions" (1962, p. 23). 
For Kuhn, as for Beer, "normal science consists in the actualization 
of that promise, an actualization achieved by extending the knowledge of 
those facts that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by 
increasing the extent of the match between those facts and the paradigm's 
predictions, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself" (op. cit., 
p. 24). In other words (Beer's in fact), the OR scientist is concerned with 
form and the manager with content. 
OR is not concerned with normal science: "The cybernetician seeking 
to account for the behaviour of a company and its controls does well to 
redefine the boundaries of world situations, and ought not to accept 
uncritically the conventional boundaries he finds... Even when the bound- 
aries are drawn it will be necessary to remember that they are quite 
arbitrary... For all anyone knows, nature may have a different idea of 
where these boundaries lie" (Beer, 1966, p. 303). Also, "... the manager 
... 
(is)... dealing with a given world situation which it... (is)... his 
responsibility to manage. In the higher functions of management... it is 
precisely the structure of the world situation which has to be managed" 
(pp. 345-346), and the "... whole purpose of OR as described here is to 
join with the manager in questioning... (the)... framework" (p. 404). This 
type of relationship between the scientist and the manager also provides the 
foundation for Ackoff and, Rivett's envisaged eventual 'Marriage' between 
OR and management. Ackoff and Rivott are correct in designating the 
relationship in this way as a marriage; normal science and the provision 
of paradigms cannot be separated. 
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One of the major puzzles with which Kuhn was concerned in his work 
was ho. "1, contrary to common belief, was it roscible to account for the 
success of science liven that it is It... the abandonment of critical 
discourse that marks the transition to a science" (1970, p. 6, my emphasis). 
Moreover, in Kuhn's view, a view that we have seen expressed by Beer, 
"preconception and resistance seem the rule rather than the exception in 
mature scientific development... (and)... furthermore, under normal circum- 
stances they characterise the very best and most creative research as well 
as the more routine" (1963, pp. 81-2) and are "... symptomatic of charac- 
teristics upon which the continuing vitality of research depends... (namely) 
... the dogmatism of mature science... 
" (ibid, my emphasis). Kuhn offers 
us reasons for both why scientists normally behave in this way and why it 
is associated with success. 
Kuhn's answer to why it is that scientists normally behave in this 
narrow and myopic way is straightforward: in distinguishing different 
meanings of his notion of paradigm Kuhn emphasises that "a paradigm 
governs, in the first instance, not a subject-matter but rather a group of 
practitioners" (1962, p" 180). On the one hand, therefore, a paradigm 
ýý... stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, 
and so on shared by the members of a given community" 
(1962, p. 175), my 
emphasis). The word community was enphasised because, in Kuhn's view it 
is its dominance which cultivates and enforces "... shared values... (which 
act as)... important determinants of group behaviour" (1962, p. 186): a 
paradigm, through its social enforcement via the community becomes, as 
he puts it, a "... time-tested and group-licensed way of seeing" (1962, p. 189). 
The hapless scientist falls prey to the community just as the manager in 
Beer's account is 'conditioned'. For Kuhn, then, an important corrollary 
of the notion of paradigm is that it is 'r... an accepted achievement in the 
sense that it is received by a group whose members no longer try to rival it 
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or create alternatives for it. Instead, they attempt to extend and exploit 
it in an number of ways... " 
(op. cit., p. 91): in other words, the "... scien- 
tific community acknowledges... (it)... for a time as supplying the 
foundation for its further practice" (op. cit., p. 10). Realising, then,. 
that it is the "existence of... (a)... strong network of commitments - 
conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological - ... 
(which) 
... is a principal source of 
the metaphor that relates normal to puzzle- 
solving. " provides the explanation why so much of a scientist's normal 
activity can be appropriately viewed as a "... mopping-up operation" (op. cit., 
p. 24), and it provides an answer to the "... most striking- feature of 
normal research problems... (uhich)... is hoc) little they aim to produce 
major novelties, conceptual or phenomenal" (op. cit., p. 35). The same 
feature of problem-solving in organizations is explained by Beer in the 
same way in a passage which we have already examined from a different angle 
in Chapter 2. 
"So what is the best;, solution for the com- 
pany? - The solution normally adopted quite 
obviously lies in the common phase-space - 
that is, in the area of overlap between the 
phase-spaces of the individuals who comprise 
the management team - but there is no guar- 
antee that this gives the most appropriate 
ansver. The company itself has no brain. 
It has a phase space within which it always 
operates, but this can only be interpreted 
by human beings who inevitably get the com- 
pany's phase space confused with their own. 
Eut suppose the company had its own brain 
and was aware of its own phase space. The 
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analer to a particular problem mir, -, ht then 
lie on the fringes of this space, in an 
area not belon-in to the phase space of 
one manager in the organization. The 
best anst-Jer to the problem would there- 
fore be missed, because it mould be strictly 
inaccessible to the msnarement. The thoughts 
of a man concerned with this particular prob- 
lem cannot break through the barriers of his 
own facilitated pathways to reach the Coal" 
(1966, P. 59). 
/ 
We cannot, then,. expect novelty from management and this "... is 
the reason why it takes an objective, - scientific, interdisciplinary in- 
vestigation to arrive at a solution outside the phase space -a study 
undertaken by men who are by definition not prone to this particular thought 
block" (op. cit., p. 61). Corditioning, or some such notion, then, is seen 
by both Kuhn and Beer as being responsible for myopic normal behaviour: 
the framework (phase-space/paradigm) provides the rigid context for proýlem/ 
puzzle-solving, and then "... the reason for employing operational research 
at all is to see whether there is a solution outside" (Beer, op* cit., 
n. 61). Beer is hinting here that there are benefits associated with this 
seemingly irrational behaviour, and I shall turn to these in just a moment. 
Clearly, however, there are dangers as well; the major one being that, 
chance, when desired, is inhibited. Loth Leer and : urn recognise this, 
and both provide interesting descriptions of situations where the thought 
blocks which we shall see are essential to progress on the one hand threaten 
to block it on the other (Kuhn, for example, points out that Priestley went 
to his deathbed believing temici. ously in the phlogiston theory). Churchman 
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(1971) also reco; nises the dancers involved in z strikingl;; similar way, 
The lesson i hich Churchrn n dr^rrc fron it is one th-,, t I shý. 1l return to 
later, namely, that 0:: 's v ole system has to be ccfined in. terms of im- 
plementation as well. Thus: 
"The ,a agement scientist often diccovers 
that e! hat he considered to be a sufficiently 
closed system for the development of an op- 
timal plan turns out to have facets and mod- 
ifications that he never suspected. He 
finds, for example, that people identify 
with their roles in a certain manner, so 
that then new courses of action are sugges- 
ted, their most typical reaction is to look 
at their particular role and the ! ay in which 
it will be changed if the new plans are adop- 
ted. Top management may believe that the 
total organization is striving. to maximize 
some function of money. (In the case of 
Mthn's scientists, the ntimization of truth). 
But the individuals in the organization may 
also attempt to maximize a particular kind of 
relationship they hold to the organization. 
The latter may well be threatened by a plan 
which increased the organization's effective- 
ness. These people -therefore, resist any suggestions 
for change". (p. 227, my insert). 
Whether or not Churchman would adhere to the detailed explanations 
provided by Beer and Kuhn the conceptual split between qualitatively 
i8o 
different types of roles is clear and consistent with the main thrust of 
Leer and Kuhn (and I say this notuithotanding that Churchman argues for 
'exoteric inquiry', as will be seen later on). 
And the benefits from myopic role performance? The answer given by 
both Beer and Kuhn (and, implicitly by. Churchman: see his generalized 
model of a system's anatomy, 1971, Chapter 3, p. 43) is the age-old one 
which has been provided by virtually all social commentators since Plato, 
and perhaps beyond that, namely, the virtues of specialisation. Beer is 
straightfonwward-about this: "For practical managerial reasons, a company 
is divided into clear-cut areas of responsibility; and the manager, who 
is conditioned by the whole of his experience to seek solutions in which 
he can feel confident from personal knowledge, and over which he can exer- 
cise personal authority" (op. cit., p. 51). And further: "The existing 
organization is likely to come very close to a good answer which does lie 
within its own phase-space of solutions acceptable to all the managers, 
because there will be no thought block to prevent its so doing" (opo cit., 
p. 61). Beer's reference to the necessary confidence which a narrow role 
encourages is central to Kuhn's thinking. He argues that in all cases 
"... a commitment to the paradigm... (is)... needed simply to provide 
adequate motivation. Who", he asks, "would design and build elaborate 
special-purpose apparatus, or who mould spend months trying to solve a 
particular differential equation; without a firm guarantee that his effort, 
if successful, would yield the anticipated fruit? " (1963, p" 95)" Kulm: 
earlier in the same article had provided the answer: "That sort of work 
is undertaken only by those who feel that the model that they have chosen 
is entirely secure... (and therefore)... in receiving a paradigm the 
scientific community commits itself, consciously or not, to the view that 
the fundamental problems there resolved have, in fact, been solved once and 
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for all" (on. cit., p. 86). Beer will countenance no concern by managers 
for fundamentals. In stressing that a manager who has failed to find an 
answer to a problem which lies outside his phase-space should not be 
labelled 'culpable' or "... incompetent, for if managers allow themselves 
too readily to wander imaginatively outside the phase-space set up for 
them by their own knowledge and experience, they become rather dangerous" 
(op. cit., p. 61). One of the reasons for him thinking that this type 
of behaviour on the part of managers is dangerous is that without "this 
process of conditioning... (which)... is vital for survival, ... the 
world would appear entirely incoherent and unpredictable" (op. cit., p. 58). 
The manager would, if the framework were always open to revision by him- 
self and others, have no confidence in burrowing deeply into what the 
OR scientist sees as esoteric detail. As Kuhn says, following James, the 
world would become a "bloomin', buzzint confusion". 
Microscopic burrowing is then the major advantage of rigid role 
specialisation. The function of a paradigm (phase-space, or, in the 
case of Churchman, a Weltanschauung) is, as Kuhn puts it, to provide a 
pervasive foundation which "... tells them about the sort of entities with 
which the universe is populated and about the rays the members of that 
population behave; in addition it informs them of the questions that may.. 
legitimately be asked about nature and of the techniques that can properly 
be used in search of them. In fact" Kuhn Goes on, "a paradigm tells 
scientists so much that the questions it leaves for research seldom have 
great intrinsic interest to those outside the profession" (1962, p. 93) 
because ', 'given the paradigm and the requisite confidence in it, the 
scientist largely ceases to be an explorer at all, or at least an explorer 
of the unknown" (op. cit.,, p. 96-97). And because there are no "... deep 
debates over legitimate methods, problems and standards of solution... It 
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(op. cit., p. 48) OR loges interest. 
OR loses interest because it is not 1anaCenent. OR's interest lies 
almost exclusively with the creation of the framei", ork. Thoughtful oper- 
ations researchers rightly recognise that an OR which is preoccupied with 
puzzle-solving cannot be revolutionary and, by the same token, as puzzle- 
solving relies on a taken for granted acceptance of the framework, accept- 
in- the role of normal science would rule out any possibility of justifying 
that OR solutions were truly progressive. This is so because it is clear 
that paradigms define problems and acceptable solutions in a! vance of 
inquiry and, in so doing, normal science would negate OR's ideals. '"! e 
have here, of course, another entry point into the argument against OR as 
techniques. 
OP. rtnd the Kuhnian version of. HRevoluti on<^ryf Science": 
0n11's attitude towards mere puzzle-solving means that without a 
doubt in Kuhnian terms it has to identify with revolutionary inquix-. 
! "le have seen in Chapter 2 that indeed OR does adopt the self-image of 
the revolutionary and the question to be answered here is whether this 
image can be given a Kuhnian interpretation. If it can we shall be in 
as strong position to go ahead and trace out the implications of Kuhn's 
position and this will give us a vantage point from which to comment on 
the commitments which such a strategy of revolutionary inquiry would imply 
for OR's ideals. If we find - as we shall - that Kuhn's account of rev- 
olutionary inquiry has serious flaws in it as a normative scheme of 
inquiry, vie shall be led to ask whether these features are also to be 
found in some conventionalist schemes of inquiry embedded in the literature 
of OR. Our use of Kuhn, then, is as a catalyst. ; detailed understanding 
9 
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of his scheme will provide us with valuable insights into understanding 
chat issues 0:: should (but at present does not) face, to be a credible 
science of improvement. 
OR, as we have seen in Chapter 2, has a clear attitude towards the 
use of techniques: they are only justified given the larger framework. 
On this point Kuhn is adamant too. Normal science, he says, is not a 
U... methodological prescription... " (1962, p. 21f5) which vill act as 
ýý... therapy to assist the transformation of a proto-science to a science... " 
(ibid). On the contrary, it is only after the occurence of "... the 
transition to maturity... (that)... progress become(s) an obvious charac- 
teristic of the field" (ibid). Thus, "... normal science is predicated 
on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the'viorld is 
like" (op. cit., p. 5) and, as OR argues, this cannot be taken for granted. 
It is not hard to show that OR conceives of revolutionary science in 
precisely the same way as Kuhn; nor is it hard to understand what is meant 
by these versions of revolutionary science. I! hat is hard to understand is 
why this revolutionary activity is believed to be rrogressive. Kuhn tries 
hard to make his account explicit on this score and we shall follow it 
through (after having made the above mentioned connection) to see if he 
can. Later I shall consider whether OR has been able to show why its rev- 
olutionary outlook is progressive. Kuhns eventual failure to provide 
a satisfactory answer should provide some lessons for OR. 
For Kuhn "... scientific revolutions are... taken to be those non- 
cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced 
in whole or in part by an incompatible new one" (1962, p. 92). Isuhnian 
revolutions, in fact, involve nothing less than the overthro't", of reality. 
Thus: "successive raradiÜms tell us different things about the po i lations 
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of the universe and about that population's behaviour" (op. cit., p. 103); 
again, "... uhen paradigms change, there are usually significant shifts in 
the criteria determining the legitimacy both of problems and of proposed 
solutions" (op. cit., p. 109) and "... after a revolution scientists 
are responding to a different world" (op. cit., p. 111). If we understand 
by 'reality' that which cannot itself be questioned, then it is clear that 
Kuhn is indeed talking of revolutions as the overthrow of reality for looked 
at from the point of view of the scientist (or manager in OR's account) 
reality is seen by Kuhn to be mediated throught the conceptual framework 
provided by the paradigm. Asserting the primacy of 'sensation' over 
'stimuli' Kuhn argues that"... deliberative processes ... analyse what is 
for us the given" (1962, p. 195). Deliberation is for Kuhn that sophisticated 
form of analysis which he calls normal science and for him we cannot 
deliberate or analyse "... until after we have had a sensation... (that is) 
... perceived something" 
(op. cit., p. 191+). For Kuhn, then, the paradigm 
provides the essential outlines of reality (he says it provides a map 
and instructions for map-making: see Masterman, 1970) and changes in it 
change that reality. In essence Kuhn says in his discussion of the corr- 
espondence of his views with those of Imre Lakatos (see: 1970), a paradigm 
provides a 'programme' for future research, and in fact a viaiof CR as 
the provider of such 'action programmes' has recently been expressed 
(Boothroyd, 1974). This view is in keeping with a fairly long tradition 
within OR as to its essential role. 
Churchman as long ago as 1961 had outlined his views on what he 
understood to bo an "... important future task of operations research with 
respect to top management" (1961b, p. 6) and, as we shall see later, much 
of his later work can be seen as an attempt to understand and solve the 
problems of successfully carrying out such a task. The task is to 
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institute revolutionary change in organizations. Thus his "... paper 
is concerned with the problems of the creation of new Goals in an or, - 
anization. It intends to sugge. d that orerations research can be viewed 
not only as anattempt to solve problems via research methods but also 
to develop new problems and to establish the importance of these within 
an organization" (ibid). The task, then, is to provide the organization 
with a tlonr-ran, e plan' tinder which shorter-term Goals are pursued 
on the belief that one should not "... construe the Coals of an organization 
over its history as attempts to add increments to and endless pile" 
(op. cit., p. 8). Kuhn is, of course, well known for his opposition to the 
'accretion theory of the gro:, th of knowledge for precisely the same reasons 
as Churchman, namely, that it is seen to be based on a "... primitive 
form of logical induction(isn)... (which in)... as naive in business as 
it is in science" (or. ci. t., p. 9; cf. Kuhn, 1962, p. 96). Conforming very 
closely to Kuhn's view of a paradigm as a rro, -, _amme, Churchman arg tes 
that we should properly view organizations as "ideal-seeking". This 
implies (as . 1ck_off and Dyer;;, 1972, n. 237, spell out) that the "... ob- 
jective is not so much to solve problems as it is to create more challen; - 
ing and important problems to work on... " They Go on to note that "ideal 
pursuit can provide cohesiveness and continuity to extended and unpredictable 
processes... " (ib; _d). 
This is precisely one of the main functions which 
Kuhn ascribes to a paradigm. We can also refer to PSason (1969) for 
another view of the nature of a strategic plan. Referring to widely 
respected sources 2"L-on describes an organization's strategic plan as the 
It... particular set of beliefs or assumptions about the world that an 
orCanization adopts... (to)... Guide its activity... " Furthermore, a 
it... strategy is a statement in broad conceptual terms- of 'what business 
the company is in or is to be in and the kind of company it is or ought to 
be"': a strategy,; embodies the basic "... assumptions... (which)... represent 
the world of his business as the manaCer seer, it. They underlie every 
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decision he makes... (and)... a rational manager uses these assumptions 
to interpret the data provided by his information system and therusin- 
logic he concludes the best plan of action" (p. 3- 403-4). This is 
straightforwardly a Kuhnian-type view. Kuhn argues that something must 
... bridge what would otherwise be gaps in the specification of the 
content and application of scientific theories" (ibid). The 'something' 
which Kuhn has in mind for the natural sciences is, of course, a paradigm. 
This is a conceptual device which, as Ilasterman (1970) says "works when 
the theory is not there" by answering such questions as: "dhat are the 
fundamental entities of which the universe is composed? How do these 
interact with each other and with the senses? What questions may legitimately 
be asked about such entities and what techniques employed in seeking 
solutions? " (Kuhn, 1962, pp. 4-5). In a similar fashion Churchman argues 
that: 
"... scientific method must include a phil- 
osophy of the whole system, however vague, 
however inadequate, however difficult to 
defend. It is what the Germans call a 
Weltanschauung)a perception of what reality 
is like. It becomes an integral part of the 
applied scientist's behaviour. This, above 
all, is why the applied scientist is not 
merely applying the results of pure research; 
he is also applyinC his ! leltanchauunG" 
(1968x, p. 133). 
Elsewhere, (1970b as we have seen) Churchman, -in referrint- to a 
Jeltanschauun- as 'systemic assumptions , makes the same point vihen he 
says that they refer to an "... understand(ing)... (of)... the purposes 
and structure of... reality" (p. B- 43) which tells the possessor "... hors 
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the whole system should work or inevitable does work" (p. B- 42). 
The role of the operations researcher is then to formulate an 
appropriate world-view. Recall Beer's insistence that the operations 
researcher should not be burdened with a definition of the problem in 
advance of his inquiries, and that if he is to be a truly revolutionary 
scientist it is up to him to define the 'facts' (to define the nature of 
reality) and not meekly bow down before the facts as they are presented 
to him. Churchman and Emery (1966) have, it seems to me, gone further 
than anybody in arguing for the full-blown Kuhnian view. They recognise 
the strong interconnection which exists between the approaches of the 
of the behavioural scientist and the operational research scientist to 
the study of organizations, just as Kuhn has argued for the integration of 
epistemological and sociological approaches if we are to have an adequate 
understanding of the progress of science. Churchman and Emery realise 
that setting up the problem of the growth of knowledge within organizations 
in terms of what they, like Kuhn, see as the 'complementary' approaches 
of behavioural science and operational research immediately poses the problem 
of their 'combination', which they recognise is itself an organizational 
concept"(see: p. 77). Their final resolution of this problem of the app- 
ropriate basis of combination is to argue for "... engage(ment) in 
institution-building so that agreement about his research concerns can be-` 
actively pursued and powerfully sanctioned" (op. cit. P. 81; cf. also 
Stringer, 1967). Compare Kuhn (1970) outlining the basic commitments his 
research entails: 
"Already it should be clear that the ex- 
planation... (of science)... must, in the 
final analysis, be psychological or socio- 
logical. It must, that is, be a description 
of a value system, an ideology, together with 
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an analysis of the institutions through 
which that system is transmitted and 
enforced. Knowing what scientists value, 
we may hope to understand what problems 
they will undertake and what choices 
they will make in particular circum- 
stances of conflict". (1970, p. 21). 
The concern of Kuhn with an understanding of the values etc. of the 
scientific community to understand progress in science is a typical 
expression of the conventionalist's concern for the rationality of the 
processes of theory choice. A similar background motivates Churchman 
and 1hery's concern to base organizational functioning on the "... very 
pervasive strands of common interest" which make "societies as admittedly 
full of conflict as ours.. hans together... " 'Churchman and Emery, op. 
cit., p. 81). Compare Kuhn's suggestion that one possible anm"ter to the 
problem of progress in science is that it is "... important that Group 
unanimity be a paramount value, causing the group to minimize the occ- 
asions for conflict and to reunite quickly about a single set of rules 
for puzzle-solving... " (ibid). 
The assumption that 'hanging to-ether' is evidence of common values 
is that one can be challenged, and I take up this as an issue in a later 
chapter. The point to be drawn from it here is that sharing it implies 
that Churchtan and Emery and Kuhn have a common outlook. 
Conclusion: 
There are, than, strong parallels between OR and the Kuhnian scheme, 
both as regards normal science and revolutionary science. OR is rarticularly 
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strongly attached to Kuhn's notion of revolutionary science which involves 
the creation of facts, 
(1) 
and not merely their acceptance. Ziding with a 
Kuhnian version of revolutionary science would appear, therefore, to 
overcome the difficulties which beset positivism and, particularly, 
the revolutionary science of Popper. However, we still have no guarantee 
that the revolutionary science of which Kuhn speaks is guaranteed (or even 
likely) to be progressive. This must be the acid test of this scheme, and 
vie shall have to pursue matters further to discover what guarantees Kuhn 
can offer us from within his conventionalist viewpoint. Our best way of 
proceeding is to examine how Kuhn deals with what has come to be seen as 
the central problem of theories of inquiry, namely, the relationship between 
the subject who acquires the knowledge and the object of his inquiry. It 
is only by gaining a deep appreciation of the many pitfalls presented by 
the commonly made 'subject-object distinction' that self-reflective progress 
can be made in the development of an adquate theory of inquiry for OR. I 
shall, therefore, make a brief detour to examine some of the problems which 
arise because of this distinction. I shall then turn to the question of 
whether Kuhn's scheme provides an adequate theory of inquiry. 
(i) SJe will see mole of this later in his model of the psychology of the 
subject. 
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SECT10NB 
THEFOUNDATIONS0FKUHNIANSCIENCE 
The Problem of KnowledFTe: Process versus State: 
Interest in theories of inquiry means that one cannot avoid dealing 
with the problem of the natures of subject and object for this, with 
their relationship, is the most basic definition of knomtledgo possible. 
Because the issues involved in this definition of 1Q1owled-e are rarely 
given explicit consideration, theories of inquiry often have embedded in 
them covert resolutions. These resolutions often provide a foundation for 
the acquisition of knowledZe which effectively make it impossible to attain. 
Therefore, the views taken on the resolution of the subject-object distinc- 
tion-may negate the whole enterprise: they may make knowledge impossible to 
acquire by the very way in which they Tproach the problem. 
This possibility is, in fact, actualised by the way in which some 
operations researchers approach the problem of knowledge. This is reGrett- 
able because our analysis in the first chapter has led us to the conclusion 
that the distinctive feature of OR is its resolute commitment to unfettered 
inquiry into social organizations. OR stands or falls as the guardian of 
sound knowledge acquisition. The application of knowledge (via, for 
example, techniques) is seen as a secondary activity. In this section I 
wish to raise the subject-object problem and apply some general thoughts 
on the matter to the Kuhn-Popper debate. This analysis will put us in a 
favouable position to carry the analysis over to Operations Research. 
There has for some time been a growing recognition that the approp- 
riate stance towards the problem of knowledge`is not to ask ''. "Jhat is 
knowledge? ' or 'How is knowledge possible? ' but, rather, to conceive of 
knowledge interms of its growth, that is, as Piaget (1972, p. 6) puts it, 
to consider "... knowledge.., always... (as)... a process rather than a 
state... " (ibid). This recognition is now fairly widespread, and even 
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affects some views affects some views within 07-Z on the current status of 
its practice (and, as we shall see in a later chapter, this stance has 
infused virtually all modern thinking in the behavioural sciences). It 
is, of course, central to the outlook of Kuhn's work. 
The common recognition of viewing the problem of knowledge as a 
problem of growth or process has, however, not been taken very far by 
many writers. In particular, many have been reluctant to accept that 
knowledge is only to be understood in terms of process. There, are, of 
course, the products of the knowledge process, but it is possible that 
the reason they me validly called knowledge at all is because of their rel- 
ation to a process of production. Many writers who adopt the process 
stance have attempted to avoid this implication. Hegel's notion of 
knowledge as process, for example, reveals on close examination (which 
we undertake later) to have concealed in it the view of knowledge as the 
state of 'Absolute Knowledge'. Similarly, Kuhn's version will be seen to 
rest on an implicit view of knowledge as a state. Also, (in both the 
next and the final chapter) examples from the literature of operations 
research will be found to have surreptitiously imported a notion of know- 
ledge as a state, even though their schemes are presented as represen- 
tatives of the process schema. 
We should view adequate knoeiledge in teris of the process of its 
Growth because as Piaget says "the theory of knowledge is... essentially. -. a 
theory of adaptation of thought to reality, even if in the last instance 
this adaptation (like all adaptations) reveals the existence of an 
inextricable interaction between the subject and object... " (op. cit., 
p. 18, my emphasis). As I have emphasised in this quotation, looking 
at the growth of lazowledge as process implies most fundamentally that 
subject and object cannot be torn apart; it is only their combination 
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"Lich constitutes 1-, no; rled3e and, as obvious as this sounds, come ver". 1 
subtle way of distinguishing subject and object and then allowing then 
to relate have been attempted. The product of their relationship has 
then been called knowledge. That is, the problem of knowledge has not 
often been seen as the relati. onchip, between the subject and the object 
but, instead, it has been seen as the 'subject' and 'object' relatinn. 
Few have resisted the temptation of believing that one first defines the 
subject or the object (or both) and then one lets the knowledge process 
proceed. They have done this without apparently realising that what they 
have in fact achieved was not a definition of knowledge as process, but 
a definition in advance of the process of Imowledge itself. If this 
procedure is followed the process becomes merely the vehicle for realicinM 
this predefined knowledge either as the given object (positivism) or the 
given subject (conventionalism). 
Defining the bounds of knowledge in advance is, of course, the 
direct antithesis of the declared ideal of OR and all serious epistemologies 
of true discovery. In an-important sense, however, it is hard to lay the 
blame for this unwarranted move., at the doorstep of the proponents of the 
epistemologies themselves. fluch of the blame has to be placed fairly and 
swuarely on the language which we use to think about the problem of know- 
ledge, a conclusion which Wittgenstein (amongst others) cam to. fiere 
mention of the problem of knowledge in terms of subject and object seems 
to encourage the paralysis of thinking that the problem of knowledge can 
be unlocked by discovering they key in the subject or in the object. 
T: o suitable language seems available to think the problem through without 
lapsing into an essentialism(') of one or the other. The search is always 
(1) That iss that knowledge is 'essentially in the object or the subject. 
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for an unassailable foundation of knowledge, where in fact none is to 
be found. 
(1) 
t1e have seen, in the introduction to this chapter, the kind 
of rosition, which can result if the attempt is made, when we briefly 
looked at the implications of Hume's work. 
Let me mention come direction which will follow from the atance 
towards the problem of knouledZe outlined above. 
Firstly, it may be thought that I have opened up a nihilistic line 
of thought which will end with the condemnation of all attempts at attain- 
ing adequate knowledge. Not so. My aim is to expound and, to the extent 
possible clarify some issues which must be faced by OR. I hope to clear 
away nonsense. It is altogether another task to provide a clear and unam- 
biguous theory of inquiry for On, although the guidelines I provide 
later at least make this an approachable ideal. The views which I shall 
attack do not. 
Secondly, although much of the blame for the mistakes which the follow- 
ing will reveal must, as I say, be laid at the doorstep of the very 
language we use to think about the problem of knowledge - particularly 
talk of 'subject' and 'object' -I shall still retain this vocabulary for 
it seems to me that one advantage of doing so is to emphasis one very im- 
portant feature of any adequate account of the growth of knowledge. That 
is, that both subject and object are to be taken seriously. They are both 
to be treated in non-essentialist ways, certainly, in that they we not 
(i) This is even triv of Popper - his views are pessimistic forecasts of 
the amount of knowledge we can acquire, they do not weaken the argument the: 
knowledge is absolute for him because it is so in rr3. ncinle. 
(Zee: 1945). - 
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endowed with some inscrutable, independent 'Civeness'. In fact, we only 
truly take subject and object seriously when they are considered in relation 
to process. It is not the essentialist treatment of subjects or objects 
which brings them properly into account in any theory of the growth of 
knowledge. On the contrary, it is by their very treatment of them an, 
'essences' that they are forced out of the picture. The neglect of the 
nature of the object - what I have previously called subject-matter: for our 
purposes here'the terms can be used interchangeably - is. the central pre- 
occupation of this thesis.. I shall later on only have some general remarks to 
make on the nature of the subject as he is implicated in the process of 
inquiry. üome interesting thoughts on the role of the subject have been 
published by Churchman and Zchainblatt (1965), and there is a growing 
interest in the problem of implementation (see: Huysmanns, 1970; Shultz 
and Slevin, 1975), but this work is marred by a General failure to 
conceive of the nature of the subject within the context of an adequate 
understanding of the nature of the object. Part Two of this thesis is 
devoted to an analysis of the typical conception of the object which 
has popular support in OR circles. The question asked (but not adequately 
answered) by this thesis is what precisely is the nature of the subject as 
it is conditioned by the nature of the object? In simple terms, what 
would OR look like if it had an adequate grasp of the nature of its subject- 
matter? 
We turn first in our quest to understand tt problem of knowledge to 
a consideration of the work of Louis Althusser (1970). Althusser's account 
of the problems of epistemology is interesting because he shows that 
the 'empiricist problematic', by commencing with a Given subject and a 
Given object, effectively makes knowledge the tautologically inevitable 
outcome of the processes set up whereby 'knowledge' is to be acquired. 
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We --h-all in a 'moment grant to distinc fish two variants of the away in uhich 
this is achieved. It is this feature of the schemes of Popper and Lithn - 
the inevitability of valid 1mo"jled-e - uhich above all else is the major 
thrust of the criticism which I wish to make of them. Later on I use the 
results of this analysis to criticize some uritin- an the nature of OP.. 
; ghat other criticism could be more fundamental? 
To turn'to Althusser's account: he says that: 
"The empiricist-conception of knowledge pre- 
sents a process that takes place between a 
given object and a given subject. At this 
level, the status of this subject (psy- 
chological, historical, or otheri", ise) and 
of this object (discontinuous or contin- 
uous, mobile or fixed) is not very import- 
ant. This status only affects the precise 
definition of the variants of the basic 
problematic, while the basic problematic 
itself is all that concerns us here. The 
subject and object, which are given and 
hence pre-date the process of knowledge, 
already define a certain fundamental theor- 
etical field, but one which cannot yet in 
this state be pronounced empiricist. What 
defines it as such is the nature of the 
process of lnow1edGe-, in other words a cer- 
tain relationship that defines knowledge as 
such, as a function of the real object of 
which it is said to be knowledge". 
(op. cit., p. 35). 
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Althusser goes on to say that: 
"The whole empiricist process of I ow1ed-e 
lies in fact in an operation of the subject 
called abstraction. To know is to abstract 
from the real object its essence, the poss- 
ession of which by the subject is then called 
knowledge... (T)he essence is abstracted from 
real objects in the sense of an extraction, 
as one might say that Cold is extracted (or 
abstracted, i. e., separated) from the dross 
of earth and sand in which it is held and 
contained" (op. cit., p. 35-6). 
Accounting for empiricist philosophies in this vay leads Althusser 
to two conclusions: firstly, 
t'Knowledr; e: its sole function is to separ- 
ate, in the object, the two parts which 
exist in it, the essential and the inessen- 
tial - by special procedures whose aim is 
to eliminate the inessential real 
(by a 
whole series of sortinbs, sievincs, scrap- 
ings and rubbings), and to leave the know- 
inc subject only the second part of the real 
which is its essence, itself real, Which 
Gives us a second result: the abstraction 
operation and all its scourinG procedures 
are merely procedures to purge and eliminate 
one art of the real in order to isolate the 
other" (ibid). 
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The point is that schemes for the acquisition of knowledge (the 
cortin; s, sieving:, etc. ) which commence from a given subject and a given 
object claim, by the way in which the object is conceptualised in the 
first place (and this may be done unconsciously, of course), that their 
'procedures' will deliver merely by the nature of thos, rrocedures, the 
essence of the object. One insight which follows from this is that we 
cannot accept on face value the often-made claim that the scientist is not 
seeking absolute knowledge, since the search process continues indefinately. 
Hegel, as I have mentioned, and as we shall see in detail later, points 
to infinite, unending process without revealing that in fact absolute 
knowledge is ever-present even in the working out of that process. 
Absolute knowledge (of essences ) is Given in the procedures even though 
we may not Grasp the essence as such until the end. In other words, what 
the procedures guarantee is 'progress'. They guarantee this, as Althusser 
points out, because they define the real object as having a structure which 
... concerns precisely the respective positions 
in the real of the two 
constitutive parts of the real: the inessential part and the essential 
part... (rohere)... the inessential part occupies the whole of the outside 
of the object, its visible surface; while the essential part occupies 
the inside part of the real object, its invisible kernel" (op. cit. p. 37). 
With this pre-given structure of the real object it must follow that 
removal of the inessential is merely the corrollary of revelation of the 
essential. The move in any scheme of knowledge acquisition which defines 
the structure of the object in this wey,,, therefore, is always seen as 
'progressive' without the goal ever having to be reached. Progress, 
therefore, can be defined and equated with pure process because process 
is merely an instrumental operation on a given structure which by its 
construction is defined so that it must yield the sought after fruit merely 
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through its application. Althusser surfs up in this ºay : 
represent knol}lod!: e... is co. 11, letely 
inscribea in the structure of the re?. 1 ob- 
sect, jr. the form of the difference between 
the inessential and the essence... Know- 
ledge is therefore already really present 
in the real object it has to 1 ior;, in t le 
form of the respective dispositions of its 
two real parts! Knowledge is completely 
and really present in it: not only its ob- 
ject, which is the real part called the 
essence, but also its operation, which is 
the distinction and respective positions 
that really exist between the two parts of 
the real object, of which one (the inessen- 
tial) is the outer hart which conceals and 
envelops the other (the essence or inner 
part)" (or. cit., bp. 37-8). 
Power and the' Proh1c+r of. ? i' ot"tý_gýirý±; 
Hors do these thought apply to Popper's scheme, taking his an an 
exemplar of positivism? It is clear from them that tie should be highly 
suspicious of schemes which claim that they are progressive merely because 
they are corrective of inadequate l ouledge. I. -le should be suspicious 
because we are entitled to ask 'inadequate with respect to what, exactly? ', 
and if all we receive in reply is a mute ointin,; to a backdrop of 'reality', 
we can be sure that we are not talking of knowledZe acquisition as such 
but of knowledge as essence. This, of course, is not to say that vie should 
not welcome the correction of inadequate knowledge of reality. The concern 
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here is with the schemes of inquiry whereby adequate knoi-ºledZ; e is claimed 
to be acquired. 
Take Popper's notion of falsification as the key-stone in uhat he 
considers to be the 'Logic of ücientific Discovery'. I emphasise that 
Popper considers his scheme to be merely concerned with the acquisition 
of knowledge by dint of the logic of its procedures alone. Because 
scientific knowledge for Popper is solely the outcome of the application 
of the procedures of falisification, 
(1) 
we are talking of knowledge as 
the state achieved through their application. We are definitely not talk- 
ing of the process knowledge-acquisition as such when we conceive of know- 
ledge in this way. Popper's main concern seem to be to avoid situations 
where we too easily accept theories as knowledge and so he sets up the 
criterion of falsification to place the most rigorous demands possible on 
a contending theory. This rigour is useful as a value to which scientists 
should adhere but it cannot describe the acquisition of knowledge because 
of its reliance upon (as-Kuhn terms it) a neutral observational language 
which allows, by the application of his procedure, the removal of the 
inessential real and thereby progress towards the essential. Recall that 
Popper's model (for which we have seen some support in OR) involves the 
subject pervaded by his subjective conjectures which colour his expectations 
on the one hand, and on tie other there is the world - the object - which 
can be addressed in terms of the utterances 'no' or snot disproved'. Within 
this framework the problem of knowledge is the removal of false conjectures 
(i) He repeatedly says that he concedes that know1edGe can be achieved 
by other Means - but that this is of no interest to him. 
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and their replRcernent by 'not false' conjectures. But that he sees this 
movement ac progressive says much for his view of knowledge. He shows 
not the slightest concern for how knoeiledoe it actually acquired (see: 
1970, pp. 57-8 for his bitter criticisms of Kurn's turn to psychology 
and sociology). 
Thus Popper says: 
"... we have learned not to be dis- 
appointed any loner if our scientific 
theories are overthrown; for we can, 
in most cases, determine with great 
confidence which of any two theories 
is the better one. We can therefore 
know that we are making progress... 
Thus we can say that in our search 
dor truth, we have replaced scientific 
certainty by scientific progress". 
(1945, p. 12). 
Popper appears to believe that by avoiding all talk of the origins 
of knowledge and by restricting himself solely to questions of the progress 
of knowledge he avoids the incomprehensibility of essentialism. He 
believes, and rightly, that it is impossible to talk rationally of the 
origins of knowledge in essentialist terms, but how comprehensible do 
we become by remaining silent? What are we left with in Popper's scheme 
is the capitulation to the essentialist scheme by default, because Popper 
cannot avoid at least 'pointing' to the very thing that the essentialists 
directly assert. Popper is correct in his insistence that talk of the 
ultimate origins of knowledge is misplaced; he is wrong in carrying this 
over to a silencing of all talk of the process of knowledge acquisition. 
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The lesson which OR should take away from this is that the search 
for the panaceas of applied research in terms of 'criticism', 'falsific- 
ation', 'rigour', 'dialectics' etc., are in them;, elves meaningless with 
respect to the problem of knowledge. All such 'keystones' of 'science' 
often involve the totally unwarranted implication that 'reality' is 
immanent and the inessential has only to be removed. 
Kuhn and the Problem of Kno! -iled e: 
Demonstrating that Popper's scheme is essentialist is not difficult; 
it fits clearly within the empiricist problematic as described by Aithusser. 
Showing that the same is also true of Kuhn's scheme is, on the face of 
it, much more difficult because it is widely believed that Kuhn offers 
(to use his own terminology) a 'paradigmatic' alternative to the Popperian 
view (cf. Sklair, 1973; IIasterman, 1970; IHK gee, or. cit., and most of 
Kuhn's critics in 1, -, 
k, -tos and IIusörave, 1970). The task looks especially 
daunting in view of the fact that, as Iiasterman claims, Kuhn has amended 
Popper's account whore we have found it canting most, namely, ""lith regard 
to the origins of knowledge. Nevertheless, in spite of all this opinion 
to the contrary, we may be encouraged in our task by the fact that of all 
the people involved in the so-called 'Kithn-Popper debate' one leading 
character, Kuhn himself, has consistently expressed surprise at the cap 
his and Popper's followers have zealously attempted to place between them. 
I think we should pay Ku111 ti e honour of taking him at his word when he 
says that "... Sir Karl's view of science ainlmy own are very nearly identical" 
(1970, p. 1) and believe him when he writes claiming to wish to clear up 
orisunderstandings' (on. cit., passim). Much, I believe, is to be learned 
about Kuhn's scheme from examining the basis of this overlap. 
AlthouCh I have said that it appears difficult to fit Kuhn into 
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^. lthusser's 'em; ýiricict problematic', in one sense, if ue eiere prepared 
to forego the lessons which extended analysis could provide, it is ver"" 
easy to dismiss Kuhn's scheme in these terms. this dismissal could follow 
naturally from the very way in which Kuhn sets up his problem. Kuhns 
noblem is to account for progress in science, and he quite rightly sees 
an essential role in this for a study of, science 'as it is'. However, 
he goes much further than this open-ended approach would seem to imply 
when he takes as his starting point the common-sense assumption that 
science as it is is successful. Thus he says: "... we must explain why 
science - our surest example of sound knowledge - progresses as it does, and 
we must first find out how, in fact, it does progress" (1970, p. 20). 
If we discount for the moment the latter part of this sentence, which shows 
that at least Kuhn intends to uncover the processes by which science 
acquires knowledge, we might be forgiven for concluding that he is attempt- 
ing precisely the same kind of analysis as Popper. Starting from the 
supposition that the knowledge which science has is adequate, concern shifts 
from an analysis of why this knowledge can be taken as adequate, in terms 
of an analysis of the process by which it was acquired. Instead, what we 
are given (certainly in Popper's account, but not co clearly yet in Kuhn s) 
is a functional or teleological account of ho; i the given end (adequate 
lmo? fledge) could or must have been achieved. Certainly, teleological and 
process accounts are often compatible, but a teleological account cannot 
stand as a substitute for a process account. Instead of being Given an 
account of why the process of is oi"; ledge acquisition produces adequate 
l ouled e (that is, an understanding of that is adequate knowledge) Vie are 
Given an account of the adequacy of theprocedures in achieving a Given 
end (which is merely assumed to be adequate lnoi"iledge) " 
Kuhn has amended Popper's account in Several interrelated ways. 
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His major innovations, however, lie in two areas which, I believe, he 
then works through, within the essentialist problematic shared by Popper, 
to rroduce his distinctive scheme. 
(1) 
The two areas of innovation are 
firstly, in his extension of Popper's psychology of the subject to a 
psychology (Kuhn says that he prefers 'sociology') of the 'fact' - this 
is by way of a logical extension of what was already inherent in Popper's 
scheme. Secondly, on tie basis of this extension, he attempts to provide 
an account of the origins of a science. Considering that operations 
research in effect claims to be creating a new 'science' each time it 
investigates an organization, it should be very interested in such attemrks 
and the grounds on which they might fail. 
Science as a Dynamic Process: 
Whereas Popper offers us the 'comparative statics' of the growth 
of knowledge, Kuhn offers us a 'dynamic' analysis. Jhereas in Popper's 
scheme theories change in a time-independent way, for Kuhn paradigm shifting 
is a time-dependent process. Both schemes are 'processual', but for Kuhn 
the process is materially altered by having to take place over time. 
For Kuhn a central observation is that "... discovery is a process and 
must take time(1962, p. 55). The view of the growth of knowledge as time- 
dependent follows logically from the deduction that "only when all the 
relevant conceptual categories are prepared in advance... can discovering 
i1) Using his own terminology, Kuhn would call this paradigm elaboration, 
that is, puzzle-solving. 
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th-t 1=0 discovering t"'h^. t occur effortJ. es^J.; , to-ether, and in an instant" 
(ibiw'). ('. e can note just in passing that t'-. rch and Simon (i95 ) ýýoulc' 
roint, -r tKtlýn' 1 co. r . ct. r iith . ýu.... on _ 
thi c., 
_c_. 
lliný, I. 
_-. __ s r_ 
dim c hlfti_n .C r_on- 
Programmed decision-r. n. kin.; ' a_nd his notion of norrial science 'rroZrammed 
decision-makin ' ). Kuhn sees in his acceptance of the tirie-dolondont 
nature of t:. ^ grox"rth of kno! "rledZe the answer to a f, -). t--l t" seal-less in the 
Positivist vi. et"w of science. I: xg uin; that successive raradi nc crust of 
necessity be 'incon ensurable' - becaiise (cue this is an arg ! rent to u"rhich 
I shall return) a new paradi, -m by definition deals with the problems with 
which the earlier one could not - Kuhn dismisses the prevalent view of 
It... science-as-accuniulation... sI (op. cit., p. 96). This is a view w1hich 
he sees as being "... entangled with a dominant epistemology that takes 
Ic: oe: led; e to be a construction placed directly upon rar sense date by the 
mind" (ibid). As he correctly goes on to say: 
4 
"(This)... interpretation, closely assoc- 
iated with early lo; ical positivism and 
not categorically rejected by its succ- 
essors, would restrict the ranee and 
meaning of an accepted theory so that it 
could not possibly conflict with any 
later theory that made predictions about 
some of the same natural phenomena" 
(op. cit., p. 98). 
If knowledge is merely constructions (or representations) placed on 
'raw' sense data then dynamic change is thereby ruled out because the logical 
implication is that: 
"... the range of application... (of 
scientific_theories)... must be restric- 
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ted to those phenomena and to that pre- 
cision of observation with which the ex- 
perimental evidence at hand already deale. 
Carried a step further (and the step can 
scarcely be avoided once the first is 
taken), such a limitation prohibits the 
scientist from claimin; to speak 'scient- 
ifically' about any phenomenon not already 
observed. Even in its present form the 
restriction forbids the scientist to rely 
upon a theory in his own research when- 
ever that research enters an area or seeks 
a degree of precision for which past prac- 
tice with the theory offers no precedent. 
These prohibitions are logically unexcep- 
tionable. ]3ut the result of accepting 
them would be the end of research through 
which science may develop further" 
(op. cit., p. 100). 
Forbidding scientists to go beyond phenomena (as all positivists do) 
would strip the process of knowledge growth of its obviously time-dependent 
nature because accepting that normal science is conducted vithin the 
nr onise -provided by a paradiGm, means (and we Co into this in .: a moment) 
that the 'facts' are in some sense 'found' in advance of their discovery. 
Therefore, Kuhn concludes time'is-needed both to articulate the paradigm 
and to discover the scope of its application. Kuhns scheme of the dynamics 
os science runs: initial paradigm, articulation, the discovery of 'anomalies', 
the onset of 'crisis', the resolution of anomalies through the use of a new 
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If, as the positivists suCCest, facts are urnm'aimoucl 'uriven' ; 
this time-c? epen_dent -rocos3 io trunczted. :s KCi31nruto it: 
If positivistic restrictions on the ranCe 
of a theory's legitimate applicability are 
taken literally, the mechanism that tells 
the scientific community what problems mafl' 
lead to fundamental change must cease to 
function" (op. cit., p. 101). 
This attack on positivism combined with his views on the nature of 
scientific revolutions gives us, perhaps, some hope that Kuhn will avoid 
the totally unwarranted presupposition of positivism that improvement 
can be defined interms of uncovering phenomena. Ilaking a statement with 
which Kuhn (and some operations researchers) should agree Harvey (1973) 
points out, that "... positivism draws its categories and concepts from an 
existing reality with all its defects... " (p. 130): Thus, we could perhaps 
assume that the Kuhnian scheme, in remedying this defect in positivism, 
will provide us with the possibility of outlining a scheme of inquiry which 
is truly revolutionary in the OR sense, i. e., only the 'real' as a complex 
totality is given. 
With the firm commitment to viewing scientific progress as a 
dynamic process, Kuhn then looks to the problem of uncovering and supporting 
the bases upa hich such a commitment could rest. And here, not surprisingly, 
Kuhn resorts to the standard currency of the philosophy of science and 
social science of his day, and he skilfully interprets them within his 
process view. 
(1) 
If the process of scientific progress takes time to work 
(i) But they do not change their basic nature because of this, as vie shall 
see. 
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through then Kuhn's first problem is to explain the machanics of the process: 
specifically, he has to explain the commitment which scientists display 
towards theories, because commitment is a necessary corrollary to the 
activity of working out the promise provided by a paradigm to the point 
where crisis is overwhelming and change ensues. Kuhn achieves an explan- 
ation of this commitment by 'sociologizing' facts. 
Kuhn extends his criticism of positivism's belief in the self- 
evident giveness of facts (a vie;, which he sees as being responsible for 
their non-dynamic view of scientific progress) by giving facts a sociological 
status in two ways. Firstly, at the level of the individual, he argues for 
a Kantian model of man, whereby the very perception of the world is seen 
to be predicated upon given (a rriori) conceptual categories. 
(1) 
Secondly, 
at the level of the scientific community, to explain why individuals both 
share and continue to employ a particular set of conceptual categories, 
that is, a paradigm, Kuhn argues for something very close to sociological 
functionalism (of which I shall have more to say in the final'chapter) 
whereby the individual is seen to be 'socialized' by his Group into accept- 
inC a particular set of conceptual catecories. Given these two socioloGical 
innovations in the explanation of scientific process Kuhn claims that he 
has explained its characteristic dynamism. 'Ihether this model also explains 
scientific progress is quite P. different matter, as we shall see. 
The Kantian basis to huhn's work can be seen both in the enrhasis 
which he Gives to the subject (as evidenced, for example, by his criticisms 
(1) This is an option that Churchman (1970a and 1971) considers. Although 
he finds some fault in it - as, indeed, does Kuhn - it has a lasting 
influence on his views. Vote that the Kantian model of man will reappear 
in Part T. io as an attemrt to treat the members of social systems as 
'purposeful) individuals. 
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of Fon-per's notions of 'mistakes' etc. ) and in his description of the 
subject (i. e., the scientist). On the central question of theory choice 
Kuhn stays that he shares with some other -philosophers "... a common convic- 
tion of the relevance of the philosophy of language and of metarhor" as 
compared with Popper and his followers who "... share with the riore. trad- 
itional philosophers of science the assumption that the problem of theory- 
choice can be resolved by techniques which are semantically neutral" 
(1970, p. 234). It is above all around the question of the existence of a 
'neutral observational language' that "t... the central constellation of 
issues which separate... (Kuhn)... from most of... (his)... critics" exists 
(op. cit., p: 266). Kuhn is emphatically opposed to the idea of a neutral 
observational language because in his view "... languages cut up the world 
in different ways, and we have no access to a neutral sub-lino istic 
, means of reporting" 
(op. cit. p. 268). With Kuhn's denial, however, comes 
an affirmation: It... Imowledg, e of nature... is built into language" (op. 
cit., p. 270). 
(1) 
In discussing scientist's acquisition of the prevailing 
conceptual categories through being presented with 'exemplars', Kuhn argues 
that "... doing problems is learning the language of a theory and acquiring 
the knowledge of nature embedded in that language" (op. cit., p. 272). This 
knowledge is pre-linguistic in that "... relat(ing) swords to other words... 
can function only if we already possess some vocabulary acquired by a non- 
verbal or incompletely verbal process" which involved some kind of "... direct 
matching of whole words- or phrases to nature" (op. cit., p. 270-1). 
l nguage, it seems, sets the limits to knowledge. This is so because "... our 
(1) Both Churchman and Beer argue this point. 
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vor1d is populated in the firnt instance not by Stimuli but by the objects 
of our sen&'ltionc" (196x, r. 193), co that we h3. vr a "... 1 n, -, uw_"o condit- 
ioned or Z. c n. -, un-e-corre1e. ted vror of seeing the t"icrld... (without which).., 
vie do not see the i"ior1d at all" (1970, p" X7G) " 
With this stronGly Inntian model of the subject Kuhn has both given 
the basis for explaining the cömmitment (of which I spoke earlier in terms 
of 'role specialization') and has also apparently plugged the hiatus in 
the positivistic account, namely, its inability to explain the origins of 
a science other than his reference to unanalysed, rrimitive phenomena. 
This remedy is highlighted -v ith Kuhn's approval - by 11asternan's (1970) 
account of that she sees as Kuhn's "central originality". 
An analysis of the usages to which Kuhn puts the notion of paradigm 
leads her to conclude that "... the paradigm's basic property... (is its) 
... concreteness or 
'crudeness"' (op. cit., p. 67). She argues, against 
the "aetherial philo; ophicalness of the 'falsifiable metaphysics' view" 
(ibid) that Kuhn has been concerned with "... the whole process of human 
beings trying to achieve a scientific explanation" (op. cit, p. 68). 
That is, IIctsterman argues, Kuhn has been concerned, as no-one has before 
him, with the problem that if theories do not attach to nature in a non- 
problematic way, how can science work when the theory is not there? It is 
the neglect of this question which accounts for the "... gross lacuna which 
... 
(she)... asserts to be in the Popperian vie" - namely, that Popper' 
cannot account for how any new research line starts up... " (op. Cit. P. 71). 
The "central originality" of Kuhn-, ' therefore is, Ilazterman argues, his 
It... investigation into the crude origins, and early stages, of any science... " 
(op. cit., p. 73). And the crude origin of a science is, as Iiasterman 
describes it, an "... initial practical trick-which-'corks-sufficiently-for- 
the-choice-of-it-to-embody-a-potential-insight... " (op. cit., P. 70). 
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Science in this view starts fron an 'artefact' or 'construct' which 
enables puzzle-colvio to rroceed by 're7resentinr, ' an object as 'like' 
something else iithout necessarily providing the basis for sa in Z "ith 
that exactly the constituted object is similar (Kuhn, 1970, p. ? 75). 
I:: n-sterrian's analysis, therefore, provides a place for I: uhn's 'tacit' 
(i. e., non-verbal) 1aiowledZe in a philosophy of science. 
starting from a potentially productive insight, I: uhn's dynamic 
description of science follows: by the achievement of concrete results 
(which I? asterman calls the 'sociological paradi n') and the develorment 
of a scientific community which is dedicated to the fulfilment of the 
promise of the insight and its achievements, normal science blossoms into 
a "disci linary matrix" of norms, values, concepts, and results. Mills, 
unlike pourer who is exclusively concerned that theories should not too 
easily be accepted, Kuhn is preoccupied with explaining mechanisms which 
prevent theories from too easily being thrown away. It is to this end 
Kuhn musters t 'he formidable combined forces of ac ri perception 
and social conditioning. 
These concerto can certainly explain commitment, but hoti do we then 
explain change? :; e might be forgiven for suspecting that Kuhn has worked 
himself into the same corner occupied by the structural functionalist 
sociologists, namely, the inability to explain chance (see, for example, 
Couldner, 1970; Lockwood, 1970; bills, 1959) except in terms of the meta- 
physics of the 'system'. This is an option which Kuhn finally adopts. 
However, prior to this he employs another option, one which is provided 
for him by h5sKantian subject. This is to make explicit what is implicit 
in mart, namel;;, ataken-for-, ranted object world. I{ant's a priori 
cateZ; orics are a priori of somethin^ and this thins is taken for granted 
when wo focus exclusively on the subject. Kant wanted to set the bounds 
of Urure reason' much in the tgay in which Kuhn wishes to set the bounds of 
I-. -: 
'logic' and all the characteristic reasoningo of normal science. Kant 
in his 'Critique of Rare Peason' lays down the bounds of pure reason as 
subsisting within the limits of a priori. 3ano'iledge, just as we have seen 
Kuhn draw limits by the use of his notion of paradigm. The Kantian cate- 
gories by defining the nature (the 'logic') of the world (from the point 
of view of inquiry) presuppose the existence of that world, which would 
not matter at all if it were not for the fact that 'it' is continually 
referred to by Kant, Kuhn and come operations researchers, in an unex- 
plained way as a guarantor of progress. 
As Husserl (1970) says of Kant: 
"Naturally, from the very start in the 
Kantian manner of posing questions, the 
everyday surrounding world of life is 
pre-supposed as existing - the surround- 
in. - world in which all of us... consciously 
have our existence... " (p. 104). 
And referring back to Kuhn's thoughts on the nature of the contact 
between the subject and the world, we can refer to Ilepham! s ( 1973) point 
that: 
"Not only is it impossible to think an 
object world as the source of systems 
of meaning, it is also impossible to 
identify this source as subjective. 
For there is not first a subject and a 
world, and then a language created at 
their point of contact. Because to be 
a subject is already to live inra world 
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... No doubt it is possible for a rerson 
to have 'wordless thoughts' but this is 
to miss the roint. For to be a rerson is 
to live in the vorld... Where there are 
yet no systems of meaning there can be no 
subject... Thus ve cannot look for the 
determining conditions which make len, ua[: o 
and culture Torsible at the level of the 
subject. '.: e cannot, in a uantian manner, 
discover organizin- - owers of conscious- 
ness attributable to a transcendental 
subject" (op. cit., p. 126-7). 
Thus, Kuhn should not claim that it is in the subject that the 
origins of science are to be found. And neither does he. Cn the critic^l 
question of paradigm change he is forced to virtually abandon the central 
place of paradigm in his scheme and reluctantly to refer to something 
very close to the positivist's idea of phenomena. We shall coo that, as 
Kahn describes it, paradigms merely organize phenomena, and progress is 
defined as increasingly better organizations. However, in an attempt to 
avoid the positivist trap which has has by this move set for himself he 
reintroduces the supremacy of the subject in a nerv wise: the 'supra- 
subject' in the form of-the 'community'. This final move, we shall see, 
does not make his theory of inquiry any more understandable. 
Kuhn's Theory of Revolutionary Inquiry: 
(i) ')ociolo, -ical Relativism: 
With cociologizin- of the fact comes, as I have suggested, the need 
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for an explanation of paradigm change. Since paradigms determine the 
facts, paradigm change, it might appear, could just as easily be called 
fact-change'. This looks the very epitome of revolutionary, anti- 
positivistic science. But the interesting question is whether Kuhn can 
explain change in terms of the sane concepts which he employed to explain 
stability or whether he has to revert to other modes of explanation. 
Because the concepts which explained stability teere the anti-positivistic 
ones, the interest in this question is whether concepts which explain the 
basis of progressive change are also anti-positivistic. 
Kuhn initially describes scientific revolutions in terms of paradiGm 
changes or changes in "world views", as we have seen. However, this is 
clearly not an explanation of the change, not yet does it explain why a 
change can be thought of as progressive. To Give explanations of these 
two aspects of scientific revolutions necessitates an explanation of both 
the relationship between successive paradigms and the basis on which the 
earlier one was rejected, and the later one selected. Recall that what 
is involved is a "... decision between alternative ways of practicing 
science... " (Kuhn, 1962, p. 157). Kuhn attempts initially to e-. -. -plain 
both of these as: ect of scientific revolutuions by the single concept of 
"situation". The situation which Kuhn invokes to fulfil this explanatory 
role is one of 'crisis'. Crises arise, according to Kuhn, because even- 
tually the continual exploitation of the promise of the initial paradigm 
leads to the discovery of 'anomalies', that is, puzzles which have not' 
yielded to solution within the terms set by the prevailing paradigm. 
A crisis arises not merely because of the existence of unsolved puzzles. 
Kuhn distinguishes two possible reactions to 'anomalies'. On the one hand 
they can be viewed as outstanding puzzles which are expected to yield 
given enough effort and ingenuity. Cn the other hand they may be viewed % 
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'countcrinstý. nccs', tt. -t is, unsolve^ ý_iý^"les which are peen to under- 
rii no ti, e very 1, ^rZC: iý ? in which they are 
re et-ion that trite cricie occurs ^.: ct n rfý: 
It... novel theory emerce(s) only rfter t 
cosec'.. It is o ni, ý"! it' t? -. e socon d 
rronounced fr. iluro in the norna1 
nobl. n-colvir_- activ? tyt' (or. cit., Given that ^ reel. crisis 
c%-ist, -, g the selection criterion and the rel^tionchin bet-seen cort^etiný; 
rarndi, gis is determined. As Kuhn says: 
"Probably the sin-le most prevalent claim 
advanced by the proponents of a nev harz - 
diZm is that they can solve the rroble^. is 
that have led one to a crisis. ! hen it can 
leCi_timately be mace, this cl im is often 
the most effective one possible". 
(o". cit., '::,. 153). 
The ability to solve the anomalies of the old parndiGn rrovides the 
selection criterion, and it also determines the relationship betmeen ne,,., 
and old. 
"If nevi theories are called forth to re- 
solve anomalies in the relation of an ex- 
istine theory to nature, then the success- 
ful new theory must somewhere permit pre- 
dictions that are different from those 
derived from its predecessor. That diff- 
erence could only occur if the two eiere 
logically incompatible. In the process 
of being assimilated, the second must dis- 
place the first" (op. cit., p. 97). 
This loS1ca-1 incompatability Kuhn calls "incommensurability'". In this 
version Of Progressive chance, nail raradi, -, ms are nroCressive because they 
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solve problems which the old one could not. However, Kuhn does not at 
this stage of his explanation wich to stress actual rro'olem-solving 
ability. He points out that often this claim is unfounded - demonstrations 
are usually yet to come. His stress, rather, is on the psychological/ 
sociological aspects (the incommensurability) of the change. At one 
stage in his argument it is this which is held to be the basis of progress- 
ive change. However, this leads, obviously enough, to great difficulties. 
Unless something intervenes to guarantee the new logic provided by the 
new paradigm, we are correct to feel suspicious of his attempts (evidence 
ofwI. ch is given below) to provide an explanation of progressive change 
solely in terms of sociological concepts (as Popper, indeed, is). One 
reason for suspicion-is that explanation solely in terms of the socio- 
logical concepts which were employed to explain stability, appears to 
rule out even the possibility of change, regardless of the question of 
whether they can explain progressive change. This Kuhn recognises. 
Kuhn faces the same problem of explanation which operations researchers 
face over the problem of 'implementation'. * A naradi m shift being a now 
1"1a; of practicing a science is akin (as I argued earlier) to the provision 
by an operations research team of a new strategic plan. : lost thoughtful 
operations researchers agree that for real imrrovement the implementation 
of a new strategic plan involves organizational changes and all of them 
recognise that this involves crossing vested interests, and the like. 
The now t9 ay of operating rrornized by either a paradigm or P. strategic "plan 
cannot, as all agree, be realised through more logical argument and denon- 
stration. Kuhn is, therefore, ' talking like a voll-seasoned operations 
researcher when he observes: 
"... if a new candidate for paradigm had to 
be judged from the start by hard-headed 
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neonle who examined only relative rrob- 
lerl-solving, ability, the sciences iCould 
e:: rerierce very few riajor revolutions. 
Add the counter arguments generated by 
what wie previously called the incom sen- 
surability of paradir-ýrs, and the sciences 
might experience no revolutions at all" 
(1962, p. 157)" 
The simple Popperian-typo solution then is avoided by Kuhn - the 
facts do not straiGhtfomardly arbitrate boti-, een cotpetin- theories, but 
the consequence of reasserting the sociolo-ical aspect of theory choice 
ýýý 
has the awktuard implication that chance iniGht not occur at all. 
And yet, even in the face of this implication, Kuhn is not prepared 
to dive up the dominant role of the subject as he straiGhtforviardly asserts: 
"But paradigm debates are not really 
about relative problem-solving ability, 
though for good reasons they are us- 
ually couched in those terms. Instead, 
the issue is which paradigm should in 
the future guide research on problems 
many of which neither competitor can 
yet claim to resolve completely... 
The man who embraces a new paradigm at 
an early stage must often do so in de- 
fiance of the evidence provided by 
problem-solving. He must, that is, 
r : ve faith that the new paradigm will 
succeed with the many large problems 
(1 , lote that 1, uhn coriec very close to the organiza ion oa se - 
determining institution' view, a view which is an off-shoot of struc- 
-)np Prrröii. 1n7n. Ch^". tr, « r;. 
! 11., 
that confront it, 1ciowiný; only that 
the older paradi, -m has failed tith a 
feu. ? decision of that kind can only 
be rude on faith" (op. cit., p. 157-8)" 
Earlier on Kuhn had argied, consistently with his initial socioloCical 
outlook, that mere anomalies could not by themselves account for crisis 
and chan, -e because it is, he reco-niced, always ps ible that scientists 
it... do not... treat anomalies as counterinstances... " (or. cit. P. 77). 
From his sociological line of argument, Kuhn has no hesitation in saying, 
that "... no amount of observation could refute" a raradiGm and also that 
1'... every problem that normal science sees as a puzzle can be seen, from 
another vieuroint, as a counterinstance and thus a source of crisis" (op. 
cit., pp. 78-9)" Kuhn's sociology is clearly in dancer of ushering 
in the unrestrained relativism thich we have seen is ali"rays latent in 
OR, a criticism which is persistently levelled at him by both his positivist 
and non-positivist critics (Lakatos and Mais, -rave, 1970; cf. Giddens, 1976; 
Keat and Urry, 1975)" : Kuhns response to the problem of relativism is 
a reversion to the positivistic notion of rhenor: ena as a provider of 
objectivity. 
(ii) Phenormenll. ism: the ErivAn object of inquiry: 
With Kuhns immonsely rich style of writing (Uasterman found for 
example, 21 different usages of the word paradigm! ) it is possible to' 
find early warning of chahges vthich are to come as he is continuously 
wrestling with the difficulties öf positivism and conventionalism. His 
work should be seen as an attempt to curb the excesses of both. Thus, 
when I say that Kuhn changes direction it should really be understood as 
a chance of emphasis. 
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The s'giino to nccnorir n1is^i can, be seen in his remark that: 
"The decision to reject one paradigm is al- 
nays simultaneously the decision to accept 
another, and the judgement leading to that 
decision involves thn co-imarison of both 
naradi; ms wi. th nature and vith e'ch other" 
(op. cit., r. 77, ray emphasis). 
This remark is made in the context of a preamble to: 
"... what will ultimately be a central point 
- that the act of judgement that leads scien- 
tists to reject a previously accepted theory 
is always based upon more than a comparison 
of that theory with the world" (ibid). 
Kuhn is leading up to the point that: 
"INo process yet disclosed by the historical 
study of scientific development at all re- 
sembles the methodological stereotype of 
falsification by direct comparison with 
nature" (ibid). 
Thus, when he codes to ask: "... is sensory experience fixed and 
neutral? Are theories simply man-made interpretations of given data? "' 
(op. cit., p. 126) and finds the traditional answer of "... an immediate 
and unequivocal ýes! " (ibid) unsatisfactory. However, we can gunge the 
distance which he has progressed from this unacceptable position by his 
further comment that "in the absense of a developed alternative, I find 
it impossible to relinquish entirely that viewpoint" (ibid). Although there 
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is more to theory choice than 'a comparison of a theory with the world' 
there is still the operation of the 'world' (or 'nature') in theory choice, 
and we start to appreciate that. Zuhn was not really worried that the object 
was pre-given. On the other hand he was concerned that this way of view- 
ing progress in science "... no longer functions effectively, and attempts 
to make it do so through the introduction of a neutral language of ob- 
servations now seem(s)... hopeless" (ibid, my emphasis). For Kuhn, paradigm 
choice is not made 'merely' by comparison with the Given world, but it is 
nonetheless crucially made in the context of the given world. Kuhn attempts 
to get around the positivistic implications of such a viers by, for example, 
using the word 'world' in two senses: one refers to the sociological nature 
of a paradigm, namely, "practicing in different worlds, the two groups of 
scientists see different things when they look at the same point in the 
same direction" (op. cit., p. 150). The other usage, following hot on its 
heels, refers not to the way people look, but the object which they are 
looking at. Following the previous quotation, Kuhn remarks that: "Again, that 
is not to say that they can see anything they please. Both are looking at 
the world, and what they look at has not changed" (ibid). One is forced 
to suspect that Kuhn hopes by this double usage to conflate subject and 
object, but he cannot keep them together. Letting nature back in by going 
so far as to say that "most of the puzzles of normal science are directly 
presented by nature, and all involve nature indirectly" (1970, p" 163) is 
a surprising and important concession from a view which had earlier claimed 
that the origins of science lay in paradigms. 
Kuhn wishes to avoid saying that theories are 'simply' 11... man- 
made interpretations of given data" (ibid). However, by arguing that 
"though different solutions have been received as valid at different times, 
nature cannot be forced into an arbitrary set of conceptual boxes" (ibid) he 
/120 
comes very close to it especially as he consistently speaks of the 
"... scientific revolution as a displacement of the conceptual network 
through which scientists viers tho i"torlri" (196. P. , p. 102, my emrhasis). 
From such views the unavoidable conclusion is that Kuhn's model of scien- 
tific process is one where a mind (albeit Kantian) operates in an instru- 
mental on a given reality. The only way in which this conclusion could 
be a-, d. ded would be to foreswear speaking of the object as an unspeakable 
essence! Kuhn, quite plainly, does not. 
Although theory choice in the context of the given world is indis- 
pensable in Kuhn's scheme to save it from the relativism of solipsism, 
his reaction to this realization is to ban all talk of it. In introducinS 
an essay (1970, P. 1-23) he notes that: 
"... (Popper and I)... both insist that 
scientists may properly aim to invent theories 
that explain observed phenomena and that to 
do so in terms of real objects, i"'hrtever the 
latter rhrasP maý; mein" (op. cit., p. 2, 
my emphasis). 
A after asserting the crucial 'eventual' arbitrating role of 
nature (on. cit., p. 263) he toes on to insist that it is fruitless to talk 
of 1trutht in other than an "intra-theoretic sense", and he castiGates his 
critics for wanting 
"... to compare theories as representat- 
ions of nature, as statements about 'what 
is really out there'. Granting that neither 
theory of a historical pair is true, they 
nonetheless seek a sense in which the latter 
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is a better ^^rro;: in7- tion of the truth. I 
b41icvp th-t nothin^ of th-t : gort e-n be 
found. On the other hn. nd, I no longer feel 
that anything is lost, least of all the 
ability to explain scientific procress by 
taking this position" (or. cit., p. 265, 
r. y emnha, sis). 
As a part of this process of pushing the object out of mind Kuhn 
e. r, -, ues that when we come to see things correctly "... the phrases 'scientific 
progress' and even 'scientific objectivity' may come to seem in kart re- 
dundant" (1962, p. 162). Kuhn even goes so far as to rule talk of object- 
ivity out of bounds on princirle. Thus, his discovery of the sociolocical 
fact that there is "... no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases 
like 'really there "19 means to him that "... the notion of a match between 
the ontology of a theory and its "real" counterpart in nature... (is)... 
illusive in principle" (op. cit., p. 206). 
This is a return to his view that "the competition between paradigms 
is not the sort of battle that can be resolved through proofs" (1962, p. 148). 
If p radigms cannot Guarantee their objectivity, and he will not 
hear talk of the real wo .d guaranteeing 
it, the only rossible source of 
objectivity left open to him is to look for something which is external 
to paradigms and has its own guarantee of objectivity 'built-in'. Kuhn 
finds this guarantee of objectivity in the properties of science as a 
social system. I shall turn to these in a moment. Before I do so I 
wish to suggest that no matter what the process is by which paradigms are 
compared, in Kuhn's scheme phenomenalism is not thereby avoided. Kuhn 
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appears to argue that it is when he says that "in the sciences the testing 
situation never consists, as nuzzle-solving does, simply in the comparison 
of a single paradigm with nature. Instead, testing occurs as part of the 
competition between two rival paradigms for the allegiance of the scientific 
community" (1962, p. 11+5). If paradigms are, as he frequently stresses, 
incommensurable, it is impossible to fully translate the concert., of one 
into the concerts of the other, within what context does the competition 
take place? Not solely at the limited mints of conceptual contact surely? 
If this were so very limited confidence could be placed in the final re- 
solution of such competitions. A clue to the nature of the context is 
given by the facility with which Kuhn himself feels able to distinyish 
'viewpoints'. How is it, given incommensurability, that Kuhn can say 
( as he often does) that this is one view and this is another view? What is 
it that enables both Kuhn and the scientists whom he discusses to differen- 
tiate different views at all? Kuhn seems to argue that views can be diff- 
erentiated by referring to the 'field' - the views are different views of 
the 'field'. For example, after a paradig shift "for them the field will 
no longer look quite the same as it had earlier" (or. cit., r. 83). gut 
if we take Kuhn's early views seriously the 'field' is nothing but the 
paradigm in its determination of the world. If we followed the , ubject- 
ivist path which Kuhn lays down we would reach the absurd conclusion that 
having views of the field should be read as having paradigms of paradigmsl 
quite clearly, when Kuhn refers to the field we are to read this as some- 
thin, other than a paradigm. Clearly, again, a paradigm could not be 'the 
origin of a science because the 'field' must in some way be independent 
of paradig. ns for there to be 'views' of it. The very possibility of cor. ý- 
rarin; paradigms thus requires, if not a fully neutral observational 
language, then a language which exists outside of paradigms. It is to 
Kuhn's credit that he recognised that this language could not be a neutral 
observational language, but it is to his detriment that having achieved 
this step he submerged the whole issue by deifying the subject because 
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in so doing he left behind an implicit essentialism of the object. Ilaking 
a coiv: hat Similar point Harvey (1973) corarients on Kahn's cork: 
"UnderlyinC Kuhn's analysis is a -uidinC 
force which is never explicitly examined. 
This Cuidinv- force amounts to a funda- 
mental belief in the virtues of control 
and manipulation of the natural envir- 
onment. The leap of faith, apparently, 
is based on the belief that the new system 
will alloy an extension of control over 
some aspect of nature. Which acrect of 
nature? Presumably it will once again 
be an aspect of nature : which is import- 
ant in terms of everyday activity and every- 
day life at a particular point in history" 
(op. cit., p. 121, my emphasis). 
Because Kuhn refuses to talk about the nature of the object of inquiry he 
cannot bring it in to account for the objective progress of science except 
in an implicit way. As far as the individual scientist is concerned, 
Kuhn leaves him stranded in his own subjectivity. Instead of turning to 
an explicit analysis of the role of the object of inquiry in securing 
objectivity, Kuhn turns to the scientific community. In making this move 
Kuhn offers us a brand of speculative metaphysics which will occupy our 
attention in Part Two. 
(iii) science as an Adaptive Syste : 
Turn±n to the nature of the scientific community Kuhn claims to 
be able to 
/1'-4 
"... sc. ý that... (a)... later theory was 
the better of... two as a tool for the 
rractice of normal science, end... : lone 
to add enough about the senses in which 
it was better to account for the main 
developmental characteristics of the 
sciences. Bein. - able to Co that far, 
I do not myself feel that I am a relativ- 
ist" (1970, r. 261+-5). 
The su reine importance of the scientific community is shown when he 
says that ' "The very existence of science depends u; on vestinC the rover 
to choose between paradigms in the members of a special kind of community" 
(OD., .. . Cit., p. i7). nns he +e hý. d earlier rut 
it: . ttiin X01 iticnI revolution-., 
`o in paracýiýchoice - there is no standard higher than the assent of the 
relevant corimunity" (on. cit., p. 94). It is in terms of the scientific 
comnu : ity that all questions of rrodress are ans<ºered, all doubts disl elled: 
"... the nature of such communities pro- 
vides a virtual guarantee that both the 
list of problems solved by science and 
the precision of individual problem will 
grow and crow. At least, the nature of 
the community rrovides such a u. arantee 
if there is any v ay at all in which it 
could be provided. ',: hat better criterion 
than the decision of the scientific group 
could there be? " (op. cit., p. 170). 
_Recallin- the iriplicit essentialism of the object in Ku2: n's work 
and the remarks of athusser noted earlier, it comes as no surprise at 
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all to hear Kuh say that "the scientific community is ^. surrenely 
efficient instrurlent for : a. xinicin 0 -1 the nurfber a4 d precision of the problen3 
solved through rnradirn chnnCe" (or. cit., r. 16), my erinhnsic). 
What are the properties of the scientific group which provide this 
virtual guarantee? "... (T)he intuitive notion of community that underlies 
much in the earlier chapters of... (his)... book ... is a notion not, 
widely shared by scientists, sociologists, and a number of historians of 
science" (op. cit., p. 176). The notion is that the scientific community 
is an adaptive system which means by the very definition an adaptive 
system which survives that "... a sort or progress will inevitably charac- 
terise the scientific enterprise so long as such an enterprise survives" 
(op. cit., p. 170). Thus, Kuhn says, although "the analogy Wich relates 
the evolution of organisms to the evolution of scientific ideas can easily 
be pushed too far", (although he does not say hors), "... it is very nearly 
perfect... (because)... the resolution of revolutions is the selection by 
conflict within the scientific community of the fittest way to practice 
future science" (op. cit., p. 172). 
The idea of an adaptive organism may be a useful analogy in some 
contexts, but used as away of guaranteeing the growth of objective knowledge 
it is very hard to avoid making a definition of objectivity based on it 
tautologous. Thus objectivity is guaranteed by the community; the community 
is an adaptive system; adaptive systems survive; therefore survival is 
the criterion of objectivity. No vonder that as far as Kuhn is concerned 
'ý.:. to a very great extent the terra 'science' is reserved for fields that 
do ^rogress in obvious days" (op. cit., p. 160) because if it exists it has 
to be"progressiveI It is this reasoning uhich lies behind Kuhn's argument 
that tie need not consider objectivity as at all related to truth. Thus 
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he arm ues that by vie+iir. the scientific co=uni ty as an ada+. pti. ve syste*i 
ve can "... relinquish the notion, explicit or implict, that chances of 
r^radir c^rry scientists rrt those who leer:: from then clooer =0 closer 
to the truth" (oi. cit., n. 170). And if we 'acce't his view-)oi. rt we can 
also accept that so long as 11... the scientific enterprise... survives... 
there need not be progress of another sort" (i. bid). Ilowever, the adoption 
of this analogy moans that I: uhn's model is not so much revolutionary as 
evolutionary. Considering Kuhn's initial rim was to refute the 'accretion' 
view of knowledge, the selection of this evolutionary model is surprising 
indeed. Dvolution of the sreci s (which reference to Dan-yin and not, for 
example, Spencer sugCestsis Kuhn's model) is quite clearly cumulative. 
Species, unlike individuals, do not 'die'; no fundamental, qualitative, 
changes of species are possible if that species is to survive. For science 
as a whole, then, as species, the struggle is not for survival but for 
structure (see: Buckley, 1967, p. 12). Scientific revolutions, then, can 
only be seen as 'mutations' which do not change the 'critical variables' 
themselves, but only their range of feasible values. As Kuhn argues for 
a pre-given object-world which does not itself change with revolutions, 
as could the environment of a biological species. Scientific revolutions, 
it seems, are to be seen as progressive evolutionary mutations towards 
harmony with the environment. The 'structure' of science can change (which 
at the level of the individual can be legitimately seen as 'revolutionary') 
but only on one direction: science, in the evolutionary view, has to become 
'more and more like it really is'. 
This view goes a long way towards explaining why it is that both 
Popper and Kuhn It... insist that adherence to a tradition has an essential 
role in scientific development" (kuhn, 1970, P. 2). Both see tradition as a 
crime source of knol", ledCe for scientists both as framework for research and 
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as a point of departure: science's adaptations are directed towards the 
resolution of difficulties - points of misfit - in the relation between 
theory and reality in such a way as to conserve what is good in the old and 
remedy what is bad. The difference between them is that Kuhn points out 
that remedying the bad may have repercussions for our views of the good 
as well. ViewinG the community as adaptive, therefore, legitimates our 
acceptance of present knowledGe as 'essentially' ri, it but open to nod- 
ification. This is a vie: which we shall find very clearly expressed in 
Leer's work, for example, which I consider in Chapter 6. Note that Kuhn 
does not believe that scientific knowledge is fundamentally correct in any 
ontoloGical sense - he does-not believe that it proGressively uncovers the 
real structure and processes of the world. Scientific theories have 
phenomena underlying them - although they are not directly accessible - and 
in this sense they are fundamentally correct, although incomplete. 
I: u'_in's nolationshin to Sociolo -ic11 Functi on^lisrt: 
The reason why 'Haihn believes that scientific I o-alec1 e is b . sica11J 
correct is bec= e he belieneo that the scientific connurity has social 
properties which make it adaptive. 
Kuhn has by no paeans stumbled upon the adaptive cysten;, view by change. 
His contact with behavioural scientists and socioloCists has, I believe, 
provided him with wh-xt ras relatively recently (Silverman, 1970; Couldxer, 
1970; Friedrichs, 1970) become recognised as the systems paradi. , I", hich in 
sociological circles has, under'the sponsorship of Talcott Parsons, become 
most ciidely known as structural functionalism. 
4lthouaI: I shall , -, o more deem; into this paradier later on, I: uhn'c 
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social theory has all the rein features of the structural-function. l model. 
Te feature of the scientific community which nahe for its 'rrogrescive 
ad^itiveres is rrimerily the existence of common values. This feature 
is probably the most crucial as it is the pre-requisite of a high level 
of 'functional interconnectedness', a feature hit-, hlithted by Gouldner 
(1959)e-£ the cornerstone on viaich adaption is taken to rest. Kuhn depicts 
the sc3. en_tifi c corimunity as follows: 
":. scientific community consists... of the 
practitioners of a scientific speciality. 
To an extent unparalleled in most other fields, 
they have undergone similar educations and 
professional initiations; in the process they 
have absorbed the same technical literature 
and drawn many of the same lessons from it... 
As a result, members of a scientific comm- 
unity see themselves and are seen by others 
as the men uniquely responsible for the pur- 
suit of a cet of shared goals... (which means 
that)... within such groups communication is 
relatively full and professional judgement 
relatively unanimous" (op. cit., p. 177). 
Full and free communication and the responsiveness which shared 
values provides is the cornerstone of the comiunity's adaptiveness: it 
is within this structure of the free, full and dedicated scrutiny of 
competing paradigms that only the fittest survive. At this level there is 
(1) 
little to distinguish Kuhn's scheme from Popper's intellectual 'free competition' 
(1) Co r re the view exprenced by Popper that "there can be cociolo, ical laus, 
and even sociological lags pertaining to the problem of pro, -, reoo; for exam-plot 
the hypothesis that, wherever the freedom of thought, and of the communication 
.... cont. overleaf... 
/129 
Also, like Popper, bahn is careful. to point out that the functio nine of 
such e. system can be ui set b;,, anything '"rhich hinders either the floi", of 
information or its creative and fully dedicated scrutiny. Go power ha, 
to be excluded as a possibility: "If authority alone, and particularly if 
non-rrofessional authoritr, here the arbiter of raradi. Gm debates, the 
outcome of thoa-debates miGht still be v. revolution, but it would not be 
a scientific revolution " (on. cit., p. ir, 7). Kuhr_ apparently believes that 
it has not been a problem since Hellenic Greece (again in company with 
Popper). :: hat is a pre-requisite with Kuhn becomes with other:, (if not with 
Kuhn himself - cf. Harvey, op. cit., and Giddens, op. cit. ) a myopia towards 
questions of power and, its corollary, conflict. As regards creativity and 
dedication, Kuhn, along with many others including, of course, micro-economists, 
sees an important role for self-interest. Common values are crucially 
important, but should not be pressed (or expected to be effective) to such 
an extent that they stifle individual initiative. 
In Charter 7 these features will be shown to be crucial elements of 
Ones social theory. I postione criticism of them until that time. 
Postscript: The Viability of Conventionalist as a basis for OR's Theory of 
Inquiry : 
Kuhn attempts to overcome the weal messes of positivism and fails. 
He fails because although he banishes the positivist conception of facts 
as they relate to the practice of science, to convince us that science is 
objective he relies on an inplicit.. phenomenalism Thus, as Kolakowski 
(1) ... cont. 
of thought, is effectively protected by legal institutions and institutions 
ensuring the publicity of discussion, there will be scientific progress" 
(194+5, n" 322). This 'hypothesis', in fact, is a major idea underlying his a'orl: 
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puts it, alt : ouch "... convention ali. sm sets out to criticize... this... 
(rositivist)... notion of 'tim-given"" (op. cit., P. 177) "... this situation 
may be interrreted as a victory of positivist thought: ... even its 
adversaries regard its results as irreversible, i. e., have resigned them- 
selves to the fact that scientific knovledge cannot have metaphysical 
pretensions, and that metaphysical aspirations rluct consequently find 
justifications other than those -scientific 
knowloc1Ge can provide" (p. 179). 
IIistorically, conventionalists have turned to religion for this kind of 
knowledge. Ku'rn, as we have seen, Hirns to the social system. (Churchman 
turns to religion). The objectivity of science, he says, is not to be 
found in its relationship to its object of inquiry. This option is open 
to Kuhn by reason of his very sensitive historical researches. IIowever, 
his conventionalist commitments do not allo: "; him to take it. I'S Keat and 
Urry (op. cit. ) say of Kuhr. 's treatment of the discovery of o, -y; en, 
"... uuuhereas, for Kuhn, Priestley and hw-' 
oisier are seen as 'r: orl; ino in different 
t"; orld:, ' , the realist rn intainc t'-=t they 
worked in the sane morlc', uhiist their 
theories rude conflictinS claims about 
the nature and eyistence of some of it, 
constituents" (p. 62). 
To make a firm break with positivism 00 would have to be able to 
dis+in, xis' botý, Yeon the 1re^i' object as some unexrressibie es3e nce, 
end the 'object of kno-sled., e' .i uh: n cannot nahe this distinction because 
for hire, as an implicit phenomenalist, all objects are essences: hence 
his common-sense reaction of refusin, - to sneak: about the unsrea. lvu; ble. That 
vie should distinguish between the real object and the object of lmoa: ledge is 
a roint runde by . 1t'husser: 
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"... krowlecl never, as emriricir1 decner- 
ately demands it should, confronts a r_rP 
o1: 75 Fct which is then identical to the m^1 
object of uhich lunouledae. aired to rroduco 
precisely... the knot! ledge. 1; noi"1ledCe work- 
inG on its 'object', then, does not work on 
the rer+l object but on the peculiar raw mat- 
erial, ºhich constitutes, in the strictest 
sense of the term, its 'object' (of Fmovyled! 7e), 
and which, even in the most rudimentary; fords 
of kro': rledGe, is distinct from the reai object" 
(op. cit., p. 1+3). 
Kuhn attempts some kind of dialectic bett"leon ositivism and convention- 
alism, but they are not really distinct -points of viers in the first place. 
Therefore the result is a foregone conclusion. Both treat knowledge as 
lxot, ledGe of essence. UsinG different desiGnations for conventionalism and 
positivism, Bamborough (1966), through an analysis of tlittsenctein's 
solution of the problem of universals, has come to a similar conclusion on 
different grounds. Bamborough designates (rather 'Linconventionally)-as 
'nominali sn' what I have termed conventionalism, and calls frealistl chat 
I have called positivist. The latter is a common convention which I have 
not followed (see: Keat and Urry, op. cit., pp. 1-2), for obvious reasons. 
The difference in the Grounds on which Bamborough argues that both philos- 
ophies are essentialist is that he does not deal with the implicit phenom- 
enalism (realism, in his terms)-of-conventionalism. lie does not, that is, 
deal with the guarantor problem faced by conventionalism. Nevertheless, 
his account of Wittgenstein is of interest to us because he reaches an iden- 
tical conclusion on the necessity of distinguishing between the real object 
and the object of knowledge, and he Gives us some insight into the nature of 
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1 
-t : ct of o:... c= iz coin ü roal :. '. G': t t . o! c ob. 7cc : -, 
+- : is, ý, lvez" 
: ccordi to : ': ittýcr. ýteir. both VZC"E : re m ctzl.: ei in t;, - .,. It they merely, 
co i'? 1erien t enc : oth^r from different Pz`C : ti li. s+ rit^ : cc . :: 1t t ;, -! otcj 
solves te T`2`O. `le"2 of universals b" den , 'inü that the prob! ^i has .er Ota , 
lie says, that the Troblerl of uriverz is ? rises frort the eist 71: en belief t . at 
for ua to be able to claim l: no:: led; e t:. -at hio""'leeZ; e ': as to 'on of t'ac '^orld 
in general (cf. Logic , 19tiý). T%4 -s naturally leads us on to'look for a 
;c er :1 ±ro rty son" ', hero ""hich All sustain our e cr'? 1 ý~. ýO . rl e rte. In U" 
this step have ushered in essentinlic by directin; out attention 
a ay fron our 1-no : 1cdZe to the thin t": hich sustains its -enerality. te. ad 
of universals, all that we can hope for and ever find :; itt; enstein scys, 
are family resemblances. Thus, if we take a family and sa of one V. -Lat. 
she has the lfaiilyl. nose, of n.. nther that he has the 'family' eyes, and 
of yet another that she has the (family' mouth, etc. 'e can exhaust nll 
their characteristics and never find the one essence to which they aU 
corres: ord. There is nothir., in 'essence' 1-! hich accounts for then beton in 
to the sane family: all that vie have are a set of cries-croycin- arch over- 
lappin- relativ:.;,!:,. -,;, between the characteristics which deter-: 4, e 't e 
faciil; '. : iavir. 
l-, achieved 
t.: is unc? erstardin, - uc can nay that the o: 1; 7 
thin- which the members of the family have in cor , on is t rtt thc: arr nem- 
bers of the family. This notion off 1ýýresý blw. ýces in on: osition to 
universals seerns o--c' <thouä again I do not i-t-int to argue it in detrag ) 
identical to the distinction made by Christo-, her 1p nder (19r, 4) becrºer; 1 
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resrectively, 'semi-lattice' structures and 'tree' structures, and I 
mention it at this staCe only to indicate one feature of '! ittCenctein's 
notion tlhich gill be of importance later. This feature is the inherent 
complexity which semi-lattice structures display compared to tree structures. 
Dealing with comnlexity, i"! e sw from Chapter 1, is central to OR'c ideals, 
so we : hall look (in Chapters 5 and 7) with interest at its attitudes to 
the requisite structure of its k owledCe of social systeris: is it the sim- 
plicity of universals, or the complexity of family resemblances? 
': litt, enstein's favourite exa^mle of the rroblen of universals is the 
question of what it is that games 
(e. g., chess, badminton, the ol; rpic üumes, 
etc. ) have in common. 
"': Iittgenstein... denies at one and the same 
tine the nominalist's claim that tames have 
nothir_c in common except that they are called 
games and the realist's claim that Geores 
have somethinG in common other than that 
they are -ames. Ile asserts at one and the 
same time the realist's claim that there is 
an objective justification for the application 
of the word "game" to tames , and 
the nominalist's 
claim that there is no element that is common 
to all games. And he is able to do all this 
because he denies the joint claim of the 
nominalist and the realist that there cannot 
be an objective Justification for the applic- 
ation of the '"Yord "bane" to -ames (universal is 
in rebus) or a common relation that all Games 
boar to comethin;:; that is not a Came (univer- 
sa7. ia ante res)" (BamUorou . z, op. cit., r. 199)" 
L; 4 
ý. 
Jittoonstein is not a romi naiict in th-t he does not accent that 
? r'Bý can be assincd to randon objects, for the there ! Yould be-, no Oct 
of rel^tionshirs 'hic definers a frimil; ': the rro-ortie, of the objcct3 in 
terms of their resemblances to each other are crucially in-ort^nt to under- 
ctonc: inh. But, on the other h, -und, he v-511 not a, -reo with the realist (in 
LamborouGh'c tcrric) that ichat is corimon to a set of objects is somothir_; 
other than that they are a sot of objects. The nominalist is right when 
he denies the existence of this other ^ropcrtJ, but is i"iron'-, in saying th^t 
there is nothing else; the realist is right that there is something else, but 
is wronc in saying that this somethin- else is somethin- common to all: 
"I3ecause the nominalist and realist are 
both rieht and both 'ron;, each is driven 
into the other's arras when he tries to be 
both consistent and faithful to our lanG- 
uage, know led-e and experience. The nonin- 
alist talks of resemblance: until he is 
pressed into a corner Nahere he must ack- 
knowledne that resemblance is unintelligible 
except as resemblance in a respect, and to 
specify the respect in which objects resemble 
on another is to indicate a quality or nrorer. ty. 
The realist talks of properties and qualities 
until, ruhen the properties and qualities have 
been explained in terms of other properties 
and other qualities, he can at last do nothing 
but point to the resemblances between the 
object that are said to be characterized by 
such and such a rroperty or quality" 
(Damborough, op. cit., p. 205). 
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!: ith either rositiv, sm or conventior. -? lis'i 
(to revert to our terminolo ) 
the rroblert of 1 io,.., ledýe is abandoned. Lot uc now turn to consider rrobabl. 
the most philosophically sophisticated member of the 0? r-, community, C. West 
Churchman. Churchman has been preoccupied with the Problem of'd. esigninz 
adequate inquiry' (as he Muht put it). °,: ýe will be concerned to see if he 
has avoided the pitfalls which have diverted Kuhn from his intended path, 
i. e., the develo? ent of a theory of inquiry. 
I 
A36 
CHAPTER FOUR 
CHURC ii I! A 11 'ZPIL0ZC, PIC A'L' F0 
OPERATI 0 1dAL RE SEARCH 
ý 
. 
Introduction: 
We have seen (in Chapter 2) that Churchman has strong elements of 
conventionalist philosophy informing his work, and some connections (in 
Section A of Chapter 2) between his view of OR and Kuhn's view of science 
have been drawn. Further connections between the views of Kuhn and 
Churchman will appear in this chapter. However, Churchman is not 
straightforwardly a conventionalist (we have, for example, noted pragmatist 
strains in his thought). The conventionalist basis to his work leads 
(as it did with Kuhn) to difficulties of guaranteeing objective progress 
in inquiry so he turns to Hegelian idealism for help. To the extent to 
which Churchman offers us clear guidelines to the construction of an 
adequate theory of inquiry, they are to be found in his Hegelian inter- 
pretation of conventionalism. Kuhn's guidelines to the development of 
an adequate theory of inquiry are to be found in his sociological-function- 
alist interpretation of conventionalism. Whereas Kuhn finds his guarantor 
in the social system, Churchman find his in Hegelian idealism. For him, 
all OR is in some sense 'social OR', he is sceptical of much direct help 
being forthcoming from the social and behavioural science in their present 
state of development. He is, for example, distrustful of cybernetic 
'organismic' analogies (1968a p. 87). This is not to say that he rules 
out an eventual intimate tie up between OR and the social sciences. Far 
from it, as his paper-with Emery (previously referred to) demonstrates. 
His worry seems to be that it is premature to involve oneself in theories 
of social process while the philosophical foundations of these theories, 
and particularly the implications which they may have for inquiry into 
social systems, remains unclear. This, again, is not to say that he sees 
a clear temporal priority with social theories being 'based on' philosoph- 
ically sound strategies of inquiry: there is room in his thinking for some 
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kind of joint progress. Churchman has, however, been preoccupied with 
philosophical issues and has by and large steered clear of direct dis- 
cussion of social issues - both theoretical and practical - preferring to 
refer selectively to particular connections as illustrative material 
to the general line of argument he is pursuing. Nevertheless, Churchman's 
work can fruitfully be seen as an attempt to provide the philosophical 
foundations of OR's social theory (which is discussed in Part Two). 
Although Churchman acknowledges indebtedness to Hegel, and his 
preferred "Dialectical Inquiring System" (1971) is more or less straight- 
forwardly Hegelian, his indebtedness goes further than this. Showing this, 
however, raises considerable problems of exposition. 
Hegel's writings are vast and too multifarious to be treated as 
a whole for the purposes of this chapter. What is required axe Hegel's views 
on the overall outline and purpose of his scheme, and such are available 
in his'Introduction to the History of Philosophy'. It is here that Hegel 
tells us what philosophy is and, more importantly from our point of 
view, in doing so spells out the role of the philosopher in the history 
of knowledge. I intend, therefore, to use this work as my major source 
of authority on Hegel's scheme. I shall refer to the translation and 
commentary of Quentin Lauer, S. J. ('Hegel's Idea of Philosophy', 1971). 
As regards Churchman's works I shall largely restrict myself to his 
later work on the 'Design of Inquiring Systems' (1971), where we find 
the fullest treatment to date of what he considers the major philosophical 
issues of OR (as a 'planning science'). 
Shoving the deep relationship between Churchman's work and 
Hegel's philosophy has a very important implication. Hegel's philosophy 
has to be taken whole. It has an internal coherence and 'tightness' which 
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means that the problems which it poses and the solutions which it offers 
are merely different reflections of the same thought. This fact has 
the very important implication that it is not possible to pick up Hegelian 
problems without at the same time becoming embroiled in Hegelian solutions. 
We shall see that Churchman considers Hegelian problems to be the crucial 
'design' problems in any attempt to set about adequate inquiry, and 
although he expresses some 'worries' about the comprehensibility of 
Hegel's solutions (going so far at one point to subject Hegel's dialectic 
to a 'critique')-it is the latter's solutions which he is thereby forced 
to adopt. 
In this chapter I shall show that Churchman's proposals originate 
in Hegelian philosophy. In the following chapter I shall show that this 
makes his scheme incapable of realising OR's ideals. This claim may 
sound surprising because not only is Churchman one of the most vigorous 
exponents of OR's ideals, but he is also very critical of positivsm. 
Churchman continually argues, as Hegel does, that we should 
understand the progressive development of thought as a movement away 
from the reality of sense perception (see particularly, 1958a, passim). 
We have also seen Kuhn argue that the same feature characterises : the 
revolutionary periods of scientific activity. In this sense, Churchman 
can be seen as openly advocating some form of revolutionary inquiry. 
However, in the context of Hegelian philosophy, this advocacy amounts to 
very little because Hegel, as we shall see, replaces the given reality of 
the senses with a much larger (in fact infinite) given reality which it 
is thought's tank to make manifest. In the Hegelian scheme the problem 
of knowledge is reduced to a problem of the mechanics of revelation, 
and is notat all concerned with the process of creative discovery. In 
Hegel's philosophy it is impossible to distinguish the real object from 
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the object of knowledge (because, we shall see, they are the sarge). 
It legitimates and encourages a kind of speculative idealism, 
and makes illegitimate and discourages attempts to understand real-world 
structures and processes. For Hegel the underlying reality is the Idea. 
The Role and Nature of Reason: 
Churchman shares with Hegel a profound confidence in the power 
of reason - rational thought - in human affairs. Hegel, as Lauer puts 
it, "... saw rational thought as that which in the highest degree charac- 
terizes man as man and which should, therefore, characterize man when 
he is concerned with that which is of highest interest to him" (op. cit., 
p. 11). Given that Churchman considers the highest interest of man to 
be improvement we can see why he defines "systems design" as "... imple- 
menting improvement in social systems by means of the best available 
method of inquiry" (1974, p. 452), and why he believes that the key terns 
in this definition are interrelated in the ways in which he suggests 
they are. Before we turn to these relationsl s it will, however, be 
helpful to understand Hegells'and Churchman's views on the nature of 
reason itself. 
Hegel was convinced that It... reality was more concretely, present 
(more real) in thought, in ideas, than in sensation" (Lauer, op. cit.,, 
p. 2). We have seen Churchman attack positivism on similar grounds 
because of the implication that-we should base recommendations for 
improvement in the 'reality' of raw sense data. The identical point - 
that we grasp reality more completely through our ideas of it than we 
do from direct 'contact' with reality itself - is of course made by Kuhn. 
Reason for all three is the reason that is achieved through the development 
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"If thought is free anc: undetermined by 
the changing world in which it lives, its 
validity would seem to be unconditioned, 
or conditioned only by itself. But this 
would mean that it is self-contained, id- 
entical with itself, always precisely what 
it is, and, therefore, not susceptible of 
development" (op. cit. p. 18). 
And further: 
... since thinking is the activity-of 
spirit, not spirit's being-acted-upon - 
by a non-verifiable causality in things' 
- it must produce its own objects; there 
is no other way for them to come into, 
being as objects. At the same time, if 
thought is to be true, its objects cannot: 
be other than the real; the problem, 
then, is the problem of any idealism: 
how to identify the products of thinking. 
7 
activity with reality" (op, cit., p. 35)- 
14e have'seen this problem loom large in Kuhn'c work where he 
becomes faced with the problem that ... if 
paradigms are closed systems 
of epistemological premises, which succeed each other by processes of 
revolutionary change, how is anyone to be able rationally to adjudge 
one paradigm against another? " (Giddens, 1976, p. 142). Churchman runs 
up against the same problem for the same reasons. We. have seen him 
argue that: .. 
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"... scientific method mu t include a phil- 
osophy of the whole system, however vague, 
however inadequate, however difficult to 
defent. It is what the Germans call a 
Weltanschauung, a perception of what 
reality is like. It becomes an integral 
part of the applied scientist's behaviour, 
This, above all, is why the applied scien- 
tist is not merely applying the results 
of pure research; he is also applying 
his Weltanschauung" (1968a, p. 133). 
Elsewhere, speaking in very much the same way as we have seen 
Kuhn, Churchman refers to a Weltanschauung as "systemic assumptions" and 
he notes that they refer to an "... understand(ing)... (of).... the 
purposes and structure of... reality" (1970b, p. B- 43) which tells the 
possessor "... how the whole system should work or inevitably does work" 
(op. cit., P. B- 42). Churchman realises that setting things up in 
these terms means that "systemic judgements... are certainly not verifiable, 
either by observation or clear reasoning" (op. cit., p. B- 47) because 
"... one's'"world view" (Weltanschauung) shapes the information he uses 
to reach his conclusions... (therefore)... no data can ever fatally 
destroy a Weltanschauung, though it may produce modifications in its 
basic story" (op. cit., p. B -47). That thought is self-determining is 
the corollary of reality being determined by thought, but Churchman 
makes it an explicit principle of design. Thus he argues that 
"It can be seen that design, properly 
viewed, is an enormous liberation of 
the intellectual spirit, for it chall- 
enges this spirit to an unbounded spec- 
ulation about possibilities... The 
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liberated designer of inquiring systems 
... will look at present practice as a 
point of departure at best" (1971, p. 13). 
And he goes on to talk of "the intellectual freedom that belongs 
to the designer... " (ibid). He hammers the same message home in the 
lesson which he draws from Spinoza. He asks: 
"Could an inquiring system be designed 
with a completely free executive? If 
so, we would have an example of Spinoza's 
fourth inquirer, whose characteristics 
are described as follows: "There is 
the knowledge that arises when a thing 
is perceived through its essence alone 
... and a thing is perceived through 
its essence alone when from the fact 
that the inquirer knows something, its 
executive understands why it knows it" 
That is, the executive has a valid 
theory to explain why knowledge occurs 
... Intuition in the fourth type must 
above all be conscious, because as it 
grasps the truth it immediately reflects 
on this action and simultaneously veri- 
fies that it knows" (op. cit., p. 27-8). 
It is clear that Churchman sees the self-determining property 
of thought as an absolutely essential property of adequate inquiry and 
it is for this reason that he expends much effort in the "... establish- 
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ment of a design base... (where)... an inquiring system... is open to 
its beginnings and... has control over all the material it processes" 
(op. cit., p. 20). Combined with these features is his argument that 
the material must not be 'given' from outside: this for him is the 
essence of 'control' (ibid). 
However, Churchman recognises that these strong demands create 
a nasty problem - the so-called 'hermeneutic problem', in fact, which 
is the claim that all understanding requires some pre-understanding of 
the very thing which is to be understood. This problem, in fact is 
apresupposition of conventionalism (see: Kolakowski, op. 'cit., pp. 
160-1). Churchman poses the problem this way: 
... what is wrong with the claim that 
large models can sweep in all reality... 
(is that)... the models don't mean any- 
thing unless they use information. But 
we can't determine what information is 
correct unless we understand the whole 
system. But this is what our realistic 
models are supposed to tell us. In 
other words, we need realistic informat- 
ion to start with in order to build our 
models, but we need the model to get the 
information... The point seems to be that 
we can't get facts about systems with- 
out making very-stirong assumptions about 
systems. Thus it looks as though we're 
involved in a vicious circle. We must 
get information to make our models real- 
/145 
istic, but we must have general models 
to get our information" (1968a, pp. 
161-2). 
Churchman is too much of a conventionalist to dilute the role 
of his Weltanschauungen, and he calls at several points in his various 
works for 'optimal Weltanschauungen' ("... the critical issue is to 
decide which systemic assumptions can legitimately be made" (1970b, 
p. B- 42)) a problem which, like Hegel, he sees Kant's work having 
implicitly posed (1971: Chapter 6): Churchman's argument that Kant's 
scheme is in the end incoherent because the 'inputs' have to be taken as 
given (pp. 144-7) mirrors that of Hegel who points out that Kant's 
critique of reason must have either been based on something other than 
reason or was relying on reason to determine its own validity. Given 
Churchman's commitment to some form of idealism to resolve the hermen- 
eutic circle, the problem turns into finding some basis for comparing 
Weltanschauungen. This, of course, was precisely Kuhn's incommensura- 
bility problem. 
Hegel's Solution to the Problem of Progress: 
Having wedged himself in the conventionalist corner Churchman turns 
to Hegel's idealism for a solution: 
"It is really not until the time of 
Hegel that it occurred to philosophers 
that external vs. internal only makes 
sense to a third mind observing and/or 
controlling the process of learning. 
The three minds then become parts of 
the total inquiring system" (1971, p. 35). 
/146 
Because a solution within the framework requires that "external" 
resolution of Weltanschauungen be avoided at all costs Churchman is 
forced to define objectivity in terms of the relationships between Welt- 
anschauungen. Thus, "... a necessary condition for objectivity is that 
the behaviour of an inquirer be capable of being observed" (op. cit., p. 149). 
Kuhn, as we have seen, does locate the origins of the 'potentially- 
successful-insight' which starts off a programme of research in one 
great man (though his descriptions often come close to this); he locates 
the essential creativity of science in the community. And so with Hegel 
and Churchman. As Lauer says, Hegel differs from the simple idealist 
tradition partly in"... his refusal to accept the individual's rational 
insight as the ultimate criterion of truth" (op. cit., p. 36). And 
Churchman argues for an "appropriate organization of science" and the 
11... design... (of)... a society in which the possibility of progress, 
i. e., the ideal seeking, is made secure" (1974, p. 460), again on the 
basis that the "objectivity" of experience is to be based on some kind 
of interconnection of observers" (1971, p" 149). For Hegel the philosophy 
which summarizes all that is best in an age, is, likewise, not to be 
thought of as a single philosophy but, rather, It... the complementarity 
of diverse simultaneous philosophies... " (Lauer, op. cit., p. 47). 
Progress iss then, seen in terms of the development-through-combination 
of ideas. 
Kant's failing was that his solution to the development of 
ideas presupposed the very rationality that the development was intended 
to secure. Hegel attempts to avoid this problem by starting the develop- 
mental process from an "initial minimal awareness" (Lauer, op. cit., p. 2) 
so that the rational is not presupposed. This is also Churchman's sol- 
ution: we have, he says, to it... begin with unclear material which is not 
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an input" (1971, p. 20). Similarly, Kuhn starts scientific development 
from the 'crude' statement of an idea. The initial idea cannot be jus- 
tified as reality and yet it is the only place to start, so reality 
must be achieved by the development of the idea. We are now, logically, 
forced to worry about justifying the developmental-process. As development 
could not take place within any one thought-it must of necessity take 
place by the conflict between thoughts and, particularly, through the 
overthrow or negation of existing thoughts. This-is the only logic possible, 
and the logic is called by Hegel 'dialectics'. Thus, the first level of 
guaranteeing the development of ideas is a logical justification. This is 
a logic which 
"... follow(s) consciousness from its first 
act of minimal awareness which had to be 
true, because it affirmed no more than that 
it was awareness, through all the success- 
ive purifications which were forced on it 
by its own realization that it was not 
adequate to the implications of its very 
awareness, until it reached a form of aware- 
ness which was adequate to its content... " 
(Lauer, ope cit., p. 12). 
But what is it that guarantees this logic? This is a question which 
Churchman raises and answers only implicitly. 
The Already Given Object as Guarantor: 
Hegel insisted that no thought can be said to be a true thought - 
a fully developed thought - until all the implications of it had been 
worked out. There has, that is, to be a development of the 'content of 
consciousness' as minimal awareness "... to the (ideal) totality of aware- 
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ness in complete rational knowledge" (op. cit. p. 2). Stopping the 
process at any point short of the 'absolute' means inevitably that the 
thought is 'abstract' and not fully 'concrete'. This insistence of the 
fullest possible development of the idea to the absolute is a distinctive 
feature of his philosophy. It is more usual to argue that knowledge can 
be developed to different degrees and still be knowledge. Not so for 
Hegel because he is not concerned with what is usually taken to be knowledge. 
He is interested in It... follow(ing) human consciousness until it reaches 
a level beyond which it cannot and need not go" (op. cit., p. 13). That 
is, the totality of knowledge. Hegel is concerned with the logic whereby 
consciousness catches up with its incipient content (just as Kuhn is 
concerned with the fulfillment of the promise of a paradigm). True 
knowledge is the state when the fully developed idea (Absolute Spirit) is 
adequate to the whole of reality (Absolute Idea). 
We have here an Hegelian statement of OR's ideal of inquiry into 
the whole system. 
In implementing this ideal Hegel, as Lauer puts it, It... remains 
within the tradition of transcendental thinking, whose concern is to 
establish the necessary conditions for thought to be true" (op. cit., 
p. 35). This is also a tradition which Churchman follows. He ends his 
(1971) book with the question "What kind of a world must it be in which 
inquiry becomes possible? " (p. 277). For Hegel the guarantor of thought 
becoming absolutely true - as an integrated totality of thought - is 
the pre-existence of absolute reality as an integrated totality. Hegel's 
dialectic, as the movement from the in-itself through the for-itself to 
the in-and-for-itself, does not, as Lauer points out, "... make any 
sense... as an identificatnn of thought and reality... unless reality, too, 
consists in an interconnected totality" (op. cit., p. 37). 
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This reality is a thought-reality - that is, it is only real in 
thought - but the products of the development of thought are seen as rev- 
elations or manifestations of what was always (Hegel says eternally) given 
even in the most abstract of thinking. A well-known student of Hegel 
describes the dialectic in the following way: 
"What does"dialectical" mean? ... Fund- 
amentally, a dialectical movement is one 
in which a positing - an initially unmed- 
iated, immediate position, a thesis - is 
negated or "sublated" (tollere) in its 
immediacy (in, the sense of being removed), 
in that the sense-contents already implic- 
it in the thesis are uncovered in their 
contradictoriness and posited as antitheses, 
and the contradictions, "pushed to extremes", 
negate themselves as such and are sublated 
to a result, a synthesis, "come about" from 
these sense contents" (Werner Marx, 1975, 
p. 78, my emphases). 
Again, as Lauer puts it: 
"It is true enough to say that reality is 
truly real only when it is thought-reality; 
but it is equally true that thought is 
truly thought only as a process of coming 
to terms with the real" (op. cit., p. 3). 
For Hegel, then, the development of knowledge is nothing more than 
progressive 'awareness' of all that is already given - to-be-discovered: 
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"A truth may be discovered today which was not known yesterday, but it 
does not become true in being discovered" (Lauer, op. cit., p. 19). 
Recognising that "the progressive awareness of itself that Spirit achieves 
through history will be a gradual revelation of all that was there from 
eternity... " (op. cit., p. 4) is the cornerstone of the Hegelian scheme 
is the reason why his dialectical logic is guaranteed to be progressive. 
Churchman recognises the need for a guarantor of process, that 
is to say, a guarantee that process will be progressive, and he wonders 
whether the Hegelian synthesis can in fact be designed (1971, p. 177)" 
He also says that he finds Hegel's free use of the concept Absolute Mind 
"uncritical" (op. cit., p. 178). In short, he thinks that Hegel's is 
difficult to operationalize. Nevertheless, he advocates Singer's "... 
theory of inquiry ... (which)... says that when all is going well, and 
the data and hypothesis are mutually compatible, then is the time to rock 
the boat, upset the apple cart, encourage revolution and dissent... 
(because he thinks that this is the)... only pathway to reality... " (1971, 
p. 199). Thus, he gives the "observer-of-the-subject" a grant of objec- 
tivity because of his attempt to reach agreement through disagreement (in 
an earlier work (19'1', p. 151) he had called this process "judgement"). 
He currently advocates it as "dialectical".. He sayo that 
"... the process is dialectical, which 
means that two opposing processes are at 
work in the inquiring system. One is 
the process of defending the status quo, 
the existing "paradigm" of inquiry, with 
its established methods, data, and theory. 
The other is the process of attacking the 
status quo, proposing radical but forceful 
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paradigms, questioning the quality of 
the status quo" (ibid). 
As we have seen, the only basis on which dialectical processes 
are obviously guaranteed to be progressive is by presupposing the very 
thing which Churchman finds problematic about Hegel's scheme, namely, 
Absolute Idea. It is only by presupposing reality that the straightforward 
(i. e., unqualified) advocacy of criticism alone as the source of progress. 
Churchman offers-us only the Hegelian "... idea of an "object" as a collec- 
tion of interconnected observations" (1971, p. 149). The basic problem 
of objectivity, as he sees it, is to find a way of organising "... a set 
of representations of an object... (so as to)... capture the essence of 
the object" (ibid). In the next chapter I shall go into the necessary 
presuppositions for these views. We shall find that they negate OR's 
ideals of free inquiry into complex-totalities. 
Churchman attempts to support his suggestion that dialectical 
processes are progressive by emphasising that in such a process "... the 
most important decision makers are the heroes, those inspired by the 
heroic mood to depart from the safe lands of the status quo" (op. cit., 
pp. 200-1). This again is an expression of the revolutionary ideal of 
OR, and Churchman sees its implementation in terms of 11... intuition... 
(which)... is the force that breaks through the apparently insuperable 
conflict of ideas to create a new position which can observe the conflict 
and pass beyond it" (op. cit., p. 2h2). Very much the same role seems to 
be envisaged by Kuhn when he claims that he has provided, through his category 
of 'construct paradigm', a philosophical justification of the origins of scienc 
as an "insight" which resolves the conflict of warring factions in a 
crisis period. This concept again presupposes Absolute Idea. The hero 
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for Tiegel was the philosopher whose role was, by participating in the 
totality of thought, to reveal that totality more fully. For Hegel 
11... the history of philosophy reveals... that each thinker thinking 
his thoughts is simply the overriding Spirit thinking itself" (Lauer, 
op. cit., p. '41). Philosophers may not intend this but by their rev- 
olutionary stance towards current thinking they invariably carry out 
their role as history determines it: 
"(Great men)... may be called heroes, 
inasumuch as they have derived their 
11 1 purposes and their vocation,. not from 
the calm, regular course of things, 
sanctioned by the existing order; but 
from a concealed fount - one which has 
not attained to phenomenal, present 
existence - from that inner Spirit, 
still hidden beneath the surface, 
which, impinging on the outer world as 
on a shell, bursts it in pieces, be- 
cause it is another kernal than that 
which belonged to the shell in question" 
(Hegel, 1956; quoted by Althusser, 1969, 
p. 91, my emphasis). 
Conclusion: 
From his acceptance of both Hegelian-type problems and Hegelian- 
type solutions, we can see that Churchman is fully implicated in the 
Hegelian scheme. The major feature of the Hegelian scheme for our purposes 
is the necessity of presupposing the whole system (Absolute Idea) and 
the related suggestion that the focus of inquiry should be the development 
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of ideas. We have seen Churchman designate this as the first challenge 
to reason (1968a), and from his involvement in the Hegelian scheme we 
can understand why he sees inquiry in this way. The most important problem 
in the Hegelian scheme is the development of ideas so that they 'catchup' 
with the content which, even in the early stages of their development, 
they implicitly are assumed to have. It is on the basis of this assump- 
tion that Hegel-(and Churchman) encourages daring speculation and intuit- 
ion so as to reveal this implicit content in all its complexity. The 
bias of this scheme is that the object of knowledge only enters in as a 
presupposition; it is not taken seriously as a crucial feature of the 
acquisition of knowledge because it is assumed to already be present in 
our ideas. Put in this straightforward way, of course, the scheme looks 
truly fantastic! Yet there must be some basis (ors more accurately, bias) 
for the persistent neglect of real-world structures and processes which 
Churchman has shown. How could there possibly be a science of improvement 
which is not founded on an understanding of the systems which it is intend- 
ed to improve? This neglect is not confined to Churchman. We have seen 
how other operations researchers have been biased away from a study of the 
nature of the systems with which they are concerned by their involvement 
with philosophical positivism. A similar bias is evident in Kuhn's 
conventionalism, a philosophy to which some operations researchers are 
already leaning, and towards which others may be expected to turn if the 
lead given by prominent OR academics is followed. Hegelian philosophy 
provides another bias away from concern for subject-matter by its emphasis 
on intuitions. As Piaget says of this strategy: 
"... if I observe in myself "intuitions" 
that I experience, from the first I only 
observe the already elaborated, instead of 
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observing the process of formation; and 
then what I see is so bound up with my 
conception of it and so dependent on my 
intentions of finding this or that, that 
it becomes utterly impossible to trace 
with certainty the boundary between the 
"intuitions" of the introspector and 
that of the introspected... If an "essence" 
is both a concept of the subject and the 
phenomenal nucleus of the object... how 
are we to know if the essence is "true" 
without examining separately the exper- 
ience of the object... and also the logic 
used by the subject to elaborate his 
concepts" (1971bß pp. 111-114). 
Taking the reality of the whole system as a taken-for-granted 
backdrop which is to be progressively revealed by the development of ideas 
implies that whatever conception of the subject-matter is implicit in our 
ideas has only to be developed. It need not be questioned, and this 
injects a strong bias towards accepting dominant versions of the nature 
of the subject-matter. This, I think, is the Hegelian justification for 
the acceptance of tradition which we have seen both Popper and Kuhn 
advocate on different grounds. We trill see this anti-revolutionary bias 
in action in Part Two. There we shall find operations researchers 
arguing (in Chapter 6) that the role of OR is to discover and refine the 
traditional wisdom which is to be found in social systems. This is OR's 
theory of management. In Chapter 7 we shall find operations researchers 
accepting the dominant tradition in sociology (structural-functionalism) 
as a way of providing support for its theory of management. This is OR's 
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theory of social systems, and we shall see that the key feature of it 
is the injunction to take the nature of the social for granted. 
Before we turn to these matters I wish to conclude, in the final 
chapter of this part, with an analysis of the impact of the neglect of 
subject-matter on OR's ideals-particularly the ideals of grasping complex 
totalities. Churchman argues against a strategy of inquiry which 
suggests starting from the 'simple' and progressing to the 'complex'. 
He suggests that, in some way, we have to start from the complex. I agree, 
but the Hegelian starting point is Absolute Idea. The question thus 
arises as to whether the Hegelian notion of Absolute Idea, even supposing 
that Churchman's desire for its operationalisation was fulfilled, is truly 
the presupposition of a complex totality. 
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CHAPTERFIVE 
C0NCEPTS0FT0TALITY 
Introduction: 
In this chapter I shall briefly examine some notions of totality 
and assess their viability. From Chapter One it is clear that the most 
significant of all OR's ideals is that of dealing with the whole system. 
Churchman and others have seen the necessity of developing the idea of 
totality rather than merely reiterate it as an ideal. To the extent 
that positiVsm has a notion of totality (and we have seen that there are 
doubts about this) it is completely opaque: it is the totality of 
'phenomena'. Conventionalists attempt to think of totalities in terms 
of ideas. To the extent to which they try to make ideas-as-totality 
objective (as Kuhn does) they revert to either a positivist notion or a 
metaphysical notion. Kuhn's is a metaphysics of the social system, as 
we shall see in Chapter 7, because the model which both he and OR adopts 
is incapable of investigation in terms of generative structures and 
processes. Churchman opts for the Hegelian notion of totality whereby 
a totality is intuited in the attempt to capture the underlying whole 
system. A similar notion of totality informs the systems approach, of 
which a major exponent is Ackoff. Let us look first at the implications 
of this approach before turning explicitly. to Churchman's notion. 
The Adeouacy of the Concept of Totality Employed by the Systems Approach: 
Ackoff argues strongly for the idea of a "... system... (as)... 
a set of two or more interrelated elements of any kind... " which have the 
following properties: 
"1. The properties of behaviour of each element of the set has an effect 
on the properties or behaviour of the set taken as a whole... 
2. The properties and behaviour of each element, and the way they affect 
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the whole, depend on the properties and behaviour of at least one 
other element in the set... 
3. Every possible subgroup of elements in the set has the first two 
properties... A system cannot be subdivided into independert subsets 
(1974, p. 13). 
The central message of this view of totalities is that "a system 
is more than the sum of its parts" (ibid). There are certain logical 
consequences and action imperatives which can be drawn from this definition 
and Ackoff does this ably both here and elsewhere. These are not my 
concern. Ackoff means this to be a perfectly general definition of 
wholeness, and the question which is of concern is the nature of the 
strategy of inquiry which such a notion involves. 
Ackoff1s view of wholeness is that it is the emergent property 
which is more than the mere interaction of the parts. This view, however, 
is but one of two possible alternatives to the atomism which he roundly 
rejects, as the only other competitor to his preferred alternative. The 
alternative which Ackoff does not discuss (nor anyone else in the OR 
and related literature of which I am aware) is that termed by Piaget 
(1971a) 'Operational Structuralism'. In Ackoff's view, the whole, by 
being more than the sum of the parts, is primary to the parts. Referr- 
ing to his definition, there are no independent subsets because of their 
relation to the whole. This emphasis on the primacy of the whole is shown 
again by the role of the researcher whose interest is focussed on the 
total or overall behaviour of the whole. This emphasis is misplaced from 
an epistemological point of view as it takes the whole's existence for 
granted. This can be shown by contrasting the 'emergent totality, view 
of Ackoff with the operational structuralism described by Piaget: 
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"Over and beyond the schemes of atomist 
association on the one hand and emergent 
totalities on the other, there is, how- 
ever, a third, that of operational struc- 
turalism. It adopts from the start a 
relational perspective, according to which 
it is neither the elements nor a whole 
that comes about in a manner one knows not 
how, but the relations among elements 
that count. In other words the logical 
procedures or natural processes by which 
the whole is formed are primary, not the 
whole, which is consequent on the system's 
laws of composition, or the elements" 
(Piaget, 1971b, pp. 8-9, my emphasis). 
If we ignore a system's 'laws of composition' and pass straight 
on to emphasise merely its wholeness, we actually bypass the 'wholeness, 
of a totality. As Piaget says: "As a first approximation, we may say that 
a structure is a system of transformations... " (p. 5). "(T)he elements of 
a structure are subordinated to laws, and it is in terms of these laws 
that the structure qua whole or system is defined" (p. 7, my emphasis). 
Although this perspective on structure is not at odds with Ackoff's 
inasmuch as"... the whole... (has)... overall properties distinct from the 
properties of its elements", these properties of the whole are conferred 
on it by the "... laws governing a structure's composition... " (ibid). 
The emphasis on the laws of transformation (construction) is at odds 
with Ackoff's notion of wholeness because it places complete emphasis on 
the outcome of such processes. This bias is highlighted by Harvey (1973) 
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who emphasises the epistemological imperatives which flow from Piaget's 
notion. He says that "this concept of totality... leads us on to ask 
how totalities are structured and how those structures change" (p. 289, 
my emphasis). These are questions which Ackoff never feels compelled to 
ask. I shall give an explicit illustration of this neglect in Chapter 
7. 
The same questions follow from the realist philosophy which we 
briefly encountered at the end of Chapter 2. Keat and Urry (op. cit. ) 
summarize the realist view of explanation 
ýý... in the claim that answers to why- 
questions (that is, to requests for 
causal explanations) require answers 
to how- and what- questions. Thus, 
if asked w something occurs, we must 
show how some event or change brings 
about a new state of affairs, by des- 
cribing the way in which the structures 
and mechanisms that are present respond 
to the initial change. To do this, it 
is necessary to discover what the ent- 
ities involved are: to discovertheir 
natures or essences" (p. 31)" 
The reasons why we must ask such questions is clear. Unless 
we are to give up our commitment'to totalities we must ask how 'structures 
comes about and how it is preserved and how it changes. How could we 
possibly do this without an investigation into its laws of construction? 
Unless we ask these questions about construction we are faced with the 
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alternative of totality without origin and structural stability without 
effort (and we also completely rule out change except by external in- 
fluence`- perhaps a comforting thought for operational researchersl) As 
Piaget points out: "Were it not for the idea of transformation, structures 
would lose all explanatory import, since they would collapse into static 
forms"'(p. 12). See also, Allen, 1975, on this point. We shall see in 
Chapter 7 that OR does in fact entertain a notion of organizations as 
static, given wholes. 
Given that the very notion of totality carries with it the corroll- 
aries of structure, transformation, construction, and self-regulation, 
what legitimate relationships are there between this 'object' and the 
researcher (subject)? If we adopt Ackoff's notion of totality, whereby 
the pre-given. whole determines the parts, we have a justification for 
seeing the really significant relationship between the researcher and 
the totality consisting of the researcher's conceptualisation of the whole. 
We have seen him argue that systems are "... subjective insofar as the 
particular configuarion of elements that form... (it and its environment) 
... is dictated by the interests of the researcher" 
(1972, p. 84). 
Emphasising this role of the researcher is justified with Ackoff's 
notion of totality because, as Piaget says, "... viewing the whole as 
prior to its elements or contemporaneous with their "contact"... simplif- 
ies) the problem to such an extent... (that it)... bypass(es) all the 
central questions - questions about the nature of a whole's laws of 
composition" (op. cit., p. 8). Seeing totalities in terms of the whole 
which dominates the parts (a conception which forms the basis of OR's 
social theory, as we shall see in Chapter 7) legitimates subjective 
conceptualisation of the totality because, not being concerned with the 
laws of transformation which structure the whole, the researcher can rest 
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content with a view of the whole which 'works'. That is, he has done 
all that can be expected of him if he is able to provide an account of 
the gross properties of the whole. In terms of a strategy of inquiry, 
this makes OR identical-to statistics. The concept of totality as a 
'simple-unity' (the whole) reassures the researcher that he need not be 
concerned with more than phenomenal appearance. It is this concept of 
totality as simple unity which legitimated that remarkable statement by 
Beer (1966, p. 119) which we have already quoted, namely, that "... the 
OR man is a special kind of scientist, for he does not have to bother 
with determining the laws governing basic natural phenomena... " And 
he says this after having staked out the claim that OR was scientific 
on the basis that it attempted to uncover a system's "real processes"i 
The. notion of totality held by the systems approach does not require such 
an understanding, as Beer comes to realize. 
The philosophies with which OR is implicated exert, as we have 
seen, a persistent bias towards grounding any theory of inquiry in the 
nature of the subject (as regards positivism, recall Popper's emphasis on 
bold conjectures), and away from an analysis of the object. This we have 
now seen is the implication of the notion of totality currently expressed 
in the systems approach. However, if we accept the idea of structure as 
being constitutive of wholeness then we have also to accept, as Piaget 
puts it, that 
"The notion of structure is not at all 
reducible to a simple formalisation due 
to the observer's mind: it expresses, on 
the contrary, through its formalisations 
... properties constitutive of the struc- 
tured "being" (1971a, p. 109). 
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Compare this statement with one by Beer (and such statements 
are to be found passim) that "... coherence, and pattern and purpose are, 
all three, acts of mental recognition rather than characteristics of 
physical things" (op. cit., p. 243, my emphsis). Beer goes on to say: 
11... the detection of a system in the world outside ourselves is a sub- 
jective matter" (ibid). Is this all? Compare Piaget again: "Structures 
are not simply convenient theoretical constructs; they exist apart from 
the... (observer)... for they are the source of the relations he observes 
a structure would lose all truth value if it did not have this direct 
connection with the facts" (1971a, p. 112). And again: "... understanding 
or explaining is not just a matter of applying our operations to the 
real and finding that "it can be done". Such "application does not break 
through to causes; it keeps us within the realm of laws. Causal explan- 
ation requires that the operators that "fit" the real "belong"to it, that 
reality itself be constituted of operators" 
(p. 40). Beer, as we would 
expect, reverts to Hume on causes and argues that they only exist in the 
mind (see: p. 121). For Beer being 'in the mind' is good enouPh, and 
so long as totalities-are thought of in, terms of simple unities it is 
good enough. However, as soon as we understand that totalities are con- 
structed and that neither the whole (nor the elements) are primary but 
the system's laws of composition, the system itself must be brought into 
account. It is only with a concept of totality which emphasises this'that 
problem of knowledge becomes "... determining how knowledge comes to terms 
with the real world, and therefore what relationships obtain between 
subject and object" (piaget, 1972, p. 6). It is not with the concept of 
totality entertained by the systems approach that, "the theory of knowledge 
is... essentially a theory of adaptation of thought to reality, even if in 
the last analysis this adaptation (like all adaptations) reveals the exis- 
tence of an inextricable interaction between the subject and the objects of 
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study" (p. 18). 
Emphasising the object should not in any way be thought of as 
letting positivism slip in through the back door and with it the re- 
entry of the strategy of inquiry which we dismissed in Chapter 2 as in- 
comprehensible. Structural knowledge must, as Piaget says, have structures 
as their source but this does not mean that what the researcher gains as 
knowledge is the real object which could be called 'the' structure. I 
shall come back to this. 
With the notion of totality as a simple, overarching unity there 
is not pressure to go, beyond giving 'plausible' accounts of real processes. 
Once this notion of totality is discarded, however, the pressure to give 
theories a special kind of content becomes overwhelming. I believe that 
this can, even be seen from Kuhn's descriptions of the development to 
'mature' science. If we ignore his philosophical and sociological inter- 
pretations it is possible to iinderstan d his descriptions of the development 
to maturity as the acquisition of models which are closer and closer to 
the nature, of their subject-matter. (see, for example, his description of 
the developments in explanations of electricity and the composition of the 
atmosphere, which show this particu]rly well). Kuln himself, as we have 
noted, argues that maturity has something to do with the type of 'boxes, 
into which scientists try to force 'nature', but elsewhere he argues 
that he can see no progress in the 'ontology' of various sciences. However, 
I think that his reservation, being based on the fact that he can detect no 
'linear' progress, does not weaken the case that there has indeed been a 
'development': restricting 'progress' in this x-ray does not seem appropriate. 
Still, we do not have to rely on either reading between the lines 
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or on Kuhn's opinions. Others have argued on general grounds that a 
necessary condition for scientificity is a grasp of the nature of the 
subject-matter being dealt with. Rom Harre, a realist philosopher and 
social scientist, has argued against what he sees as "the neo-positivist 
idea of science... (which)... was that the compilation of a catalogue of 
laws describing... regularities completely exhausted the content of a 
science... The sole virtue of a theory, on this view", he goes on, "is 
to bring order into the mass of observational and experimental data. 
Provided that order is produced, neo-positivists are not much concerned 
with the meaning of those concepts which appear... in the theory... " 
(1974, p. 241). As our previous discussion has shown, Harre's description 
of 'neo-positivism' accords well with the prevailing view in OR. Against 
this he argues that It a real scientist tries to discover what produces 
patterns which he observes; that is, what mechanisms are responsible form 
them. He requires that his theories have a certain kind of content" 
(ibid). 
Arguing in very similar terms to Piaget - who points out that "... structures 
are not observable as_such9 being located at levels which can be reached 
only by abstracting forms of forms or systems of the nth degree; that 
is, the detection of structure calls for a special effort of reflective 
abastraction" (1971a, p. 136) - Harre goes on to say that at some "... 
point in most sciences... observations temporarily comes to a halt, and 
for the next step we are forced to resort to the scientific imagination" 
(ibid), and imagination which is disciplined. And by what? Well, he says 
"it is not good just imagining any kind of process that might produce 
observed patterns. To be scientific one must imagine processes and gener- 
ative mechanisms which are proper and appropriate to the problem in question 
... The model and the unknown real mechanism must be functionally=equiv- 
alent" (pp. 241-2). In Harre's view, then, "scientific models are iconic; 
that is, they are imagined things, processes or structures" (ibid). 
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Compare this view with that of Beer's. He argues that "a scientific model 
is a homomorphism... " (1966, p" 113, my emphasis) which means, literally, 
merely a similarity of form or a superficial likeness (Collins New English 
Dictionary). An isomorphism is a model ünich is similar in structure. 
Beer only allows models to be isomorphic with each other (ibid), and he 
chooses the homomorphism because it reduces complexity to manageable levels. 
Complexity must be 'managed', but it matters greatly in which way this is 
done, and the way Beer chooses negates the scientific conception of totality. 
If knowledge of totalities is knowledge of laws of composition, 
then the adaptation of tho ; ht to reality is contingent onthe activity 
of attempting to understand the totality in question. It is activity 
which produces scientific understanding, and not merely reflection. As 
Piaget puts it, "each scientific'"fact" is: (a) an answer to a question; 
(b) a verification of "reading off"; (c) a sequence of interpretations, 
already implicit in the very manner of asking the question, as well 
(unfortunately or fortunately) as in the verification as such, or the 
"reading off 11 of experience, and explicit in the manner- of understanding 
the answer given by reality to the question asked" (1972, p. 125). The 
kind of questions that we need to ask are thorn directed towards uncovering 
the structure and functioning of complex totalities. Let us turn now 
to Hegel's concept of totality to see if it permits this type of question. 
Here1's Concert of Totality: 
As we have seen, Churchman is a confirmed Hegelian, and this 
remains true notwithstanding his 'critique' of Hegel. The concern of 
his critique is to make Hegel's dialectic explicit, and not to question its 
fundamentals. Churchman argues for a vision of the whole system to 
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guarantee progress through Hegelian dialectics. What kind of totality 
could this-be? If we interpret Churchman as calling for an operational- 
isation of the Hegelian concept of totality we get some answers which he 
shouldrnt, and to some extent, does not like. On the other hand we have 
little choice. We either say that Churchman shares Hegel's concept of 
totality (although he finds it somewhat vague), or we say that Churchman 
has no concept of totality. The latter seems out of the question so 
perhaps the truth is that Churchman is undecided. If this is the case 
perhaps he will forgive us making up his mind for him by burdening him 
with the Hegelian concept of totality with which he is most strongly assoc- 
iated. 
At first sight Hegels dialectic seems to offer the prospect of 
progression to an ever more complex vision of the whole. Althusser (1969) 
says that it appears that with the Hegelian dialectic "the further we pro- 
gress in the dialectic of its production, the richer consciousness becomes, 
the more complex is its contradiction" (p. 101). This is a result which 
Churchman would like to achieve as is shown by his advocacy of the concept 
of the "maximum loop" (1968a, Chapter 7). This concept (which is closely 
related to his notion of "exoteric" inquiry) comes from the belief that 
"... reason is the process by which man is able to look at himself... (and) 
... that the way anything can look at 
itself is through a series of frame- 
works". The final conclusion is that "... a social institution becomes 
rational to the extent that it can be considered to function like some 
other institution". That is, "... the rationality of reflection comes 
from using as much of the world, or the "whole system", as one possibly can 
tos understand oneself" (p. 105). However, employing the Hegelian concept 
of totality Althusser argues that this is not, in fact, a movement towards 
increased complexity and richness at äll. Discussing Hegel's conception 
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of the dialectic as the movement of the Idea he notes that Hegel "... 
projects this movement on to the reality of scientific labour, ultim- 
ately conceiving the unity of the process from the abstract to the con- 
crete as the auto-genesis of"the concept, that is, as a simple development 
via the very forms of alienation of the original in-itself in the emergence 
of its end-result, an end-result which is no more than its beginning" 
(1969, p. 189; cf. Piaget, 1972, pp. 115-116). 
Churchman, in his 'critiques of Hegel (1971, pp. 176-7) queries 
the necessity of having only a contradiction composed of two opposites. 
But, as Althusser points out, "... if we take the rigorous essence rather 
than the metaphysical sense of the Hegelian model, we can see that the 
latter does require this 'simple oroginal unity with two opposites"... " 
(op. cit., p. 197, cf. also, pp. 19k-5). As he earlier puts it, "... this 
' simple process with two opposites' in which the Whole is split into 
two contradictory parts is precisely the very womb of Hegelian contradiction" 
(op. cit., p. 195). He goes on: 
"this is the original unity that constit- 
utes the fragmented unity of the two opp- 
osites in which it is alienated, changing 
even as it stays the same; these two opp- 
osites are the same unity, but in duality, 
the same interiority, but in exteriority - 
and that is why each is for its own part 
the contradictory and abstraction of the 
other, since each is merely the abstraction 
of the other without knowing it, as in- 
itself - before restoring their original 
unity, but enriched by its fragmentation, 
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by its alienation, in the negation of 
the abstraction which negated their 
previous unity; then they will be a 
single whole once again, they will 
have reconstituted a new simple 'unity', 
enriched by the past labour of their 
negation, the new simple unity of the 
totality produced by the negation of 
the negation" (op. cit., p. 197)" 
And what of the concept of totality which progress by simple con- 
tradiction presupposes? The Hegelian dialectic, Althusser concludes, 
'!... is completely dependent on the radical presupposition of a simple 
original unity which develops within itself by virtue of its negativity, 
and throughout its development only ever restores the original simplicity 
and unity in an ever more 'concrete' totality" (ibid). "The He_elian 
totality is the alienated development of a simple unity, of a simple 
principle, itself a moment in the development of the Idea... " (op. cit., 
p. 203). This is the concept of totality which is demanded by the notion 
of progress through simple contradiction, and as we have seen in our 
discussion of operational structuralism it cannot be taken as an adequate 
concept of totality at all. As Althusser says, "... negativity can only 
contain the motor principle of the dialectic, the negation of the negation, 
as a strict reflection of the Hegelian theoretical presuppositions of-sim- 
plicity and origin" (op. cit., p. 214). And Aithusser speaks almost directly 
to Churchman's notion of the "maximum loop" when he goes on to say that 
"... contradiction is a motive force for Hegel as negativity, that is, 
as a pure reflection of the 'being-in-itself even in being-other-than- 
itself', therefore as a pure reflection of the principle of alienation itself: 
the simplicity of the Idea" (ibid). Referring back to our previous dis- 
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cussion of the systems approach, this similar notion of totalities as 
simple, presumably justifies Churchman's emphasis on the 'intuiting' 
role of the designer. 
Thus, he says that "... the selection of a definition of "system" 
is a design choice, because throughout this essay it is the designer who 
is the chief figure. In other words, whether or rot something is a system 
is regarded as a specific choice of the designer" (1971, p. 42). And as 
far as the designer is concerned "the differentiating feature of systems 
is that they can be separated into parts and that the parts work together 
for the sake of the whole". (op. cit., p. 49, my emphasis); this view is 
again, Churchman emphasises, a 'design choice'. "What is of chief interest 
to the designer is the relationship of the parts to the whole system" 
(op. cit., p. 30); "what matters most to the designer is that he can con- 
ceptualise how a decision maker can change (design) a part and the change 
makes a difference in the performance of the whole" (ibid). That is, 
the whole is an emergent property prior to its elements, and the interest 
is in how the parts 'coincide' with the whole. This interest of the 
designer, Churchman notes, can be manifest in different ways (he can, 
for example, treat the parts separately or simultaneously) all of which 
merely 11... express the attitude of the designer" (op. cit., p. 51). 
The nearestwe get to recognising that the system may have a structure of 
its own is a note to the effect that there is a reality 'underlying' the 
designer's conceptualisations, and that the designer's conceptualisations 
may be wrong. Thus: "In any choice the designer makes, he may identify 
the components incorrectly and/or measure their effectiveness incorrectly. 
Thus he may believe that he understands how M (the whole) is related to 
the mi (the parts),... e but he may be wrong. This rather obvious 
point merely states that there is a real relationship between both the 
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true M and the true M., and the designer's estimates of these" 
(p. 51). 
We never hear of 'real relationsTiips' again. 
The neglect of the real by Churchman would follow from-his 
commitment to the Hegelian notion of totality. In its bypassing of the 
central question of the laws of construction which make up a totality, the 
Hegelian notion of totality implies the "... absence of any real structure 
in the whole... 11 (Althusser, op. cit., p. 209). 
The simple original unity which Churchman's notion of totality 
implies is therefore in its nature hostile to the discovery of structures. 
In the Hegelian dialectic each 'movement' is merely an expression of in- 
ternal. unity; each 'part' has but an ephemeral'. existence and because all 
have significance only with respect to the given totality, there can 
never be one dominant part (or contradiction in the dialectic). 
All 
parts are 'equal' within the totality because all are merely expressions 
of the single unified whole. Differences are only posed to 
be negated. 
They are phenomena which can always be righted with respect 
to the dominant 
unity. We shall see this concept of totality working overtime 
in OR's 
social theory. 
This hostility to the notion of structure goes, I think, a 
long way towards explaining why, as Mitchell 
(1973) has put it, "OR has 
failed to structure, in a way sufficiently persuasive to have a major 
impact, any problem of major significance in the world at large" 
(p. 4): 
OR neglects, and is in every way hostile towards, the very idea of 
structure. How can one understand and, more importantly, change a totality 
without grasping and operating on its structure? With the concept of 
totality prevalent in OR circles we has not, with the absence of any 
concept of real structure, moved beyond the 'anything goes' strategy of 
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inquiry which seemed dominant in Chapter 1. 
It should be clear that sweeping in complexity is but a corollary 
of dealing with structured totalities. Understanding that totalities are 
complexly structured by their laws of construction and transformation means 
that whatever complexity there is is given in these relatonships. This 
means that the 'facts' as they appear to us are merely representative of 
an underlying complexity, which it is the researcher's task to discover. 
The complexity of facts does not only lie in the interrelationship 
which they have with theories. As Althusser puts it, the existence of 
structured wholes implies that "... every 'simple category' presupposes 
the existence of the structured whole... (That is, )... simplicity is 
merely the product of the complex process" (op. cit., p. 196). "Facts", 
then, are only to be understood in terms of the complex whole, which 
implies their location in terms of the laws, or as Althusser puts it, 
the 'conditions of existence' of the system (cf. Allen, -1975). Thus, as 
regards Churchman's conundrum, facts do depend on a view of the whole 
system, but the whole system conceived of in terms of its laws of 
composition. 
Revolutionary Inquiry: 
Clearly, concern for the nature of the subject-matter is merely 
the corollary of bringing the object', into inquiry. Finding out what' 
is 'revolutionary' about this sweeping in of the object takes us back to 
the subject-object relationship, and back to the question of what it is to 
have knowledge of structures. Recalling OR's persistent ideal of being 
"revolutionary", I suggest in this section that the realist-type approach 
satisfies this condition which is required for a strategy of inquiry to 
be acceptable to OR. One possible case for arguing that bringing the 
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object in is revolutionary comes from Piaget's argument (and to some 
extent demonstration) that knowledge as the product of. interaction between 
the subject and object always involves a transcendence of the object. It 
will be recalled that this is the complete reverse of Kuhn's view of rev- 
olutionary science in which the object was given. That is, in Kuhn's view 
of revolutionary science the object does not enter in, but always lies 
beneath the activity of the scientist. We have seen that a similar con- 
clusion holds for Hegel, and hence Churchman. For Piaget, on the other 
hand, although the real object lies beneath and is not knowable as such, 
"... perception never operates alone: we only discover the properties 
of an object by adding something to perception... " (1972, pp. 51-2); that 
is, ".. * one does not understand the properties of an object except by 
acting upon it and by transforming it, An the same way that an organism 
does not respond to the environment except by assimilating it, in the 
wides sense of the term" (op. cit., p. 48). The views of both Kuhn and 
Churchman, therefore, contrary to all appearances, are neither revolutionary 
nor processual. For both the object is at best a source of stimuli which 
are interrupted and merely 'interpreted' by the subject: the object is 
'given' to the subject, and is not constituted through interaction, as 
it is for Piaget. As Harvey puts it for Piaget "the subject is thus re- 
garded as both structuring and being structured by the object" (op. cit., 
p. 298); Israel makes the same point when he notes that for Piaget "a 
thing is not an object of knowledge until the knowing organism interacts 
with it and constitutes it as an object" (1972, p. 129). There is, he 
points out, a truly dialectical relationship between suirject and object 
(ibid) whereas for both Kuhn and Churchman the relationship is subject 
determined. 
Because he is himself a structuralibt, Piaget sees the growth of 
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knowledge, in terms of a process of interaction between subject and 
object, as the development of operational structures or laws of trans- 
formation which constitute, in their various stages, point.; of equilib- 
rium representing for that stage a totality. Knowledge, then, as a product 
of subject-object interaction, is seen in terms of structured totalities. 
Structures, then, are the conceptual outcome of subject-object inter- 
action, the products of 'reflective abstraction', which, partly because 
they are this product of 'inquiry', do not merely passively receive ex- 
perience but always reconstitute it within that structure while at the 
same time reconstituting the structure itself: this is 'perpetual 
revolution'. Piaget's psychological interpretation of this dialectical 
relationship between subject and object is in terms of 'assimilation' - 
'facts' are integrated within a previously built up structure - and 
'accommodation' - where a structure is applied to a new situation and 
through assimilation it is differentiated and changed. The structure 
is continually being built up and modified through interaction with the 
'real', and the latter - the 'given' - is being continually transcended 
through its integration and interpretation within the structured totality. 
At the level of consciousness, when employed as an explicit 
strategy of inquiry, bringing the subject-matter in is revolutionary on 
two counts: firstly, we search for a structure, that is, for "... a 
system of internal relations which is in the process of being structured 
through the operation of its own transformation rules" (Harvey, op. cit., 
p. 290); secondly, we take the 'given' the 'facts' and what is 'obvious' 
and attempt to locate them within the structured whole to find out what 
they mean. The stance is obviously that facts do not have immutable mean- 
ings as transcendental 'objects'; their meaning changes as 'knowledge' 
changes. It implies that 'facts' can only have meaning and existence as 
part of a pre-given structured complex whole, and it challenges the 
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researcher to look beneath the given to discover the totality and in so 
doing to transform the given. As regards its objectives, this strategy 
of inquiry has much in common with phenomenology, where the task is to 
get beneath the world of 'common-sense' and, in its sociological usage, 
understand the production of this world. However, as Piaget says, 
It... phenomenological problems as much as one wishes, but not the phen- 
omenological method, not as long as it remains confined to the philosopher's 
consciousness... " (1972, p. 111). 
Like Piaget, Althusser understancb inquiry as a dialectical 
'production', as a transformation of the given ('raw material') into 
'knowledge'. He sees (as does Piaget) the production of scientific 
knowledge as essentially open-ended; it has no final resting place as is 
envisaged by Hegelians (although the latter see knowledge as continual 
process without end, this is the endless cycle of becoming its own destiny) 
genuinely new problems (an impossibility for Hegelians) are possible and 
therefore genuinely new knowledge is possible; knowledge 'grows' and does 
not merely 'become' (see: Shotter, 1974, for a discussion of this difference 
in strategic outlooks with respect to social psychology). 
As Althusser points out, we never start from an objective 'given', 
from "... pure and absolute ! facts"' 
(p. 184). Instead we always start 
with the 'abstract', with the pre-constituted, as our 'raw material'. The 
simple being the product of the complex we cannot take the simple as it 
stands, as it presents itself to us. Science does not start with the 
'facts' but, as Althusser puts it, "... its particular labour consists of 
elaborating its own scientific facts through a critique of the ideological 
'facts' elaborated by an earlier ideological theoretical practice. To 
elaborate its own specific 'facts' is simultaneously to elaborate its own 
'theory', since a scientific fact - and not the self-styled pure phenomenon 
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- can only be identified in the field of a theoretical practice" (op. cit., 
p. 184). 
The realist-type philosophy, therefore, is compatible with OR's 
ideal of revolutionary inquiry, whereas the philosophies in which OR is 
currently interested are incompatible with it. With positivism it is 
impossible to transcend the given because the given is the guarantor. 
With conventionalism and idealism the given is implicit and can only be 
interpreted. But from what basis is the given to be transformed and, in 
being so transformed to be transformed itself? I have concentrated on 
the importance of explicitly dealing with the object of inquiry, but what 
is the: nature of the subject which does the inquiry? These questions 
refer to the very difficult and important problem of the relationship 
between OR and the scientific disciplines, one specific instance of which 
(the relationship between OR and the social sciences) I take up in Part 
Two. 
Revolutionary Inauirv and the Scientific Disciplines: 
An ideal which derives from OR's overriding ideal of dealing with 
the whole system is that inquiry should have an interdisciplinary basis. 
En route, however, we have had occasion to question whether, when set 
within the philosophical frameworks which inform thinking in ORS this 
derived: ideal was understandable. From a positivist point of view inter- 
disciplinary teams 'cover the ground'. Apart from the fact that this 
view has its basis in phenomenalism we saw that for its justification 
it relied on the existence of a mysterious meta-logic. From a convention- 
alist and idealist point of view interdisciplinary teams engage in 
process and the supposition is that they progress. We have seen that the 
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idealist claim of progress through contradiction required the pre-existence 
of a simple totality for this claim to be justified. However, even if we 
put questions of the validity of the underlying ontological presuppositions 
to one side, it is hard to understand this claim as a practical proposition. 
In practice the process has to be a social process, and we cannot understand 
how this process works (and, therefore, whether it will be progressive) 
without an understanding of these processes from a social point of view. 
Our understanding cannot be complete from a purely philosophical point of 
view, and yet Churchman is reluctant to examine the viability of his 
strategy from a social point of view (see: 1971, pp. 180-185). Others, 
including Kuhn of course, have not been so reticent, and in the final 
chapter I shall assess the social basis which has been put forward by 
some operational researchers to justify the progressive nature of process. 
In providing this background operations researchers have extended the 
interdisciplinary team idea to an ideal which was always incipient within 
it, namely, to sweep into the process of inquiry all the members of the 
social system being studied (cf. Churchman's notion of the 'well-informed 
public', 1968a). 
From where we stand at the moment, therefore, the interdisciplinary 
team ideal is difficult to understand in the ways in which it is currently 
interpreted. The difficulty with which operations researchers have had 
with the ideal of interdisciplinary inquiry stems, I think we can see, 
from an initial hostility towards the subject-matters of science, we have 
seen (particularly in Chapter 2) that this hostility is the product of 
commitment to philosophical outlooks which bias attention away from the 
object of knowledge. OR has been very keen to be something different from 
just another science, and has recognised the inadequacy of basing attempts 
at improvement on sciences which were not developed to be anything other than 
themselves. Because of its bias against subject-matter OR has been unable 
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to see how it could be something different from scientific disciplines with- 
out being entirely somethinr' else. That is, OR has been unable to find 
a way of using the scientific disciplines in a way that is consistent 
with its philosophical commitments. The unfortunate thing is that it has 
given priority to its philosophical commitments and not to its ideals, 
because by banishing scientific disciplines its ideals have been forsaken. 
The use of the scientific disciplines is not, however, inevitably incom- 
patible with either its ideals or its justified desire to be something 
different. We should bring in scientific disciplines, and with them 
subject-matters, and use them in ways which are more than merely psychol- 
ogically suggestive sources for homomorphic models, in order to meet OR's 
ideals. 
Let me briefly indicate how scientific disciplines fit within 
the philosophical outlook which I have used as a basis for prising out 
some of the implications of OR's current philosophical interests. For 
Aithusser the means whereby knowledge is produced is called by him Gener- 
ality 2. That is, 
"... the corpus of concepts whose more or 
less contradictory unity constitues the 
'theory' of the science at the (historical) 
moment under consideration, the 'theory' 
that defines the field in which all the 
problems of the science must necessarily 
be posed (that is, where the 'difficulties' 
met by the science-in its object, in the 
confrontation of its 'facts' and its 'theory', 
of its previous 'knowledges' and its 'theory$, 
or of its 'theory' and its new knowledges, 
will be posed in the forth of a problem by 
6 
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and in this field)" (Althusser, op. cit., 
pp. 184-5). 
For Piaget it is only through 'application' that structures of 
knowledge are transformed, and Althusser makes the point that the outcome 
of inquiry ('Generality 3') is never identical to either the raw material 
('Generality 1') or the means of production. Existing structures work on 
the given to produce new knowledge. For both Piaget and Althusser exis- 
ting structures of knowledge are a point of departure; for Kuhn a paradigm 
is simultaneously a beginning and an end - paradigms exist-to be fulfilled 
(as do Hegelian world-views). Althusser proposes the word 'problematic' 
in an attempt to differentiate between knowledge seen as fully consistent 
'world-view' and it considered as a complex totality which is not necess- 
arily internally consistent. In the latter sense knowledge is a way, of 
asking questions (op. cit., p. 229), rather than being the source of both 
questions and answers. A problematic is, as a paradigm is not, a method; 
a paradigm is a solution. As Piaget points out, "... structuralism is a 
method, not a doctrine" (1971a, p. 142). 
Let me finally, and very briefly, mention the view of Piaget on 
the relationships between the sciences which stems from his understanding 
of the inevitable interrelationship between subject and object in the growth 
of knowledge. Because, as he says, the relationship between subject and 
object is 'circular', so is the unity of science a circular unity. He 
describes what he has in mind in the following way: 
"... the object is never understood ex- 
cept through the individual's thought 
processes, but the individual does not 
understand himself except by adapting 
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himself to the object. Thus man cannot 
understand the universe except through 
logic and mathematics, the product of 
his own mind; but he can only understand 
how he has constructed mathematics and 
logic by studying himself psychologically 
and biologically, or in other words, as 
a function of the whole universe. This 
is the true meaning of the circle of the 
sciences: it leads eventually to the con- 
ception of unity through interdependence 
between the various sciences, such that 
disciplines on opposite sides of this 
cyclic order maintain reciprocal relation- 
ships with each other" (1972, pp. 82-83). 
The unity of the sciences, and the role for OR, is based on a. 
grasp of the complementarity of understandings which the development of 
the sciences should, according to the ideals of OR, bring us. This 
sounds like Churchman's notion of thQ rationality of the maximum loop 
until we realise that the sciences are complementary by providing an 
understanding of complementarity of real structures and processes. If 
there is truly a whole system it will be understood as the structures 
and processes on the basis of which the seemingly disparate aspects of 
life are related. 
Conclusion: 
This chapter really stands as the conclusion to Part One, on 
0 
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the relationship of OR to philosophy. I have attempted to trace through 
the various philosophical associations which have been built up in OR 
circles and have shown some of the implications of these for its ideals. 
The overall conclusion, quite clearly, is that the impact of these assoc- 
iations is by and large to lessen the possibility of OR achieving its 
ideals. The major reason for this is that the philosophies exert a strong 
and consistent bias against a serious consideration of the subject-matter 
of OR. I have tried to show that this bias persistently operates against 
the ideals of OR. However, we leave this part with some unfinished 
business which is taken up in Part Two. 
The preoccupation of this part has been an examination of the 
philosophical foundations of OR. Operations researchers have resorted to 
philosophy (sometimes implicitly) in an attempt to operationalise their 
ideals. In one sense, the overall conclusion of this part shows that 
philosophy is not likely to help OR in this task. This is because philosophy, 
broadly speaking, is usually understood as inquiry without a subject-matter. 
By this I do not mean that philosophers do not talk about anything. Rather, 
I mean to suggest that philosophy properly understood does not reveal 
truths about the world. Its concern (at least as it interests us) is 
with discussing, criticising, and sometimes suggesting schemes which tell 
us not so much how to acquire knowledge, or what valid knowledge is, but 
more fruitfully what knowledge is not. It is inconceivable that philosophy 
could tell us in advance of inquiry what rue knowledge was or what it'will 
look like. There is only one way to gain knowledge of the world, and 
that is to investigate it. Philosophies, if they attempt to posit the 
nature of the world before an attempt is made to find out what it is, may 
hinder us in our attempts to acquire knowledge. If it is suggested that 
knowledge exists only in our senses or that knowledge exists only in our 
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ideas, then there is a fruitful role for philosophical investigation, 
and that is to point out that these suggestions, if taken seriously, 
would impose arbitrary limitations on our ability to acquire knowledge. 
This, as I understand it, is the justification for and the role of the 
realist-type view which I have been counterposing to the strains of 
positivism, conventionalism, and idealism which are to be found in OR. 
This is why I have not advocated a specific philosophy and claimed that 
it would solve OR's need for a theory of inquiry. This is why I have 
referred to the philosophical viewpoints I have employed as critical tools 
as realist-tv e. Realism, (or Structuralism, or Wdittgensteinianism) 
is a term which refers not so much to a philosophy as a criticism of 
philosophies which arbitrarily limit inquiry. If OR has need of a phil- 
osophical foundation it is a need for a sdt of philosophical tools which 
will ward off such encroachments into its liberty. 
If OR cannot look to philosophy to find secure foundations, we 
must look for its foundations in its attempts to come to grips with the 
real world. To do this we must move away from philosophy and attempt to 
understand OR on the terms in which it perceives its subject-matter. 
Notwithstanding the philosophical attempts to banish subject-matter with 
which OR is associated, it is impossible to operate without some theoretical 
understanding of the nature of the object being investigated. This much 
at least we can learn from conventionalism. The unfinished business 
which we take up in Part Two is the nature of this theoretical understanding 
as it is found in OR circles. Although I have attempted to show that 
OR'cannot achieve its ideals withöut. a grasp of its subject-matter, if 
this grasp is an inadequate one it will just as surely be prevented from 
achieving them. The theoretical structures which inform thinking in OR 
circles which I wish to discuss in Part Two are thow which inform their 
i 
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owners about the nature of the social world. I do not claim that these 
theoretical structures are the only ones held in OR, or even that they 
are the major ones. I do claim that they are major, and that their 
impact on the likelihood of OR achieving its ideals is profound, and 
at the moment that this impact is a profoundly negative one. However, 
notwithstanding this conclusion, the growing interest in the social sciences 
within OR circles is a healthy one. It would be intolerable for OR to 
neglect the social world because to do so would be to deprive itself of 
its most potently revolutionary ally. This is so because as Piaget has 
so cogently put it (many others have made the same point): 
"Whereas other animals cannot alter them- 
selves except by changing their species, 
man can transform himself by transforming 
the world and can structure himself by 
constructing structures; and these struc- 
tures are his own, for they are not entire- 
ly predestined either from within or without" 
(1971a, pp. 118-119). 
The real structures with which OR deals and theorises about can be changed 
by those structures themselves. As Harvey (op. cit. ) has pointed out, 
theories which are perfectly 'true) of the social world (in that they 
enable us to make reliable predictions, etc. ) can nevertheless be falsified 
by that world. This is why the theories of social process which we 
shall find are being entertained within OR circles are so encouraging. 
However, it is also the reason why their failure to grasp the real nature 
of these processes is all the more depressing. 
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PART TY! O 
THESUBJECT- MATTE R0F0PERAT10NAL 
RESEARCH 
Introduction: 
A writer who has shown great concern over the subject-matter of 
OR is Ackoff, whose early attempt to define its nature was considered 
in Part One. In a more recent article (1972) he introduces his readers 
to concerns'which will dominate our attention. Ackoff says that: 
"The concept system has come to play a critical 
role in contemporary science (Churchman, Emery). 
This preoccupation of scientists in general is 
reflected among Management Scientists in particular 
for whom the systems approach to problems is 
fundamental and for whom organisations, a special 
type of system, are the principal subject of 
study" (p. 83). 
Ackoff goes on to devote l/ pages (including the conclusion and 
the references) out of a nine page article to discussing organisations, 
and most of what he has to say, apart from minor changes in terminology, 
is repeated from his 1961 article in a collection on progress in 
operational research. Churchman (1974) defines all OR as social OR, 
and he says nothing, either in this article or elsewhere, on the nature 
of social reality (he has a section on 'Social Reality' which only 
discusses the nature of goals as counterfactuals). In 1964 a conference 
was held on the problem of OR and, the Social Sciences' (Lawrence'(ed), ' 
1969); in 1968 another conference was held on Approaches to the Study of 
Organizational Behaviour (Heald (ed), 1970) and the subtitle was 
Operational Research and the Behavioural Sciences. The outcome of both 
these conferences was that the relationship between OR and the social 
(or behavioural) sciences was a poor one. There was much mutual 
recognition of the value and importance of the work done on either side 
and promises and hopes for joint work and close collaboration were expressed. 
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Such evidence as there is on the relationship between OR and the social 
sciences seems to point very strongly to the conclusion that there is a 
large gap between them. This is not to say that there have not been 
partially successful efforts in bridging this gap (particularly by Friend 
and Jessop, 1969, and more recently, Ackoff and Emery, 1972) and I shall 
give these works close attention in chapter 7. But even these efforts 
have accepted that they were taking on a task which was made difficult 
because OR and the social sciences are currently very different animals. 
Many operations researchers would agree with the views of Bennis who 
appeared at the 1964 conference as a behavioural scientist sympathetic to 
the task of forging a tie-up between OR and the social sciences. For 
Bennis the major difference lay in the fact that OR and behavioural 
science deal with different sets of 'variables': OR deals with the 'hard' 
variables such as stocks, money, machines, numbers of workers etc., 
whereas organization theory deals with the human end of things which 
includes leadership, resistance to change, satisfactions, and so on. 
Some operations researchers would like to bridge the gap which exists in 
our attempts to relate these variables in our problem-solving attempts, 
but this is all sad evidence of their being a gap to be bridged. 
In the face of this evidence it might appear foolhardy to suggest 
(as I do) that OR and the social sciences share a common theoretical 
orientation towards the nature of the social world. It should be noted 
that by the term social sciences I do not wish to suggest that the social 
sciences in general all share one theoretical outlook. This is not the 
case. Which particular social sciences I have in mind regarding this 
shared orientation will become clear as we proceed. I should like in 
the rest of this introduction to at least weaken any strongly held 
convictions that OR and the social sciences are obviously different as 
regards their theoretical orientation towards the nature of the social 
world. 
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One way of doing this is to look at the kind of demands which 
operational researchers typically make of social scientists (these 
demands are, in fact, "complemented by the services typically offered to 
OR by those social scientists who are interested in bridging the gap). 
We have seen earlier how Ackoff has lamented the fact that OR has 
not been very interested in opening the 'black box' of behavioural 
variables and his interest in extending the scope of OR models to include 
them so as to 'cover' the total system - which he sees as being completely 
defined as a man-machine (or, in more current terminology, 'socio-technical') 
system. This may seem a completely natural move to make given OR's 
commitment to the whole system, but what else is Ackoff looking for? 
Ackoff's view at that time (1960) was that 
"in the operation of a system... the aspects of 
the system which can be manipulated so as to improve 
its performance are likely to come from many 
different disciplines" 
(p. 25, my emphasis) including, of course, the behavioural sciences. 
One of Ackoff's interests in the behavioural sciences, therefore, is the 
enhanced ability to manipulate the system which is provided by the ability 
to manipulate behavioural variables. As OR is only seen to 'sub-optimise' 
by not including behavioural variables, what is being asked for is the 
control of behavioural variables. 
(1) 
The concern is to eliminate 
behaviour which is deviant with respect to the organizational purpose 
which OR is attempting to promote. That this is the attitude of operations 
researchers to the behavioural sciences is also revealed by the 
introductory comments of Sir Charles Goodeve to the 1964 Cambridge 
conference. 
(1) That this is still his interest is shown in Ackoff and Emery. 
op cit. P. 11. 
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Sir Charles writes: 
"Operational Research people are very much 
concerned with change and can deal with the 
logic, including the economics of it. But 
attitudes of people - managers, technicians, 
workpeople, salesmen, customers, etc. - can 
throw the best of predictions into confusion" 
(p. 12). 
He goes on to state what he sees as 
"the main object of social scientists... 
(namely) ... to increase their knowledge and in 
particular their ability to predict" 
(p. 14). 
Cook, in his introduction to the 'Organisation and Control' section 
continues the theme of predictability. After noting that the social 
sciences can offer help to the operations researcher in improving 
organisational effectiveness by providing some knowledge of the "far 
greater" level of complexity of the system where "human characteristics 
cannot be ignored" he comes to the main point of contact which he sees 
between them. He writes: 
"... operational research men see the importance 
of human factors in at least two areas which are 
vital to operational research. 
First, to design a good management control system 
which will work as predicted, they need to know 
much more about the likely behaviour of the human 
components of the system. 
Second, in trying to implement operational research 
proposals, whether for some sophisticated management 
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control system or for much simpler change 
of method, they often find human resistance 
to change to be a major obstacle. They need 
all the help that social science skills or 
theories can provide" 
(p. 24). 
Cook was not completely disappointed by the contributions which 
followed (although Burn's paper, he notes (p. 89), was criticized for 
being "negative"). Bennis, summed up his views on the possible and 
desirable contribution of the social sciences to 'planned organizational 
change', the banner under which he saw a nexus between OR and the social 
sciences. He writes: 
"What we know least about - and what continually 
vexes those of us who are vitally concerned with 
the effective utilization of knowledge is 
implementation. As I use the term, implementation 
encompasses-a process which includes the creation 
of understanding and commitment in a client system 
towards a particular change which can solve problems, 
and devices whereby it can become integral to the 
client's operations. It bears to organisational 
theory the same relationship as the term 
internalisation does to personality theory, i. e. it 
is a process which leads to automatic self-generation 
and integral functioning. 
When it comes to implementation of organisational 
changes, most practitioners seem to overemphasise 
the importance of intellectual understanding or 
the informational status of the intended change. 
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Now, as I have said, information and 
understanding are a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, component for inducing change. 
More than that is required if the change 
affects important human responses. For 
human changes are bound up in the self-image 
and its maintenance and the complicated 
context of the social life and groupings 
which help to define and give meaning to 
the individual's existence. If an intended 
change is perceived to threaten (or enhance) 
the self-image, then we can expect differential 
effects. If an intended change, is perceived 
as threatening the social 'life space' of the 
individual, then safeguards must be undertaken 
which ensure new forms of gratification and 
evaluation" 
(p. 73 - second, fourth and last emphases mine; first, third, fifth 
and sixth emphases original). 
Churchman and Emery likewise advocate "the joint consideration 
of two research strategies" (1969, p. 82) on the basis that: 
"There has been a marked reluctance to recognise 
that which is obvious to any who has had to 
directly command a body of men. An aggregate of 
stones has such extremely weak field properties 
that we can usually ignore them. An aggregate 
of human beings readily constitutes a powerful 
contagious social field, more or less inclined 
to shared emotions and behaviour of hostility, 
docility, loyalty, flight, fight, etc. " 
(ibid). 
/189 
Finally, we can refer to a more recent contribution to the problem 
of the interface between OR and the social sciences in the work of 
Huysmanns (1970) whose focus of interest was 'implementation'. 
Being concerned to "... bridge the gap between social scientist 
and technical operations researcher that underlies the gap between 
scientist and manager" (p. 15) Huysmanns argues for collaboration around 
the "previously proposed implementations strategies... (which were)... 
being mainly the work of social scientists... usually centred around the 
problem of relaxing the human constraints that inhibit managerial 
adoption of a research proposal" (p. 31 my emphasis) and the OR approach 
to co6ting the relaxation of these 'constraints'. Thus he goes on to 
argue: 
"There is no obvious reason why only technological 
constraints should be considered in the research 
proposal, while human constraints should be 
left as implementation problems, other than the 
fact that the researcher does not know how to 
integrate the human constraints in his research" 
(p. 31) . 
The desire to predict behaviour stems from the widespread 
acceptance within OR circles that an organisation can be defined in terms 
of its goal. 
(1) 
Thus, for Ackoff (op cit): 
"An organisation is a purposeful system that 
contains at least two purposeful elements which 
have a common purpose relative to which the 
system has a functional division of labour; 
its functionally distinct subsets can respond 
(1) 1 have more to say on this in chapter 7. 
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to each other's behaviour through observation 
or communication; and at least one subset has 
a system-control function" 
(P. 90) . 
See also the definitions given by Churchman, Ackoff, and Arnoff 
(1957), Stringer (1967), Huysmanns (op cit), Beer (1966). Apart from 
the fact that this definition is also orthodox in the social sciences 
(Albrow, 1973), the desire to predict behaviour, with this definition 
as a background, must be based on the presumed ability to be able to 
distinguish behaviour which is in accordance with the organization's 
goal from that which is not. Both operations researchers and social 
scientists seem confident that they can distinguish these two types of 
behaviour. If OR was not confident about this we might expect worries 
about what it would do with its increased predictive powers if'it had 
them. Such worries are not strongly evident. What does the ability 
to distinguish organizationally relevant from organizationally irrelevant 
behaviour which is shared by OR and the social sciences depend on? 
Bittner (1973) provides us with an answer when he shows us "... how 
sociologists go about distinguishing the facts of formal organization 
from the facts of informal organization" (p. 265). One way in which 
they could do it, he suggests, is by employing a rule such as the 
following: 
"In certain presumptively identified fields of 
action, the observed stable patterns of conduct 
and relations can be accounted for by invoking 
some programmatic-constructions that define them 
prospectively. Insofar as the observed stable 
patterns match the dispositions contained in 
the programme they are instances of formal 
organisational structure. Whereas, if it can be 
shown that the programme did not provide for the 
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occurence of some other observed patterns 
which seem to have grown spontaneously, these 
latter belong to the domain of the informal 
structures" 
(p. 265) . 
Whether or not the formal/informal distinction does really 
correspond to organisations relevance or irrelevance, the ability to 
construct and apply a rule of this type is prerequisite for both OR 
and social science. Without such a rule they could not make the kind 
of distinction which was evident in the above quotations. We can now 
ask on what basis does the joint application of such a rule depend? 
Rules do not implement themselves, as Bittner recognises. As he 
puts it, their use depends on common-sense concepts (ibid). Zimmerman 
(1971) has discussed this problem in greater depth. 'The problem he 
tackles is "... the question of what it takes to warrant the application 
of any rule - formal or informal - in concrete situations... " (p. 223). 
The :.. crucial question", as he sees it, is "the judgmental processes 
that members must use to employ rules on relevant occasions" (ibid). 
Zimmerman was concerned to understand 'the practicalities of rule use' 
by members of an organisation. However, we need not restrict his 
comments to this sphere; as Bittner (p. 276) says, we are concerned with 
the "methodical" use of rules by any socially recognised "competent user". 
Both operations researchers and social scientists are mutually recognised 
as competent users of the rule which distinguishes organizationally 
relevant from organizationally irrelevant behaviour. Zimmerman argues 
that as such rules cannot implement themselves (no rule, for example, 
carries with it a complete specification of the situations in which it 
is to be employed, etc. ) there must be "... sanctioned courses of 
common-sense judgment that members use to recognise, to interpret, and 
to instruct others... " (p. 224) on what they mean. The 'reasonable' use 
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of a rule, so the ethnomethodologists argue, is judged against the 
background of both tacit and explicit understandings of 'what anyone 
knows' is 'normal'. Kuhn (1962) makes a similar point when he argues 
that scientists do not first learn a scientific law and then learn to 
apply it. The law and the situations where it is 'normally' to be applied 
are learned together by ostension. To learn how to apply a scientific 
law or a rule to distinguish behaviours in organizations, in Kuhn's 
terminology, is to learn a paradigm. The paradigm (or world-view) 
provides the common-sense background context within which the application 
of a law or a rule makes 'sense'. 
The unproblematic way in which operations researchers and social 
scientists both imply that they can apply the rule referred to above 
requires that each should have, and suggests that they share, a paradigm 
or a set of background assumptions about the nature of social organizations. 
Much effort has been devoted by some social scientists in unearthing and 
assessing the dominant paradigm in the social sciences (called by 
Gouldner, 1970, "domain assumptions", and Friedrichs, following Kuhn, 
the "paradigm"). I shall show in chapter 7 that OR shares this paradigm 
and I will show some of the implications on the likelihood of OR achieving 
its ideals which flow from this fact. 
Before we can proceed towards a substantiation of our thesis, 
however, it is clear that in one sense at least OR has traditionally 
thought of itself as being distinguished from other management sciences 
by the level of its interest in organizations. We noted earlier on that 
it was a prevalent view in OR circles that one of its distinguishing 
features was a concern for 'the whole'. Thus, OR, by this account, is 
distinctive in being concerned with those responsible for the whole 
organization, namely, management. OR is not simply interested in 
organizations as phenomena to be improved. Rather, it is interested in 
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how organizations are to be improved by improving the way in which those 
organizations are 'managed'. If this is a vague concept which can 
easily be (and often is) claimed as a focus of interest by other of the 
management sciences, this is all the more to the point. Perhaps the story 
of the basic nature of OR is really to be told in its theory of management. 
This is a possibility that we must look into, and I turn to this task in 
the next chapter. From this analysis we shall find a very convenient 
entry into an exposition of our suggest relationship between OR and the 
social sciences. OR's 'theory of management' - or, to anticipate our 
conclusion, OR's lack of a theory of management - presupposes a theory 
of organizations. That is to say, attempts to develop OR's theory of 
management show very clearly that it is impossible to understand how to 
manage an organization without first understanding what an organization 
is. In fact to the extent to which OR can be said to have a theory of 
management it is submerged in its theory of organizations. 
/194 
CHAPTERSIR 
O R' sTHE0RY0FMANAGEMENT 
ký- 
Introduction: 
OR's theory of management has its origin in the wholly familiar 
homily in OR circles that 'OR works for a decision-maker'. Even today 
this idea must be seen as one of the key (if inadequately developed) 
heuristics in thinking about the practice of OR. An early recognition 
of the importance of the idea of OR working for a decision-maker is to 
be found in churchman, Ackoff, and Arnoff (1957). They state that: 
"Before we can formulate a problem we should 
have some ideas as to what a problem is. That 
is, what are the components of a problem? 
First, and most obvious, is the fact that 
someone or some group must have the problem. 
This individual or group is dissatisfied 
with some aspect of the state of affairs and 
consequently wants to make a decision with 
regard to altering it. For this reason we 
shall refer to this individual or group as 
the decision-maker. Where the decision-maker 
controls the operations of an organised 
system of men and/or machines, he may also 
be referred to as the policy-maker, or 
executive. The decision-maker is the first 
component of the problem" 
(p. 107). 
Much of the criticism of this notion has centred around the 
difficulty of finding the decision-maker, yet this attack misses the 
mark for (as noted by Churchman, Ackoff, and Arnoff, p. 108) no-one who 
formulates this basic proposition of the nature of OR's subject matter 
should assume that it is straightforward to identify 'the' decision- 
maker. This assumption does not follow from their proposition. 
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OR's theory of management is a theory of the decision-maker. It 
is a theory which explains the nature of his values and his role in the 
problem-solving process. Little effort has been devoted to the 
development of this theory, so questions of reviewing the literature 
do not arise. In the light of this fact I shall adopt the strategy of 
giving an extended consideration of only two efforts at the construction 
of a theory of management for OR. Firstly, I shall consider the well- 
known paper by Stringer on 'Operational Research for Multi-Organizations' 
(1966) for which he won the Operational Research Society Bronze Medal. 
Secondly, I shall turn to a further analysis of Beer's work on 'Decision 
and Control' (1966). These two pieces of work have to represent the 
views of the OR community. However, as the whole question of OR's theory 
of management will be seen to depend on OR's social theory (of which 
there are important elements in the works of the two writers considered 
in this chapter which will be brought out in chapter 7), exponents of 
OR's social theory complement the writers considered here. 
A several key points in the arguments of the two exemplars of OR's 
theory of management whom I consider there are very striking gaps. 
The way in which these gaps appear and the arguments which surround them 
will suggest ways in which they could be coherently filled. At these 
key points, therefore, I shall draw upon relevant concepts from elsewhere 
to highlight the full meaning of the arguments presented. 
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SECTION A: 
OR in Multi-Organizations: 
Introduction: 
Stringer's writing is of particular interest because he attempts 
to provide a foundation for doing OR in what he perceives is an abnormal 
social context. We shall be particularly interested in the way in which 
he deals with this abnormality. 
Historically, Stringer notes, the normal context for the practice 
of OR is industrial. There is, he says, an "... air of confidence which 
nowadays surrounds a great deal of industrual operational research" (p. 106). 
His paper, however, is concerned with "... a less comfortable point of 
view" (ibid) which comes from contemplating the practice of OR in the 
public sector. He argues that as compared with the prviate sector, the 
services (and goods) provided by the public sector have "... a special 
structure to the problems of managing them" (ibid). His argument, 
essentially, is that the 'special character of public problems' means 
that: 
"The concept of a "decision-maker" with his 
"problem" which is the formal basis of most 
writings on operational research, no longer 
applies and current operational research 
methodology, centred on the idea of the 
"optimum decision", may thus prove inadequate" 
(ibid) . 
His argument rests on what he sees to be the distinct social 
contexts in the private and public sectors. In the private sector there 
can be sensible talk of 'optimum' decisions because the social context 
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of 'a' decision-maker allows for it. In the public sector, on the other 
hand, such talk is meaningless because the social context of "... a 
multitude of "decision-makers" who influence the allocation of resources" 
(ibid) will not allow for it. In the private sector OR can work with 
easy confidence, on this argument, because the social backdrop provides 
a reality against which OR can work. One would have expected that this 
being so Stringer would have argued strenously for an attempt to come to 
grips with this new social reality in its own terms. This move, of course, 
rests on the assumption that OR had accepted as a fact of its existence 
that it depended on social realities and that, in the nature of things, 
these could be different, and in so being they required different 
orientations. This is what Stringer appears to be arguing. However, the 
appearance is deceptive. As his argument unfolds it will become clear 
that the apparent recognition of different social realities characterising 
the public and private sectors is overshadowed by his treatment of the 
social reality of the public sector as an epiphenomenon of a basic reality - 
a reality which is typified in the private sector. As he sees it, the 
first task of OR when it is faced with the novelty typified by the public 
sector is not to tackle this on its own terms, but to transform an apparent 
reality into a basic one. The basic reality which Stringer takes as 
typical of the private sector, is summed up under the concept of 
'organization'; the epiphenomenon is the 'multi-organization'. 
Organisations and Multi-Organisations: 
As Stringer sees it, an organization 
"... may be defined for the present as comprising 
a set of connected interests involving people, 
resources and channels of communication, and 
established in such a way as to be recognisable 
as an entity. An organisation (an industrial firm, 
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a hospital board, or a partnership of 
architects, for example) has unifying 
characteristics, e. g.: 
(i) It has imposed upon it, or is capable 
of defining for itself, a set of goals 
ultimately applicable to all its parts. 
(ii) It has established means for pursuing 
these goals. 
(iii) There is some ultimate expression of the 
organization's authority as an entity 
(Its internal structure is usually 
hierarchical, and there is a "boss" or 
a "board of directors". ) 
(iv) It has a permanance which transcends 
particular tasks. " 
(p. 107) 
"A multi-organization, on the other hand, is 
the union of parts of several organizations, each 
part being a subset of the interests of its own 
organization. It is defined by the performance 
of a particular task (which may be a continuing 
one) through the interaction between individuals. 
It therefore constitutes a "socio-technical 
system"; that is to say, a system in which social 
and interpersonal relationships are partly 
conditioned by the task - and vise versa" 
(p. 107). 
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The crucial distinctions which Stringer appears to be drawing are 
that: (i) whereas an organization has a clearly defined overall goal 
structure a multi-organization is a "... situation where parts of several 
organizations - each with its own affiliations, its own goals and its 
own values - are all involved in the achievement of a plan or an end- 
result" (p. 106). This difference implies for Stringer that it is possible 
to unambiguously define 'improvement' and 'optimum' in the case of an 
organization, but that it is not possible in the case of a multi-organization. 
(ii) Whereas an organisation has, following its overall goal structure, 
a matching authority structure which will "sanction" the research and 
"overcome difficulties", the corrollary of the multi-organization is that 
no such 'sponsorship structure' exists. Instead of there being the 
(presumed) harmony of interests, in the multi-organisation case there is 
"... conflict between the objectives of the component... " (p. 119). It 
might appear as though Stringer intends these distinctions to depict 
different social realities. This, however, is not the case as has been 
pointed out by Bevan (1975). Bevan argues that if (as seems reasonable) 
Stringer is attempting to contrast the 'unitarist' with the 'pluralist' 
frame of reference - which are nothing if they are not attempted 
depictions of different social realities (see: Fox, 1969 and 1973) - his 
attempt fails because if these differences are taken as real they are 
because of that fact incommensurate and so, without drastic modification, 
it is not possible to apply concepts such as improvement and optimum to 
both. Bevan argues that Stringer's usage of terms such as improvement, 
optimum, interests and conflict all betray a basic commitment to the 
'unitarist' frame of reference. In short, Stringer's concept of 
organization is dominant throughout. Bevan's arguments will be verified 
here. We shall see in the following sections how Stringer collapses the 
two, apparently distinct, realities into one. In doing this he draws on 
a particular 'theory of management'. 
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We can sum up the distinction which Stringer is making between 
organizations and multi-organizations by the concept of 'unity': the 
organization has it; the multi-organization does not. This being so, 
Stringer's subsequent arguments amount to the proposition that OR is 
impossible unless carried out within the context of a cohesively unified 
social entity. This proposition we shall find in chapter 7 is dominant 
in most of the thinking about the nature of OR's subject-matter. 
Stringer's reaction to the multi-organization is to transform it into 
a cohesive unity; only then can OR begin. 
Stringer declares as a first principle of OR the necessity of 
unity: 
"In its absolute need of sponsorship by those 
who are affected, operational research may be 
distinguished from many other, descriptive, 
forms of research" 
(p. 108) . 
Clarifying what is meant 'by those who are affected', he argues 
that even "scientific objectivity", which he takes to be unproblematically 
available when we can rely on the pre-given existence of an organization's 
goal strucutre, 'may have to be 
"... sacrificed to enable a satisfactory 
sponsorship structure to be built up. This 
is essential if there is to be the opportunity 
to undertake research which is beneficial to 
the purpose which defines the multi-organisation" 
(p. 109, my emphasis). 
The problem which Stringer foresees here is that in building a 
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sponsorship structure the operations researcher has explicitly to take 
sides. Not being able to rely on the pregiven sponsorship structure 
(and the concommitment goal structure) OR has, as it were, to step back 
one pace to create one. This, as Stringer's comments imply, can be a 
messy business, but he draws courage from the altogether remarkable 
assertion that there is a purpose which defines a multi-organization. 
But how could he possibly assert this in the light of his definition of 
a multi-organization? 
We can see how he attempts to justify it by recalling that a 
multi-organization, according to Stringer is "... defined by the performance 
of a particular task" (ibid). Where does this 'task' come from and how 
is it recognised? It cannot be from the goals of the member organizations. 
It is likely, for example, that the various 'organizations' in the 
Health Service would define 'the task' very differently. On what basis, 
therefore, can Stringer assert that the task exists and that it is 
unifying? The clue which Stringer offers us is a reference to Trist et 
al (1963) as the originators of the concept of socio-technical system. 
It appears that Stringer views a multi-organization as a socio-technical 
system. One of the major assumptions of systems theorists is that systems 
have identifiable boundaries. The socio-technical systems theorists argue 
that these boundaries have two dimensions -a technical and a social 
dimension. A major development of the socio-technical systems idea was 
made by Miller and Rice (1967) when they suggested that a social system 
had a "primary task". The concept of 'the task' goes unexplained in 
Stringer's paper, and yet it is clearly the crucial concept if multi- 
organisations are defined in terms of it. Stringer must have some 
justification for taking it for granted that such a task exists. As a 
former director of the Institute for Operational Research he would be well 
aware of the work of Miller and Rice (members of the parent Tavistock 
Institute) which provides what amounts to a theoretical justification 
for his indifference. Let us look briefly at their work. Stringer is 
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preoccupied with making proposals for 'organizational' design. I will 
show how these proposals rest on the background provided by the work 
of Miller and Rice. 
(l) 
If a multi-organization is defined by its task, 
a preoccupation with organizational design questions alone suggests that 
the existence of the task (which the organization is designed to achieve) 
is taken for granted. 
The Given Task: 
Miller and Rice reveal the universe of discourse in which they are 
operating when they assert that "any enterprise may be seen as an open 
system which has characteristics in common with a biological organism" 
(p. 3). Clearly, the implication is that enterprises can be treated from 
the analyst's point of view as if they were part of the natural world. 
That is to say, the analyst is entitled to conceptualise organizations 
as autonomously occuring and functioning phenomena to which the 
generalisations which apply to biological arganisms may, by analogy, be 
applied. Organizations are taken, in this view, to obey the laws to which 
biological organisms must conform with the convenient theoretical result 
that properties which may, by virtue of the dominant (Darwinian) paradigm, 
be taken for granted in the biological sphere, may also be take for 
granted in the organizational sphere. Thus, the starting assumption of 
biology that organisms struggle for survival, where 'survival' "... occurs 
when a line of behaviour takes no essential variable outside given limits" 
(Ashby, 1952, p. 43), can be taken over into the analysis of organisations, 
so that 
"We ... (can)... postulate that at any given time 
an enterprise has a primary task - the task that 
it must perform if it is to survive" 
(p. 25). 
(1) Miller and Rice are, of course, part of a much longer tradition in the 
social sciences (of. Silverman, 1970). This tradition and its relation to OR are discussed in chapter 7. 
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The primary task of Miller and Rice corresponds to the cluster of 
essential variables which an organism has to protect. In the biological 
sciences the existence and maintenance of a primary task can, literally, 
be taken as a fact of life. Surviving organisms by definition have, and 
are continuing to fulfill, a primary task. Also, more than this, the 
biological sciences can take it that the organism's primary task has 
been arrived at through processes of interaction with the environment 
such that it could be nothing other than it is. The primary task is not 
arrived at by choice. It is determined by the 'nature' of the organism 
(which may have evolved) and the 'nature' of the environment (which may 
also have 'evolved'). The biological sciences can, then, start their 
analysis of the behaviour of the organism with the secure knowledge that 
in studying the influence of the primary task on behaviour they can assume 
its existence. It is determined in nature. The biologist is often 
interested in explaining the origin of the current primary task, but he 
will do this by explaining the changing nature of previous primary tasks. 
At each point he can take a primary task for granted: at each point in 
time he can take it that the primary task has been determined by the 
organism's history. 
The biologist's strategy for explaining the behaviour of an organism 
can justifiably, therefore, start from the given primary task. Miller and 
Rice also adopt this strategy of explanation as regards organizations, but 
it is not easy to see the justification for this (oc. Child, 1972; 
Silverman 1970). They merely assume that the primary task arises from 
interactions between the nature of the organization and the environment. 
Thus: 
"We have said that any enterprise any be 
considered as an open system, that exists, 
and can only exist, by exchanging materials 
with its environment. It imports materials, 
converts them, and exports some of the results. 
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Its outputs enable it to acquire more 
intakes, and the import-conversion-export 
process is the work that the enterprise 
has to do to live. The task of any enterprise 
can be defined in the most general way, 
therefore, as to secure a payoff by converting 
intakes into outputs - the minimum payoff 
being the postponement of death.... 
The primary task... makes it possible to 
construct and compare different organizational 
models of an enterprise based on different 
definitions of its primary task; and to compare 
the organisations of different enterprises 
with the same or different primary tasks" 
(p. 25) . 
The primary task, then, is the product of the nature of the 
organisation and its environment. Although they call the primary task 
an "essentially heuristic concept" it is seen to "... determine the 
dominant import-conversion-export system, and the operating, as distinct 
from the maintenance and regulatory, activities. It specifies the 
resources required and hence determines the priorities of the constituent 
systems" (pp. 25-6). Also, they go on to say that: 
"The primary task is not a normative concept. 
We do not say that every enterprise must 
have a primary task... (and then either go 
out to check whether they have one or try to 
install one)... or even that it must define 
its primary task; we put forward the proposition 
that every enterprise, or part of it, has, 
at any given moment, one task which is primary" 
(pp. 27-8, original emphasis). 
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Their argument is that although there may be conflicts over the 
definition of the task an underlying primary task exists. Thus they say: 
"In the analysis of organization, the primary 
task often has to be inferred from the behaviour 
of the various systems of activity, and from 
the criteria by which their performance is 
regulated. One may then be able to make make 
such statements as: 'This enterprise is 
behaving as if its primary task were... '; 
or: 'This part of the enterprise is behaving 
as if the primary task of the whole were... '. 
Such formulations may be compared with explicit 
statements by the leaders of the enterprise 
and of its parts about their definition of the 
primary task" 
(p. 27). 
The resort to a behavioural definition of the primary task - the 
primary task is what organisations do regardless of what they or others 
might say - is unsatisfactory. That an organization behaves 
in a certain 
way may be explained, perhaps, by citing the primary task, but not if 
primary task means only behaving in a certain way. If we observe the 
behaviour of an organization and say that this behaviour is indicative 
of a primary task then surely we are not entitled to say that the primary 
task is this behaviour. This resort to a behavioural definition, then,, 
reveals the fundamental nature of the role of the concept of primary task. 
It has the definitional circularity that one would expect of a truly 
basic and undefined starting point. 
We can just note in passing that no such troubles beset the 
biologist; he does not require a behavioural definition of the primary 
task. It is defined independently of behaviour in terms of physiological 
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variables, a move which rests on a developed understanding of the nature 
of the subject-matter being dealt with. 
For Miller and Rice the primary tasks exists on its own, oblivious 
of its recognition. Awareness of it is necessary only because an 
"inappropriate" definition or conflict can "jeopardize" survival (p. 28); 
also, on the other side of the coin, awareness of it can further its 
promotion by guiding a facilitating organization design. An organization 
that is not cognizant of its primary task is, by this approach, 
disorganised. Thus: 
"... (I) organization is regarded primarily as 
an instrument for task performance, we can 
add that, without adequate task definition, 
disorganization must occur" 
(p. 28). 
Organization and the Primary Task: Stringer's Design Proposals: 
The giveness of the primary task provides a touchstone for 
organizational design. This background explains, I feel, why Stringer 
devotes most of his paper to resolving what he sees as the disorganization 
of the multi-organization. In the normal case the organization is in 
tune with the primary task. This being so OR can get straight on with, 
promoting the primary task with no worries that its efforts will be 
thwarted by (in the terminology of Miller and Rice) 'human constraints'. 
In the multi-organization case the 'organization' is not necessarily in 
tune with the primary task, and this must be put right before normal OR 
can get to work. In concluding his paper Stringer writes: 
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"The problems which arises in such a crucial 
' form in attempting to do operational research 
in the public sector could become the growing 
point for a new methodology concerned with the 
problems of designing organizations; with 
perfecting techniques of co-ordination; with 
decentralised decision-making; and with the 
practical resolution of inconsistent objectives. 
It is the author's belief that methods for 
handling such problems are a prerequisite for 
the effective use of operational research in 
systems where there are multiple decision-makers" 
(op cit, p. 119). 
Stringer gives us the first indication that he finds the multi- 
organization situation disorganized as compared with the organization 
when he remarks that it is only by using the concept of organization 
is 
it possible to understand what a multi-organization is! Thus, he says, 
although I can see no pressing reason why we should agree with him, 
"A multi-organization is necessarily a rather 
vague concept but some of the ways in which it 
differs from an organization can be stated" 
(p. 107, my emphasis). 
Stringer continues this theme of the disorganization of the multi- 
organization situation in the example's which he quotes. Of a building team 
as a multi-organization he writes that the situation was so chaotic that 
improvement was impossible to define - even theoretically; that the chaos 
was manifest not only in the absence of an overall goal structure but also 
in the high level of uncertainty which the lack of organization promoted. 
I quote him in full: 
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"The diversity of interests - architects, 
surveyors, engineers, builders, sub-contractors, 
suppliers, labour, clients, local authorities, 
building users, planners, the public, the 
government - emphasize there is not, likely 
to be a single generally acceptable definition 
of "improvement". Thus, even at a theoretical 
level - quite apart from a practical one - 
the question "What is improvement? " was 
difficult.... 
"Apart from the diverse "values" which prevail 
amongst them, all members of the building team 
have become conditioned to working in an 
" atmosphere of uncertainty. In addition to 
uncertainties due to outside factors such as 
shortage of labour and materials, government 
policy, economic and social climate, weather 
and so on, uncertainties are to a considerable 
extent self-induced, i. e. they are basically 
organizational. The very actions which one 
party takes to reduce his uncertainty, or to 
cope with it, has the effect of increasing the 
uncertainty for others.... This atmosphere of 
uncertainty is all-pervasive and is responsible 
for the style of "crisis management" which is 
prevalent in the industry" 
"The basic problem, therefore, was how to 
advocate orderly change where the various parties 
concerned were conditioned to disorder and had 
different concepts of what would constitute 
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improvement" 
(p. 108, my emphases). 
Notice the quotation makes around the world values - perhaps this 
indicates that Stringer does not quite take them as real. I shall return 
to this later. If Stringer were to take them as real he should abandon 
his 'concept of improvement and, perhaps, engage in moral criticism of 
some or all of the values. 
Regardless of whether this last option is taken it is clear that 
Stringer should not set about attempting to mold the behaviour which the 
values are taken to produce (or the values themselves) to be consistent 
with some imposed 'higher-order' values. On what basis could this possibly 
be justified? In the nature of the case such values are said not to 
exist. This inconsistency in Stringer's position is the central thrust 
of Bevan's criticism. But we have seen Stringer argue that there is a 
"... purpose which defines the multi-organization" (p. 109). Given this 
commitment to the idea that there must be an overall purpose it is not 
surprising, to continue the quotation regarding the building industry 
example, that: 
"In the circumstances at least as much 
effort was devoted to setting up an appropriate 
structure of sponsorship for research as to the 
conduct of the research itself" (ibid). 
Setting up this structure is regarded as "essential" if the overall 
purpose is to be pursued: -- 
"For a planning process to exist at all in 
a multi-organization there must be some 
recognition of common purpose for which 
the "planners" provide a focus. This central 
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focus is often associated with the 
exercise of central influence. It is 
situations of this sort which are discussed 
here" 
(p. 110). 
Stringer identifies this 'central influence' with "top management" 
(he notes the relevance of his work to the "practice and problems of 
"top management", in industry, i. e. the level above that at which 
well-structured problems exist" (p. 109) and his reference to "influence" 
and his call for help from political science in setting up sponsorship 
structures, implies that he is identifying the overall purpose with the 
most powerful. We have here, then, both of those features which were 
supposed by him to distinguish the organization from the multi-organization, 
namely, an overall purpose and a hierarchy of authority. 
Stringer also concludes that to deal with a multi-organization is 
going to require a model of decision processes because: 
"By definition, a multi-organization is not 
being "managed" in the ordinary overall sense, 
nevertheless, processes are going on within 
it which have managerial effects" 
(p. 109) . 
What Stringer means by the 'ordinary sense' of management is the 
detailed individual control which he sees as lacking from the multi- 
organization situation: 
"That some actions are taken, and others not, 
implies the existence of a "decision process", 
which need not be an explicit procedure. It 
may be a haphazard system of some complexity, 
as the effect of a decision depends on the 
actions of others" (p. 110). /211 
Apart from drawing the obvious corrollary to the notion of 
organization, namely, that co-ordination is required, Stringer wants to 
see this insight employed to further the "... objectives of the... system 
as they are seen by the central planning authority" (p. 111). This is on 
the principle that "... for any one decision-maker to choose the actions 
he should take to achieve his objectives requires an effective 
understanding of the behaviour of the other parts of the decision-making 
system" (p. 110). Because 'top management' "... does not have complete 
control of the system... (I)t can, therefore, pursue its own objectives 
only by the interventions it makes in the decision-making process" 
(ibid). Designing these 'optimum interventions' becomes the role for OR 
(p. 111). 
Stringer's Theory of Management: 
Why should Stringer so clearly and unambiguously align the efforts 
of OR in the multi-organization situation with the 'central planning 
authority'? Surely it cannot be solely on the grounds that they are the 
most influential or powerful (these words are used interchangeably 
although they could mean quite different things) because most of the 
effort of the OR team will be directed to increasing the influence (power? ) 
of the 'focus' which is chosen. Stringer gives us no idea as to how this 
power or influence is to be measured except in terms of the self-same 
'interventions' which the OR team will devise for the 'centre'. In fact, 
it makes as much sense to say that the 'centre' could become any group 
which the OR team decided to help as to say that the centre is the client 
who will be helped. If it is not the pre-existing power of the centre 
which determines its choice, perhaps it lies in the fact that the centre 
has goals of such a breadth (they are 'overall' goals) as are not to be 
found elsewhere in the multi-organization? If this is the basis for the 
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choice, then it is surely arbitary. Any one of the groups which comprise 
the multi-organisation could provide such goals. Why, then, choose the 
goals of the 'centre' as the only ones worthy of pursuit? Stringer 
appears to recognise the instability of power/influence relationships 
and the possibility of many competing definitions of the overall aims of 
the multi-organization. Why, then, given the argument as he presents, 
it and the logical conclusions which can be drawn from it, does he persist 
in his argument that "for a planning process to exist at all in a multi- 
organization there must be some recognition of common purpose for which 
the "planners" provide a focus" (p. 110)? Although "this central focus 
is often associated with the exercise of central influence" (ibid) this, 
by Stringer's argument, is a variable as far as OR is concerned, and the 
values which this central influence holds are, again by his argument, only 
one possible set out of many. 
Far from Stringer's arguments convincing us that his proposals will 
lead to the ability to give "... operational meaning to such terms as 
"planning", "design" and "co-ordination"... (which)... will contribute to 
the "science" of management in multi-organizations" (p. 119) (and, presumably, 
to the term 'improvement' as well) his arguments seem, if anything to 
encourage the abandonment of any such attempt. Given the background theory 
the notion of task looks objective and secure, but we are given no reasons 
for supposing that the values of any of the groups of a multi-organization 
coincide with it. Values could be imposed, to be sure, but how would one 
square this with a 'science' of management? One could choose a set of 
values to pursue, but no metric is given by which this choice could be 
made 'operational'. Stringer tells us, indeed, that he wants to "avoid 
injecting the operational research analysts' own set of values" (p. 119), 
and yet it is clear that unless the questions of the choice of values is 
ignored altogether. OR has to be something more than a 'science' with 
purely 'operational' terms. 
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On what basis could Stringer on the one hand recognise the diversity 
of values in the multi-organization situation and on the other advocate 
the promotion of 'higher values'. The only possible basis, I suggest, is 
a theory (such as that developed by Herbert Simon) which justifies 'higher 
values' as more rational. This is Stringer's theory of management. I 
shall now examine Simon's theory to show how it both fills the gap in what 
Stringer does not way, and fits in exactly with what he does. 
Recall his view that multi-organizations in the 'raw state' are 
disorganized and even confused. The implication of his discussion could 
be that each individual organization is by itself incapable of rationality. 
Presumably Stringer found the concept of improvement hard to understand 
because each individual concept of improvement with which Stringer was 
presented was in some way not quite adequate: recall the shy use of the 
term "values" applied to individual groups. What is unreal (? ) or 
inadequate about the expressions of improvement at the individual group 
level is not argued. If he is assuming that a Pareto optimum could be 
reached whereby some could benefit but none could lose even this notion 
is firmly rooted in the adequacy of the individual values (none shall lose), 
and with it there is absolutely no warrant for deeming any or all of these 
values inadequate. Yet Stringer is not satisfied with individual values. 
This dissatisfaction must, therefore, be based on the grounds that the 
values are individual and not 'comprehensive'. 
This is precisely the view of Simon. 
There are infact many similarities between the views of Simon and 
Stringer. Simon was, in the words of Storing (1962), (whose account of 
Simon's work I follow in several places), "... one of the first to 
popularize the vocabulary of decision-making... " (p. 65). Simon's intention 
was precisely to provide the "... operationally useful theories of the 
decision-making behaviour of the several decision-makers forming a 
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multi-organization... " (Stringer, op cit, p. 119) which Stringer calls 
for. 
Simon, like Stringer in the case of multi-organizations, claims to 
start his analysis from the individual and his values (or 'definition of 
the situation' as it appears in Organizations, 1958) which may conflict 
with those of both other individuals and the organisation (Perrow, 1972, 
pp. 148-9). The difference here is that whereas Simon regards value 
conflicts as normal (wherever he takes the individual as his starting 
point, which he does not always do) for all organizations, Stringer takes 
it to be something of a special case. More importantly for the current 
line of argument is the parallel which exists between the role Simon sees 
for his Administrative Science and the role which Stringer advocates for 
OR. Simon argues that the individual cannot approach anywhere near the 
'global rationality' which would be implied by tradition notions of what 
it is to be rational. The individual cannot consider all alternatives 
because he is an information processing system of limited capacity and, 
therefore he cannot be truly rational. However, this raises the problem 
that he cannot be rational by limiting his search by the use of his values 
either, as the notion of. 'satisficing' behaviour implies (Storing, op cit). 
This is so because the operational use of values requires that they are 
something less than 'ultimate' values, and if they are we cannot say 
that the individual is truly rational. Simon attempts to circumvent this 
difficulty by arguing, first, that the informational demands on the 
individual are, in practice, overcome because he 'responds' to 'stimuli' 
which happen to impinge upon him. The individual does not in practice 
consider all alternatives but is tied 'down by current (and accumulated) 
stimuli. This clearly does not solve the problem of rational behaviour 
so Simon goes on to argue that instead of the randomly generated stimuli 
to which the individual would be exposed to in the unorganised state, the 
individual should be exposed to patterned stimuli which reflect 'higher 
values'. Simon is prepared to make the assumption that these higher 
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values are to be found in an organization. In fact, what Simon means 
by the concept of organisation is the patterning of stimuli to influence 
behaviour which promotes higher values (see March and Simon, 1958, 
chapter 6). This leads him to develop a theory of decision-making in 
organizations of the foundation for the role of Administrative Science. 
Thus, Simon argues: 
"The behaviour patterns which we call organizations 
are fundamental... to the achievement of human 
rationality in any broad sense. The rational 
individual is, and must be, an organized and 
institutionalised individual. If the severe 
limits imposed by human psychology upon 
deliberation are to be relaxed, the individual 
must in his decisions be subject to the influence 
of the organized group in which he participates. 
His decisions must not only be the product of 
his own mental processes, but also reflect the 
broader considerations to which it is the 
function of the organized group to give effect" 
(1957 - p. 102). 
The individual makes his decisions, according to Simon's stimuli- 
response model of human behaviour, on the basis of factual and value 
premises. In the organizational setting these premises are provided 
by various forms of information which can be controlled. Here, I think, 
we have the missing raison d'etre of Stringer's intervention strategy. 
Stringer instances as examples of interventions "... not only the control 
of funds, and the exercise of statutory powers, but also the publication 
of plans and estimates and advice together with exhortations of various 
kinds" (p. 110-11). And the objective he sets for OR is the "... choice 
of those interventions which appear to have the best change of meeting 
the objectives of the... system as they are seen by the central planning 
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authority" (p. 111). Stringer seems convinced that it is both possible 
and desirable to "... design... a system of interventions sufficient in 
variety to provide control over the significant inputs and outputs of the 
system of operations" (ibid, my emphasis). The objective is to "... design 
... a strategy 
for guiding the decision-making system in... (the)... direction" 
(ibid) of the central planning authority's objectives. Compare this with 
Simon's view of the role of the science of administration: 
"The need for an administrative theory resides 
in the fact that there are practical limits to 
human rationality, and that these limits are 
not static, but depend upon the organizational 
environment in which the individual's decision 
takes place. The task of administration is so 
to design this environment that the individual 
will approach as close as practicable to 
rationally (judged in terms of the organization's 
goals) in his decisions" 
(op cit, p. 240-41).... 
"The theory... (of administration) ... must be a 
critique of the effect (judged from the point 
of view of the whole organization) of the 
organizational structure upon the decisions of 
its component parts and its individual members" 
(p. 241) . 
The Given Rationality of Management: 
The introduction of the 'higher values' to solve the problem of 
the irrationality of the unorganized individuals, from which follows the 
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role of Administrative Science and OR, has no justification. If it is 
true that individuals (or individual organisations) cannot attain 
rationality without their decisions being oriented towards higher goals, 
the same must be true of the individuals who constitute the central 
planning authority (management or administrators in Simon's terminology), 
and also, of course, their advisors. As Storing is at great pains to 
point out (pp. 87-98) there is no basis in Simon's work for the move which 
he makes from individual values to organizational values to provide a 
basis for the rationality of individuals. He is forced to make such a 
move, but no justification of it is attempted. All we seem entitled to 
say according to his and Stringer's schemes is that one individual's 
(or group's) goals are being selected as the criterion of rationality in 
preference to other individual (or group) goals. As a last resort to 
resolve this dilemma Simon makes two moves which are completely inconsistent 
with his view of science: he decides the basis of rationality by fiat. 
First, he says that organization's by definition have common goals - 
although it is not clear how this resolves the problem if it is said (as 
he does sometimes) that these are an amalgam of individual goals: the 
individual would have to be capable of raising himself to contemplate 
higher goals (otherwise how could they be shared? ) and the raison d'etre 
of control of the environment of choice would be lost. Second, he latches 
on to the contradiction inherent in the first move to assert that there 
are some individuals who are capable of a higher form of thought than that 
envisaged in his basic model. It is possible, apparently, for some people 
to contemplate "... the framework within which is own mental processes 
operate... " (op cit, p. 101), and this"... very highest level of integration" 
(ibid) of behaviour is to be found "... in the tastes of the administrator 
at the highest levels of the hierarchy" (p. 219). As Storing notes this 
seems to open up the possibility that high level values may themselves 
be open to rational evaluation, but neither Simon nor Stringer provide the 
wherewithal to engage in such analysis. The goals of "top management" 
are indispensable and they are, apparently, to be taken as given. We must 
conclude that where we looked for a theory to explain the origin of 
management's values and their role in the decision-making process we 
have found in Stringer's account (and Simon's) nothing beyond unjustified 
assumptions. Thus, from Stringer's account of it, OR has no acceptable 
theory of management. 
SECTION B: 
RPPY'S DPcisicn and Control.! 
The Tension in Beer's Thought: 
Beer's book is about the relationship between management and science 
(p. ix). However, in Beer's account of it there are two types of 
management and two types of problems, and these are not always explicitly 
separated. Corresponding to the two types of management with their two 
types of problems are two different roles for science. Thus, for example, 
in Beer's account there are two different types of 'fresh look' and two 
different types of 'rigour'. These distinctions have to be made to 
clarify a central tension in Beer's work. 
The tension in Beer's thought appears in the following form: On 
the one hand Beer often writes as if the 'fresh look' of OR means that any 
management problem could be completely transformed and overthrown; practices 
could be radically changed, or made obselete, or the problem itself could 
be rendered obselete and a new. on_e instituted. This 'no-holds-barred' 
approach is to be found informing his work in may places. With it management 
could become obselete through the 'use' of science. Beer (p. 91) recognises 
this possibility but dismisses it as being contrary to his intention. 
He writes: 
"... it should be made abundantly clear that 
the whole purpose of OR... is to aid the manager. ý /219 
People sometimes seem to fear that the 
aims of scientists in the managerial sphere 
are vainglorious. Some go so far as to imagine 
that the scientist wishes to establish dominance. 
Possibly a few scientists feel like this. If so 
they are on the same footing as the historian 
or the classicist who feels the same way. Such 
men are either psychotics or potential managers 
and entrepreneurs. The scientist qua scientist 
seeks only to do science". 
Yet the fact remains that Beer's claim on behalf of the OR scientist 
to have "... complete freedom to study whatever facets of a situation it 
regards as relevant... " (p. 67) could really mean that "... the manager 
might well say that OR is trying to arrogate to itself a managerial 
function and perogative. If there is no factor known to the manager that 
was unknown to the scientists, then (he may ask) what decision 
is there 
left for the manager to take? " (ibid)'. It is difficult to see why the 
manager should be put at ease by the reply that he should be thankful 
to the scientist; this does not answer the point at all. Beer writes: 
"The answer... (to the manager's worry) ... is 
really quite simple. Operational research 
exists to try and eliminate, or at least try 
to reduce, guesswork. Sometimes it succeeds; 
and when it does so entirely, there is no 
managerial decision left to take. No-one 
should be more pleased about this than the 
manager" (ibid). 
Nor will the manager's worry be much attenuated by the example 
which Beer gives (following the last quotation) where the manager is 
presented with a choice where he can exercise 'value-judgement'. 
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The suspicious manager will surely reason that this doesn't answer the 
point either because if these are the only types of decisions that the 
OR process leaves him it is not at all necessary that he makes them. 
Surely value judgements should be systematized within some 'total view', 
and what of the manager's role then? As Beer goes on to say (and it is 
again hard to see how management can take much comfort from it): 
"Once it has fully specified its set of values, 
a unique scientific solution should become 
possible. Sometimes the values can be quantified 
in advance and built into the study. In this 
case, the manager has exercised his prerogatives 
before the work begins, and can stand by to await 
a unique solution in the knowledge that he has 
already done his job. At other times, it takes 
an OR investigation to isolate clearly the value 
judgements that have to be made, and in this case 
the manager is left with a decision at the end" 
(pp " 67-8) . 
On the other hand, Beer argues that in some sense management's 
basic role is left untouched by science; its essence remains unimpugned 
by the radical disposition which science takes towards its function. 
The way in which Beer gives his account of the distinctiveness of science 
points very strongly to this conclusion. He writes: 
"Scientists are people who have been trained in 
ways of examining the wdrld which offer the best 
known means of making our beliefs about the way 
that world behaves correspond to the facts.... 
There is no question of trying to 'reduce' the 
process of management to a science'. The intention 
is simply to augment by scientific method the 
processes of which brains are capable in making 
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judgements and taking decisions... 
"The first insight to be attained, it seems, 
is that to say whether management is a science 
(or could be reduced to it) or an art (in which 
all true managers glory) is not to the point. 
What matters is that every relevant skill should 
be turned to the task of producing good decisions 
and more effective strategies" 
(p. 10, original emphasis). 
By arguing in this way, Beer suggests that science is just another 
skill to be set beside management's skill. In pointing to what he sees 
as the distinctiveness of science's skill, he emphasises that it lies 
in the fact that science is rigorous method; he "... equate(s) the method 
of science with a kind of rigour which our ordinary modes or thinking 
do not have" (p. 31). Adopting this attitude means that "... the method 
of science is intended to import rigour into the rationality of managers" 
(p. 32). 
Although "managers sometimes use irrational procedures for settling 
opinions that will determine decisions in their problems... " (ibid) by 
'irrational procedures' Beer means not that they are "stupid" (p. 26). 
They "... may all have genuine survival value in the evolutionary sense... " 
(p. 31) and "... are intelligent in so far as... they fit in with the way 
nature in general operates". (p. 26). By the statements I think he means 
to convey that those procedures which OR makes rigorous have in fact got 
survival value. In Beer's view OR makes rigorous those management 
procedures which work. Calling these procedures 'irrational' is only 
his way of distinguishing them from the procedures of science! and arguing 
that the procedures of science operate upon the rationality of managers 
is his way of saying that existing organizations are, by his definitions, 
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by and large rational. As he puts it: 
"Such rational arguments as are used to 
justify these procedures are based on 
their practical effectiveness. The 
choice that people make are usually 
fairly successful, for reasons other 
than the method of science itself could 
underwrite" 
(p. 31) . 
This side of the thought on the relationship between science and 
management, then, expresses clear diffidence towards the underlying 
rationality of management. The rationality of management - their success 
in surviving (it would clearly not be possible to work for a management 
which was irrational in the sense that it did not survive) - is 'augmented' 
and it is, by its nature, outside of the scope of the 'method of science'. 
There are other sources of tension in Beer's thinking on the 
relationship between science and management, and it will repay the effort 
to unravel them. In doing so we get to Beer's 'theory of management'. 
Essentially Beer distinguishes two leves of management, and two scientific 
attitudes towards them. First, there is what he variously calls 'opertional', 
'junior' or "middle' management. The attitude of science towards this 
level is decidedly radical. Second, there is what he variously calls 
'top management' or the 'highest level' of management. The scientific 
attitude towards this level is one of diffidence. It is this latter 
attitude in particular that we-wish to understand, for we shall find that 
when we do understand it we shall have a much fuller version of Stringer's 
theory of OR in the multi-organizational context. We shall again find 
that OR works within the given 'context' set by top management. If, as 
Beer says, the essence of science is method ("If we want to use words 
carefully", he says, "in fact, the method of science is method") (p. 29) 
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then it must, at this level, be working on a given content. This, in 
a crude form, is one way in which OR perceives its subject-matter. 
Resolution of the Tension: Two Realities: 
In Beer's world-view these are two different realities. One is 
mutable. Here science is radically disposed, and the management involved 
is 'lower' management. The other reality is given. Here service is 
diffident, and the management involved is 'higher' management. 
The mutable level of reality is the one at which Beer's dictum that 
OR is something that the manager could not do if only he had the time 
(p. 103) applies. It does not, I think we shall see, apply to the higher 
levels of management. Why does it apply at the lower levels? Beer is 
not making the rather crass point that managers are not trained as 
scientists (either natural or social or OR) because, apart from the obvious 
fact that many managers have been trained as scientists at universities 
and elsewhere, the plain fact is that if they had the time they could 
become trained. Even if all managers were trained scientists, Beer is 
arguing, they still could not do OR, nor would OR necessarily be done. 
The reason that managers could never do OR with either training or time is 
for Beer a fact of social organization. The model of social organization 
which, for Beer, justifies his dictum lies at the heart of his vision of 
the nature of OR. 
There is a level at which OR adopts a truly radical-disposition 
towards the given. This attitude may be aroused, for example, when an 
organization is faced with a 'major' technological change. 
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Beer writes: 
"... (I)f there is a major breakthrough in 
any technology that is relevant to the enterprise, 
this changes the character of the whole system. 
It does not merely have 'far-reaching effects' 
but actually turns the old enterprise into a 
new one in which the thinking, the old costings, 
the old methods of control may well have no 
place whatever. The scientific description of 
the whole situation has to be rewritten, which is 
a job for operational research" 
(p. 41). 
It is hard to attribute any meaning to this statement, which tends 
to imply that there are objective reasons for the radical disposition 
which is taken to the system. The 'possible' impact of technological 
change - "... may well have... " later on becomes a certainty. Commenting 
on the tendency to react to technological change by "dressing up the old 
system" Beer remarks that "... the old system is no longer required, in the 
dress of any period" (p. 42). If this is the meaning intended to be 
conveyed in the statement, the attempt has failed. With the key terms 
in the first sentence - 'major' and 'relevant' - undefined, the rest of 
the statement becomes tautologous. Clearly, 'major' breakthroughs in 
'relevant' technology have radical effects. The meaning of this statement, 
therefore, turns on the question of how these key terms are defined, and 
in Beer's account this actually turns on who defines them. Beer's argument, 
I think, amounts to this: Certain managers who would typically be 
responsible for thinking through the implications of changes in technology 
are, by the very nature of their social existence, incapable of taking a 
radical view of these implications. Operations researchers, on the other 
hand, are capable, and will take a radical look. This I think is the 
correct meaning of his statement. 
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The incapacity of 'ordinary' managers to engage in a radical look 
at their operations and procedures is the justification which Beer offers 
for OR doing so. Beer writes: 
"It is worth recalling that many of the problems 
that most need to be solved, which are (as has 
been seen) those very problems in which the 
solution has not only eluded management but has 
not even been envisaged, arise precisely because 
of the way in which a company is organized. For 
practical managerial reasons, a company is divided 
into clear-cut areas of responsibility; and the 
manager, whose authority derives from his position 
in one of these areas, is conditioned by the whole 
of his experience to seek solutions in which he 
can exert personal authority. But problems are not 
respecters of the company organization, nor of the 
talents of the company servant who first meets a 
symptom of the problem" 
(p. 51, my emphasis). 
By the phrase 'conditioned by the whole of his experience' Beer 
means a good deal more than that decisions are made in terms of what people 
know. Even when the company tries to breakdown the organizational barriers 
by means of various forms of liaison and committees he argues that not 
much good will come of it. If it were just knowledge and information 
which were lacking (or even other forms of constraint, such as political 
intrique, pressures of work) then surely something could be done about it, 
even though there may be no guarantees of success. Beer does not think 
so. He erects the Simonian model of man whereby man, in being prey to 
external stimuli, and attempting to act rationally by forming simplified 
models, he becomes thoroughly irrational. He is 'intendedly rational' 
(Simon's phrase) in forming simplified models but irrational in doing so 
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because he misses the big picture. Such a man obviously, by definition, 
needs outside help. No matter what he does, alone or in concert with 
others, cannot change the fundamental nature of his predicament. This 
is Beer's view: 
"... (T)hought block... is the mechanism by which 
the brain learns to find patterns in the world 
outside: the brain becomes conditioned. This 
process of conditioning... is vital to survival, 
for in its absence the world appears entirely 
incoherent and unpredictable" 
(P. 58). 
Beer uses the notion of 'phase-space' to describe the 'framework' 
which the individual of necessity employs to cut down to size the 
"... infinite number of possible reactions that he could make... " (ibid). 
He argues that although there is some commonality of phase spaces this 
is so only for 'simple social situations' (p. 59). In more complex social 
situations specialised phase spaces emerge from specialised experience. 
This for him is the inevitable consequence of organization, he argues, 
and although phase spaces may be modified at the margin, they are still 
phase spaces and they can in no way measure up to the true complexity of 
real situations. He writes: 
"The phase space for the solution of a 
managerial problem exists in the head of 
the man who'comtemplates it. It is therefore 
unique to that man. For a given problem,. the 
phase spaces of the solutions envisaged by the 
production manager, the accountant, the 
engineer and the salesman are far less likely 
to coincide exactly than they are in the case 
of the simple social situation. The experiences, 
and therefore the learning and adaption of these 
men is different. So what is the best solution 
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for the company? The solution normally adopted 
quite obviously lies in the common phase space - 
that is, in the area of overlap between the phase 
spaces of the individuals who comprise the 
management team - but there is no guarantee that 
this gives the most appropriate answer. The 
company itself has no brain. It has a phase space 
within which it always operates, but this can only 
be interpreted by human beings who inevitably get 
the company's phase space confused with their own. 
But suppose the company had its own brain and was 
aware of its own phase space. The answer to a 
particular problem might then lie on the fringes 
of this space, in an area not belonging to the 
phase space of any one manager in the organization. 
The best answer to the problem would therefore be 
missed, because it would be strictly inaccessible 
to the management. The thoughts of a man concerned 
with this particular problem cannot break through 
the barriers of his own facilitated pathways to reach 
the goal, This situation is called 'thought block" 
(p. 59, last emphasis original; early emphases mine). 
However, like Simon, Beer will not easily contemplate the possibility 
of at least some levels of management tearing themselves outside of 
their institutionalised ways of thought. It is by his absolute insistence 
on the necessity of ordinary mortals falling prey to the exigencies of 
conditioning that provides, for him. 
"... the reason why it takes an objective, 
scientific, interdisciplinary investigation to 
arrive at a solution outside the phase space - 
a study undertaken by men who are by definition 
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not prone to this particular thought block.... 
The existing organization is likely to come very 
close to a good answer which does lie within 
its own phase space, because there will be no 
thought block to prevent its so doing. Then 
the reason for employing operational research 
at all is to see whether there is a solution 
outside" 
(p. 61). 
The Simonian background again raises Simon's problem of why, if 
it is true that lower level managers are prone to thought blocks, the 
same does not apply to scientists and to higher level managers? It is 
certainly true in the terms of Beer's argument that neither scientists 
nor higher management will be subject to the particular thought blocks 
which beset lower level managers. They are not subject to the same 
experience. However, to the extent to which they are human, in the terms 
of Beer's argument, they cannot avoid having of necessity to operate with 
simplified models. Therefore, it cannot seriously be argued without 
further explanation that the thought blocks of scientists or of top 
management are any more rational than those of the lower levels of 
management while they are still thought blocks. They are as much subject 
to environmental conditioning as any others - at least on Beer's argument 
so far. Recall, also, from chapter 2, Beer's arguments on the subjectivity 
of science, where we saw him make this point very forcibly. 
We saw there how Beer attempts to guarantee the objectivity of 
science by reference to the facts. However he also looks for objectivity 
in his distinction between levels of management. His line of thought seems 
to run; if the irrationality of lower management is turned into rationality 
through organization, so the irrationality of science can be turned into 
rationality by the originators of organization, namely, top management. 
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Although lower management are, in themselves, irrational their activities 
are made rational by reference to the totality of which they are part. 
Scientific models are not in themselves rational because they suffer 
exactly the same subjective limitations as do the models of lower management; 
by analogy, however, scientific models can be made rational by their 
orientation to a larger reality. Top management provides this larger 
reality; OR's job is to make this reality more 'rigorous'. In short, 
accepting that the facts and models of science are subjective, Beer's 
argument turns to a defence of their subjectivity. 
Management as the Guarantor of objectivity: 
The line of argument we shall trace through Beer's work is that top 
management provides the 'overall values' which turns the irrationality of 
both lower management and science into rationality and in so doing it 
provides for the 'underlying reality' with which OR works (Note that this 
provides a kind of Kuhnian idealist base to the objectivity of facts). 
The role of OR is to make this reality more 'rigorous' by adopting a 
'professional' attitude towards it. It is the attitude of diffidence 
mentioned earlier which Beer must be adopting when he remarks that the job 
of. OR is to "... enrich the managerial model by the scientific one... " 
(p. 105), and when he later on says: 
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"It is not the substitution of science for management 
that is advocated; it is the appeal for a 
professional rather than an amateur approach to 
the managerial task" 
(p. 425). 
This diffidence eventually finds its expression in the call for the 
explicit design of an organization as an organic adaptive system. This is 
the relevance of cybernetics. The diffidence itself, however, stems from 
the belief that top management displays qualities of thought which are not 
to be found elsewhere. Carrying on his line of thought which suggested 
that lower management inevitably could not see the system whole and could 
not, therefore, adopt a radical attitude towards their own activities, 
Beer observes that: 
"(Although)... it is not a manager's job to 
change his own conceptual framework, but to get 
on with the responsibilities he exercises within 
it. (T)he onus on general management to consider 
such changes is, however, much heavier, Perhaps 
this kind of decision is their most important 
task" 
(p. 84, original emphasis). 
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Adopting the analogy of a rugby team (which carries with it the 
implication that there is an organic unity of purpose: the implications of 
this view will be explored in the next chapter) Beer argues that "to 
consider each part of a large system separately, to find a perfect 
solution to the problems of each part, and then to add the solution together 
and call the result a strategy, does not necessarily work" (p. 40). He 
carries on: 
"This assertion can be examined in a small way 
on the rugby field. The individual trying to play 
a superb game from his own point of view, on the 
theory that if each player does this the side will 
win, may be a spectacular wing three-quarter, but 
is dropped from the team because he is selfish.. 
The same is true on the battlefield and in industry. 
But is is the function of the football captain, the 
military commander and the managing director to see 
that these things do not happen. These are the 
leaders who must see in the whole an entity greater 
than the sum of the parts" (ibid). 
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The only problem that Beer finds with this anology is that "... the 
leader has no mechanism for doing this once the system he controls 
grows to larger diminsions that can be comprehended in one man's 
brain" (ibid). Enter OR, which".. . does this, essentially, as a 
service for the leader who is responsible for that whole" (p. 41). 
Later on Beer argues that given the existence and stable 
functioning of an organisation "... the 'owners' of the system seek 
to discuss its future in a metalanguage" (p. 372), because the lower 
level managers are incapable of so doing: 
"The operational managers speak the language of 
the system: they are content that it should survive 
in a stable condition, that it should make a profit 
which is a guarantee of its future, that it should learn 
from its own experience, evolve and adapt. But at 
a higher echelon there are the policy-makers: those 
for whom this state of affairs is necessary but not 
sufficient; those who would re-direct the motives of 
the enterprise as distinct from its aims" (ibid, original 
emphasis). 
Let us continue this quotation to see what Beer sees as the special 
capabilities of this 'higher echelon'. 
"These are the gods of the system. To the 
operational managers of the firm, they are the 
directors who represent the shareholders; to the 
civil service they are (or ought to be) the 
political masters who represent the electorate. 
Thus it is perfectly possible for a 
self-regulating engineering company, for 
example, to evolve satisfactorily as a 
supplier of markets - even to diversify 
its products, to re-design them and to 
change the entire technology of production 
and distribution. But it is as inconceivable 
that such an engineering company should 
suddenly become a publishing company or a 
shipyard as it is to suppose that a dog 
should suddenly evolve into a rabbit. With 
a sufficiently strong notion of the organic 
wholeness of nature and of history, it is 
not impossible to envisage such a change 
eventually - because one can contemplate the 
infinitely ]. arge number of tiny yet directed 
mutations which might carry the former state 
into the latter. But the heads of enterprise 
are distinguished by their ability. to take 
decisions of this kind overnight" 
(p. 372, latter emphasis mine). 
Top management, in Beer's view, is the fulcrum on which the 
long-term adaptiveness of the organization rests. In Ashby's terms, 
it is the source of adaptiveness which comes from parameter change 
(op cit). We shall see in a moment that this amounts to Stringer's role 
for management (and their OR advisors); that is the designing of a 
strategy of 'interventions'. 
Arguing that organizations are, in the sense discussed by Ashby, 
'self-organizing', in his view: 
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"It is the pathology of self-organizing systems 
to take a self-defeating turn. Some evolutionary 
adaptions, such as the increasing size and weight 
of prehistoric animals, which were viable learning 
systems in one language, turned out to be 
metalinguistically defeating... A self-defeating 
system, in short, is one which succeeds in its 
self-appraising language and fails in the 
metalanguage of its top direction" 
(pp. 372-3). 
All this is but another way of saying that lower managers are not 
by themselves fully rational. This is why although 
"(I)t is the function of executive management to 
make the effort to respond when interrogated by 
the market, and to cut subsidiary companies out 
of its will if this seems sensible. It is the 
function of the board to observe, metalinguistically, 
when these executive adaptions will prove self 
defeating in larger terms" (p. 373). Beer, then, distinguishes 
two levels of adaption: the organisation is self-organizing, and top 
management set the conditions under which this self-organization takes 
place. Beer argues that organizations are capable by their nature of 
"... structural adjustment to a set of disturbances within the context of 
a set of overriding goals" (p. 355). Presumably Beer has these 'overriding 
goals' in mind when he goes on to say that organizations as"... natural 
systems organise themselves over a period of time to become what they 
immanently are" (p. 359). Top management should not become involved in 
the detailed direction of the organization: first, because it is 
impossibly complex, and second because there is no need. Organizations 
are self-organising, and all that is necessary is for top management to 
"... interfere with the alleged randomness with which the... (organization) 
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... poses solutions, as well as vetoing further attempts to pose the same 
unsatisfactory solution as before" (p. 368). This, I think, is Stringer's 
strategy of interventions. 
The justification for this is the by now familiar model of 
rationality. The organizational participants can, we have seen (p. 372) 
only have 'aims' whereas the top management policy makers have 'motives'. 
As with Simon, the notion of rationality becomes one which can only be 
applied to the goals of the 'organization'. Beer writes: 
"Any viable system is evolutionary, a learning 
and (in part) an optimizing creature. But its 
teleology is an artefact: it is something 
understood post hoc. It is... driven by a 
'purpose' which is defined by the 'goals' it 
did in fact hit. It is only the forecasting, 
forward planning, intending human mind which 
chooses goals on the basis of deliberately 
formulated ideals. These ante-hoc goals 
constitute the metalinguistic policies of the 
enterprise. 
"Now it is obvious that if we seek to have an 
enterprise which can attain a goal formulated 
in advance, but whose structure and mechanism 
is that appropriate to an organism whose goals 
are formulated only with hindsight, then our 
managerial task is one of organizational design. 
The job is to modify the structure, without 
destroying, the self-organizing properties of 
the system, so that the goals it 'just happens' 
to achieve (the ones recognisable only after 
the event) turn out to be the goals which the 
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managers wished to attain all the time" 
(p. 38O), my emphases). 
Top management, then, are truly the 'gods' of the system; they are 
constrained and fettered not in the least by the tought blocks and 
subjective models with which lower level managers are 'inevitably' 
encumbered. As Beer says of the latter group: 
"Those employees whose lives are dedicated 
to the operation of the company as they know 
it will never understand these overriding 
intentions and success criteria, because they 
do not speak the metalanguage" 
(p. 397). 
I think that a more pertinent question than whether the lower level managers 
are capable of speaking "... a metalanguage... (which)... the enterprise as a 
whole talks... (and)... in which the language of the operations can 
be 
disputed" (p. 388) is whether anyone is ever capable of speaking such a 
language. Beer gives us no guidance whatsoever on the question of how 
such a language is constructed or, more importantly, whether the 
'metalanguage' of top management is itself rational. To judge it one would, 
presumably, require an even higher metalanguage... and to judge that? 
Note that Beer does not offer us cybernetics as the foundation for 
such a metalanguage. The language of cybernetics merely clarifies what 
is already there. The language of cybernetics is merely, in Beer's words, 
"... a descriptive account of how enterprises actually work" (p. 397, 
cf. 1970, p. 45). As he goes on to say, use of the cybernetic "... model 
would radically change the appearance of an enterprise controlled system. 
For although it was just said that controls are actually exercised rather 
like this, no-one acknowledges the fact; nor is the machinery explicitly 
designed - and therefore it must be inefficient" (pp. 397-8, latter emphasis 
mine). This seems to be Beer's major worry - cybernetics merely makes 
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manifest "what is really the core and central nervous system... (of control 
which) ... is locked within the communicating minds of a managerial elite" 
(ibid). Cybernetics, then, is the science of organization which enables 
us to "... think in a scientific way about the constitution of management 
itself - since this is the control structure of the enterprise" (p. 425, 
original emphasis). It may be true, as Beer says, that "this task is more 
fundamental than any other; more fundamental even than the construction 
of a global model of the firm" (ibid). However, it does not in any way 
provide us with a 'theory of management' (although it may provide us with 
a theory of management control (see: p. 398), for when it comes to the 
fundamentals of which Beer has been talking in reference to management, 
specifically, the idea 'purpose' or 'higher goals' or 'ideals' which 
distinctively get top management apart from other mortals, Beer tells us 
it is a purely subjective matter. Thus he writes: 
"Let it be noted please that these explanations 
of teleological mechanisms do not explain 'purpose' 
away. They do not assure us that self-organising 
systems are not purposive, only that there is a 
natural mechanism to which the name of purpose is 
given. How anyone should interpret this is a 
subjective matter and must depend on the 
connotation he accords to the word 'purpose"' 
(p. 362, my emphasis). 
This reluctance to discuss the propriety of using the word 'purpose' 
is a refusal to discuss, by the terms'of his own argument, top management. 
It is a conclusion which was foreshadowed by his earlier one that 'purpose' 
was a property of the 'observer' of a system. Thus, "what the observer 
does is to project his own notion of purpose on to the system" (p. 357) and 
"when the observer has. defined a set of goals as appropriate to his purposes, 
and has spotlighted an entropic drfit which conforms to those needs, he 
will dub the system self-organising" (ibid). We have seen Ackoff and 
Churchman in a similar position. How the observer decides his purposes 
i') '-7 
is left as an ineffable mystery. 
If cybernetics depends on the giveness of top management, then OR 
certainly does. Beer, because of his inclination towards cybernetics 
perhaps, is very clear on this. Beer's argument is, essentially, that OR 
should follow from the cybernetician's attack on the problem of organization. 
However, we shall see in chapter 7 that the reality backdrop which Beer 
attempts to provide through his cybernetically slanted discussion is no 
idiosyncratic move on his part. The ideas he dresses in cybernetic language 
could for example as well be dressed in the vernacular of organization 
theory, as our references to Simon have indicated. 
The Relevance of Cybernetics to OR: 
Beer's arguments on the relevance of cybernetics to OR help us 
greatly in our quest to understand his account of the nature of OR. Put 
very bluntly, his argument amounts to the thought that we can improve 
situations by making explicit the given reality which OR takes for granted, 
namely, top management. Cybernetics improves the structure of top 
management while taking its content for granted. The content is guaranteed 
because top management is viewed as the adaptive leading edge of a self- 
organizing system. The relevance of cybernetics to OR, then, is that it 
makes these adaptive mechanisms 'more like what they really are'. That 
is, 
"the enterprise-is an organic whole. It is 
a homeostat built of homeostats. It is an 
ultrastable machine. It is, 'very largely, a 
self organizing system... (p. 371)... (Added to 
this is a) ... hierarchic system which is 
superimposed upon it, or rather by which it is 
In-%^ 
implicitly informed... which speeds up the 
operation of homeostasis, and which can evoke 
quick responses when danger is threatened" 
(p. 380). 
And the cybernetic solution to what the "... structure of a control system 
for the enterprise should be like... "? (p. 383). It should be 
"an essentially self-organizing system, with 
hierarchical overtones. It is a control system 
which operates itself, but which can be monitored 
from on high, and given new directions towards 
predetermined goals which it does not itself 
recognise and of which it cannot indeed be made 
aware" 
(p. 383) . 
If, as Beer seems to be saying, the role of cybernetics is to improve 
on what is already a reality, then it becomes clear why "... the very first 
thing to do is to think in a scientific way about the constitution of the 
management itself... " (p. 423). One should do one's cybernetic thinking 
first because, as Beer immediately goes on to say, 
"... once OR begins to model the totality spread 
before it, it makes the fundamental acceptance 
of the structure which controls it. This is 
because that structure can be discussed only in 
a metalanguage" (ibid). 
Later on Beer clarifies for us what he means by the term 'structure'. 
Arguing that "if we once have access through science to the very nature of 
viable organization, then we begin to formulate OR models which can be 
used to achieve improvements" (pp. 436-7), he points out that he does not 
have in mind what is normally understood by organizational change, namely, 
"... to make clearer what has to be done in the way of redefining responsibilitic 
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reorganising information flow, reconstituting the committee system... " 
(ibid) etc. Beer distinguihsed four levels of organizational 'category' 
as he calls them. 
At the very highest level one can understand the organization in 
terms of 'structure', beneath this is the level of policies, and so we go 
down to problems, and then to practices. These levels do not represent 
for Beer levels of activity, but, rather, categories of understanding. 
That is, from the viewpoint of top management and OR there are questions 
of practice, problems, policies and structure which are to be considered 
in organizational improvement. Beer seems to be arguing that if top 
management can be persuaded to consider the level of structure by reflecting 
on what it takes for its organization to be a viable organization, then OR 
is put on a surer footing, Beer argues: 
"If a firm is ready to reconsider the very 
structures of organization, then the outcome 
for its policies may be a considerable change" 
(ibid). 
Not only can top management think more coherently about policies, 
it can also think more coherently about the other levels as well. Providing 
top management with insight into structure gives rise, that is, to an 
"... exceptionally well endowed management; a management, that is, which 
really understands how... (for example)-problems arise, because it 
understands the structures which provoke them. And if top management can 
think coherently then, apparently, so can OR. "A managerial situation of 
this kind is thoroughly amenable to OR attack" (ibid). 
This is so because the activities of top management - conscious or 
otherwise - provides the necessary context for doing OR (as we have seen 
is also the case for cybernetics). 
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This interpretation of Beer's thinking is also one which will make 
sense of some other statements which he is prone to make about the practice 
of OR. He frequently makes statements which point to OR's realiance on a 
given reality. These statements would make his overall scheme incoherent 
were it not for the fact that top management, in their adaptive role, 
provided this reality. Otherwise. it would conflict directly with is view 
that OR takes a fresh look. The statements which follow reveal that OR 
has to take a reality for granted. Top management, in Beer's argument, 
justifies it doing so. 
An early indication that Beer sees OR working with an underlying 
reality is when he remarks that although managerial phase spaces are 
irrelevant to OR there exists something which he calls "the company's 
phase space" (p. 59). Although a solution could lie outside the managerial 
phase spaces he does not suggest that it could lie outside the company's 
phase space. A bit later on, after changing the terminology from phase 
space to model, he argues that the activity of OR is a process of finding 
isomorphic correspondences between the 'managerial siutation' (he had 
earlier talked of the "actual management problem" p. 66) and the scientific 
situation. The origin of his managerial situation, or the correctness of 
attempting to model 'it', are not discussed. This is seen as a fundamental 
reality for while he is at pains to point out the subjectivity of facts 
(e. g. "measurements are themselves based on theory" p. 96) we are shortly 
afterwards told that the 'utility' of the scientific model of the managerial 
situation "may be accomplished by straightforward testing of the predictive 
value of the scientific model" (p. 113)! 
I 
Returning again to the justification of OR being provided by the 
arbitariness of lower management's phase spaces, Beer writes: 
"The manager who appreciates the sense of this 
description, and the limitation of his whole 
organization as a machine devoted to handling 
an arbitary account of the way things are, will /241 
use OR in a correct way. He will deliberately 
send his OR team into orbit around the... 
(specialised)-phase space.. . He will enjoin 
the team to explore the outer space to find 
out what is going on beyond the confines of 
his own managerial-universe; to think afresh 
about the nature of his problems in the context 
of the whole... In short; what is the enterprise 
all about? " 
(p. 404) . 
'The whole', 'outer space', 'what the enterprise is all about' are 
the givens which OR attempts to model. Some justification for this 
attitude and why, as Beer at one point says in introducing a case study 
report, "... as usual, we start from the premise that we are confronted 
with a system which works, and is working... " (p. 418), seems to be 
required. All the signs in Beer's writing point to one conclusion: top 
management is taken for granted. 
Conclusions 
Both of these widely respected accounts of the relationship between 
OR and management fail to provide as adequate justification for the 
obviously very important role played by management. Management it seems, 
takes care of OR's 'reality problem'. That is to say, management, in 
these accounts, provides the context or framework (weltanschauung) within 
which OR works. From our analysis of conventionalism and positivism in 
Part One perhaps it was only to be expected that some form of metaphysical 
response to the subjectivity of individuals and the pressing demand for 
objectivity would be made. Kuhn's response took the form of the claimed 
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objectivity of science as an adaptive social system; Churchman's response 
took the form of the claimed objectivity of dialectical processes. The 
response of Stringer and Beer is to claim the objectivity of management. 
Making such a claim certainly solves the twin problems of limiting the 
scope of OR while at the same time claiming that this limitation is 
objective. These problems only remain solved so long as we avoid asking 
on what basis it is claimed that management can and should perform the 
functions which OR asks it to perform. As it stands at this point, OR 
ought to have a theory of management which explains the origin and use 
of values in decision-making in organizations. We have found instead, 
a metaphysical solution which asserts properties of 'management' (or 
'top management') without explaining them. 
This is merely a metaphysical solution to pressing philosophical 
problems. It is possible, however, to go further and, as it were, to 
'unpack' OR's theory of management to reveal its foundations. At several 
key points I have referred to the work of Miller and Rice and of Simon 
to illuminate the conceptual framework within which both Stringer and 
Beer were working. These social scientists are, however, representatives 
of a much wider and older tradition in the social sciences. In the next 
chapter I shall push deeper into the foundations of OR by showing how 
this tradition in the social sciences in fact provides the supports upon 
which OR's theory of management rests, and some of the implications which 
this foundation has for the likelihood of OR achieving its ideals. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
0PERAT10 11 AL RESEARCH ANDS0CIALTHE0RY 
Introduction: 
The conclusion from the last chapter is that, of necessity, 
when OR talks about management (and itself) it is talking about 
something other than management (and itself). Talk of the process 
of OR and management of necessity entails a notion of the reality 
with which both deal. One way to discover the nature of this 
reality is to analyse the language in which the discussion is 
carried on. It is my contention that this language is a language 
infused with social concepts. The task of this chapter is to 
show that these concepts add up to a recognisable social theory. 
That OR cannot just talk about itself is a point made philosophically 
by Churchman (1974). However, he does not go on to ask Chat OR 
typically does talk about and what it should talk about. 
Finding out what OR is referring to in its accounts of itself will 
go some way towards plugging the gaps that we have found to exist 
in several accounts which have been given of its nature. There have 
been gaps between theory and fact, the subject and the object. Also, 
in the last chapter we found a gap between management and the real 
world. That is, in this last case, we could not understand how manageient 
understood the real world. It needed this understanding, we saw, because 
it could then provide OR with a guarantor of objectivity. In this 
chapter we will begin to understand horn these gaps are filled by 
understanding an important aspect of OR's grasp of its subject-matter, 
namely, the nature of the social world. 
The development of this understanding of OR's grasp of its subject- 
matter to it7 practical implications for probler1c in the practice of 
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OR (e. g. data-^atherinr, problem formulation and solution, implement- 
ation) is, however, no part of this thesis. These development'-, 
if they ca : ne at all, would re--t upon the develop^ient of an adequate 
understanding of the nature of the social world and how this 
understanding affected the practice of 0'',. T', er9 is nucn wort: 
that needs to be done in this area. This part is confined to 
'cringing to consciousness the fact that OR does have a coherent 
grasp of the nature of its subject-natter, and that this grasp 
is inadequate. 
Ält: ouoh popular accounts of the role of the social science 
in On argue that the social sciences may provide extra operational- 
izable variables (for a recent example of this in the area of 
implementation see: Schultz and Slevin, 1975), in fact the indebtedness 
of OR to certain schools within the social sciences is greater, as 
I indicated in the introduction to this part. Borrowing come 
terminoyr from Gouldner (1970), my claim is that 0I shares the 
"domain assumptions" of selected parts of the social sciences (which 
parts will become clear). !; 'riting about sociology Gouldner argues 
that "... whether or not an empirical study of social life develops, 
and the kind of study it is, depends upon certain prior assumptions about 
society and men... " (p. 28). He goes on to argue that domain assumptions 
are something less than "world hypotheses" by being "... applied to 
members of a single domain" (p. 31). However, when applied to "man 
and society" he argues that they imply a disposition to believe that 
"... men are rational or irrational; that society is precarious or 
fundamentally stable; that social problems will correct themselves 
without planned intervention... " (ibid) etc. These are illustrative 
of the forms which domain assumptions may assume. fly argument will be 
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that OR shares some key domain assumptions with the social sciences; 
particularly those 1"ihic: _ relate to the rationality of the social 
":, orld. 
Gouldner was preoccupied with a concern which is not one 
directly shared by this work. Gouldner's ultimate objective was to 
develop a 'sociology of sociology'. That is, his task was to explain 
sociological theories sociologically (see also: Friedrichs, 1970). 
It is not my intention to attempt to explain the theories of OR 
sociologically. Such an enterprise would seem to be urgently required 
for at least three reasons. First, OR is concerned to improve social 
systems and the extent to which it is influenced by those social 
systems will partially determine the criteria of improvement. Second, 
OR is an interdiscipline in a more profound sense than being only 
some kind of combination of sciences. OR works with and for social 
systems and some means for achieving a full 'understanding' on a 
mutual basis (cf. Churchman and Schainblatt, 1965) is necessary both 
as regards the problem of implementation and to be able to claim that 
'real' improvement has been secured. Third, it is one thing to 
understand from the outside (from the position of a sociologist, for 
example) what the theories of OR imply for the achievement of their 
ideals, and quite another to engage in fruitful dialogue about those 
theories. To engage in this dialogue about OR's social theories 
requires that we understand how those theories come about. 
Given that this is not a sociology of OR our route to the 
domain assumptions of OR is a different one from that taken by Gouldner 
with respect to sociology. I shall be concerned with what Krupp (1961) 
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has called the "... informal logic" (n. xi) of theories. Krupp's 
concern, as is mine, was to "... distinguich between "formal" and 
"informal logic"; that is, between the locic of the logician and the 
logic of argument in actual theories.. Wat is)... to sift, from the 
systematic elements which structure... theory, those guiding; themes 
and premises that express the values, determine the descriptions, orient 
vision, and pattern policies" (pp. x-xi). It is just such an informal 
logic that I shall be looking for in OR's account of itself. In this 
informal logic we shall find OR's conception of its subject-matter. 
Clues from the Orizins of OR: 
A convenient place to start our search for OR's conception of 
its subject-matter is with the origin of 03 itself. 1,111at is of 
interest here is not the details of the early days of OR but the 
context within which 03 is perceived to be a rational response. 
The context, in question is perceived to be the state of development 
of the social organization of task: fulfillment. In the accepted view, 
OR was'a rational response to developments jr. the form of social 
organization. 
In their discussion of the 'Essential Characteristics of 
OPI Churclean, Acl: off and Arnoff (op cit) note that "although the 
activity called Operations Research began in a military context, its 
evolution or emergence can be described in terns of the well-k. no; "m 
development of industrial organization" (p. 3). They go on: 
"Before the industrial revolution most business and industr;, r, 
consisted of small enterprises, each directed by a single boss 
who did the purchasing, planned and supervised production, 
sold the product, hired and fired personnel, etc. Tue 
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7ec"anisati on of rroduction led to such rapid 4ro"ith of 
industrial enterprises trat it became iriposcible for one 
man to perform. all these nana, r-erial functions. Consequently, 
a division of the nana^erial fur. ctio-n too'': place. IIanaý3ers of 
production, narheting, finance, i? ersonnel, and the li'.: e 
appeared. Continued nec'. hanisation, surrlemented in part by 
automation, resulted in still further industrial üro,. rt'h which 
manifested itself in decentralisation of operations and still 
further division Of the management function... L'arin7 this 
period of dif£ereztiation and se entation of the r. n. aSenent 
function a new class of managerial problems began to appear 
and assert themselves, problems which can be called exective- 
type problems. These problems are a direct conseluence of the 
functional division of labour in an enterprise, a division 
which results in orea nixed activity. In an organization each 
functional unit (division, department, or section) has a part 
of the whole job to perform. Each part is necessary for the 
accomplishment of the overall objectives of the organization. 
A result of this division of labour, however, is that each 
functional unit develops objectives of its own... These objectives 
are not always consistent; in fact they frequently come into 
direct conflict with one another ... 
(T'_ius)... an executive-type 
problem ... 
(a) 
... involves the effectiveness of 
the organization 
as a whole, and (b)... involves a conflict of interests of the 
functional units of the organization... It is important to note 
that this division, of organizational objectives is not "bad". 
If a large group of persons attempts to accomplish some task, 
it may not be possible for then to act as a single person would. 
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Thus it is pointless to develop a plan for a large industrial 
organisation Y-. ich assumes that everyone knows and can evaluate 
what everyone else does. Division of function seems to be the 
only solution in this situation. The executive problem thus 
arises out of the need to subdivide functions. Its solution 
is rarely of the form: "Let's all try to understand the other 
fellow's problem". Rather, the solution demands a highly refined 
balance of departmental objectives and over-all objectives; 
departments need to be motivated to pursue their o:. m goals and 
excessive interest in the good of the whole may lead to stagnation 
of effort. Therefore, when we talk of an "over-all optimum" 
we mean a policy that takes account of the necessity of a 
split function in the organization" (pp. 3-5)" 
The conclusion which they reach fron this chance in the form 
of social organization is that: 
"an objective of C::, as it has emerged from this evolution 
of industrial organization, is to provide managers of the 
organization with a scientific basis for solving problems 
involving the interaction of components of the organization 
in the best interest of the organization as a whole" (p. r). 
Ideally, they argue, OR deals with the whole organization, although 
sonietines it is forced to deal with only a part of it. This is 
sub-optimization. The clue vtiich this description of the origins 
(and hence the task) of 02. provides for gaining an understanding of 
OP's subject-matter is that' in- it we find the simultaneous statement 
of OR's ideals and a basis on which they could be inplerlented.. At 
least this is a possibility which I wish to explore. O RI's aspiration 
to optimize implies a radical disposition towards existing departmental 
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responsibilities and functions. Mais is the radical disposition of 
the systems approach towards the definition of systems boundaries 
(cf. Churchman, 19G8b) directed to; "rardc a specific content. The bound- 
aries in question are the boundaries of social organization, i. e., tacks an 
relationships. Perhaps it is ;., orth mentioning, here, in anticipation 
of the analysis to come, the types of theoretical entities which it 
could be ar7ued subsist in accounts such as that of Churchman et al. 
This may at least encourage us in our task.. In their account ue are 
committed to, amongst other 't"ing, s' : the e:: istence of an entity 
called an "organization", which has as one of its major properties 
"objectives"; that there are people who can in some sense be said to 
be "in" an organization and who, because of their "position" in the 
organization are "given" and "develop" suhobjectives; that it is 
possible and even likely that these organizational menbers "recognize" 
and "pursue"; and that the subobjective wach they pursue is controllable. 
There are no a mori grounds for sayin5 that these tern 'obviously' 
have no relationship to a background social theory which Gives them 
meaning-,. 
I"ly argutient . All be that OI Vs aspiration to optiiize the level 
of integration in organizations requires a prior co mitiient to the 
bases on which integration is 'normally' achieved in the first place. 
That is to say, this aspiration involves the very strong assu. iption (in 
the terns of social science) that integration is achievable, and is 
normally achieved by some means. In making, this argument I am in 
fundamental disagreement with Selznick who argues that there are two 
"analytically distinct" standpoints from which to view organizations, 
namely, that '... on the one hand, any concrete organizational system 
is-an economy; at the same time it is an adaptive social structure (19 3, 
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p. 35ý, ). Selznicl, 's views neatly capture the prevailing; view in 
CR about the status of the social sciences, but it fails to explain 
why the 'economy' of an organization is a realistic topic for inquiry 
in the first place. If Churchman et al's views are representative, 
OR certainly views the study of an organization's economy as realistic. 
OR does not usually inquire into the basis of integration upon which 
study of the economy of an organization becomes realistic, but I shall 
argue that it can only take its task as riven by presupposing that 
a social basis of integration already exists. Stringer's endeavours 
in the last chapter can be interpreted at an attempt to re-establish 
the social basis of integration so that work on the economy of an 
organization could proceed. '.! e shall see that Selznic': 's distinction 
in outdated even for OR. Increasingly OR is blurring the distinction 
between the economy and the social structure of an organization. ,o 
shall see, however, that this (e. g.. ic%off, 19? 0) is merely an 
elaboration of a basic model of the social basis of integrätion which 
has been employed by OR in both its developed and undeveloped forms. 
It rni tht be thou rt that On could straightfor, "! ardly rely 
on the activity of top manaccement as a basis for the integration of the 
organization and, of course, its own activity. $owever,, we saw in the 
last chapter that managements role was in need of further explanation. 
This further explanation is provided by OR's social theory, which is 
in fact a theory of the social basis of integration in organizations. 
Our way for proceeding is to look: for horlomorp'_zisn s between 
the language of OR and the language of the social sciences and to 
ask whether they anount to isomorphisms. The conclusion trill be that 
OR can justifiably be understood within the conte.. t of a particular 
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type of social theory. An implication of this conclusion is that 
the develor-icnt. of C2, has necessarily (though not exclusively) 
to be oourht for ', it'iin the con ec: t of social theory as a '. ih'. ole. 
This is not a possibility ii ich has been seriously discussed within 
o3. 
071 anc Durlýcin's Problem of Order: 
Mile Durk. ^, eii, generally recognised as one of the founding I" 
fathers of cociolo; y, , has had a profound effect on certain schools in 
social science. His work has provided a context for these schools 
by determining the nature of their problems and the terms within which 
solutions are to be sought. It is in the context of these problems 
and their modern solutions that we shall find illuminating 
isomorphisms between O and social science. But, first, the homo- 
morphisms. I shall engage in liberal, though not I trust distorting, 
interpretations of some of Durlheim's thought. 
In one sense selecting Wrk eiri's thought as a source of potentially 
fruitful ho: iomorp'hisms to give us insight into 0R's social theory 
seems straightforwardly justified. Dur? -. heim was particularly concerned 
with the very phenomenon vinich OR sees as being the conditions which 
were responsible for its emergence, namely, the division of labour. 
Just as O is concerned to distinguish a primitive era from a modern 
one, so too is Durhheim. In both cases the constrast turns on the 
distinction beti. veen the simple and the complex. This distinction will 
occupy much of the following. For Dur? chein the peculiar complexity 
entailed by an highly differentiated system is not to be found merely 
in the fact of differentiation. So too for OR. Rather, the peculiarly 
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complex nature of rodern societies for Dur%7-cim, -as it is for 0--I 
with respect to or; *ani^ations, is the basir on i _ic'- 'order' or 
inte7 r tion is to he ac, tieved, ,. '., ere the criterion of order -in 
the collective standpoint (1). The basic pro: Dlerl faced by Durkhein, 
as it is by 0-:, was Low was order possible in the face of the diversity 
engendered by the division of labour? 
The peculiar nature of the problem faced by OR is not merely how 
to gain some kind of order between diverse subobjectives. One possible 
kind of order night be the now infamous minimize costs'. As Churchman 
wicely points out,, there is only one way to minimize costs, "... and 
that is suicide" (19'ßa, p. ? 1! ). T', e order that OR has in mind is an 
optimum, and this in defined in terms of overall goals. The distinctive 
difficulty in achieving this when there is a co:: iple:: division of labour 
is the perceived inability of detailed control over the units responsible 
for the subobjectives. Not only is detailed control considered to 
be impossible for all practical purposes, it is not even seen as being, 
desirable. And by desirable I do not mean that it is necessarily seen 
as morally undesirable (althoug'n it often is). It is seen as being 
undesirable because it is seen to be dysfunctional. 
Churchman et al distinguish the different order of problem involved 
in optimization with man-machine systems compared to the problem involved 
with mechanical systems. They comment: 
"The "division of labour" aspect of human organizations is 
different from the component functioning of machine systems... 
because in human organizations there is the critical problem 
of motivating the divisions to perform their respective functions" 
(op cit, p. A. 
Z Lote that 0,1 aspires to solve pro'ole: is--achieve higher levels of 
into;, -ration--on a !., ider scope than those posed by or anications: Or, 
is concerned with social systems of any sine. 
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To single out motivation as a separate control pro'ýlem implies that 
they see nonethhin-; of? er than air.? -)le direction beine' reruired. 
This is a point made very clearly by Beer 
(19r-r) when he comments: 
"The cybernetic commentary on world situations is that 
controls for Vie: cannot be designed in the sense in which 
most reople : ao' ld understand that term, because there 
is 
no": rhere near ="nfficient understandinC about the detailed 
structure of the organism itself, nor of the environment 
to 
which it has to adapt, nor of the interaction between these 
two" (p. 301). 
And he goes on to argue that "... because the human head cannot contain 
all the variety of Mich the enterprise 
is such a potent generator" 
(p. 371) "... there is no doubt whatever that the enterprise has to 
be very largely a self-organizing system" (p. 378)" 
No similar contro1; problen is perceived 
by operations researchers 
to exist in the pre-divisionalized state, presumably on the basis that 
no freedom is required for the nembers because, with the boss absorbing 
all the variety that there is, each member does essentially the same 
task in a repetitious and, hence, progra able way. 
Dur! heia concurs -., it'7 02 in its judüements. In a debate which 
! could be instructive for the ranarement student of today, Durt: hei^ 
establinhed ? gis rosition On' the solution to the problem of order in 
nodern specialised industrial society con-oared to the solution which 
^ýac appropriate in pre-industrial societies. If w"we ignore for the 
noment Durk'_ei-mle obvious and self-conscious use of social concepts, 
it seems an though we have a meetinr* of minds bet acen him and C^ on 
/254 
hots ': e should at lea^t der cri', e t'_e pro' ýleii off' orc? er. Lu: e^ (197) 
Bums up Durkheimlr vie-!. c- in to follo`. iinrn way: any attempt to deal with 
the problem of control ': iad to be 
"... an explanation whicz, did not, like Conte, exaggerate the 
role of consensus and conformity, of , shared beliefs and 
sentiments, and of uniforn patterns imposed on individual 
behaviour, and wich allowed for increasing differentiation 
of occupation, beliefs and behaviour; an e. -: planation, secondly, 
which did not, like Spencer, assume a harmony of interests, but 
postulated a co: ple_: social regulation of behaviour; and an 
explanation, finally, -Mc-, iinlilze Tonnies and also Corite, 
detached such re ulation from the State, linking it rather to 
the 'internal' functioning of society, and to the processes of 
social differentiation" (p. 14'7). 
: 111 of these points are to be found in the descriptions of the operations 
researchers ,, Yhich we have considered so far, although the latter use 
different lange. 
To conceptualise the distinctive differences in the control problems 
in the simple and complex situations, Durkhein coined the terms 'Mechanical 
Solidarity' and 'Organic Solidarity'. As Lakes (op cit) puts it, this 
distinction was, for Dur'.: heiri, a ''... way of stressing the social 
differentiation of 'organized' societies, involving interdependence 
and multiplying specialised roles, beliefs and sentiments as opposed to 
the undifferentiated unity of uniform activities, beliefs and sentiments 
and rigid social control found in 'segmental' societies" (p. 148). 
Me parallel bet', een DurIthein's thought and thinking in OR can be 
taken further if we allow the substitution of OR's notion of management 
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_ich we found in to lust c! zabter for Durkheim's notion of the 
conscience collective, ich for Duritheirn is the repositor,; of 
collective overall goals (etc). I shall say more on this notion later. 
If we do substitute the notion of rmana ement for conscience collective 
in the follo""rin^ quotation from Re:: (1963), there is a strikin_; 
homomorphism. Rex says: 
",., whereas the conscience collective in ample social 
conditions lays dot, n immediate ends and detailed means for 
achieving then, in more complex conditions it sets only more 
(; eneralised means and leaves the individual free to choose 
the intermediate ends" (p. 99). 
The difference bet; -reen Dur: =heim's and 0? 2's account of the nature of 
the problem of order in simple and complex situations is obviously that 
Dur1L7. eim sees the problem in social terms whereas OR does not. For 
OR it would appear that t'^. e division of labour is explicable in terms 
of rationality alone: it in more rational to divide responsibility and 
therefore it occurs. It -could also appear that OR reasons in the same 
; ray about its o: rn role: the division of labour rationally produced is 
susceptible to rational control. Iio: "rever, this way of conceivinü of 
the problem of order, characteristic as ! gell of economists, gras seen 
by Durkheim to be fundamentally misconceived. For Durk-heim, to conceive 
the problem of order in tY is way was to conceive it in a theoretical 
vacuum. The fundamental sociological insight ": rhich Durkheim applied 
to the problem of order (an insight which earned him the title of 
one of the founders of sociology) gras that re are only able to thin?: 
of the problem as a problem of rationality because order was an already 
accomplished social fact. For Durk eirn there is no gap between his version 
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of the nro', 1en of order ^. nd th'? t nrecentec '17 C': --e:: ceit that Q^ts 
is not e n1ici t. Dur'. --I_-ein ar; *ued th .t 
the rtti onal ^ro'ý1ert of order 
would not exist ,: ere it not for the fact that it was already posed in 
the e:: 4otin- social or-; anination iiiiic-, an a social fact, defines the 
essence of the division of la')oui. As Aron (19''? ) puts it 
"... e.: alanation... (of t'ýe division of 1t'3our)... in ternls of the 
rationality of individual conduct strikes Dur1"?: eim as a reversal 
of the true order. To say that men divided the work anon 
themselves, and assi-ned everyone to his own job, in order 
to increase the efficacy of the collective output is to assure 
that individuals are different from one another and aware of 
their difference before social differentiation... Therefore, the 
the rational pursuit of an increased output cannot e: -plain 
social differentiation, since this pursuit presupposes that 
very social differentiation which it should explain" (p. 21")). 
On the face of it, Dur'thein is concerned with the very thing 
that OR is not. The It... problem on which... (Durkheim)... embarked... 
was nothing less than the nature of social solidarity itself" 
(Lukes, 
op cit, p. 139). The task before use then, is to show that Durk1 eim 
is correct in his (implicit) assessment of OR: that it is impossible 
for OR to attempt to hermetically seal itself off from conceptions 
of the social world. Let us see intially whether OR accepts the terms 
of Durkhein's version of the problem of order. 
The Individual and the Collective: 
The terns in which Durlheirn sets up the problem of order are 
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spelled out by Aron (or cif) a-- follows: 
"ýhe theme of Dur'_ hoi: ian thought... is the relation between the 
individual and the collectivity. The problem might be stated 
thus: How can a multiplicity of individuals nahe up a society? 
i orr can, individuals achieve iýenat is the condition of social 
existence, namely, a consensus? " (p. ? 1). 
On w"ihat basis is this relationsi'in resolves':? 
As an initial move, Durltheirl extends his sociological insight 
in a direction '"r'hichh some have found o'3jectionable. H7e e-,. -,. ends the 
idea that the economic level of reality depends upon and presupposes 
a social reality to t? -e nuc'^. more specific and stron, cr proposition 
that the social is a reality sui ! "everi . As Lu%es 
(op cit) puts it, 
as regards the individual and the collectivity, made =1 ... _ý 
ont010_. ical d1 s ncti on_ between levels of real1. ty... " 
(p. 1ný " 
iiil S 
distinction i: mediatelyt raises the problem of the relationship between 
the two levels. It is the criteria by ci : ic:: t'--As relationship is 
resolved ".; '_, ic': creates (and solves) the problem of order. I shall 
return to the cuewtion of the criteria actually employed by 
Durl-±ein. Does OI: see its rro'. hlem of order as a prohlen of the 
relationship between different levels of reality? 
:: proolei noted brr C:. urc"man et al (op cit) is precisely this: 
"if a 1ar-e group of persons attempts to accomplish some tas?:, it 
may be impossible for them to act an a single person : could" (P. 5). 
Also, Ackoff (1977) armes that "... objectivity is the social product 
of an open interaction of a -Ade variety of individual subjective 
jud,, r:: ents"; further, "objectivity is obtai nod...; ": 'hen all possible values 
/258 
ý` ý' 
0 
have been taken into account... ". As On works for orf, anizations 
which have "... three basic typet of responsibility: to themselves, 
to their parts and to the whole of which they are part... " it is the 
"... responsibility of manager and management scientist to try to 
dissolve or resolve these conflicts... " (all quotations, p. ti). This 
states the individual/collectivity relationship problem in very clear 
terms. From our analysis in the previous c apter we can also assert 
that this problci: i is much in evidence in the ; corks of Stringer and 
Beer. It is the central theme of a paper by Churchman (19r-Ac) which presex- 
is his "Case Against Planning. ". Churchman presents two alternative 
forms of resolving the relationship, resolutions which define distinctive 
managerial philosophies. First, there is the current situation of 
"reflective management" (itself a development from an earlier "forceful" 
management). This philosophy has five axioms. These say, essentially, 
that (i) everyone should contribute to the plan, (ii) each person 
contributes in a specialized fray, (iii) the object of the exercise is 
to promote the interests of a relevant public, (iv) there is a hierarchy 
of contributors, ranked in order of the importance of their contribution, 
(v) management reflects so as to choose the best plan to serve the 
public. In this philosophy the public is merely 'represented' in the 
planning process. The individual's interests are taken care of only 
insofar as the individual is "part" of the collectivity. Churchman's 
reaction to this this philosophy is to dismantle the last four of 
the planning axioms: "expertise cannot be segmented and separated"; 
"i; o one's contribution can be represented"; "Contributions to the plan 
of social systems cannot be ranked"; "The role of reflection in planning 
is to maximize contributions to the plan". Churchman summarizes the 
difference between the two philosophies in the following wa : 
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I'... t'- .: -o1e 19< 
"ýl 1^nln, ^ T rocs i^ T1rBdic to on the f-l ^E 
and un te.. able 7osi tion or serr_r. - the public's interest b^ 
means of export reroresentation. :. 'd'is old-fashioned" ans', ILlrtion 
of 10 "' is false ')ecause in realiter the publi c' n "interest" is 
to plan, to mean somet!: in^ in the plannin- uroces: 7, to be a 
master-, not a servant, in planning the s-7sto i" p. 71). 
. 21 o° toe vie. -rs -;; oporatio: - reeearc'_er: - ýe the cuection 
of the criteria are to be applied to resolve the rel'±t7 unship 
bet'"roon the individual and the collectivi r 
(alti: Ol1g an8'. iers are 
latent in then as dell). 
`' ^. e 3oun&- ri e^ Pro'ýIen. of Order- 
Durkehin claimed to have found u basis for the selection of criteria oi: 
which the individual/collectivity relationship could be resolved in his opcci ". 
interpretation of the role of the social reality*. His interpretation 
of this role (for an elaboration of this line of thin!: iag see: Berger 
and Luckiiarn, 19'x) nets conceptual boundaries to the problem of 
order. These boundary constraints have been the suoject of much 
discussion in social science. I turn to this later. Let us now 
extend Dur%hhei&&w vision of the proDlem of order (or control, which 
for hin is synony i ous with order). 
In single situations c_: aracterised by 'mechanical solidarity' 
control is the direct correlate of social organization. In the 
couplex situation the connection between social organization and 
control is attenuated. The problem which e:: ercised Dur'"L'^eim (and has 
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su'bsequentl,: e:: ercised his followers) was how was control still 
possible and actually achieved 4-. - the co: iple° situation. In a simple 
situation no real problem e:: icts. In t, ic case society, being a 
reality sui -eneris dominates the individual/collectivity relationship. 
As Lidces (op cit) ruts it: Durl_', eim "... wished to explore how individuals 
are attached tomd controlled by societies, hoer collective beliefs 
and sentiments are inculcated, how they c'r_an;; e, how the;; are affected 
by and how they affect other features or social life, hoer they are 
maintained and how they are reinforced" (p. 6). To do this one of 
his essential ideas was the "... necessity of e:: plaini:. U individual 
phenomena by the state of the collectivity , and not the state of the 
collectivity by individual phenomena" (Aron, op cit, p. 27). In the 
simple situation Durltheim conceived of the collectivity as the 
conscience collective. It was seen as beint comprised of the beliefs 
and sentiments were avera^e in a society and it had the distinctive 
property of forming a level of reality over and above individual 
consciences. The conscience collective, Durithoim thought, had a 
'life of its ow-n', even th: ou3h it was only capable of realisation 
hrou-h individuals. the use of the notion of conscience collective 
Dur'=ein quickly disposed of the problem of order in the simple 
situation: the conscience collective tales complete control. 
Iiochanical solidarity exists (the problem of order is solved in the 
simple situation) there the conscience collective is 11 ... extensive 
and strong and 'harmonizes men's movements in detail'...; in these 
conditions, 'the individual conscience is scarcely disti.:: ý, tzichaäle 
from the collective consci"er_cel and 'collective authority is a`bsolute', 
nether it is diffused throe^1, oat the corimunity or incarnated in it 
chiefs" (Lie--es, op cit, p. 152). 
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Detailed direction '., ras rr c° -_- to col? iticn ir_ the simple case (cf. 
Aron, on cit, r. ? 5). 7-o concern of . ^.: oct of 
Durhhein'r -. ior': i: +a 
hog, to overcome the fact that solution ; could not , -Iorl: 
in the 
case °isýere t'-ere was a coin le:: division of labour. The simple 
solution_ w^7- mrorl. ahle heca: L^-_e, as Aron ruts it: 
"... in societies of 'r'-ic'- differentiation of individuals is 
characteristic, everyone is free to believe, to desire, and 
to act according; to hic oc_m preferences in a large number 
of circumstances ... Dur? drein ''believes he sees 
in organic 
solidarity a reduction of the sphere of existence embraced 
by the collective consciousness, a weakening of collective 
reactions against violations of prohibitions, and abovo all 
a greater margin for the individual interpretation of social 
imperatives" (op cit, p. 25). 
The difficulties of control mit', a complex: division of labour have 
also been highlighted 'iy Soisnick. He argues that "... delerltion 
is the primordial organisational act, a precarious venture which 
requires the continuos elaboration of formal mechanisms of co-ordination 
and control" (19`)3, P. 353). Both Sel:: nick and Durkheiri recognise that 
formal controls are inadequate. Selznick points out that human beings 
are "recalcitrant tools of action" and Dur : eire sees 11 ... man... 
(as)eee 
a bein'wit'h potentially limitless and insatiable desires... " (Lukes, 
1957, p. 143). Apart from the fact that this makes detailed control 
impossible, it is undesirable because "... the conscience collective must 
leave free a part of the individual conscience, so that special functions 
m , -y be established there which it cannot control... " 
(Durkkeim, quoted 
i, Lakes, 1973, p. 155) " In the complex situation the freedom 
of individuals was, then, both inevitable and desireable. How is this 
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con^iit: ent to 'individualisi' to "e reconciled i"rit'_, his still fir. -I 
commitment to tti'e coUcctivit, ',. ' 8ettin^ Vie criterion « ere'ý; the 
'order' in a rocie tom' waE to '")e ju H' c? In o tt_er . -lordc, h:; %ri-lat "e,? 1 
can it be insured that 'free' individuals are oriented (at least in 
their actions) toward: the collective? 
The neanr *. i_, ere: ýýr Durk eire car this bein- achieved was in a 
chance of role for the collective. 'Rather than Navin` the general 
role tthich it did in the simple situation, in the complex situation 
it -v; as to become specialised. Durkheim emphasized this role change 
by chancing his terminology: in the simple situation the conscience 
collective represented the functiont of the collective; in the complex: 
situation its functions are represented by rerresentations collective. 
In that the conscience collective referred to all forms of beliefs 
and sentiments, re presentations collectives referred to "the way in 
which the group conceives of itself in its relations with the objects 
which affect it" (Durkheim, quoted in Lu'_tes, 1973, p. ^). As Lu'_hes 
puts it: "Durkheim made much of "-1'_<at he called the independent reality 
of representations collectives" (p. 7); they are, in a sense, 'above' 
the conscience collective which is common to a population. Lul: es 
goes on: 
"e used the analogy of the individual's mental states, or 
individual representations, wich, though intimately related 
to their 'ttubstratur', brain cells, from Aose combined activity 
they result, cannot be reduced to and wholly explained by them, 
but have their own characteristics, and are relatively auton- 
omous, and can directly influece one another and combine 
according to their own laws" (ibid). 
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ý: As analogy is peat to full use by D xr'_ reim -in his development of 
a role for the collective '"zhicl: Would recolve the problem of order. 
Thus, of the State, a particular example of rerresontition^ collectives, 
DurTh eim says it is "... Vie seat of a special and delimited consciousness, 
but a consciousness higher and clearer, having a more lively feeling 
of itself" (Dur?. heim, cuoted in Coser, 19'0, p. 271). An-6 in disting- 
uishing administrative action from State activity, Coser argues that 
Durkheim sees the: "... differ as the muscular system does from the 
central nervous system" (ibid). Dur: Lheir_t argues that "'The state is, 
rigorously speakin , the organ of social thourht... Its essential 
function is to think"' (Durk'heim, quoted in Coser, ibid). And of 
society (which for Durkheiii was to replace God as the object of 
felig_ous. worship) he saws : 
"Societ; * is not at all the illogical or a-lo ical, incoherent 
and fantastic being 'r`ic'h it has too often been considered. 
Quite the contrary, the collective consciousness is the 
hi^aest form of psychic life, since it is the consciousness 
of consciousness. Being placed outside of and above individual 
and local contingencies, it sees things only in their permanent 
and essential aspects, which it crystallises into communicable 
ideas. At the same tine that it sees iron above, it sees 
farther; at every noment of time it. embraces all known reality; 
that is , hy it alone can furnish the minds with the noulcls 
". 0hich are applicable to the totality of things and -Jhich make 
it possible to think them" (quoted in Coser, 1971, p. 138). 
Dur? i'-iei-i's el&'aoration of the initz. -l ontolo! ictl distinction 
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'OCtIyecn týýý? collectivvn ancý 4-1-e in.? ividnal in this u; is cle'lrl. 
mirrored thearvi e""r;: of Beer and ätri n'^e" ý"i'hich '"/^ consý. derecý in 
to nevi ous chter. LiLe t_e-:, Durl-1, eir. i sees the collective as 
the em1codiment of all that is rational, , ^lo'^al, and t'_? ou, -,, I-tful, the 
individual it rerresented as the determined, n:, rro-t, ?:: C] ha' itua1/ 
automatic. For Durhhein, I1... mar ir^ 'ýL1nCil^ of dc ire i, "t, + Cýý 
need to be re elated, tamed, repressed, n?. ni_ulated -. nd given direction 
for the aýCo Of Social order... " 
(Lukes, 19'; '7t '"ý. 147). ä strik. inf-ly 
similar via, -! t"la" expressed ')y both Strir-er and Seer. For t1he 
latter it rrovided the raison d'etre of OR. 
In a weaker form, but one which nonetheless captures the essence 
of Dur!: heim's distinction and i-yhich also describer his vier of the 
role of the collective in the co:, tplex situation, Churchman et al (op 
cit) come to a similar conclusion. They come, finally, after having 
considered several "sinple" control processes to the highest--the 
"reflective goal-ch; nginr unit". They note that "the mechanism that 
considers various goals and courses of action can be called the 
consciousness of the organization" (p. 82). After havin analysed 
its various properties they conclude that the consciousness of the 
organization can be identified with c-: hat the e:: ecutivec do or do not 
do, and that the function of 0:: is to enhance the capabilities of 
it (pp. 8l-5). 
A similar distinction is to be found in the work of 'Friend and 
Jessop (19.9) in their concept of "Strategic Planning". The. introduce 
their work with the comment that "it addresses itself in particular 
to those more strategic levels of choice uhich tend to be linked , -pith 
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the terns ' pla-nir- ' and ' policy-nalci -7 1 ... " 
(p. xi: ). Closely 
parallelling Simon's distinction between 'prorramrned' and 'non- 
proL; ram e d' decision--, they derlarcate the "strategic" fron the 
"o?, erational" 'by arruin, 7 t'--at "... my procec^ of choice '! ill become 
a process of plannir.,; (or strate^ic c oice) if the selection of 
current actions is Made only after the for: ulation and co-nparison 
over a , rider field of decision relatin! 7 to certain anticipated as 
%-tell as current situations" (p. 110). StrateCic choice is "... the 
process of visualizin-, possible designs for the long-tern future of 
a conmunity... " (p. 111) involving a "... capacity to anticipate the 
future and yet also to adapt to the unforeseen" (p. leis). Operational 
choice, on the other hand, is "... essentially deternined by a Generic 
vie": ipoi nt, i.: hether this is made e : -plicit through the laying dom of 
formal regulations, or is implied in the gro%rth of conventions ;: hick 
reflect the perspectives and e:: perience of t1nose concerned" (p. 105, 
;.,; erýr: _asis). :t the operational level, they says, little "discretion" 
is involved; at the strate_"ic level nuc'h discretion (? 1''hicý1 they equate 
*17 r_' t't'_'. 0u ht and di scussi0`1' (ihid)) is involved and, in the last 
instance, the ;; ardstic!: by ""? Iic`, strate`i c plannin is judged is, 
they .o on to sa; T, 'may the capacity '-r'^? ch it provides to 11... make 
intelliTent decisions... " (p. 113, their erýp? zasis). 
More recently, Cln-. cl. o (197) uses the analo7, of an orc': estra 
to deternine it is that constitutes rn a, enent ('"the eubstance 
of the OP', 1C: º... 
(S; jstenis 1. zalytiis).... " idea (p. 81)). The difference 
between an orchestra -ri th and an o. -c' estra 'rithout a conductor is that 
"without the conductor, the bect of orc'. estrao would only produce a 
Collection of incliy dual so'Luldc... 11 (p. S ). The conductor sees the 
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"whole"; understands the "intent" of the composer and can "evaluate" 
the performance (ibid). 
All of these operations researchers appear to accept the 
boundaries which Durkheim lays down for the solution to the problem 
of order in the complex situation. The boundaries are, fundamentally, 
that we are to take it for granted that order is to be found by a 
reconciliation-of two givens: the intelligent collective and the 
determined individual. These descriptions by operations researchers 
would clearly fall into Churchman's 'old-fashioned' category. Later 
on I shall consider some more modern schemes. For the present it 
should not be hard to anticipate both Durkheim's and OR's solution 
to the problem of order. Let us go on to state both solutions to 
the problem of order before encountering it in its modern. form and 
then going on to ask on what assumptions both solutions rest. 
Durkheim's and OR's Solution to The Problem of Order: 
Durkheim is often portrayed as a crude social determinist. This 
is both true and not true. He is a social determinist, but he is 
not crude, at least when he is dealing with organic solidarity. 
Durkheim wished to distinquish 'social facts' from other sorts 
of facts. He defined a social fact as "'every way of acting, fixed 
or not, capable of exercising over the individual an external constraint' 
and further as 'every way of 
, acting) which 
is general throughout a 
given society, while existing in its own right, independent of 
individual manifestations"' (Durkheim, quoted in Lukes, 1973, pp. 10-11). 
Lukes comments that "Durkheim's definition embodies three distinguishing 
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criteria: externality, constraint and generality-plus-independence" 
(ibid). I would also stress that the definition implies that a 
social fact is behaviour which is deemed 'social' by its correspondence, 
intentional or not, to collective external standards. Durkheim is 
not a crude social determinist because he does not insist that 
external constraints cause behaviour in the strong sense of that 
term. This would require the constraint to be both a necessary and 
a sufficient condition of the social behaviour. Durkheim only argues 
that external constraints be necessary conditions of the behaviour 
for it to be called social. No other interpretation ig consistent 
with his insistence on the 'freedom' of individuals. Also this 
interpretation is consistent with his insistence on the collective 
setting the standard by which order is to be judged. 
Social facts for Durkheim, then, are 'external' to individuals 
in that they exist both 'outside' and 'prior' to the individual. They 
are constraining in the sense (which Luker, feels is "ambiguous") 
"... social and cultural factors influence, indeed largely constitute, 
individuals" (Lukes, op cit, p. 13); they are 'general-and-independent' 
in that they emanate from the collective: "... the social fact is 
not social because it is general but rather 'general because it is 
collective (that is, more or less obligatory)... it is a state of the 
group which is repeated among individuals because it is imposed on; 
them'' (Lukes, op cit, p. 15). The problem of order is solved, therefore, 
in the face of individual diversity, by the collective issuing 
general constraints to which individuals conform. Individuality is 
maintained, in this formulation of the solution, because individuals 
are 'free' within the general constraints. Order is achieved because 
action within these constraints 'calculated' to achieve the collective 
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purpose. Order is achievec, in short, by the collectivity setting 
the 'context' of the behaviour and individuals (in some unexplained 
way) taking note of it in their actions. 
It is unclear exactly how Durkheim's solution works, and how 
robust a solution it actually is. Of particular concern are the 
questions of how, exactly, individuals are 'constituted' as social 
beings, and at what level of complexity does the solution of external 
constitution hold good? Durkheim does not give specific answers to 
these questions, but they have been of considerable interest to 
some modern social scientists. I shall turn to some of their work 
later. I shall do this because, as we shall see, some operations 
researchers have expressed a dissatisfaction with the simple 
Durkheimian solution. Nevertheless, the reaction to the simple 
Durkheimian solution has been to modify it rather than to dismantle 
its basis, which is that an unexplained collectivity solves the 
problem of order. Let us, then, set the scene for what is to come 
by comparing Durkheim's simple solution to the problem of order 
with solutions to be found in the OR literature. 
Support for the argument that OR adopts the Durkheimian framework 
can be found from a slight extension of our analyses of Stringer 
and Beer presented in the previous chapter. Stringer, it will be 
recalled, envisages a situation where there are several organizations 
each pursuing their own goals. The task for OR, it being unable to 
rely on what Stringer presumes is the detailed control available in 
a normal organization, is to provide advice to a "... central planning 
authority... (on)... determining the optimum interventions to make in a 
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decision process which is decentralised" (1967, p. 111). The individuals, 
pursuing their own goals, have to be constrained by the interventions 
of the collective (by, for example, "... the control of funds,... the 
exercise of statutory powers,... (and)... the publication of plans 
and estimates and advice together with exhortations of various kinds" 
pp. 110-111). The interventions are calculated, through the study 
of the decision-making system, to influence the decisions of the 
individual organizations so that they are "... beneficial to the 
purpose which defines the multi-orgarnzation" (p. 109). For Durkheim 
behaviour is social if it is productive of the goals of the collective, 
and anything which constrains behaviour in this direction is a social 
fact. Again, we can fruitfully draw a strong parallel between Stringer's 
views and those of Simon. This parallel will provide support for 
the suggested connection between Stringer and Durkheim. 
A key idea in Simon's work is that in order to control an individ- 
ual's behaviour, one should control the "premises" upon which he is 
assumed to base his decisions. One does not have to change the individ- 
ual as such. At various points in his work it seems that Simon feels 
that individuals are so complex that this latter option is not a 
viable one in any case (cf. Perrow, 1972, who argues that Simon should 
be seen as a sociologist rather than as a psychologist). The premises 
of decisions are such things as the communication system, the 'vocabulary' 
of the organization, the 'programs', the rules and regulations, etc. 
All these things are to some extent open to control by management. Thus, 
they can 'guide' the individual to make decisions which are "... not only 
the product of his own mental processes, but also reflect the broader 
considerations to which it is the function of the organized group to 
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give effect" (Simon, 1957, p. 102). It is this socialization of 
the individual "... that enable(s) him to make decisions, by himself, 
as the organization would like him to decide" (p. 103), because 
"the rational individual is, and must be, an organized and 
institutionalized individual" (op cit, p. 102). These remarks 
of Simon seem to sum up Stringer's argument very well. They are 
also strictly in line with Durkheim's views (1). 
Let us now turn to Beer's cybernetic solution to the problem 
of order. Beer, too, entertains a Durkheimian concept of social 
facts as the constraints which emanate from the collectivity to 
guide (but not control in detail) the behaviour of the individual 
so that he, of his own 'freewill', produces behaviour (his own 
'action') which meets the goals of the collectivity. Beer accept 
wholeheartedly the necessity for the parts of the organization to 
exercise freewill, because it is the only way in which the organization 
can meet the requirements of the law of requisite variety. How does 
he conceive of control in this situation? 
Arguing that systems of all types conform to the "natural law", 
which says that their inner principle of organization will direct them 
to their maximum likelihood state with respect to their environment, 
he moves directly to the solution of the problem of control by suggest- 
ing control of the environment. Thus, he says, "the basic answer of 
cybernetics to the question of how the system should be organized is 
that it ought to organize itself" (1966, p. 346). He realizes, however, 
that "to exercise control... and to meet the appropriate set of goals, 
(1) I think that Perrow is slightly misleading when he says that Simon's work fills out the "Weberian Skeleton"--Weber's ideal 
type of bureaucracy. Simon is not a Weberian because he pays 
no heed to Weber's concept of social fact which requires recognition in one's action of the intention of another (cf. Weber, 1964). 
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something must be done" (p. 354). His solution, building on his 
belief that "natural systems ... 
(of which organizations are an 
example)... organize themselves over a period of time to be what they 
immanently are" (p. 359), is to claim that what organizations 
immanently are can be controlled. 
"The answer is not to design the control, but to constrain 
the system. Let us so uncouple a sub-system that the natural 
movement of increasing entropy within it will tend towards one 
of the goals. The design or management task is to set the 
structure of the system to determine sub-systems in which the 
process of entropy is so defined that it will find a way 
(which we may neither detect nor understand) to cope with 
disturbances from outside" (p. 354+). 
"The management of high-variety systems is always concerned 
with a definition of entropy which serves particular goals, 
and with defining success as the maturation of a system in its 
maximal entropy" (p. 355). 
The manager is only interested in the outcomes produced by the 
sub-systems from his own point of view: "... if a system is moving 
towards what he regards as desirable ends, it is 'under control"" (p. 
357)" He controls the system by injecting "bias" into the "alleged 
randomness" of the interacting sub-systems (by means of punishments 
and rewards--the "algedonic feedback loop") so that the desired outcome 
is produced. Thus: 
"Cybernetic insights show, in particular that the totality 
of the organization ought to be made up of building blocks that 
/272 
will be called quasi-independent domains. This is a compromise 
notion lying between actually independent domains (decentraliza- 
tion) and no domains at all ( centralization). These domains 
have a certain local autonomy and may ( in their own language) 
claim to be altogether autonomous. But they are not autonomous 
in the metalanguage of the whole system, which monitors their 
activity according to the laws of cybernetics... The extent to 
which domains are (metalinguistically) independent derives 
from the need for local fluctuations without which local 
homeostasis, still more learning, is impossible... (latter 
emphasis mine). 
"On the other hand, it is vital that all these local controls 
be mediated centrally; otherwise they will sub-optimize and 
destroy the total system by (as it were) internecine strife" 
(pp. 381-2). 
The image is "... a control system which operates itself, but 
which can be monitored from on high, and given new directions towards 
predetermined goals which it does not itself recognize and of which 
it cannot indeed be made aware" (p. 383)" We have in Beer's work 
a clear Durkheimian solution f the problem of order. The individual 
is 'constituted' by the collectivity which operates as an autonomous 
domain. As Beer puts it, we have. a control system for the enterprise 
which is "... essentially. .. 
(a)... self organizing system, with 
hierarchical overtones... (p. 383)... by which it is implicitly 
informed... " (p. 379)" 
That Friend and Jessop view the problem of order in the sarge way 
can be seen by again employing Simon's work as a basis for comparison. 
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They argue that we can understand decision-making by the individual 
"agencies" in local government (akin to departments in an industrial 
organization) by reference to what they call "the context of operations". 
By this they mean "... the general view of the way in which appropriate 
actions should be selected" (p. 105). The factors which "contribute" 
to it are "... the operational policies themselves, the local objectives, 
and the appreciation of external constraints... " (ibid). This concept 
seems equivalent to March and Simon's (1958) "definition of the situation". 
This describes for the decision-maker the "... set of "given" character- 
istics of the situation... (which)... include knowledge or assumptions 
about future events, knowledge of alternatives available for action, 
knowledge of consequences attached to alternatives... and rules or 
principles for ordering consequences or alternatives according to 
preferences" (pp. 150-1). March and Simon claim that. knowledge of the 
definition of the situation will enable us to predict behaviour (p. 151). 
Their's is a more elaborate description of the influences on decision- 
making behaviour than that. provided by Friend and Jessop, but the 
latter claim, nonetheless, that "the context influenc(es) all... stages 
of the ongoing decision process... " (ibid). 
Friend and Jessop are concerned with modification of the context 
of operations "... as situations arise... which cannot easily be dealt 
with within the existing context" (ibid). Processes of adaption are 
also fundamental to March and Simon's view of organizational functioning. 
They distinguish between "short-run adaptiveness", which they call 
"problem-solving", and 1115ng-run adaptiveness", which they call 
"learning" (p. 170). In describing processes of problem-solving which 
account for short-run adaptivity they emphasise the "boundaries of 
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rationality"--the fact, in their view, that "... human beings as 
organisms... (are)... capable of evoking and executing relatively 
well-defined programs but.... (are)... able to handle programs 
only of limited complexity" (P., 171). Thus, the emphasise how, in 
the face of novel situations, efforts are made to reduce complexity. 
This-is achieved by (amongst other things) identification with a 
sub-goal and role. This reduces the number of "stimuli" to which 
"attention" is "directed". Complexity is also reduced by factoring 
tasks into semi-independent programs, by the development of specialized 
vocabularies which screen out much of the information potentially 
available, by the "absorbtion" of uncertainty by the "reification" of 
organizational categories and sources of information, by use of 
specialized communication channels, etc. 
Friend and Jessop argue in the same way about short-term adaptivity. 
In their description of the decision-making activities of agaencies 
they see it dealing with three basic types of information. These 
are: information relating to values; information relating to related 
decision fields, and information relating to the environment. Their 
description of decision-making processes can be said to follow that 
of March and Simon in that they concentrate on how uncertainty relating 
to these three categories of information is handled. An agency may 
perceive uncertainty in any one or all of these areas of information. 
Although efforts are made by the agencies to change the context of 
operations to meet uncertainty, they see this as very attenuated. 
In gathering information about the environment, for example, they note 
that "... each agency tends to build its own internal system for 
gathering and interpreting of information; and it is a common experience 
for this tendency to operate in such a way that any potential value of 
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information to other agencies becomes very difficult to realize" (p. 
123). Later on (p. 272 ff. ) they speak of their worries about 
"... breaking down barriers of communication between existing professions 
and of promoting more meaningful dialogues with lay representatives" 
(p. 273). These comments suggest that such information as each 
agency collects will be restricted to that which is meaningful to 
itself. As regards information relating to values, they speak of 
the role of "... any conventions as to matters on which the section head 
should seek the guidance of his departmental head, because of uncertainty 
about any political implications or about the 'rights system of values 
to apply in putting forward a recommendation" (p. 123). On gathering 
information on related decision fields they argue that "... any 
agency will tend to adjust the number and capacities of its external 
channels of communication only to such a level as does not result in 
any serious instability within the agency itself" (p. 124). There is, 
they suggest, "... some kind of law of conservation of stress'... " (ibid) 
which restricts the extension of communication channels. 
They are particularly worried about this last feature of the 
decision-making processes of agencies because they "... develop a 
picture of inter-agency planning activities which suggests the 
desirability of flexible patterns of organization for planning, in which 
planning frameworks are not necessarily constrained either by hierarchical 
relationships or by continued existence over time" (p. 126). However, 
"Because of the limited perspectives of agencies, and the 
protective forces within them, it is by no means certain 
that local initiatives alone will be sufficient to generate 
a relevant pattern of connections, and to adapt to changing 
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circumstances... " (ibid). 
And yet they insist that "the extent to which the context of operations 
changes will depend on the... system's capacity to learn... " (p. 105). 
How, then, can things be arranged so that the system as a whole can 
learn when the parts cannot? 
If the agencies themselves cannot, because of their inherent 
limitations and biases, be relied upon to generate appropriate patterns 
of connections we have, they say, to rely on a "third party": "it 
may perhaps only be some third party who can see with clarity the 
need for a connection... " (ibid). They perceive the need for a 
"centralized strategic control function" or a "nucleus for strategic 
control" (p. 129). It is only this, they sary, which can solve the 
"... problems of mobilization, regulation, and scheduling of planning 
activities involving several different combinations of agencies... " 
(p. 127). The function of this nucleus of control is with "how the 
planning process itself should be organized... " 
(ibid); its job is 
to "regulate" and ensure consistency between the agencies. Having 
provided us with this much of the Durkheimian solution to the problem 
of order they shrink from setting it out in full. They refer to the 
strategic control function "... regulating in some undefined way... 
" 
(ibid). However, the only type of solution which is consistent with 
the model of the agency which they provide is a Durkheimian one of 
external constitution. "Given their starting points, they-seem forced 
to accept the model put forward by March and Simon for long-run 
adaptivity (learning) whereby the "... programs of the members of 
higher levels of the organization have as their major output the 
modification or initiation of programs for individuals at lower levels" 
(op cit, p. 150). What other role for the strategic control function 
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can be envisaged within their scheme other than that: 
"the attention of high levels ... 
(should)... be directed 
principally to those proposed innovations that have significance 
for the maintenance of organization structure, for the survival 
of the organization, or for activities in more than one 
organization sub-division" (op cit, p. 199)? 
Also, given their image of the limitations of the individual agencies, 
they could not possibly suggest that this function could be carried 
out by full participation with the agencies. The need for the 
regulatory function arose in the first place because the agencies 
by their very nature could not be relied upon to "generate a relevant 
pattern of connections" (op cit, p. 126). If the agencies were not 
by their very nature in need of external regulation and control the 
solution might be to give them more information. This is not 
suggested and with this comes the implication that the agencies are 
to be constituted as part of the collectivity by external determination. 
J 
This implicit feature of the work of Friend and Jessop is, of 
course, made explicit by their colleague, as we have seen. I refer, 
of course, to Stringer (1967). It is also made explicit by Ackoff 
in his development of a new philosophy o`f planning ("adaptavizing"). 
This new philosophy is contrasted with conventional OR ("optimizing"). 
Arguing that normally the "... optimizing planner... takes the system 
structure for granted... ", he suggests that a better way to proceed 
would be to "... change the "system" in such a way that more efficient 
behaviour follows "naturally"" (1970, p. 20). Ackoff's "... principle 
of control... involves motivating participants in the system to act in 
a way that is compatible with the interests of the organization as 
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a whole, and it does this by providing incentives that make individual 
and organizational objectives more compatible" (ibid). Later on 
he makes it clear that he understands that incentives work as 
external constraints. He argues that "in planning, all existing 
incentives (even those that are implicit) should be identified and 
evaluated to make sure that they induce behaviour that is consistent 
with corporate objectives and goals" (op cit, p. 108, my emphasis). 
The idea of inducing behaviour to be consistent with collective 
goals is Durkheim's. It is not consistent with spontaneous and 
individually produced behaviour. This point has been the focus 
for a modern revision of Durkheim's solution to the problem of order, 
especially by Parsons. Ackoff also, notwithstanding his views 
expressed here, has been concerned with the "purposeful" nature of 
individual behaviour. Let us postpone a detailed look at Ackoff's 
views on this and turn to consider the 'modern problem of order' 
which has arisen as a reaction to the over-emphasis which Durkheim 
placed on the collective and his under-emphasis of the individual 
(1). 
Difficulties with Durkheim's Solution to the Problem of Order: 
Of crucial importance is whether we can understand Durkhie&&s 
notion of the collectivity. If we substituted it for the notion 
of management which we found in Stringer's and Beer's writings, would 
we have a clear picture of management's nature? The collective can 
be seen to play an important role in OR's solution of the problem of 
order, and yet in its Dur1. heimian form it is fundamentally opaque. 
We cannot understand either its rationality or how it functions. 
It has been a persistent criticism of Durkheim's views that because of 
1I shall give Ackoff's important work with Emery (1972) detailed 
consideration later on. 
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his insistence that social facts can only be explained in terms of 
other social facts, the nature of the social could not itself be 
explained. We saw in the last chapter that the nature of management 
was only explained if one was prepared to accept assertions about it 
which were themselves unexplained. This, and the implication of the 
views which we considered in the previous section that the collective 
constituted individuals in some unexplained manner, comes very 
close to what Rex (op cit) has called the 'group mind' fallacy to 
be found in Durkheim's work: 
"Durkheim amongst others has been accused of accepting the 
'group mind' fallacy because of his... attempts to give an 
account of this kind. The point to be made, however, is 
not that the concept of group mind as such is illegitmate. 
Provided that its meaning is made clear and statements are 
made about it in verifiable form, there is no reason why it 
should not be introduced as a theoretical model. What is 
illegitimate is the reification of the concept which is 
inevitable if we follow Durkheim's rule that a social fact 
must be regarded as existing independently of its individual 
manifestations" (p. 46). 
The central criticism which Rex stresses is that "a quite central 
fact about Durkheimts sociology is that because of his emphasis upon 
the externality of social facts he could never really begin to analyse 
the elementary concept of a social relation" (ibid) and so he could 
not begin to understand 'society'. The point that Rex is making is 
that we cannot analyse the collective by taking it as a given starting 
point. To simplify his argument, Rex is saying 
(as have many others) 
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that to understand the collectivity we have to understand how it 
is made up. 
A similar worry has been expressed in OR circles. There the 
worry takes the form that for the development and imposition of 
plans by management (and OR) to be rational takes the rationality 
of management (and OR) for granted. In complex situations, this 
level of rationality cannot be straighforwardly assumed. We cannot, 
the worry goes, start from the assumption of rationality (in the 
form of a rational plan)--we must demonstrate it. Thus, Friend and 
Jessop criticize the "... tendency to distort reality through imposing 
hierarchical patterns of thought... " (op cit, p. 126). In their 
view "the set of connections between agencies is always likely to 
be a changing one; connections will always tend to form in an 
ad hoc tray to deal with particular current problems, and these may 
tend to fade away when these problems have been resolved in an 
acceptable way" (ibid). It is, therefore, a mistake, they argue, 
to attempt to treat these flexibly created planning frameworks as 
though some were subordinate to others (ibid). This line of thought, 
away from the latent Durkheimian view, has been more fully developed 
in the subsequent work of Friend, Power and Tewlett (197+), where the 
emphasis is on the "mutual adjustment" processes of the individual 
agencies, aided by a "reticulist". A strong shift away from the 
Durkheimian view where the rationality of the collective, is given is also 
evident in Churchman's views. We have already seen him, for example,. 
attack the role of the representative and argue for the individual 
as the focus of planning. Thethrust of Churchman's work, as we have 
seen in earlier chapters, is against the acceptance of a given 
weltanschauumn, and towards the creation of new weltanschauugen. 
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The emphasis in modern thinking is towards process (cf. also, 
Checkland, 1975; Mason, 1969; Eden, 1976) in planning. An attempt, 
apparently, to understand the collective from the viewpoint of 
the individual. A major exponent of this *1iew is Ackoff. 
Ackoff criticizes hierarchy and central control: he argues that 
"not everything that can happen can be anticipated. The 
number of unexpected things that do happen is too large to 
be handled by a centralized control unit such as are usually 
designed by optimizing planners. Every part of an organization 
should be made capable of exercising self-control and of 
responding effectively to the unexpected even when not 
controlled from above" (1970, p. 14). 
Ackoff provides a very clear statement of the modern problem of 
order, so let us briefly consider his version of it before we turn 
to examine the assumptions which underlie it. Then we shall see that 
although many in OR and the social sciences move towards process they 
do not thereby move away from the difficulties of the Durkheimitn 
solution with its reliance upon a given collectivity. 
The Modern Problom of Order in OR: 
The central focus of Ackoff's adaptavizing is "... responsiveness 
planning... (which) ... consists of building responsiveness and flexibility 
into an organization" (p. 17). The route to the achievement of 
an integration of the individual and the collective is not, therefore, 
seen as the imposition of the collective onto the hapless individual. 
This solution, Ackoff argues, would only make sense if we had a much 
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greater degree of knowledge than we do have (and, he notes, that 
human motivation was completely programmable). Thus, he argues, 
"at present the best that can be done is to optimize either 
complex ... (organization)... structures relative to very simple 
problems or simple structures relative to complex problems. As yet", 
he goes on. "we cannot optimize complex structures relative to complex 
problems" (op cit, p. 13). The solution which Ackoff proposes is to 
modify our conception of the problem of order from one of intellectual 
resolution and imposition to one of continuous process-and building 
up. Thus he argues that adaptavizing is "... based on the belief that 
the principal value of planning does not lie in the plans that it 
produces but in the process of producing them. In effect", he goes 
on, "the adaptavizing planner's slogan is, "Process is our most 
important product" ... 
(and)... hence it holds that the value of planning 
to managers lies primarily in their participation in the process, not 
in their consumption of its product" (p. 15). It is on this basis 
that he advocates "multiheaded organizations" in which "... there is 
no single ultimate authority... " (1974, p. 38). The ideal is a 
democracy where all are equal and the "parts" are served by the 
organization rather than the parts serving the organization. 
Part oriented and multiheaded organizations are, he says, 
"humanized". Humanizing organizations is a necessary condition for 
them to exercise self-control. Humanized organizations allow their 
members to be "purposeful", and a "... purposeful system is one that 
can change its goals in constant environmental conditions; it selects 
goals as well as the means whereby to pursue them... (I)t thus displays 
will" (Ackoff and Emery, 1972, p. 31). Organizations with purposeful 
members are "variety increasing". Treating members as "multi-goal-seeking 
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systems", whereby they can "... pursue different goals, but they do 
not determine the goal to be pursued--the environment does" (ibid), 
makes the organization "variety decreasing". Decreasing the variety 
of individuals was a major objective of Durkheim's solution to the 
problem of order. He would almost certainly have perceived individuals 
as multi-goal-seeking-systems. Ackoff, on the other hand, wants to 
promote the "... creation of new courses of action and policies--rather 
than evaluation of old ones--(because this) ... is a key to successful 
planning" (197o, p. 43). Rather than control the individual as 
Durkheim enjoins us to do, Ackoff wants to set his imagination free 
by involving him in the "... design... (of)... an idealized future for 
the system being planned for" (1974, p. 30). In short, Ackoff wants 
to use "the human being (even the manager)... (as)... a special kind 
of resource... (which is)... capable of making decisions" (1970, p. 81). 
"... (H)uman beings are, in a sense, general purpose computers ... 
(which) 
... cannot be programmed like eauipment" 
(op cit, p. 82). 
Ackoff wants to solve the problem of order not by imposing a 
predetermined collective view on the individual but, rather, by 
organizing such that a collective view can emerge from individuals. 
Thus, 
"The adaptive planner... sees changes of organizational structure 
as one of his most effective means of improving system perform- 
ance. He believes that, if he designs an organization that 
is foresightful, innovative, and rational, much of the need 
for planning is removed" (op cit, p. 87). 
In this statement of the modern problem of order, the collectivity as 
a given starting point seems to have disappeared. The collective is 
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is organized individuals. In the place of the rationality of 
management we have the rationality of adaptive processes. These 
processes are claimed to be comprehensible through understanding 
individual motivation, group processes and principles of organization 
design. This, of course is Kuhn's line of argument: we understand 
science best as a social process of adaptation. We may be able to 
understand some organizational and scientific processes in this 
way, but can we also make their rationality transparent? If we 
look at the assumptions upon which the modern solution to the problem of 
order is based, we will find an unexplained guarantor slipping in through thr 
backdoor. Management and Durkheim's collective may be out of sight, 
but they are not out of mind. We shall find that the suggested connection 
between OR and Durkheim's solution of the problem of order isa 
deep one. 
The Assumptions Underlying the Solution to the Modern Problem of Order: 
The critique of bureacracy which is currently animating some 
operations researchers has been traced by blayntz (196+) as a key 
change which has taken place in the conceptual history of organization 
theory. She argues that it was the "... neglect of-such important 
processes as goal-setting, decision-making, environmental relations, 
adaptive change, and in general of self-maintenance as a problem" 
(p. 98) which prompted a critique of the-prevailing classical models 
of bureaucracy. Mayntz describes the model of organizations sought 
for by modern organization theorists (cf. also, Hickson, 1966-7 and 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) as one which should 
"... permit more leeway for improvisation and personal 
responsibility; minimize the number of fixed rules; de-emphasize 
the principal of hierarchical authority in favour of de- 
centralization, team-work, and only conditionally activated 
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lines of communication; define the individual's area of 
competence and responsibility less strictly; and emphasize 
personal authority (expert or functional authority), personal 
relationships, and personal commitment to the organizational 
goal" (p. 99). 
All of these features are to be found animating Ackoff's work (cf. - 
his proposed design for a "circular organization" (1974)), and they 
are latent in the work of the other operations researchers I have 
mentioned. Mayntz makes the interesting point that whether such 
organizational models are proposed as descriptive (as most organization 
theorists would see them) or whether they are prescriptive (as most 
operations researchers would see them) they still articulate one 
basic underlying model. That is, unlike Gouldner (1959) she argues 
that there are not two basic models of organizations prevalent in 
the organization theory literature (the "rational" model and the 
"natural systems" model). She argues that there is only one model, and 
that is the social'systems model. She argues that 
"both emphasize flexibility, adaptability, and innovative 
change... (I)n the one case they appear as properties of 
enduring social systems, and in the other case they are 
treated as pre-reouisites of efficiency in a new and wider 
sense.... (W)e may therefore conclude that modern organization 
theory does in fact imply one basic system concept, whether 
as explicit starting point or implicit in the results of analysis" 
(p. 104, latter emphasis mine). 
The chief exponent of the social systems concept, and the person who 
has borne the brunt of the most pointed attacks on it, is Parsons 
(1949,1951). 
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Parson' work was a reaction against what he saw as the 
"positivism" in Durkheim's treatment of social facts as 'objects'. 
As Giddens (1976) puts it: 
"Parsons' early work was directed towards reconciling the 
'voluntarism' supposedly inherent in the methodological 
approach of Weber (and, from a different angle, foreshadowed 
in Pareto) with the idea of the functional exigency of moral 
consensus" (p. 95) 
which was attributable to Durkheim. As Giddens says, Parsons' "... use 
of the term 'voluntarism' suggests that... (he)... wished to try to 
build into his own approach a conception of the actor as a creative, 
innovative agent, thus seeking to break with schemes in which human 
conduct is not connptually differentiated from the explanation of 
the movements of objects in nature" (ibid). Because of his commitment 
to volutarism Parsons does not assume (as many popular account suggest) 
that the problem'of order is easily solved. Parsons' view is that 
"... society represents a veritable powder keg of conflicting forces, 
pulling and hauling in all ways at once... (S)ociety is not a neatly 
articulated "organic system" in full control of its own internal 
processes and mechanisms. It consists instead of a loosely federated 
congeries of system and sub-systems of many different sorts... " (Devereax, 
Jr., 1961). Societal equilibrium--the establishment of order--is, for 
Parsons, something to be explained, and not taken for granted. Perhaps, 
then, we may find in Parsons' work the background assumptions upon 
which OR's interest in the modern problem of order is made sensible. 
There is, in fact a striking correspondence between the problem as 
it is seen by Parsons and as it is seen by Ackoff. Compare Landsberger's 
description of Parsons' concerns with Ackoff's view of the responsibility 
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and task of management and management scientist. Landsberger (1961) 
notes: 
"According to Parsons, the central task of the social sciences 
is the formulation of a single theory applicable, after 
appropriate specification, to all kinds of social systems. 
Such a theory would show (a) how individually motivated 
units of such systems can attain their private ends while 
(b) simultaneously furthering the collective (i. e., the 
system's) end, (c) maintaining stable relationships with other 
units, and (d) remaining integrated both within themselves 
and with higher and lower units" (pp. 215-216). 
Compare this with Ackoff's recently expressed view of the nature of 
organizations and the task for OR created thereby: 
"First, they... are purposeful systems that have goals, objectives, 
and ideals of their own. 
"Second, organizations contain as parts other purposeful systems 
that have goals, objectives, and ideals of their own. 
"And third, organizations are parts of larger purposeful 
systems that also have goals, objectives, and ideals of their 
own; and that contain other purposeful systems that have goals, 
objectives, and ideals of their own.... 
I'Goals, objectives, and ideals at these three levels may 
be in conflict... 
"It seems to me that it is the responsibility of manager 
and management scientists to try to dissolve or to resolve 
these conflicts and serve all of an organization's stakeholders 
in a way that reflects the relative importance of the organization 
to them" (1977, p. 6). It seems as though Parsons and Ackoff 
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have the same problem: how are the ends of all levels of systems 
met at once? Let us look first at Parsons' solution to this problem, 
and the assumptions which underlie it. 
The problem is one of establishing an 'equilibrium' between 
potentially conflicting ends. Are these ends (particularly those 
of individuals) determined independently of each other, or do they 
have a systematic dependence upon one another? Parsons' seems to 
argue that if needs were determined independently then the task of 
establishing an equilibrium is nigh on impossible. Although he 
argues that the actor should be seen as an entity which can express 
free (1voluntary') choice amongst what he calls the "pattern-variables", 
he argues that for the choices to cohere they must be regulated (1). 
Parsons calls this problem of choice regulation the "motivational 
problem of order", and with good reason. He argues that they only 
way in which the motives, goals, capacities and values of the 
individual actor can be reliably motivated so that integrative behaviour 
is produced, is if they are oriented towards and take their cue from 
the "central value system". "Parsons argues that any particular social 
system will tend to develop a set of normative patterns which are 
somehow relevant to its own particular functions" (Devereax, op cit, 
p" 35)" It is the central value system or 'shared orientation to actions 
which resolves the dilemmas of choice with which the actor as a free 
agent is faced. With a given central value system the actor can 
be relied upon to make choices which support these values, and he 
can confidently expect others to do the same. It can only be by relying 
on the guidance provided by the central value system that, for example, 
(1) Pattern variables are generalised orientations which actors 
can take towards each other. As Devereax (op cit) puts it: they "... constitute universal and basic dilemmas confronting any actor in any social situation" (p. 39). 
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Friend, Power and Yewlett (1974, following Braybrooke and Lindblom, 
1963) can confidently expect the system to be co-ordinated by 
processes of "mutual adjustment". Without this assumption we 
have as much reason for arguing that the system would degenerate 
into chaos if we relied on the choices of free individuals. This 
possibility is mentioned in passing by Power (1971). Commenting on 
Schon's (1971) proposals for decentralized, informal planning, he 
notes that "... it could create pockets of volatility and unpredictability 
... " 
(p. 48), but then he moves onto other "difficulties". Acceptance 
of the Parsonian framework within which this difficulty is minimized 
is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for indifference towards 
this as a potentially major problem. 
What happens to the individuality of individual ends when the 
central value system solves the problem of order? Giddens (op cit) 
reasons in the following way: 
'The notion of 'value', as it is represented in Parsons' 
writings, plays such a key part in the 'action frame of 
reference' because it is the basic concept linking the 
need-dispositions of personality (introjected values) and 
(via normative role-expectations on the level of the social 
system) cultural consensus.... For Parsons the very same 
values that compose the consensus universal, as lintrojected' 
by actors, are the motivating elements of personality" (p. 95). 
Parsons' 'volutarism' is lost by his solution to the problem of orders 
because if the individual's values are, for the purposes of the system, 
the system's values, the individual can only be creative and free in 
his pursuit of those values. He can exercise his 'individuality' only 
in his personal interpretation of values and ends which are given and 
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external to him. With Parsons' solution we have not, therefore, removed 
the opacity which surrounded Durkheim's notion of the collective. 
Parsons, himself, notes the shift of levels whereby what are from 
the actor's viewpoint his own values are, from the 'system's' viewpoint 
its values. Thus, 
"In the personality system, the pattern variables describe 
essentially the predispositions or expectations as evaluatively 
defined in terms of what will... be called ego-organization 
and super-ego organization. In the case of the social system 
they are the crucial components in the definition of role- 
expectations" (Parsons and Shils, 1951, p" 79). 
Precisely the same shift of levels from the 'individual' to the collect- 
ive was found in the last chapter in the work of Simon and, hence, 
the work of Stringer and Beer (as we saw). What the shift amounts 
to, in the view of Urry (1970) is an illicit and unsuccessful attempt 
to overcome the Durkheimian error. Urry reasons as follows: 
"It can be maintained that contemporary sociology has made 
one of two mistakes. The first alternative has been to operate 
with a notion of the society-actor relationship in which 
society is postulated as a superior entity, standing apart, 
beyond and above the individual actor. The actions of the 
actor have thus been explained in terms of the superior moral 
fiction without recourse to the motivations of the individually 
interacting agents... (Here)... the individual experiences his 
role as pre-given by the environing society and it is one 
within which he performs, perhaps non-reflectively, in 
accordance with its prescriptions. The alternative mistake 
occurs where this transcendental view of society is replaced 
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by an immanent one; a view of the man-society relationship 
in which neither is conceptualised as superior--a view where 
men make society and society make men... The mistake occurs 
here... (because of)... the reified conception of role or 
rule which is an accompaniment of it" (p. 351). 
The second type of error brings in society as super-actor implicitly 
because it "... evad(es) the manner in which such... roles come into 
existence, are maintained, and are transformed by men's purposive 
acting within their world" (op cit, p. 356. See also: Turner, 1962; 
Silverman, 1970). Parsons does not solve the problem of order because 
if we accept "that the very performance of actors within roles serve(s) 
to constitute and reconstitute the nature of the framework structuring 
such norms,... (this)... means that actions may go beyond or depart 
from the existing organization, since man's actions result also 
from his interpretation of his experience" (Urry, op cit, p. 360). 
Dawe makes the same point: 
"The argument here is that subjective meanings are, through the 
postulate of consensus, ultimately derived from the central 
value system and are thus, at root, external conditions of the 
actor's situation; essentially, objects of the environment... 
(G)iven the view of the relationship between the social and 
the individual inherent in... (the problem of order)..., 
meaning can only be conceptualised by postulating social 
norms as being constitutive, rather than beins merely regulative 
of the self. That is, the problem of order can only be 
solved by conceiving of the actor as a reflex of the social 
system and meaning as a reflex of the cultural system. Far 
from disappearing, constraint becomes total through internaliz- 
ation" (1970, p. 209). 
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So long as the actor is merely a reflex of the 'social' the social 
goes unexplained, and hence the problem of order is not adequately solved 
It is because of the initial definition of the task of social science 
as solving the problem of order between two independent 'realities' 
(the individual and society) that Parsons (and others who make the 
same distinction) experiences the fatal difficulties of explanation 
which he does (I turn to these in the next section). Conceiving of 
the task of social science in this way inevitably means that the 
task is to find a metalanguage to transcend them. This is why 
Parsons sees his work as providing a "general theory" (Swanson, 1953; 
cf. also, Mills 1959 and Bottomore, 1975 who points out that Parsons 
has neither a methodology nor a conception of real-world problems 
in his work). But with a metalanguage all we have is a way of talking 
about two separate realities in the same language. We do not have 
the means of understanding the construction of those realities. (cf. Black, 
1961). Conceiving of the task of social science within this conceptual 
universe makes it merely a matter of preference how the problem of 
order is solved: either society or the individual can be determining 
(for the latter option, see: Rose, 1962). Parsons preference is to 
see society as the determining reality, and by taking this course 
he loses the ability to explain both the construction of the individual 
and society in their mutual determination. This weakness of many 
sociological schemes has motivated several attempts to develop a 
truly 'dialectical' theory of the relationship between 'individual' 
and 'society' which I have no space to assess here (see, for example, 
Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Garfinkel, 1967; Giddens, op cit; Coulson 
and Riddell, 1970)" In their various ways these attempts all struggle 
to avoid the pre-supposition of the subject-matter of social science, 
namely, the nature of the social. 
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To be consistent with its ideals OR must similarly avoid 
the presupposition of the rationality of the collective--which in 
its terminology is represented by both management and itself. 
Let us now look at the weaknesses of the Parsonian scheme and, 
in doing so, draw the homomorphic parallels into an isomorphic 
net. We will find that OR shares the assumption underlying the 
Parsonian solution to the modern problem of order. It also shares 
the weaknesses of explanation which bedevill the Parsonian scheme. 
An illustration will be given at the end of this chapter of the 
impact on OR's ideals of involvement in this scheme. In general, 
however, the thrust of the criticisms made against this erstwhile 
dominant paradigm is that it fails to grasp (and, for the reasons I 
have mentioned, is prevented from grasping) the nature of its 
subject-matter. It is biased in the sense that it systematically 
excludes many important aspects of reality. We can note here that 
this debate in the social sciences is matched by the philosophical 
debate which occupied our attention in Part One. There we saw that 
the philosophical schemes with which OR could be associated were 
deficient precisely on the grounds that they could not avoid 
presupposing the nature of reality, and that it could not retreive 
this situation because of its persistent bias against serious 
consideration of the nature of the subject-matter which was being 
inquired into. OR's involvement with the Parsonian scheme runs 
up against the same criticism because, as we have seen, Parsons 
presupposes the very nature of the subject-matter of the social sciences, 
namely, the nature of the social. 
Sociological Assumptions in OR: Criticisms: 
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Setting up the modern problem of order simply in terms of 
'some kind' of relationship between. the ends of the collectivity 
and the ends of individuals, as both OR and Parsonian sociology 
do, implies, if the formulation is taken literally, that the potent- 
ialities for the form which the order takes is open-ended. Literally, 
all that is required for an equilibrium is compatibility, on whatever 
terms are available, between the different ends. Because this 
formulation of the problem of order is not grounded in a conscious 
attempt to grasp the realities of social relationships, it sets 
up a conceptual tension which has to be resolved. The same open-endedness 
which we found in OR's ideals appears here as the open-endedness of 
possible social relationships. The drive towards closure is met 
by the adoption of a paradigm. This has, in the social sciences, 
reduced the potentially large number of possible bases on which order 
could be judged to one--the goals of the collective (although this 
has been expressed in different ways: e. g. as "compliance" (Etzioni, 
1961) or "prime beneficiary" (Blau and Scott, 1963) as the basis 
for organizational classification). Given Parsons' commitment to 
the greater reality of the collective, and his definition of the 
organization's central value system as its goal, it follows that an organiz- 
ation should be defined by its goal(s). Others follow; defining organiz- 
ations in the came way(cf. Albröw, 1973). Thus; Selznick (op cit) argues 
that the ".. indivisibility of control and consent makes it necessary 
to view formal organizations as co-operative systems... " (p. 359; cf. 
also, Barnard, 1965), i. e., organizations must, by definition, have 
common goals. 
Defining organizations as co-operative systems is as commonplace 
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in OR circles as it is in the social sciences. Consider the 
views of Rivett (1973)" He notes, in discussing one of the problems 
of doing OR that 
"... we are intimately concerned with the formulation and 
understanding of organizational objectives. You will notice 
that it is not a question of asking some benevolent company 
president to tell us the organization's objectives. It is 
more a question of looking for a set of purposes and trying 
to understand the collective will and to see the extent to 
which the collective will is an amalgam of individual wills" 
(p. 227, my emphasis). 
In his account of the problems of doing OR he does not tell us what 
he would do (or what anyone else should do) if the collective will 
was not an amalgam of individual wills. The indifference shown towards 
this question (after all, he raised the question) suggests that 
the possibility is considered remote. In fact, the wording that 
he uses implies that it is an impossibility. The last part of the 
quotation is a non secuiter. To "collect" is to "bring together; to 
gather; to assemble; to deduce" (Collins New English Dictionary). How, 
then, could a collective will be anything other than an amalgam of 
individual wills? 
lie have already seen Ackoff (1972) define an organization in the 
same way. So, too, does Stringer. Defining an organization in this 
way is, however, much more than a formal exercise. Unless substantial 
qualifications are made it has profound implications for the way one 
views social reality. Most fundamentally, these implications can be 
reduced to the extremely naive view that collective goals determine the 
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behaviour of individuals. Thus, Elger (1975) notes that "for 
Parsons this view implies that the relevant values, signified by 
the organizational goal, inform all aspects of organizational 
structure" (p. 93). Boundary interchanges and internal decision- 
making processes, for example, are thought to be "structured" by 
these values embodied in the organizational goal (ibid). An implication 
of the definition is that behaviour which is not determined by the 
collective goal cannot properly be thought of as organizational 
(or social) behaviour at all. This implication is the "curious 
feature" of Durkhiem's Division of Labour of which Rex speaks 
when he brings to our attention Durkheim's . "... assumption that 
societies based upon the 'anomic division of labour' are not really 
societies at all" (op cit, p. 101). This assumption followed from 
his "... assumption that... norms taken as a whole constitute some 
sort of social consensus which served to integrate all unit acts into 
a system" (ibid). And, as Gouldner says of Parsons' views: "The 
catechism is: no society, no humanness" (1970, p. 420). 
An identical view is to be found in the work of Ackoff and 
Emery (1972). They argue that an organization has the "... properties 
of self-selection of courses of action in repetitions of the same 
situation or in varying situations with respect to common objectives" 
(p. 218). An organization, they say, is the realization of the 
potentiality of purposeful individuals making "... choices with respect 
not only to their own purposes but also the purposes of others" (p. 219). 
If this potentiality is not realized then, they say, we are not talking 
about an organization at all: "So long as this potentiality is not 
realized, we are dealing with an unorcanized social soup, one in which 
the individual elements, although themselves purposeful, cannot make 
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the purposeful choices of the group" (ibid). At face value this 
statement could be taken to be purely normative: if you find that 
a group is unorganized the imperative, as we have seen with Stringer 
(cf. also Churchman and Emery, 1966), is to find it a common purpose. 
However, they go further than this. They argue that it is "is the 
intention to coproduce common objectives... (that)... produces the 
interactions that lead individuals to cohere as a social group" (p. 213). 
This implies that unless there are common objectives there will be 
no social group. I shall come back in the final section to discuss 
their views on conflict. They reinforce the conclusion drawn here. 
Parsons (and Durkheim) is enabled to claim that collective 
goals determine behaviour because of his treatment of individuals 
as merely the "reflex" of the collective. In doing this, however, he 
commits (as is widely known) the error of "reification". As Elger 
puts it (cf. Silverman): 
"... systems theories... reify the organization as an entity 
with characteristics independent of the social processes 
through which organizational members construct and construe 
social reality. The systems theorist assumes that the 
organizational "function",, generally equated with the 
organizational goal, provides an unambiguous and virtually 
unchallenged referent for action within the organization, and 
thus neglects the ways in which actors' purposes and 
perspectives intervene in the interpretation and contesting 
of goal-related prescriptions for action... The theoretical 
underpinning for this reified conception of the organization 
is provided by the postulate of an overarching consensus which 
informs all organizational processes" (op cit, p. 94). 
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Also, Gouldner, referring to Parsons' definition of the organization, 
observes: 
"... an organization as such cannot be said to be oriented 
toward a goal, except in a metaphorical sense, unless it is 
assumed that its parts possess a much lower degree of 
functional autonomy than can in fact be observed. The 
statement that an organization is oriented toward certain 
goals often means no more than that these are the goals of 
its top administrators, or that they represent its societal 
function, which is another matter altogether" (1959, p. 420). 
The danger is clearly that unless the connection between the individual's 
purposeful behaviour and the goals of the organization is made by 
explicitly showing (or at least attempting to) the basis on which 
it is achieved, the role of the organization's goals becomes 
metaphysical. 
It might be thought that of all people in OR Ackoff, with his 
unremitting emphasis on the purposeful nature of human behaviour, 
would be immune from the criticism of reification. This, however, 
is not so, and it can be clearly shown because Ackoff is very explicit 
about his approach to the behavioural foundations of OR. This clarity 
does not, unfortunately, characterise other major writers in the 
field. However, before we turn to Ackoff it is appropriate to briefly 
consider the views of some other operations researchers so as to avoid 
the impression that Ackoff is alone in his mistakes. These others 
can be accused of making the sister error to reification, which is the 
tendency to explain behaviour in social systems in terms of the 'function' 
which it performs for that system. 
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Functional explanation is a weak form of explanation because 
instead of searching for the generative mechanisms which generate or 
'bring about' the phenomena in question, reliance is placed on the 
'end', 'purpose', or 'function' which the phenomena is 'supposed' 
to serve. The problem with this form of explanation is that no 
explicit connection is made between the phenomena to be explained 
and the function which it is said causes it. Parsons can find 
functional explanation adequate because of his conviction that collective 
values are determinative of behaviour. Thus, explanations of social 
behaviour which refer to the 'needs' of the social system as causal 
are implicitly assuming the operation of a central value system. 
Consider the argument employed by Beer to explain how social 
systems have organised to meet their need' for "reliable outputs". 
Beer argues, from cybernetics, that reliability increases with redund- 
ancy. Redundancy, he therefore argues, being a 'need' of all 
surviving systems, arises naturally to meet that need. Arguing 
from the employment of redundancy by the brain to fulfill the function 
of producing reliable outputs he argues that 
"... human societies have adopted the same device. Not 
only is there a tendency to form boards, committees, conf- 
erences and meetings of a formal kind; there is also the 
tendency to undertake a great deal of unofficial consultat- 
ation within any managerial group... " (1966, p. 198). 
Beer places much reliance on functional explanation (see also p. 434). 
From the argument that all systems (including social systems) function 
'naturally' to meet their needs, he moves to make his general case 
for the application of cybernetics to organizations on the grounds 
that they are like biological organisms. The organismic analogy which 
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Beer, like Parsons (who also relates his theories to cybernetics), 
uses extensively, is the paradigm case of functional explanation. 
Another example of the use of the organismic analogy in 
OR is Hertz's attempt to describe what he sees as the basis of 
"Elegant OR" (1961). Hertz is concerned with the "... innate 
characteristics" of OR. By this he means "... the methodology used 
in achieving solutions to operations research problems, and especially 
methods which seem particularly appropriate to the solution of 
a"significant problem" (p. 34). To help decide when methods are 
appropriate he adopts a broadly conventionalist perspective. For 
him elegant work uses an "... intelligne, systematic, conceptual pattern 
for the observed data which will be capable of uniting phenomena which, 
without it, 'are either surprising, anomalous, or wholly unnoticed" 
(p. 42). "What matters", he says, "is that certain systems of concepts 
can help us to observe intelligently what there is" (p. 35)" What 
do these systems of concepts refer to? Concluding from an "examin(ation) 
... 
(of)... the published work in-the field... that operations research, 
as practiced, is a science which aims simultaneously at: (a) discover- 
ing certain kinds of societal relations, and (b) developing means 
of deciding on and testing courses of action in a social environment", 
he suggests "... that the researcher tackle the total problem... 
recognising that the decision process stems from and returns in its 
action context to the social environment" (ibid). However, OR must 
attempt (to be elegant) "... to formulate programs for action with 
respect to very specific kinds of social phenomena... " (p. 36). 
Hertz perceives the social base-point of OR to be a "social organism" 
(p. 37) which thereby displays "... uniformities or laws in nature-- 
in nature as represented by society ... Which has these)... underlying 
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structural characteristics" (p. 39) which guarantee "... the underlying 
unity of the society and its decisions... " (p. 41). By this he 
presumably has in mind at least something equivalent to a central 
value system 
Friend and Jessop do not use the organismic analogy, but their 
account of planning processes nonetheless relies heavily on 
functional explanation. A blatant example of this is their 
suggestion, after summarizing what they see as the "five basic 
operational problems of strategic choice", that 
"each of these problems is... implicit in any process 
of public planning, and it is inevitable that any 
governmental body will tend to develop certain 
methods for dealing with them, even if they are 
nevernade explicit" (op cit, p. 119). 
This suggestion becomes a principle of analysis: 
"certain organizational changes in Coventry during the 
period of... (their)... research are. interpreted as a 
response to a growing awareness of the difficulties of 
coping adequately with the more strategic aspects of the 
decision-making process" (p. xxiii). 
The only warrant for this interpretation is the assumption that however 
blind, faltering and unconscious these responses were, they-were 
necessary to meet the needs of.. the system: therefore they occurred. 
They say that given the complexity and uncertainty of the environment, 
"in these circumstances planning must become. in some degree an'adaptive 
process" (p. 112, former emphasis mine). It 'must' only if it is 
assumed that collective goals implicitly determine it to be so. To 
say that planning processes should become an adaptive process is surely 
/302 
an insufficient basis for interpreting responses as an attempt to institute 
it as such. As with Beer there is a continual confusion of normative 
with descriptive statements. This confusion is the result of refusing 
to take seriously the nature of the subject-matter with which they 
were dealing. Then normative statements can be taken to adequately 
substitute for factual ones. 
The clear implication of functional explanation and the reified 
conception of the collective with which it is associated, is that 
an OR which employs them must give up its ideal of freely investigating 
complex totalities. Within the Parsonian scheme we must give up 
any hope that operations researchers can do anything but sub-optimize 
with respect to the social world. Within it operations researchers 
cannot explain mechanisms (of decision-malting and planning etc. ') 
which are of obvious importance to them. The adoption by Friend and- 
Jessop of a framework other than that organizational changes (and 
also decision-making conventions, see: p. 47) were responses to the 
'needs' of the collective, could well have led them to make different 
recommendations. The responses might, for example, have been interpreted 
as the outcomes of the strategies of motivated actors to further 
their own purposes (e. g. political, status or security motives) as these 
were mediated by both their knowledge and resources, and the motives, 
knowledge and resources of others (cf. Burns and Stalker, 1961; 
Silverman, op cit; Elger, op cit). If this were the case, how are we 
to interpret proposals for organizational change? These comments apply 
with equal force to the subsequent work of the Institute for Operational 
Research (particularly, Friend, Power, and Yewlett (197. )). 
The institution of organizational forms in this situation may 
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or may not further the interests of certain groups, and may or may not 
be thwarted in their intention. From their accounts of their work both 
Stringer (as regards the Building Industry Communication Project - see: 
Higgin and Jessop, 1965) and Ackoff (as regards a project with General 
Electric - see: a brief report in Ackoff, 1970, PP. 129 ff. ) it would 
seem that insufficient account of the motives, strategies and knowledge of 
the actors led to unwelcome results. 
(') 
After discussing the widely 
diverging interests that characterised the building industry Stringer 
(1973) merely attributes the failure to resolve them as a "... difficulty... 
in the communication process" (p. 256). Ackoff, noting that General 
Electric "... has not been as successful in keeping the... (planning)... 
efforts, once launched, afloat" (p. 129) concludes that the solution is 
an organizational one. What are required, he suggests, are smaller, 
rotating groups. The problem is that we have no way of assessing the 
efficacy of either of these solutions. My own experience is that formal 
changes have no raison d'etre outside of an understanding of the purposes, 
knowledge and resources of. the groups involved. With this understanding 
organisational changes may make sense; without it such changes are, at 
best, based on intuitive guesswork and, at worst, are positively arbitrary. 
I move ön now to justify the claim made earlier that Ackoff effec- 
tively reifies social systems, and that because of this his concepts can 
be said to reveal, and in fact rely on, commitments about the nature of 
the social world. identical to those held by Parsons. Ackoff's work is'per- 
meated by the-fundamental ambiguity inherent in the individual-collective 
(1) See also Young (1973) for an account of the difficulties of manpower 
planning which ignores sociological analysis of "attitudes" (as he calls them) 
of the parties involved. Young would get little of the help which he 
calls for from the sociology I have been discussing here. 
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dichotomy. The problem in Ackoff's work is the basis on which we reconcile 
what appears, on the face of its to be a fundamental incompatibility 
between the purposeful nature of the individual and the obviously reified 
conception of the collective. 
The collective is reified in the sense that it is 11... attribut(ed) 
... 
(a)... concrete reality, particularly the power of thought and action... " 
(Silverman, op, cit., p. 9). In fact it is a "social construct" in the 
sense that it is constructed from the social acts of individuals. Ackoff 
and Emery are concerned with "social individuals". These are 'zany collec- 
tion of psychological individuals that is itself treated as an individual,, 
(op. cit., p. 212). They argue-that "... we can observe the properties of 
a social group without observing the properties of its members... (and 
therefore)... it follows that we can aloo observe its behaviour... " (p. 211). 
They see no difficulty in treating social systems as if they. were indiv- 
iduals, and it is on this basis that they speak of an organization 'having' 
a goal; of co-producing "... the outcomes the system wants" (p. 220); of 
organizations "surveying" their members (p. 221); of "group personality" 
(p. 212). It is hard to think of a more reified conception of the collective. 
And yet, this notwithstanding, Ackoff and Emery are harsh in their criticism 
of schemes which are not grounded in the fundamental commitment to treat 
individuals as purposeful. How is this apparent contradiction to be 
resolved? The resolution is to be found, I think, in the treatment of the 
individual in the first place. Close examination will show that he is' 
not in fact treated as a purposeful individual in any strong sense at all. 
He turns out to be purposeful only from the point -of view of the collective. 
The subtlety of their scheme calls for an equally subtle analysis. 
If we take their scheme as they intend us to we have, in the first two 
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parts of it the development of the basic methodology and, in the last 
two parts, an application of the concepts developed earlier. (This is 
slightly less true of Part 3 (Interactions of Purposeful Systems) than 
it is of Part 4 (Social Systems and Beyond)). The earlier concepts are 
seen by the authors to be applied to social systems, rather than these 
concepts themselves depending on the concept of social systems. Thus, 
they comment that "a re-examination of the conceptual sytem developed in 
this book will reveal that it has no properties that restrict its app- 
lication to persons (to psychological individuals)... (I)t is equally 
applicable to groups (to social individuals)" 
(p. 212). This implication 
is ,I will show, 
incorrect. Ackoff and Emery's scheme depend crucially 
(and, I will argue, fatally) upon the reified conception of social sybtem 
which they entertain in the latter part of their work 
(and elsewhere). 
I shall show this by pointing out a logical incompleteness in their method- 
ology for measuring purposefulness, and then show how it is filled. 
The aim of Ackoff and Emery's work is to "... open to public exam- 
ination the study of the mind's inner workings" 
(p. 7) and to do this in 
sich a way that all reference to subjective 
linnert states is avoided. 
They attempt to do this by the development of what they term an 
"objective 
teleology" wherein "... beliefs, attitudes, and traits are attributed 
to 
an individual because of what 
he does" (p. 6). Such subjective concepts, 
they say, "... do not lie behind behaviour; they lie 
in behaviour" (ibid). 
(1) 
The strength of their claims for this approach to understanding human 
behaviour amounts to the assertion that-the foundation of all 'objective, 
knowledge is what is directly available to our observation. There are 
some qualifications made by them on the questions of how we acquire and 
use this knowledge,. but these do not affect their basic point. "Hence", 
they go on, "in an objective teleology functional characteristics of human 
(1) This argument was advanced long ago by the well-known positivists 
Lundberg (see: Odum 1951, p. 208) and Tolman (see: Taylor, 1964, p. 79) - 
cf. the discussion of positivism in Chapter 2 of this work. 
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behaviour are not treated as intervening variables subjectively fabricated 
to conceal our ignorance: they are derived objectively from what we can 
observe" (ibid). Thus they would dismiss as "subjectively fabricated" 
explanations of the sort advocated by, for example, Louch (1966) (and 
many other similar schemes advocated by social scientists and philosophers, 
for example, Harre and Secord, 1972). Louch's scheme is summed up by him 
as follows: 
"when we offer explanations of human be- 
haviour, we are seeing that behaviour as 
justified by the circumstances in which 
it occurs. Explanation of human action 
is moral explanation. In appealing to 
reasons for acting, motives, purposes, 
intentions, desires, and their cognates, 
which occur in both ordinary and technical 
discussions of human doings, we exhibit 
an action in the light of circumstances 
that are taken to warrant a person to 
act as he does" (p. 4). 
Louch's argument (which I do not have the space to reproduce in full 
here) is that (a) perfectly adequate explanations of human behaviour can 
be provided by ad hoc 'moral' accounts of human action; that is,, there is 
no universal law of adequate explanation which restricts them to the 
general case of 'regular' behaviour (a view which is based both on historic 
myth and an inadequate (Humean) notion of causality) - we can have perfectly 
adequate explanations of 'special cases', and (b) as far as human action 
is concerned, precisely because it is 'purposeful', we avoid many gross 
errors if we employ such ad hoc accounts. 
Ackoff and Emery define 'purpose' behaviourally: thus, a system can 
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be said to be purposeful and have a purpose if it behaves regularly in 
a certain way. There is, however, an immediate difficulty with this 
as a form of explanation (and note that they argue that "to predict 
behaviour is not enough; we must explain it" (p. 11)). Ackoff and Emery 
wish to turn subjective concepts into objective ones by, as Louch puts 
it, "... "unpacking' them (as Ryle would say) into descriptions of tend- 
encies or patterns of behaviour... " (p. 61). But, Louch points out, in 
doing this the concepts lose any explanatory significance whatsoever. For 
example, "that a man persists in a line of conduct may be explained by 
citing his strong desire, but not if desire means only the tendency or 
pattern of behaviour in which he persists" (ibid). 
(1) 
Clearly, then, 
there has to be some warrant, derived externally to the behaviour itself, 
for designating as displaying a purpose or, more generally, as purposeful. 
Calling behaviour purposeful has to be nothing more than a 'labelling' 
exercise (cf. Taylor, 1950) unless we can find some good reason, external 
to the behaviour itself, for so doing. Louch argues that moral justific- 
ation - the 'grounds' for acting in such and such a way - provides an 
adequate external context. Ackoff and Emery argue that "... idealized 
operational definitions and measures... " provide the only acceptable 
external context (p. 7). These definitions and measures "... provide 
standards in the same sense that ateleologically oriented sciences 
provide standards for structural concepts (for example, length, density, 
and energy in physics)" (p. 7; cf. Churchman, 1961a). 
(2) 
The question 
(1) Ackoff and Emery do not define desire but they do talk of 1'beliefs in 
utilities". They argue that to avoid the tautology of taking what an in- 
dividual says he wants for what he actually wants (p. 97) "". " we must find 
a type of behaviour he displays almost invariably when he is aware of their 
utlity and that he almost never displays otherwise" (p. 98). This avoids 
one tautology but commits another. 
(2) Again, Lundberg and Tolman anticipate Ackoff and Emery (op. cit. ). 
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thus arises whether these standards can be specified in such a way that 
they do not rely on background conceptual commitments or, if they cannot, 
what these back7round commitments are and what effect they have on the 
original intention of treating humans as purposeful. Louch argues 
that discovering the grounds of action requires investigation into the 
uses of language in a particular society as informed by historical 
study. It would take me too far afield to fully explain the justification 
for this, and I mention it here only to avoid the impression given by 
Ackoff and Rnery'that no reasonable alternatives to their approach exists. 
Louch, unlike Ackoff and Emery, is not concerned with developing a method- 
ology which conforms to a preconceived view of objectivity, but wants to 
avoid confounding the investigation of the social by its presupposition. 
The standards which Ackoff and Emery set up to explain human action 
consits, firstly, of the "parameters of a purposive state" which define 
the relationships which can possibly exist between the components of 
a purposive state and, secondly, the purposeful state itself. This defines 
the subject in his environement and its properties (available courses 
of action and outcomes possible). The parameters (the probabilities that 
the subject will choose particular courses of action and how efficient 
the'action is for producing an outcome which the individual values) 
relate the individual and his environment. The objectives of the exercise 
are (a) to define state and its parameters in a measurable way and (b) 
because they are all seen as co-producers of the behaviour, define them such 
that they are independently manipulable. Ackoff and Emery look upon the 
producer-product relationship as the It... most critical concept in... 
(their)... book"" (p. 22), and the employ it to define, behaviourally, the 
"personality" of an individual. "What the individual contributes to a 
choice situation, then, is a transformation of situational properties 
into probabilities of choice, efficiencies, and relative values" (p. 40). 
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They argue, therefore, that "... personality is... an observable function 
that describes how an individual or system converts a choice situation 
into an expected relative value for himself or itself" (p. 41). Personality 
is measured by independently measuring (by treating it as a dependent 
variable) each of the three parameters of a purposive state (courses of 
action, efficiency, and relative values). Thus, for example, to measure 
someone's intention (measure of end preference) we hold 'constant' any 
preferences the subject may have for certain means and also his knowledge 
of the efficiences of different means. We can then, they say, measure 
an individual's preference for certain outcomes by allowing these to 
vary whilst holding the other parameters constant and allowing him to 
choose. Over a large number of trials we arrive at a relative frequency 
score which is taken to be a measure of preference. Thus, 
"in measuring familiarity, knowledge and 
intention are held constant. In measuring 
knowledge, familiarity and intention are 
held constant. In measuring intention, 
familiarity and knowledge are held con- 
stant" (p. 42). 
Two questions arise concerning this scheme. Firstly, why is it approp- 
riate to attempt to analyse 'purposeful' behaviour in terms of ends, 
means and knowledge? Secondly, is it possible to measure any of the 
properties of a purposeful state (given that it is reasonable to measure 
these properties in the first place) 'scientificallyt, that is, by res- 
tricting ourselves to the recording and classifying of observable be- 
haviours? 
To address the first question: we have an image of the subject who 
'transforms' situations by 'generating inputs' (Chapter 4) of 'informational 
flows' which 'get through' to the subject; these inputs are used by the 
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subject to 'model the situation' as 'simplifications of reality' (Chapter 
5): the subject uses his modelto both $formulate' and 'evaluate' choices 
(Chapters 6& 7). Thus, 
" "Once a model is accepted, a choice of a 
course of action can be made... Intuition 
suggests possible courses of action that 
can be evaluated by use of the choice 
Model and the process of thought. The 
model itself is the product of past and 
present observations ors more generally, 
perceptions. The consequences predicted 
are evaluated by feeling. A course of 
action that is predicted to yield sat- 
isfaction is selected" (p. 133)" 
The subject is treated, as Simon (1957) would put it, as 'intendedly rational' 
if not fully rational in practice. The model of the subject employed to 
gain a foothold on understanding his behaviour, by being set up as fully 
integrated model of rationality (whereby the subject becomes comprehensible 
as a 'totality' by being a 'system' integrated by rules of rationality), 
runs the risk of denying the subject the very purposefulness which the 
scheme is intended to elicit. 
This point is brought out forcibly by Garfinkel (1974) when he 
deliberately exaggerates a distinction between 'common-sense' and 
'scientific' rationalities. Scientific rationalities are idealized pres- 
criptions for behaviour. Behaviour viewed within this scheme is deemed 
rational because of the logic of the scheme itself. The problem for the 
behavioural scientist employing this scheme is to identify behaviours 
and compare them with the rationality of the scheme. The rationality of 
'everyday life', however, is presumed to have its own logic. What is 
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data for the scheme which employs scientific rationality is taken as a 
nroblem in the scheme which looks for the rationality of everyday life, 
that is, the rationalities which people actually employ. The problem is 
the use of various rationalities (including the scientific rationalities) 
in the conduct of purposeful behaviour, and not the assignment of pieces 
of action as purposeful or non-purposeful by reference to a preconceived 
scheme which is used as the reference point for the meaningfulness of 
the action. Thus, Garfinkel's conclusion. ' on the use of the scientific 
rationalities model of investigation (see: pp. 60-1) is that; 
"it has been the purpose of this paper to re- 
commend the hypothesis that the scientific 
rationalities can be employed only as ineffec- 
tive ideals in the actions governed by. the 
presuppositions of everyday life. The scien- 
tific rationalities are neither stable feat- 
ures nor sanctionable ideals of daily routines, 
and any attempt to stabilize these properties 
or to enforce conformity to them in ihe conduct 
of everyday affairs will magnify the senseless 
character of a person's behavioural environ- 
ment and multiply the anomic features of the 
system of interaction" (p. 71). 
Thus, for Garfinkel, Ackoff and Emery take for granted the very thing of 
concern to the sociologist, namely, the rational achievement of rationality, 
by their reification of the individual in referring the meaning of his 
action to a preconceived logic of action. Ho-one would dispute that 
individuals 'think', 'feel' and 'evaluate' etc. --'The question is on what 
bases are these properties dependent? Garfinkel puts the problem facing 
the sociologist in this way: 
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"... sociological inquiry accepts almost as 
a truism that the ability of a person to act 
'rationally'... depends upon the fact that 
the person must be able literally to take 
for granted, to take under trust, a vast 
array of features of the social order... 
"The sociologist refers to these trusted, 
taken for granted, background features 
of a person's situation, that is, the 
routine aspects of the situation that per- 
mit ! rational action', as mores and folkways" 
(P" 72). 
The sociologist is concerned to investigate these mores and folkwrjs. 
In Ackoff and Emery's scheme these prerequisites to rationally purposeful 
behaviour are ignored. The question thus arises as to whether this defect 
can be remedied within their scheme (the impression one gets is that they 
believe that, for example, norms could be derived purely statistically as 
average behaviour in the classical Durkheimian sense: for a criticism 
of this approach from a somewhat similar point of view to that of Gar- 
finkel's see: Filmer et al, 1972, Chapter 3). 
Consider the problem of actually using their scheme. Suppose we 
wish, for example, to measure a subject's "beliefs in efficiency" (p. 90). 
We are told that: 
"As long as there is the possibility that 
the individual in this environment is 
pursuing many different ends, we cannot 
use his behaviour directly as evidence 
/313 
of what efficiency he believes a course 
of action to have with respect to any 
one outcome, for we do not know with 
respect to which outcome his behaviour 
can be taken as an indicator of such 
belief. 
"(Thus)... to determine an individual's 
belief in the efficiency of a course 
of action for any outcome, it is necess- 
ary for us to isolate the outcome no 
that his choices cannot be taken to be 
serving any other objectives" (p. 91). 
How would one know, in the first place, whether there was any "possibility" 
that the individual had different ends? According to their scheme the 
answer is simple: control for beliefs in efficiency and knowledge and 
measure the ends that the individual is actually pursuing in this envir- 
onment. But, it was beliefs in efficiencies that we were concerned with 
in the first placel To hold them constant we have to know them, but to 
know them we also have to hold them constant so that we can be sure of 
the ends to which they are relevant! In Ackoff and Emery's scheme of 
measurement gaining knowledge of anything presupposes that the very know- 
ledge in question is already at hand. In measuring preferences for ends 
we have to know that preferences for means are equal. Now do we know' 
this? The only way we could know this, according to their scheme, is 
by measuring means preferences when ends are equally preferred. And 
we can only know whether ends are equally preferred by measuring them with 
means held constant. There seems to me no acceptable way within the 
confines of their scheme-of breaking this (vicious) circularity. It might 
be suggested that we could, by making an initial common-sense evaluation 
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of the relation of ends and means to situations by reference to what 
would be 'reasonable' to expect in this situation, 'converge' on a correct 
measurement. Could we check out the reasonableness of our assumptions 
by attempting to 'falsify' them by observed behaviour (as suggested by 
Emshoff, 1975). Clearly we could not. We could rover be sure that the 
behaviour gras more than 'coincidentally' congruent with our assumptions 
and, what is more to the point, even if they (eventually) always coincided 
on what basis would we be able to claim that we had 'explained' the 
behaviour, as Ackoff and Emery argues is necessary (p. 11)? To be sure, 
ways of relating the assumptions and the predictions could possibly be 
found, but what confidence could we have that even as a totality these 
referred to the purposeful behaviour of individuals? Set against their 
claims to have provided the basis of an objective science which does not 
make subjective judgements to conceal its ignorance, the subjectivity of 
the researcher plays the key role in a completely unexplored way. Nor 
is this likely to be explored, and for two reasons. Firstly, Ackoff and 
Emery seem overcommitted to-the power of the producer-product scheme of 
causal relationships as a way of resolving the problem of explanation. 
Commenting on this approach, Keat and Urry (op. cit. ) "... find problematic 
the manner in which different types of causal conditions are somehow 
combined or conjoined to constitute the complete cause" (p. 32). As we 
have seen, the producer-product scheme is essentially open-ended. No 
guidance is given as to the relevant producers or on how they are related 
to each other to produce the product. Thus, when, for example, the ' 
researcher makes assumptions which are not borne out by experience, where 
is he to turn to, an Emshoff (op. cit., p. 691) puts it, make his 'theory' 
more 'general'? 
The second reason for believing that the subjectivity of the re- 
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searcher will not be explored is that, in the view of Emshoff at least, 
OR cannot (for some unexplained reason) "... afford to rely on other 
disciplines that have different methodological bases of research to provide 
it with the needed techniques for modelling behavioural systems" (p. 676). 
Combining this with the open-endedness of the producer-produce scheme, 
we can expect needless, wasteful and often erroneous speculation on the 
reasonableness of assumptions about 'behavioural systems'. Let us return 
now to the original purpose of this excursion into Ackoff and Emeryls 
scheme for measuring purposeful behaviour, having now demonstrated that it 
is logically incomplete. 
Given the necessity in Ackoff and Emery's scheme for making prior 
assumptions about the nature of purposefulness, we can appreciate the 
temptation which they must feel for making general assumptions about 
the nature of the social world and the relationship of individuals to it. 
It would be very convenient indeed if it were reasonable to assume that 
(to repeat) "the intention to coproduce common objectives is what produces 
the interactions that lead individuals to cohere as a social group" (p. 213)" 
Hence, by theoretical inclination, and this temptation opened up by their 
approach to the measurement of purposeful behaviour, Ackoff and Emery 
are led to reify the organization as a social individual and yet, at the 
same time, maintain that its parts are purposeful. For Ackoff and 
Emery's scheme to be workable it is only too natural for them to be 
driven to see the purposefulness of individuals only as an expression*of 
the collective will. It is only by this reification of the individual 
and organization that it is possible to resolve the logical weakness of 
their scheme of measurement and at the same time assert, as they do, that 
"an organization is a social system in which the state of a part can be 
determined only by reference to the state of the system" (p. 218). That 
this reification is consistent with their definition of purposefulness 
says more for their powers of reasoning than it does for the usefulness 
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of their scheme. 
There are, then, some good reasons for Ackoff and Emery making 
broad assumptions about the typical orient4tions which actors take 
towards action, just as Parsons argues that we must make assumptions 
about the "pattern variables" which characterise any social system. 
The reason that they choose to assume a general consensus over collective 
ends follows from their desire to deal, in terms of their own version 
of what it is to be scientific, with social systems. To find purpose 
in the behaviour of a social system requires that the purpose be 
intially assumed, as we have seen at the level of individuals. Following 
this through, it would not be possible to measure the purposeful 
state of a social system if that system (through its members) were 
pursuing divergent ends. It it were pursuing divergent ends then the 
circularity involved in their scheme would prevent measurement of its 
purposeful state. For Ackoff and Emery's scheme to make sense at the 
level of social systems the social system has to be pursuing collectively 
shared ends. 'de have to assume this as a starting point. The preoccupation 
which they show with consensus (extending to consensus at the level of 
ideals, see: p. 246) while at the same time asserting that'the essence 
of purposefulness is the ability to choose ends can, then, be partly 
explained in terms of its resolution of a gap in their methodology(1). 
The consensus assumption, however, also serves another function. 
It allows us to simultaneously assert the purposefulness of individuals 
and, at the same time, claim to be able to find the purposeful of the 
collective by observing the behaviour of the individual. The desire to 
do this can be found in the early work of Churchman et al (op cit) 'ezhen 
(1) Further evidence of the consensus assumption in Ackoff's work is 
provided by his opinion that the use of scenarios "... enable an organization's 
management to reach consensus on the kind of business it would like to be in and the way (style) in which it would like to conduct it" (1970, p. 41). 
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they advocate the study of an organization as a communication network 
as the first stage of a study towards It... understand(ing) the organization 
and the resulting system.!. " (p. 110, my emphasis). Viewing the 
organization as a communication network which can be studied as such 
to find out the expression of the collective will in it (which, of 
course, is then to be improved upon by OR) only makes sense if it is 
assumed that the purposefulness of individuals is oriented towards 
collective goals. Similar comments apply to Ackoff's (1970) advocation 
of the construction of a decision network. Even with the elimination 
of unnecessary flows, and the institution of needed control, there 
is no a priori reason, 'outside of a consensus assumption, why this 
make sense. Why, for example, it "... makes it possible to identify the 
decisions required to run the business... " (p. 91). Assuming that 
individuals are purposeful and are purposefully pursuing their own 
goals might lead us to the conclusion that the decisions being made 
were necessary for the pursuit of the objectives of the individual 
decision makers (as these were mediated by many different factors which 
are not necessarily adequately catered for by the notion of organizational 
goals or theories of motivation and personality--cf. Silverman, op cit). 
It is noteworthy that the najor impetus for viewing an organization as 
a communication system was Simon 
(particularly 1957) who explicitly 
assumes (following Barnard, 1964) that the equivalent of consensus is a 
necessary feature of organizational life. Simon prefers to achieve 
the same result as the consensus assumption via his "inducements-contributions" 
balance theory of organizational equilibrium. That Simon's model rests 
on the effective non-purposeful character of individuals is shown very 
clearly by the work of Krupp (1961, especially chapter 8). 
An Illustration of the Impact of OR's Social Theory on its Ideals: Conflict 
Power, and the Problem of Interests: 
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The consensus assumption seems as essential for the theory 
of OR as it is for Parsons' theory of social systems. Without it 
the perceived necessity of formulating OR's task within the modern 
problem of order would be the source of much anxiety. This anxiety 
is subdued by the assumption. But what is the cost to OR in attempting 
to formulate its task within this theoretical framework? We can 
conclude by pointing out one of the severe limitations which the 
consensus assumption (and related theoretical framework) has on our 
ability to come to grips with social reality and the impact which this 
has on the feasibility of '0R achieving its ideals. 
The specific limitation which I shall discuss is the inability 
of the theoretical framework associated with the consensus assumption 
to allow us to adequately deal with a phenomenon which OR has a 
declared interest in, namely, conflict. OR explicitly recognises the 
existence of conflict as a necessary part of'the problem of order. This 
interest should have been heightened by the modern reformulation of the 
modern problem of order. It has not. Although, I have. argued, OR relies 
on a model of the social world to give a coherent account of itself, 
nowhere in OR has there been an attempt to develop an understanding of 
the social nature of conflict (although some interest has been shown in 
the 'logic' of conflict, e. g., Rappoport, 1961). It is predictable that 
such interest as is shown in this phenomenon is tailored to fit within 
the consensus paradigm; precisely the same way that we have seen the 
notion of purposefulness truncated by boing forced to fit within a pre- 
conceived model of the social world which is dominated by the collective. 
The biases introduced by the consensus assumption have been high- 
lighted in what is probably the most worked out part of the overall 
/319 
hl 
critique of Parsonian-type sociology. The general objective of this 
part of the critique has not been to show a 'conflict model' is generally 
preferable (although some critics have argued in this way, see: Dahrendorf 
(1959). Rather, the critics have argued that the major defect of the con- 
sensus model is that its selective attention to the phenomenon of normative 
regulation has rendered it incapable of providing a general theoretical 
orientation which can deal with the reality of social systems (Lockwood, 
1970; Rex, op. cit., Giddens, 1970), and not that the phenomenon with 
which it does'deal is unimportant. 
The argument has been advanced by these critics that conflict 
(and the inextricably related phenomenon of power) is a pervasive feature 
of social life and that the problem facing sociology is the development 
of theory adequate to grasp both the nature and existence of conflict, and 
its relationships to the nature and existence of normative regulation. 
As Giddens puts it, "... the real problems which have to be tackled, and 
which lie at the root of much of the debate, concern how leritimation 
is 
mediated in its operation in systems of parer" 
(1970, p. 462). The real 
worry has been not just that the consensus model ignores the reality of 
conflict but that in doing so it ignores social reality. Focussing on 
consensus is not merely partial, the argument runs, it is wrong. In 
fact, of course, the consensus model does not totally ignore conflict; 
the problem of order is premissed on potential conflict. However, as 
we have seen, the problem of order is set up as an opposition between the 
collective and the individual. With this initial commitment, with the 
collective and the individual already assigned their realities in the 
conceptual universe, conflict becomes visible only as an"operation" of 
that reality and cannot be seen as constitutive of it. That this weakness 
is intrinsic to Durkheim's view of the problem of order has been pointed 
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out by Coser (1960): 
"Dur1heii was forced to assure that the 
major social norms generally express the 
sentiments of the total society. He 
never seriously entertained the idea that 
they might only express the sentiments 
of a specific stratus within it. If it 
is affirmed a priori that the major 
social norms express the sentiments of 
the total collectivity, then one cannot 
recognize conflicting norms orithin a 
society; one cannot understand... that 
certain subordinate social strata may 
accept a norm only because it is im- 
posed upon them by violence or because 
they passively submit to its whereas it 
is thegenuine expression of the moral 
sentiment of only a superordinate 
stratum" (p. 218). 
A similar point is made by Giddens (1970) with respect to the consensus 
model of Parsons: 
"'Conflict of interest', in this concep- 
tion, never becomes anything more than 
a clash between the purposes of indi±id- 
ual actors and the 'interests' of the 
collectivity. In such a perspectivo, 
power cannot be treated as a problematic 
component of divergent group interests 
embodied in social action, since meshing 
of interests is treated first and fore- 
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Most as a problem of the relation bet- 
ween 'the individual' and 'society"? 
(p. 97). 
I shall only deal in detail with Ackoff and Emery's development of the 
concept of conflict as it is seen to affect OR. Before doing this, however, 
let us briefly look at the 'problem'of conflict as is to be found in 
a section of Lawrence (1966), aptly titled "Conflict Resolution and 
Control" (Part IV). The title is apt because it suggest the overall 
orientation towards conflict: the 'problems' are to resolve it and/or 
control it. That this orientation is taken towards conflict is not 
surprising, considering the underlying tendency, expressed by Trist in his 
introduction, to view conflict as stemming from "our inherent destructive 
tendencies... "which emerge only under the agency of the exceptional in- 
dividuals who are not adequately socialized, "... resulting in the extremes 
of mental illness or anti-social behaviour" (p. 367)" When conflict is 
seen as "regressive behaviour" (p. 368) the only reasonable implication 
is that consensus is the 'norm'.. ( or that 'society' is collapsing). Ido 
attempt was made to assess the causes of conflict in terms of the conflicts 
of interest of groups of motivated individuals who attempt to skillfully 
manage their social and economic existence within the context of differen- 
tial access to resources of power (cf. Burns and Stalker, 1961 and the 
interpretation by Silverman, op. cit., Chapter 7, of Gouldner's analysis 
of a 'Wildcat Strike' (1965)). Instead, we have, for example, Walton' 
who stresses the conflict arising from the tensions between organizational 
roles in lateral interaction (p. 409 ff. ); similarly, Ackoff (p. 427 ff. ) 
concentrates on 'structural conflicts within organizations', those conflicts 
which 'arise' because of flaws in the incentives 'inherent' in the organiz- 
ational structure. These emphases are indicative of a view of conflict which 
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sees it as a flaw in a given social reality, rather than it being part of 
that social reality (similar comments are made by Mayyntz, op. cit., p. 115, 
on Beer (19 k) and other advocates of viewing organizations as self- 
regulating systems). It is not merely that such writers as Walton and 
Ackoff overemphasise specialization as the basis of conflict. fitti and 
Goldner (1969) have pointed out that "... specialization is only one 
dimension of conflict and competition" (p. B-2k5). The complaint is rather 
OR has not perceived that the "... important research problem... is the 
understanding of how organizational actions are affected by the complex 
identities and expectations of organizational members at all levels... 
(and)... more fundamentally, the problem... (of)... describ(ing) hob: 
members do perceive their identities in the fluid, cross-cutting environ- 
ment of the modern technology-based organization" (pp. B- 245-6). There 
is a growing desire in OR circles to model decision-making processes in 
organizations (as evidenced not only by Ackoff, 1970, but also Stringer 
op. cit., and Eden, 1976). Ritti and Goldner should be pointing out the 
obvious when they say that "the explanation of... conflicting interests 
among organizational factions is a major concern in the systematic 
study 
of organizations... for the understanding it brings to the processes by 
which decisions are reached and the resources of the organization allocated 
among competing alternatives" 
(p. B-233). As far as OR is concerned, they 
are notl The emphasis in OR, because the collective is taken as given, 
is on the consequences and not the causes of conflict (cf. Silverman, 
op. cit., p. 58) except insofar as the causes are indicative of the con- 
sequence that the collective. is not functioning properlyl This general 
orientation towards conflict is to be found in the treatment of it by 
Ackoff and Emery. 
That they see conflict as a somewhat 'unreal' phenomenon is indicated 
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by the following: 
"To say the members of a social group share 
a common objective is not to say that they 
do not conflict... with respect to other 
objectives or even with respect to the cour- 
ses of action by which the common objective 
should be pursued. Similarly, we cannot 
ignore the factors that may lead to relative 
indifferences or independence... with respect 
to achieving the-common objective. Such 
conflicts hinder and disrupt cooperation and 
communication, and undermine the cohesiveness 
of groups. Consequently the organization 
of groups must be adapted to manage conflict 
and assure adequate communication and coop- 
oration with respect to the group's corznon 
objective" (p. 214). 
Firstly, we can note that 'by definition' there cannot be conflict within 
a social group over what the common objective should be. Thus, an 
organization in which such conflict was present (a common enough occurence, 
see the case studies presented by Perrow 1970, Chapter 5; see also, Perrow, 
1961) would presumably not exists One thing is certain, such an organization 
has no theoretical existence in their scheme. Secondly, we can note that 
conflict is by definition a 'bad thing'; 
(') 
it must be removed if we are 
to have'a social group at all. One would have thought that the adoption 
of this normative stance would have encouraged efforts to develop theoretical 
schemes which would lay bare the causes of conflict so that it could ade- 
(1) Precisely the reverse of the way Churchman et. al. claim to view its 
as we have seen. 
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quately be removed. This, however, is not forthcoming. In their chapter 
on 1Conflict, Cooperation, and Competition' (Chapter 12) there is an 
almost exclusive preoccupation with the consequences of conflict: we are 
given a definition of conflict in terms of its affects on the values of 
the'conflicting parties (p. 197) and the rest of the chapter is devoted 
to "ways of affecting conflict". 
Given that conflict is defined by its consequences it follows that 
to 'affect' it we modify those consequences. As the consequences result 
(obviously) from behaviour we affect the consequences by affecting the 
behaviour of the conflicting parties directly (either "resolution" or 
"solution" depending on the party concerned) or by changing the 'environ- 
ment' ("dissolution"). Even if we could effectively modify the behaviour 
of the participants by the use of Ackoff and Emery's scheme of purposeful 
behaviour, that scheme would be of no use for explaining the conflictual 
behaviour in the first place. That is, even if Ackoff and Emery's scheme 
allowed us to modify the purposeful states of the individuals (or groups) 
concerned, we could not use that scheme to tell us why they had those 
purposeful states in the first place. The nearest that they get to anything 
approaching an explanation is cast in terms of the consensus model. They 
argue that "people tend to cooperate more when they can communicate with 
each other than when they cannot" (p. 206), the principle being, pres- 
umably, that through communication people can find their common interest. 
As they go on to say: "Social groups are normally held together by coop- 
erative interactions among their members" (ibid), because in a 'social 
group",... such contact as thereis tends to further the common objective" 
(p. "214). It should be obvious (cf. Schelling, 1963) that conflict is 
sometimes reduced by the curtailment of communication, and also that it 
may increasy with an increase in communication. It is only by swallowing 
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the consensus model hook, line, and sinker that one could so systematically 
overlook these possibilities. 
() 
Clear evidence of the insular circularity of Ackoff's approach 
to conflict, whereby it is both defined in terms of and is also resolved 
by the'system' is to be found in an exchange between him (1974,1975) 
and Chesterton. et al (1975) on the question of the 'Social Responsibility 
of Operational Research". We have seen Ackoff argue that the role of the 
manager and the management scientist is to resolve the conflicts between 
the three levels of system (the individual, the organization, and the en- 
compassing system (society)). He tells us, more specifically, that 
the task is "... to learn how to remove the apparent conflict between 
these lvels of purpose - subsystem, system, and the suprasystem - and to 
find strategies which serve each of them. efficiently" (1974, p. 362, my 
emphasis). Whereas Ackoff talks of 'apparent' conflict, Ackoff's critics 
(Chesterton et al) talk of a "... basic conflict between managers (and 
their scientists) and the managed", this difference being based, as they 
see it, on "... a difference of understanding about the nature of the 
dominant structural relationships" (p 91). Although they do not say what 
they see as the dominant structural relationships, it is clear that con- 
flict for them is 'basic' if it is produced by structural relationshops 
(which would therefore take structural changes to remove). Ackoff's 
comment that "they do not define basic conflict" (1975, p. 96) is therefore 
unwarranted. He, however, interprets their view as a concern for the 
fact that-!!.. o the conflict in question is unresolvable in principle" (p. 96), 
and using such a vague term as''prind. plo'it is open to him to say what 
sort of principle should be applied. For him the principle should be 
applied. For him the principle to be_ applied is that "... the only 
conflicts that are not resolvable in principle are ones involving 1o gically 
(1) Ackoff and Emery's comments on the 'ineviable' effects of communication are strongly reminiscent of the much criticized theories of the functionalist Homans (1950). For a trenchant criticism of the naivete of this position see Louch (op. cit. pp. 14-19). 
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incompatible ends" (ibid - whereas Rosenhead in a further reply reemphasises 
that his concern is the "the social incompatibility of ends" (1976). We 
could, perhaps, interpret Ackoff's critics as asking 'what is the reality 
of conflict, and when is it really resolved? ' To this Ackoff in effect 
replies, 'a conflict is really resolved if it is resolvable in principle 
and that principle is applied to effect a resolution'. We could, then, 
understand the reality of conflict and its resolution if we could understand 
what was meant by Ackoff's use of-the term 'logic'. He gives us his 
answer: the reality of conflicts and their resolution is whether a It... con- 
flict that appears to be unresolvable at one level of means or ends is 
subject to resolution at'a higher level of desirability" (ibid). This is 
the logic of which Ackoff talks, but, in fact, it is a completely circular 
logic, because it should not have gone unnoticed that the logic by which 
the conflict resolution is judged is the systems logic! Saying that conflict 
can be resolved at a higher level of desirability is merely a reiteration 
of the systems 'view from which Ackoff started which says that subsystems 
are 'parts' of larger systems, and by definition for any two parts there 
is a' system of which both are subsystems. If this is so 
(and it is an 
axiom of the systems view) the higher system always provides the basis for 
the resolution of subsystem conflict. In Ackoff's view, therefore, for 
conflict to be irreconcilable would be a denial of the systems approach 
(for an identical view to that of Ackoff see: Churchman and Emery, 1966, 
p. 81) which we have seen defines "an organization... 
(as)... a purposeful 
system that contains at least two purposeful elements which have a common 
purpose" (Ackoff, 1971, p. 89). As an organization is defined to have 
this 'higher level' (which provides the basis for conflict resolution), 
basic conflict would again mean the non-existence of the organization! 
(ýý 
(1) This follows, in fact, from the functionalist view of organizations a 
co-operative systems. As Allen (1975) puts it: "The assumption that organ- 
izations were co-operative systems allowed participants to be accounted for 
within the formal system of control as individuals or members of small groups 
and permitted the introduction into the analysis of personal goals which 
...... cont. 
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If OR is prevented because of its sociological commitments from 
äpproaching an adequate conceptualisation of conflict, it follows that 
it could not approach an adequate conceptualisation of power. Ackoff 
and Emery do not even attempt a dfinition of power, and I know of no 
operations researcher-who has considered the impact of the phenomenon on 
their work (although it could be considerable: see, Bevan and Dryer, 
forthcoming). Ackoff and Emery clearly see no need to attempt an under- 
standing of power when they "note that cooperation and conflict exhaust 
the ways in which one individual can affect the expected relative values 
of others" (p. 197). Although Ackoff and Emery do not explicitly define 
power, a definition is in fact implicitly provided by their definition of 
conflict. For Ackoff and Emery one individual A is in conflict with another 
individual B when (say) the subjective interests of A (his "expected value") 
is less than it would otherwise have been because of the presence of B. In 
accordance with their scheme the only way in which we could measure the 
impact of B upon A would be in terms of what they call"... intersystem 
behaviour-- that is, where there is an intent to coproduce a behaviour 
in the other... " (p. 139). Within this framework one might easily define 
power as the ability of B to influence by his behaviour the subjective 
interests of A. To measure Ackoff and Emery's (implicit) concept of 
power one would look at how the observable behaviour of B influenced the 
subjective interests of A. Ackoff and Emery's scheme is, in fact, quite 
(1) cont. 
participants hoped to achieve within the organization. These personal goals 
might be consistent or inconsistent with the formal organizational goal. 
But the assumption that action was co-operative meant that the organization 
had qualities to survive a predominance of multiple personal goals which 
conflicted with the formal organizational one" (p. 104). Also, he goes one 
with reference to the existence of systems, "if there are systems it must be assumed that in some way they can maintain their identities, otherwiä 
system is not a workable concept" (p. 105). 
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sophisticated by the prevailing standards of political sociology where 
most of the attempts to develop a concept of power are to be found. Their 
scheme easily handles all forms of overt (i. e. behavioural) influences. 
As they say, "one system can affect the behaviour of another... by producing 
a change in one or more of the four components of the other system's 
choice situation, or in one or more of the other's parameters of choice" 
(p. 142). All the features that for them coproduce behaviour can be man- 
ipulated, and hence they form (potentially) part of their definition of 
power. By Lukes' (1974) classification of power concepts Ackoff and Emery's 
notion would be "two-dimensional". The features of both the one and two 
dimensional views of power are (a) the influence of B over A by BIB be- 
haviour which (b) affects A's subjective interests in (c) a situation of 
overt conflict. The two-dimensional view adds to this 'agenda-rigging', 
whereby power is exercised by the deliberate manipulation of what are taken 
by A to be 'issues' affecting his interests. For both Ackoff and Emery 
and the proponents of the one and two-dimensional views power is undetec- 
table except through the influence of observable behaviour on subjective 
interests. Again, like Ackoff and Emery, subjective interests are only 
detectable as they are revealed in behaviour, i. e., as 'policy preferences'. 
It is in these two commitments that Lukes finds the weaknesses of the one 
and two dimensional views in comparison to a three-dimensional view which 
he erects. The three-dimensional view argues that the concentration on 
observable instances of the exercise of power is inadequate because "... the 
bias of the system is not sustained simply by a series of individually 
chosen acts, but also, most importantly, by the socially structured and 
culturally patterned behaviour"of»groups, and practices of institutions, 
which may indeed be manifested by individuals' inaction" (Luker, op. cit., 
p. 21). The argument is a realist one; we must look for underlying struc- 
tures and see power, as ýý... a function of collective forces and social 
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arrangements" (p. 22). The three-dimensional view not only takes issue 
with the view that the form of the power must be sought in observable 
behaviour, but also with the view which argues that the existence of the 
exercise of power is provided by the criterion of overt conflict. Just 
as Ackoff and Emery cannot explain the origin of conflict, they cannot 
explain its non-existence either. And this is just as important because, 
as Lukes says in criticism of the one and two-dimensional views, "to 
assume that the abserdce of grievance equals genuine consensus is simply 
to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by definit- 
ional fiat" (p. 24). There are serious issues raised for OR by these 
defects. 
It is, first and foremost, an unacceptable limitation on our ability 
to investigate the social world. There is no a priori reason for assuming 
that the social world will be revealed to us solely in terms of observable 
behaviour, and every reason against such an assumption if we follow the 
realists and structuralists. Another important consequence of limiting 
the concept of interest to preferences expressed in conflictual behaviour 
is the implication, noted by Connolly (1972), that "... there simply 
cannot be "unarticulated interests"; those without, particular policy 
preferences in certain areas must be viewed as not having an interest in 
a given policy result" 
(p. 462). It is possible within the three-dimensional 
view of power to make the important distinction betwen 'real' and 'subjective' 
interests; it is not possible to make this distinction within the one, and 
two-dimensional views. The latter are firmly restricted to a consideration 
of subjective interests only. Since an individual's expressed preference 
depends crucially on the range of alternatives which are available for him 
to consciously choose between (as Ackoff and Enery and many other operations 
researchers accept), our entitlement to claim that an individual is acting 
in his 'real' or 'best' interests depends on our justified belief that he 
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has chosen from the best alternatives which he really has. It is frequently 
claimed on behalf of OR that a major function performed by it is the display 
of realistic alternatives before a decision-maker from which he can choose. 
It is, of course, fundamental to the view of Ackoff and Emery (and Church- 
man, 1961) that what an individual's ends really are can only be determined 
by his choice amongst a range of alternatives. Thus, it would seem that OR 
embraces a concept of 'real' interests. 
( ) 
We have seen, for example, 
Rivett (op. cit. ) telling us not to rely on "... asking some benevolent 
company president to tell us the organization's objectives" and that, instead, 
we should "... look at an intricate, social grouping of people working 
together and try to understand the collective will... " 
(p. 227). Precisely 
the same injunction is made by those social scientists 
(e. g., Katz and 
Kahn,, 1966; Miller and Rice, 19rj7)who accept the consensus view). Thus, 
there seems to be clear evidence that OR does make a distinction between 
'subjective' and, as Balbus (1971) terms it, 'objectives interests. 
Surely Ackoff desires to resolve conflicts between subsystem, system, 
and suprasystem such that their 'objective' 
interests are mot? Balbus 
draws the distinction in precisely a way which should be appealing to 
operations researchers. He says that"'... -our ordinary language recognises 
an objective meaning entailed in the concept of 
"interests', so that when 
we say an individual has an "interest in" something we mean 
that he has 
a stake in it or is "affected by it" 
(p. 152). Thus, "in this objective 
sense of the tern the existence of the interest is not contingent upon the 
(1) The determination of an individual's real interests amounts to the 
problem of determining valid 'counterfactuals' i. e., the interests an in- 
dividual. tw3u'd have'. -under certain, conditions e. g., (perfect knowledge(. 
This idea is central to Churchman's (1961) and Ackoff's (1962) views. For 
example, Ackoff justifies the maximization of the expected value of a course 
of action as'a- criterion whereby a problem can be said to be 'solved' on 
the grounds that it is the criterion which ýýý.. "rianld be preferred under 
idealized conditions in which the decision maker has perfect knowledge (p. 64). 
.... e cont. 
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individual's awareness that he has the interest, i. e., upon any psycholog- 
ical state in the mind of the individual. A person may be affected by 
something whether or not he realizes it; hence evidence can be marshalled 
to demonstrate that an individual has an interest even if he is not aware 
of it or even that what an individual thinks is in his interest is in 
fact not in his interest" iibid, my emphasis). 
We have here, in fact, a direct conflict between, on the one hand, 
the aspiration of OR to serve the objective interests of individuals and 
the systems which they constitute and, on the other, the possibilities 
which are open to it by reason of its constraining conceptual commitments. 
In this conflict it is the aspiration which loses out. Also, the ideal 
of free inquiry crumbles immediately we accept the restriction of confining 
our inquiries. to observable behaviour. because, as Lukes puts it in a criticism 
of the 'pluralist' school in political science lino accept it, "... the 
trouble is that, by doing this, by studying the making of important decisions 
within the community, they were simply taking over and reproducing the 
bias of the system they were studying" (p. 36). Without a developed con- 
ception of the social world which a developed conception of power and 
conflict presupposes, the very result OR aspires to avoid is in fact achieved. 
The only assumption that could save this result is that the social system 
is unbiased, but then what need is there for OR? It has been pointed out 
(e. g., by Gouldner, 1970) that this is precisely the assumption lying behind 
(1) Cont. 
Also Churchman (1968) argues that "the operations researcher... feels that 
a very important part of his role is to prevent unsatisfactory suboptim- 
ization. He believes that his responsibility is not merely to translate 
what the client La s his needs are, but to study these needs in relation 
to the broader ainis of the client" (p. 13)" 
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Parsonian sociology. Balbus (op. cit. ) makes the same point against 
Bentley, the acknowledged father of pluralism, when he says that "... if 
the political process is nothing but overt activity, and if interests are 
manifested solely through overt group activity, then it is logically 
impossible to say that certain interests are being ignored, distorted, 
or discriminated against in the policy-making process" (p. 158). Thus, 
Ws desire to remedy sub-optimization is guaranteed fulfillment: it is 
logically impossible within its conceptual framework for there to be any 
suboptimizationl 
The promotion of objective interests is not achieved merely by the 
institution of social processes of interaction, even though such innovations 
have been proposed, partly at least, on the recognition of the distinction 
between objective and subjective interests (this is particularly true of 
Churchman). The obvious reason why not is that it is the context within 
which such interactions are to take place which are, in the three-dimensional 
view of power, the subject of concern. It is impossible to see how, for 
example, we could have any faith that Ackoffts 'humanization' and 'democ- 
ratization' (cf. also. Thorsrud and Emery, in Lawrence, opo cit. 
) proposals 
could lead to the furtherance of objective interests, 
(1) 
even though he 
argues that one should never "... force anything on workers or anyone else 
that they... (do)... not want" or "... pretend to know bettor than the 
workers what is in their best interests" 
(1975, PP" 97-98). Balbus suggests 
(1) which are partly based on the equivocal, if not largely discredited, 
'job enlargement' thesis for which Ackoff (1974) takes the authority of 
Blumberg (1969). Human Relationists, from whom this thesis emanated, have 
according to Perrow (1972) largely abandoned it. Also, Hulin and Blood 
(1968) after surveying much of the work done on the thesis conclude that 
the studies which support it are unscientific, and thou which do not support 
it are scientific (p. 50). 
P 
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that to operationalize the concept of objective interests requires an 
'objective' analysis of the whole system of which the individual is a 
part. Thus, he argues that the objective sense of interest "... is objective 
because. it refers to an effect by something on the individual which can 
be observed and measured by standards external to the individual's conscious- 
ness"; we should be concerned, he says, with the It... complex interdepend- 
encies within our society which bind men together and shape their destinies" 
(ibid). To discover objective interests one has to be concerned with 
nothing less than the It... structure of social organization as a whole... " 
(p. 156). Ackoff has not tackled the "... theoretical problem... (of)... 
understand(ing) the relationship between the way in which individuals. 
interact'to objectively affect each other's life chances and the way in 
which they perceive these interactions, i. o., to understand the origins 
of consciousness" (ibid). ? or has he shorm any inclination in practice 
to do so. 
In Ackoff's book 'Redisigning the Future' (1970) he presents a 
number of designs to solve real-world, large-scale problems, which he 
says are inspired by the systems approach. It icy of course, bard to 
say to what extent the solutions would be accepted by other analysts 
adopting the systerns approach. However, in fact many of the solutions 
were proposed by other analysts. 
(I) 
I believe that most, if not all, of 
the solutions are built on assumptions about the nature of the social world 
(1) Also, a critical analysis of several instances of systems analystse 
attempts to apply the systems approach to large-scale real-vorld problems 
has been made by Hoos (1972). She comes to much the came general con- 
clusions as I do. 
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which would be objectionable to a large number of modern social scientists. 
I cannot subject all the solutions to the scrutiny which they deserve, 
and we will have to remain content, in this already overburdened chapter, 
with two brief illustrations. 
In his solution to the ghetto problem the central assumption is that 
the reason for the persistence of ghettos is that there is a vicious 
circle of poverty which can be broken by the injection of some minimal 
amount of resources. Thus: "The blacks cannot go it alone in a white 
dominated society. They need access to human and material resources con- 
trolled by whites. They need whites working for them, not on them. This 
requires whites placing themselves and some of their resources at the dis- 
posal of the blacks, to be used as the blacks see fit" (p. 120). Although 
Ackoff presents this as a new solution, it is, in fact, the typical one 
which has been tried and which has repeatedly failed. I think it is fair 
to say that Ackoff's view is that it is a disequilibrium which has to be 
corrected. Hardly any other view is possible within the system's approach. 
However, the systems approach teaches us that what may look like a dis- 
equilibrium when the system is viewed one way, may turn out to be an in- 
correct specification of the system when viewed from another ('higher') 
level. The comments of a well-known student of planning, Harvey (1973), 
are relevant to Ackoff's assumption. Noting that the typical assumption 
made in approaching the ghetto problem is that we have a system in dis- 
equilibrium, he goes on to say tha although we might ' 
"... try to get back into equilibrium by 
attracting employment back into the city 
centre by urban renewal projects, support 
of black capitalism, and the like... (A)ll 
of these solutions have as their basis the 
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tacit assumption that there is a disequil- 
ibriw in urban land use and that policy 
should be directed towards getting urban 
land use back into balance. These sol- 
utions are liberal in that they recognize 
inequity but seek to cure that inequity 
within an existing set of social mechanisms 
... 
(p. 135).. (A)lthough all serious an- 
alysts concede the seriousness of the ghetto 
problem, few call into question the forces 
which rule the vezy heart of our economic 
systet " (p. 144). 
From the viewpoint of political sociology (or 'political economy') Ackoff's 
solution is the blatantly 'incrementalist' approach of which Churcl=an 
(1968, p. 71) complains. 
I shall be brief with my comments on Ackoff's views on education. 
Ackoff has may wise things to say about education. About how it 'processes' 
pupils in stereotyped ways to produce sterotyped 'products'; how education 
should be a process of learning rather than teaching which should allow 
the child to develop his/her individuality; how a major problem is motiv- 
ation to learn; and how the teacher's role is sometimes redundant etc. 
Early on in making his case for systems age education which gets around 
these problems he refers to Ivan Illich (1971) on the necessity for ' 
'deschooling society'. So far so good. Against this background, however, 
we are suddenly confronted with what appears to be Ackoff's only systemic 
device for implementing these good ideas (we are otherwise left guessing 
as to how they could possibly be achieved), namely, the market system. 
Ackoff, in advocating the "voucher" system advocated by Jencks, a system 
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which provides each child educational 'money' (cashed by the government) 
which the school uses as its source of income on being selected by the 
parents, argues that "much of social progress derives from the struggle 
for survival... (and that)... this is as true for organizations an it is 
for species" (p. 92). The idea is that the problem with schools at present 
is that they have no incentive to provide what is 'required'. With this 
system they mould have every incentive because "... if they do not attract 
and retain applicants they would go out of business" (p. 93). As with 
the economist's model of perfect (that is 'ideal') competition, all things 
that are good flow from "... introducing the market mechanism into the 
educational system" (ibid): there is more choice, more adaptibility and 
hence more participation. How the introduction of the market system 
into education will achieve the results which Ackoff earlier specifies as 
the desirable attributes of education is left to our imagination. By 
contrasting this vision of Ackoff's with that of Illich we shall see very 
clearly that Ackoff, once again, takes the wider system for granted in 
his analysis which, ostensibly, promotes Mich's ideal. Illich comments 
on the Jenck's scheme: 
"(It)... is like giving a lame man a pair of 
crutches and stipulating that he use them only 
if the ends are ties together. An the proposal 
for tuition grants now stands it plays into 
the hands not only of the professional educat- 
ors but or racists, promotors of religious 
schools, and others whcce interests are socially 
divisive. Above all, educational entitlements 
restricted to use within schools plays into 
the hands of all thos who want to continue to 
live in a society in which social advancement 
is tied not to proven knowledge but to tho 
/337 
pedigree by which it is supposedly acquired. 
This discrimination in favour of schools 
which dominated Jenck's discussion on re- 
financing education could discredit one of 
the most critically needed principles for 
educational reform: the return of initiative 
and accountability for learning to the 
learner or his most immediate tutor" (p. 15). 
Clearly, one's views on proposals such as those made by Jencks depend on 
much more than the internal 'sense' of ie proposals themselves. Without 
saying that Illich is correct in his diagnosis, it is clear that the sense 
of such proposals as advocated by Ackoff depend on a larger world-view 
than he feels is necessary to investigate. 
The reluctance which Ackoff shows towards taking wider social 
factors into account in his proposals stems from conceptual barriers 
which he placed in his path. From the point of view of social science 
Ackoff persistently and systematically 'sub-optimizes'. From the point 
of view of the ideals of OR he commits the two worst sins; arbitrary limits 
are imposed on inquiry which have the effect of preventing a considered 
view of the whole system. The whole system, which from the point of view 
of modern sociology is social structure, is ignored. The only image of 
the collective which enters into the picture is the Parsonian one of it 
being a benign guarantor of his proposals. As with Parson, for example, 
the 'rightness' of organizational goals is guaranteed by the assumption 
that organizations are 'adaptive' to society. Ackoff says, for example, 
that "a corporation, for example, is not evaluated by how well it performs 
relative to its own objectives but rather relative to the objective of 
the society of which it is part" (p. 15) and that "for example, universities 
/330 
are e: rlained by their role in the educational system of which they are 
part rather than by the behaviour of their parts... " (p. 14, my emphasis). 
It is unclear whether these statements are meant to be explanatory or 
normative, but even if it is the latter what concepts does the systems 
approach provide for understanding 'society' or the 'educational system'? 
As Perrow (1972) has pointed out, the idea that society is the all-powerful 
is largely a myth, and is certainly not a fruitful orientation to research 
into the relationships between organizations and their environments. A 
much more fruitful hypothesis, he suggests, is that organizations to a large 
extent control their environments. The former orientation is the product 
of the Parsonian-type view "... to..; ard(s) seeing power as a 'system property"' 
(Giddens, 1970, p. 457). This seems to be Ackoff's view of his humanization 
and democratization proposal. His "... circular organization is intended 
to maximize opportunities for relevant participation by its members, to 
maximize the extent to which the organization serves the purposes of its 
own members, and, by doing so, better serves its purposes" (1974, p. 50). 
Compare the definition of power advanced by Parsons: it is "... defined... 
as 'generalized capacity to serve the performance of binding obligations 
by units in the system of collective organization when the obligations 
are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals" (Giddens, 
op. ci. t, p. 450). Apparently, for Ackoff, then, as well as Parsons, there 
"".., is no. such thing as 'illegitimate power"' (p. 451). The fact that 
if... collective 'goals', or even the values which lie behind them, may be 
the outcome of a 'negotiated order' built on conflicts between parties' 
holding differential power is ignored, since for Parsons 'power' assumes 
the prior existence of collective goals" (p. 457). Once again, we come 
to the conclusion that the work of a prominent theoretician of OR can 
only be fully understood within the context of Parsonian social science. 
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Conclusion: 
In this part I have explored the possibility that OR could achieve 
its ideals by turning, for the objectivity of its inquiries, to an under- 
standing of the nature of its subject-matter. In Chapter 6I looked into 
the possibility that OR could, by understanding the real nature of manage- 
ment, meet its ideal of improvement by improving the processes of manage- 
ment. However, we found that OR has no theory of management processes. 
An examination of the writings of two prominent operations researchers 
revealed, on the contrary, that the rationality of top management processes 
was taken as an unexamined starting point from which it was assumed the 
work of OR could objectively proceed. Our route to reaching this conclusion 
involved filling out these two accounts of the relationship between OR 
and management by referring to social theories. In the current chapter 
I have explored the possibility that the lack of an explicit theory of 
managerial processes could still be made good because underlying it was 
an explicit theory of social organization. That is, wo have followed 
through the thought that an adequate theory of managerial processes must 
be based on an adequate theory of social organization. Thus, rather than 
'management' in the abstract constituting OR's subject-matter, it was 
suggested that one of 02's most important theoretical foundations could be 
social theory. We have found that this is, in fact, the case. As probably 
the most important theoretical source on the question of social organiz- 
ation is the work of Durkheim (and later Parsons), I followed through'the 
suggestion by asking whether it was possible to find at least homomorphic 
parallels between this theory and the views expressed by operations 
researchers. We have found that this is the case to such an extent that 
it seems reasonable to say that what we have found is, in fact, an isomorphic 
relationship between them. On -the face of it, this conclusion may seem 
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surprising. However, it is hard to envisace a discipline of inquiry 
without that discipline having some kind of grasp of the nature of its 
subject-matter. OR has such a grasp in its social theory. I argued 
(follotring Durkheim) that it was incorrect to attempt to sharply distin- 
guish between economic and social realities, and it is to the credit of the 
theoreticians of OR that they have realized this and have seen that the 
basic nature of OR is not to be understood outside of its relationship to the 
social world. 
However, an exploration of the social theory with which OR can be 
seen (in their hands) to be associated, even in its more developed form, 
led to the conclusion that within the context of it OR's ideals were un- 
attainable. The reason for this was that the social theory in question 
took the nature of the social world for granted. The questions of how 
the social world is constructed, sustained and changed were not asked. 
It was just assumed, for example, that there is a consensus over funda- 
mental norms and values without questioning whether (say) the stability 
which can be observed in many social systems is a sufficient warrant for 
this assumption. We saw how this assumption was responsible for plainly 
inadequate forms of explanation of the social world. Apart from the 
fact that acceptance of reified or functional forms of explanation (some 
examples of which were given) destroys any claim to free inquiry, it in 
clear that within the context of the social theory which produces such 
forms of explanation claims to be dealing with complex totalities have 
to be given up as well. I argued in Chapter 5 that dealing with complex 
totalities involved an attempt to understand structure or generative 
mechanisms. This is impossible within the social theory which I have 
been considering. We saw this very clearly in our illustration of the 
treatment of conflict and power which it allowed. With it we were 
confined to making untestable assumptions about the social meaning of 
/341 
observable behaviour. The necessity for this approach perhaps explains 
why Ackoff and Emery adopt it as a deliberate policy. With the social 
theory entertained by OR we are forbidden from inquiring into the 
generative structures (which may be unobservable) of social life. This 
conclusion was foreshadowed by the conclusion to Part One. OR's phil- 
osophical attachments militate against a serious study of the nature of 
the subject-matter which is the object of inquiry. This bias, it seems, 
has taken its toll in OR's inadequate grasp of the nature of the social world. 
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CONCLUZIOIT 
he y roblern .: hich I, = been tacUed in this thesis is ihctiei it 
tja: possible to find evidence in the writin o on the nature of 0:: that 
it could approach its ideal of inDlc! nentio reason in human affairs. 
'.; e have fou: d that the : -iorIzo diccu^eci are coherent each other 
üiaL. ! `. lth a v--:: t CCry11s. , Cf c0 cll 
t: ýOrýý* to :, Llr. pr i7 i ný 
h , -ý. L de ; ree. T 
"he älain 
t 'M ý t CI in ir. ý: ar. d 1oo.: iro c,, rinot be cttbztan; ikted, 
t. zol: ýl; the Ü. lý;, eýtion that it vif. -It a-- a dc11bcrwte roý. ý. cý to 'ae riore 
outuard loo!: i. r_; can be. 
We have fo: tnd that in ever;; case C', theoretical foundations 
conflict with its ideal:. They did this either because they n^; lected 
subject-matter altosethe: (Part Cne) or becauze tlhcn tiler did con-idc 
it the 41a. ^_. not taken seriously onouZh, (Part 5. "ro). In both cases 
an -. )parent consistency of OR's theoretical foundations with its ideals 
1iKs achieved by relying ur on ue:: a. mined assu'trtionc. : then thcso assumption:, 
vvvere e. =dined they were shot"tn to conflict i"Jith 011's ideals. 
This conclusion may appear totally negative. It i, not. The 
destruction of the existinG theoretical foundations teas undertaken in the 
belief that this was a necessary pre-requicite to the future construction 
of stronger foundations. A general indication of the vay in which 0 
might attempt to cake this kind of rrocress touardz implenentinG it 
ideals comes from the criticisms which I have made,, particularly those 
of Part "Zjo. I can suggest an outline of it here. 
In Part One I argued that it vac inconceivable that 01114 could meet its. 
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ideals utithout a Grasp of the nature of its subject-ratter. In part 
D"to vie found that at least one important aspect of Oil's grasp of 
its subject-matter was its social theory. t1e found there that its 
social theory vac inadequate for implementing its ideals. IIor, ever, 
OR has so far considered only a very restricted range of social. theory, 
and its -, rasr of its subject-m ; tter has thereby been very limited. 
It is possible that by extending the range of social theories to which 
it gives serious consideration it could nage progress toi; ards implementing 
its ideal--. For e.. ariple, serious interest in the nature of pol-; er and 
conflict could help, thro-, -1 eich light on the processes of Coal-setting, 
problem-formulation, data-collection, alternative evaluation and discovery 
and implementation. There seeds little , oint in developing normative 
schemes of social inquir-,, ýti"; ithout first understanding how such processes 
are influenced by these pervasive aspects of social. reality. Jo have 
seen ho;; it is impossible to under- stand the key notion of real interests 
outside of a serious study of poe; cr. It is likely that i rsight into 
decision-making processes--including those of 0R--could be enhanced and 
implications for the practice of 02 drawn if those realities were seriously 
considered by operations researchers. 
Iarortant though po: uuer and conflict are an real feature. - of the 
social urorlc:, they are not the only onos. Fo. er and conflict arc heat 
-eon k., ý ac :^ pxtzcul_ r n,.,. ýt? e., tata. o"^ . ti of more fie. eral social proceati^c. Cther 
innortant r. lanifectationo are cult: tre, tradtion and convention. . c1 off, 
throughout his mork^,, for example, Gives uz mangy inci Ghtful Illustrations 
of the ir. ypact of t.. ece realities on practical orcration; reoearc'a work; 
of the cocis]. construction of reality ,. thi. c. h had a profound influence on 
ration`: ]. : roblen formulation. and coluti. on. IIoucver, :: c does not diccuoc 
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''. ü '.! Orl' i: 1 t. ie-e t-r": s an"! :ez; ivc': ' no ^e_'1. OL1., co o1C'er ti0I1 to te 
roblerto involved in doinj Co. she car. Ze is true of other oi)oratione 
esearchers uho in practice cannot avoid iry licit1 referring to such 
rocessec as they irv in e on their cork. There are too fe*. -, cave hi. storieo 
f the ifipact of culture, tradition and convention and their creation and 
onotructive interpretation on the rorL of operational recsarc: -,. And 
eta analeres of the social proceosey of real-life proUen--colvinz; 
y (for e°. anplo) the tools of ^ ^lycis which are being rrovided by 
thnomethodolobists (prticularly lih t is lmo;! n a° "conversational 
nalysis) and other schools of modern social science, could Co some 
ay to; "! ardc cainirc an urderstondirn of the systems which Ol? desires 
o improve. The operations research team is, of course, fully implicated 
n this social reality, and attempts to understand both their indebtedness 
nd contribution to it must be made. Such objectivity as OR can claim 
ust come from its understanding, and not from its aloofness towards, 
he construction of that social reality in which it is embedded. 
Apart from the relevance of social theory to the small scale 
icro-processes of social life which impinge on On, there are also the 
acro-processes of history and social structure. I am unatiaro of any 
perations research study which has attempted explicitly to relate its 
indinGs and recommendations to the : iic? er social conte: t in tshich the 
esearch takes place. Ignorance of the history of the social syste 
, 
a question and its relation to other social systems is an arbitary 
imitation on inquiry into the nature of the problems with which the 
perations researcher is faced. The 'fresh approach' of CII, seems, 
the level of theory at least, to be interpreted as a deliberate neglect 
f history (weer (1966), for example, ex: _licitly rules out the relevance 
f history). This seen= a pity since the implication of this neglect is 
/345 
that both Cfl l roJlens and th'' r coluti o^ a1o 1Y, - ar. +car to äe 
Ciea_ rl j thcy are ,. 0t' .,, ' -It 
tf1C in 1l: liC. ý ýý"ý C. 
-... 
are forriulatec'. and co1, led t: _2`OLlý1' 
t1? i/? i; ig noted. . 
iould a 19th CC: 1tury 
02 rann tackle rroble1: z of health care in the na ne i-yc a. -, h^ does no-i, 
r Jf u: o. t rele"rarcP are Z; enerü. - r-rircznlns o. 
f rroäl. erl-formulati, o: l anä 
sol, ition , ii. 
tho t an uneer. ta. nc? ink; of the factor. o' A. ch influenc- thfei_r 
zr ecific uce : If it i. s at all ro ; oible th; t o.? r 19th Centur;; C^ rm an 
*., 'ouict differ frort his 20th Century counterpart, in chat '"Yould the 
difference lie': Is it obvious that they twould he the sane? 
Researching into the history of a problem (in its broadest cence) 
may both avoid a continual 'reinvention of the wheel' (cf. 1.6 70039 1972) 
and make a siGnifi. ccnt contribution to*iarc? s understandinC its structural 
features (see, for e°=, n ple, the research of Commoner, 1972, on the 
pollution problem). No doubt, in practice) many o. -,, erations researchers 
do their oý. in hind of historical research and have their own implicit 
Grasp of its location in wider : ocial structure. However, they are Given 
little help from theoreticians. Theoretical and empirical research into 
the life histories of problems (and solutions) should contribute much to 
our understandinG of them: as partial reflections of complex totalities. 
By atteripting to understand the practice of Ofl in both its nicro- 
social and macro-social aspects, tie may progress toi-lards a theory of the 
practice of OR. The actual practice of 0^--both itc cuccesse: and failures-- 
has too long been neClected as a focus for serious study. 
IfvectiCatinz, both theoretically and emriricallf, tho relationohi. pa 
between 0R and social reality trill not be eaof. The nature of the social 
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world is very elusive, as the current state of the socia). sciences 
attests. Alco, even if it could be fully understood Cfl tiCould not 
thereby be guaranteed an objective base. 1'he social world is conctructec, 
and can be reconstructed. Even though wo may be unable to --ay that 
one construction is absolutely objective ruhile another it not, an 
understanding of the proces: eo of construction may at least dive us 
an objective basic for understanding i-ihat we are dealing with. To 
move on fro: there is rauch more difficult; at present no clear guidelines 
e:: i 0 t. 
Jhether the conclucionc of this täesio are rend;; nO ative or not 
will depend upon whether it is rocciblo to find cone form of objective 
bacis for Cf in cociül reality then the theoretical props on ý-t hich 
it currently lecno are taken ="my. Lool: eC. at in this . -lµß; , ve can 
reDhrnce the question with uhich Churc. =^n (1971) finishez hin boo!: as 
an appropriate conclusion to this fror':, and as an -. ntroc'. uction to 
future : cork. "'. ht Einst of a cocinl uorld r: uwt it he in eihich inquiry 
'hecoricz (cf. : I- 277)o he theoroti cirxo of 0'_? h vc j osed this 
question--3, t ren rains to ans ier it. 
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